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νομίζεται δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὸ μὲν ἐξ Ἅιδου ἐς φάος 
αὐξηθὲν γενέσθαι, τὸ δὲ ἐκ τοῦ φάεος ἐς Ἅιδην μειωθὲν 
ἀπολέσθαι· ὀφθαλμοῖσι γὰρ πιστεύουσι μᾶλλον ἢ γνώμῃ, 
οὐχ ἱκανοῖς ἐοῦσιν οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ὁρεομένων κρῖναι· ἐγὼ 
δὲ τάδε γνώμῃ ἐξηγέομαι. ζῷα γὰρ κἀκεῖνα καὶ τάδε· καὶ 
οὔτε, εἰ ζῷον, ἀποθανεῖν οἷόν τε, εἰ μὴ μετὰ πάντων· ποῖ 
γὰρ ἀποθανεῖται; οὔτε τὸ μὴ ἐόν γενέσθαι, πόθεν γὰρ 
ἔσται; ἀλλ' αὔξεται πάντα καὶ μειοῦται ἐς τὸ μήκιστον 
καὶ ἐς τὸ ἐλάχιστον, τῶν γε δυνατῶν. Ὅ τι δ' ἂν 
διαλέγωμαι γενέσθαι ἢ ἀπολέσθαι, τῶν πολλῶν εἵνεκεν  
ἑρμηνεύω· ταῦτα δὲ συμμίσγεσθαι καὶ διακρίνεσθαι 
δηλῶ· ἔχει δὲ καὶ ὧδε· γενέσθαι καὶ ἀπολέσθαι τωὐτὸ, 
συμμιγῆναι καὶ διακριθῆναι τωὐτὸ, αὐξηθῆναι καὶ 
μειωθῆναι τωὐτὸ, γενέσθαι, συμμιγῆναι τωὐτὸ, 
ἀπολέσθαι, [μειωθῆναι,] διακριθῆναι τωὐτὸ, ἕκαστον 
πρὸς πάντα καὶ πάντα πρὸς ἕκαστον τωὐτὸ, καὶ οὐδὲν 




De victu CMG I 2.4 pp. 126.29-128,11 Joly 
 
 
But the current belief is that one thing increases and 
comes to light from Hades, while another thing 
diminishes and perishes from the light into Hades. For 
they trust eyes rather than mind, though these are not 
competent to judge even things that are seen. But I use 
mind to expound thus. For there is life in the things of the 
other world, as well as in those of this. If there be life, 
there cannot be death, unless all the things die with it. For 
whither will death take place? Nor can what is not come 
into being. For whence will it come? But all things 
increase and diminish to the greatest possible maximum 
or the least possible minimum. Whenever I speak of 
“becoming” or “perishing” I am merely using popular 
expressions; what I really mean is “mingling” and 
“separating”. The facts are these. “Becoming” and 
“perishing” are the same thing; “mixture” and 
“separation” are the same thing; “increase” and 
“diminution” are the same thing; “becoming”, “mixture” 
are the same thing; “perishing”, “separation” are the 
same thing, and so is the relation of the individual to all 
things, and that of all things to the individual. Yet nothing 
of all things is the same. For in regard to these things 














































INTRODUCTION – PART I 









1.1 Galen’s adoption of the model of a mixture of primary elements as the 
theoretical basis for medical investigation: An “archaic” or a modern and up-
to-date choice? Introductive overview and general setting of the thesis 
objective.      
 
 
As Mario Vegetti has argued, in the time of Galen of Pergamum, the 
physician-cum-philosopher of the Roman Empire, the medical technē and 
society seem at least in Galen’s eyes to undergo a moral and epistemological 
crisis. On the one hand, Galen portrays doctors of his age as only inspired by 
hunger for money and power and as slavishly and supinely subjected to their 
well-off clients’ desires: while leading themselves astray, they tend to neglect 
the study of Hippocratic medicine and abstain from pursuing any training in 
logic or indeed any philosophical search for truth and, as a consequence, sink 
into the most profound ignorance. On the other hand, this crisis is also 
exacerbated by the fact that over time the medical technē had split into several 
rival sects or haireseis:1 on the one hand, the Empiricists who constitute, as well 
as the Methodists later on, a relatively small group endowed with a compact and 
                                                          
1 As Von Staden notes, classical meanings of the term hairesis“taking”, “choice”, “course of 
action”, “election”, “decision”all continued to survive throughout the various stages of the 
Greek culture. But hairesis also served to designate “any group of people perceived to have a 
clear doctrinal identity”; cf. Von Staden 1982 p. 76.  
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coherent doctrinal apparatus, and on the other hand, the Rationalists or 
Dogmatists who, on the contrary, encompass very diverse theoretical positions 
ranging from the original Herophilean school to the more recent medical 
doctrines of Asclepiades of Bithynia and the Pneumatists.2 
Each of these medical sects is provided with a different and peculiar set of 
reference models and therapeutic methodologies through which to interpret both 
the hygienic and pathological dynamics of the living organism and to elaborate 
efficient healing strategies. If we want to capture the intellectual atmosphere 
prevailing in the medical schools of Galen’s age, more precisely, Galen’s own 
position in this context, we will have to briefly focus our attention on these 
schools and their conceptual underpinnings.  
The Empirical school of medicine originally derives from a schism in the 
Alexandrian medical group founded by Herophilus of Chalcedon, a schism 
initiated by the physician Philinus of Cos (in the middle of the 3rd century BCE). 
In their support for medical tendencies going right back to the Hippocratic 
treatise “On Ancient Medicine”, these physicians rose up against the principles 
of Rationalist medicine (to which Herophilus’ school belonged), according to 
which medical science had to be grounded on strong explanatory theoretical 
models aimed at unfolding the “hidden causes” determining the physiological 
functioning as well as the healthy and pathological conditions of human nature. 
The Empiricist sect survived a long time, being also very active at the time of 
Galen, who analysed their medical system in three of his most relevant works 
belonging to the genre of hairesis-literature:3 De sectis, De experientia medica, 
and the Subfiguratio empirica4. What lies at the core of the Empiricist medical 
system is the rejection of any training in logical disciplines as well as the 
disparagement of any theoretical assumptions concerning the subject matter of 
medicine, on the basis of the fact that theory, in its very nature, is based on non-
                                                          
2 Vegetti 1995 pp. 67–73 with references. The first part of this introductive overview, containing 
a reconstruction of medical scenarios of Galen’s time and Galen’s criticisms of the medical 
haireseis, fundamentally follows the vivid historical sketch provided by Vegetti 1995. In the 
second part of the overview, however, I focus on my main objective and set up some criticisms 
of Vegetti’s views.  
3 On the origins of the hairesis-literature, cf. von Staden 1982, esp. pp. 77–81. 
4 De sectis ad eos, qui introducuntur ed. G, Helmreich, Scripta minora, 111, Leipzig 1893 De 
experientia medica ed R. Walzer, Oxford 1944 (an edition with English translation of the Arabic 
translation of this work), Subfiguratio empirica ed. K. Deichgraber, Die griechische 
Empirikerschule, Berlin 1965.  
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observable facts and entities of which we cannot have any knowledge.5 On the 
contrary, instead they settle their medical methodology on sheer empirical 
observation (peîra) of external phenomena and, more precisely, on two 
important principles: i) autopsía, i.e. repeated autoptical observations both of a 
patient’s particular pathological picture and of the results achieved by applying 
a particular healing technique; and ii) historía, i.e. the written records of other 
doctors’ (among whom were also the Hippocratic authors) repeated autoptical 
observations,6 which permit them to formulate so-called theorems.7 By building 
on repeated observations accumulated over a sufficiently long timespan, these 
theorems could furnish adequate indications concerning clinico-pathological 
data and diagnostic and therapeutic policies.8  
                                                          
5 As Frede notes, it is understandable that in repudiating any kind of assumption of 
nonobservable facts, Empiricists relied on a form of scepticism; and, in fact, Empiricist 
scepticism has traditionally been associated with Pyrrhonean scepticism, as indeed later 
Empiricists quite explicitly drew on Pyrrhonism. However, Frede tends to identify a difference 
between early Empiricists’ extreme scepticism and Pyrrhonism (if by Pyrrhonism we mean the 
systematization of Pyrrho’s theories as operated by Aenesidemus in the 1st century BCE). The 
main gist of Frede’s observations is that, if the Pyrrhonists left open the question of whether 
nonobservable facts could be known by reason, the early Empiricists completely denied the 
ability of reason to understand the hidden causes of phenomena and even the external phenomena 
themselves (differently from later Empiricists, who indeed began to attribute some importance 
to the use of reason in the acquisition of medical knowledge which, as a consequence, allowed 
them to formulate, if not proper theoretical aetiological models built on invisible inner causes, 
then at least reasonable conjectures on phenomena), cf. Frede 1987b pp. 248–249 and pp. 256 
ff. It also has to be noted that their disavowal of invisible causes of phenomena turns out to have 
repercussions on the entire medical system. In fact, Empiricists do not regard either the study of 
physiology or anatomical investigations to be truly reliable for the understanding of a certain 
pathological and clinical picture and for the establishment of therapeutic treatments (De sectis p. 
10 Helmreich; henceforth H.). For although it may be useful in order to discern the right position 
of our organs throughout our body, in their opinion the study of human anatomy cannot reach a 
primary causative level (De exp. med. XXVI p. 141 Walzer) as there is no inferential link 
between the anatomical-physiological level (which, in anatomy of Alexandrian origin, relies in 
turn on alleged invisible structures) and disease and its treatment (De sectis p. 10 H.). Therefore, 
according to the Empirical school, neither anatomy nor physiology could be seen as a deciding 
factor in relation to issues of pathological aetiology; on this cf. Vegetti 1995 p. 73.  
6 De emp. subfig. III p. 49 Deichgräber 
7 De sectis pp. 3–4 H.   
8 One objection that Empiricists found themselves having to deal with is how they could face an 
as-yet-unexperienced pathological case. In such a circumstance, they advocate the so-called 
“transition from the similar to the similar” (which was a later theoretical addition and was 
formulated in the form of the epilogismós by Menodotus in the 2nd century CE, cf. De emp. 
subfig. XII p. 88 Deichgräber), that is, either the application of the same remedy to another as-
yet-unidentified but similar pathology, or of a remedy habitually applied to a particular bodily 
part to another similar part, or also the transition from a particular healing technique to another 
similar technique in treating the same disease (cf. De sectis 3–4 H., De emp. subfig. III p. 49 
Deichgräber), cf. Frede 1987b p. 251 and Vegetti 1995 p. 75. On the Empiricist method cf. 
Deichgräber 1930 pp. 291–305; von Staden 1982 p. 82; Frede 1987b pp. 243–260; Vegetti 1995 
pp. 73–76.  
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As for the Methodists,9 this medical school arose as a reaction against both 
Empiricists and Rationalists, and Galen himself informs us that the theoretical 
foundations of the Methodical sect stemmed from the dogmatic teachings of 
Asclepiades of Bithynia (1st century BCE) who, as is well-known, conceived of 
the matter as constituted by invisible onkoi10 – where the same conviction was 
also shared by his followers, such as Themison of Laodicea (1st century BCE) 
and then the imperial physician Thessalus (1st century CE)11. The Methodists 
have in common with Rationalists the notion of “indication” (endeixis), but in 
contrast to Rationalists (and also to Empiricists), the Methodists left open the 
question of the correspondence between pathological facts and underlying 
unobservable causes; therefore, in their view endeixis has to be interpreted as an 
obvious and self-evident connection between a certain disease and its medical 
treatment.12 For the same reason, like the Empiricists, they disdain the study of 
anatomical evidence and physiology13 and instead base their medical system on 
a far more simplistic reduction of all pathological states to three manifest 
                                                          
9 For an account of the Methodical school of medicine, cf. Frede 1987c pp. 261–278; Vegetti 
1995 pp. 81–82; cf. also Tecusan 2004.  
10 De nat. fac. p. 133.11 ff. H., De const. art. med. CMG V 1.3 p. 72.16 ff. Fortuna.  
11 De simpl. med. (temp. ac) fac. K. IX 783.  
12 Cf. De sectis p. 12.14ff.; 13.13; 17.5ff. H.; De meth. med. K. X 351.7; Med. K. XIV 677.12; 
Ps.-Galen, De opt. secta K. I 125.2ff.; 164.1 ff. As Frede points out, the notion of indication is 
not of Methodist origin but stems from Hellenistic epistemology; it was initially used to 
distinguish between different kinds of suggestive signs. For example, something A is a 
suggestive sign of B if we know by experience that B is the case if A is the case. Therefore, for 
example, the presence of smoke is a suggestive sign of the presence of fire. In the case of a proper 
indication, instead, A is an indicative sign of B, if we know, not by experience, but by reason 
that B is the case if A is the case. For example, as Frede reports, an Atomist should consider 
motion an indicative sign of the presence of void. But no one of these examples of indication 
could match what Methodists really meant by endeixis. For they, as well as Empiricists, deny 
any connection between a manifest pathological state and unobservable and hidden causes (thus, 
the second type of endeixis) but, in contrast to the Empiricists, they claim that the right treatment 
for certain pathologies has to be found not on the basis of the past experience (that is, the first 
kind of endeixis) but on the basis of an immediate and obvious connection between a certain 
disease and its treatment that does not entail any chain of reasoning; cf. Frede 1987c pp. 263–
265. To show this, Frede also gives a clarifying example from Sextus Empiricus, who in his 
work PH I 238 says: “As […] the sceptic is guided by thirst towards drink, by hunger towards 
food, and thus with the rest, in a similar fashion the methodical doctor is guided by the affections 
towards what is fitting for them, by constriction to dilation, just as somebody tries to escape from 
condensation due to intensified cold by getting to a warm spot”.  On Sextus’ association between 
Methodists and Sceptics cf. Frede’s analysis in Frede 1987c pp. 276–278. As Frede points out 
by appealing to a position originally held by Edelstein, Methodists actually allowed for the 
possibility of theoretical belief and, for this reason, their position can be assimilated with a brand 
of late Academic Scepticism more than Pyrrhonean Scepticism. On the concept of endeixis in 
Galen’s medicine, cf. Van der Eijk 2008 pp. 292–295.  
13 De meth. med. K. X 9.10; 107.ll ff.; 319.17; 349.16A; 928.5ff.; Frede 1987c p. 270 and Vegetti 
1995 p. 82.  
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“generalities”:14 sténosis (costiveness), rhúsis (relaxation), and a mixed 
pathological state resulting from both. Therefore, if a pathology arises due to an 
excessive costiveness, the remedy will be the contrary process, i.e. relaxation, 
and if it is due to an excessive relaxation, the remedy will be the contrary action, 
i.e. costiveness, and if the pathology is mixed, the physician will use both healing 
strategies.15 
The vivid diversity of the medical scene by Galen’s time was enriched by 
the presence of the “hairesis” of the so-called Rationalists or Dogmatists.16 In 
the late 3rd century BCE, Philinus was succeeded as leader of the Empiricist 
school by Serapion of Alexandria, who wrote a treatise in two books, the Ad 
sectas (or Against the Haireseis), the title referring to a number of rival medical 
schools, such as the Praxagoreans, Herophileans, Erasistrateans, etc., all of 
which were defined by later Empiricists as “Rationalists” or “Dogmatists,” and 
which afterwards also included Asclepiades of Bithynia, the Pneumatic school, 
etc.17. The rise of diverse medical orientations that led to the establishment of 
different medical haireseis took place in a particular historical moment that 
                                                          
14 For the concept of “generality”, i.e. commune or koinotēs cf. Frede 1987c pp. 266–270.  
15 De sectis p. 12 H., cf. Vegetti 1995 p. 81 and cf. also Von Staden 1982 pp. 83–85. As Frede 
remarks, these were also the assumptions on which Asclepiades’ physiology was based (he in 
fact seems to have explained many illnesses as being due to the contraction and relaxation of 
invisible pores), but the difference to the Methodists lies in the fact that the Methodists consider 
it an open question whether the manifest states of contractions and relaxations present a 
correspondence with the states of the invisible structures underlying the phenomena; cf. Frede 
1987c p. 272. 
16 Who are respectively designated as logikoì because of their constant appeal to logos as opposed 
to peîra and dogmatikoì, because they trust in the reliability of theories, i.e. dogmata; cf. Vegetti 
1995 p. 76. As Von Staden quite aptly points out, in the case of the so-called Rationalists the 
terms “hairesis” or “secta” can be very deceptive. In fact, in Galen’s De sectis he singles out 
three major haireseis (or sectae): Empiricists, Methodists, and Rationalists/Dogmatists. Now, 
although this threefold division has become canonical over time and has influenced medical 
historiography up to our own age, it can be misleading because, while Empiricists and 
Methodists were two compact medical groups, under the label “Rationalists”, by contrast, one 
finds very different and independent medical haireseis; cf. Von Staden 1982 p. 77 and pp. 81–
82. 
17 Von Staden 1982 p. 78. In the proem of his De medicina, another work belonging to the 
hairesis-literature (Von Staden 1982 p. 80), Celsus (1st century BCE–1st century CE) uses the 
Latin term rationalis (his translation of the Greek logistikós) to designate the Rationalists or 
Dogmatists who, in contrast to the Empiricists, were convinced of the fact that medical technē 
required a knowledge of ‘hidden causes’ relating to the physiological functioning of the human 
body and its pathological states, and that such knowledge could only be achieved through a 
process of reasoning. Cf. Celsus De med. proem. 13. As Longrigg perceptively notes, Celsus 
uses the term “rationalis” stricto sensu, whereas the correspondent English term “rational” may 
also be applied lato sensu “to embrace more widely those general attempts, ultimately derived 
from philosophy, to account for phenomena in terms of purely natural causes without recourse 
to any supernatural agency”; cf. Longrigg 1993 p. 4.  
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determined a profound breakthrough in the history of medicine. For in the first 
half of the 3rd century BCE, Greek rational medicine was transplanted into 
Egypt and into Ptolemaic Alexandria, where two distinguished Greek physicians 
practiced and taught medicine, namely Herophilus of Chalcedon and the slightly 
younger Erasistratus of Ceos, who performed dissections on human corpses and, 
in all probability, even vivisections of condemned criminals, and who also made 
extraordinary physiological and anatomical discoveries18 that were 
progressively systematized by a strong theoretical apparatus. 
In fact, the Alexandrian anatomists, but also the later Rationalist schools, 
have in common a commitment to various forms of theoretical medicine and, 
more precisely, a search, beyond the realm of the sheer observability, for 
invisible causative principles to which to attribute all external phenomena.19 
According to them, reason can in fact proceed from the visible (and therefore 
from the anatomical external evidence) to the invisible (i.e. to the non-
observable causative structures) and back again from the invisible to the visible, 
in order to attain, on the one hand, a view of the innermost level of 
pathophysiological causes and, on the other, to infer from them general theories 
relating to the therapeutic treatment of a disease.20 The logical tool that is at the 
basis of the rationalist method is the so-called analogismós, which, as opposed 
to the empirical epilogismós, consists in making inferences from the visible to 
the invisible and vice versa.21 
                                                          
18 Von Staden 1992 pp. 223–241 and cf. also Longrigg 1993 p. 177 ff. Brunschwig and Lloyd 
2000 pp. 415–418.  
19 De emp. subfig. VII p. 63 Deichgräber.  
20 De sectis p. 4ff. H.; De exp. med. XXIV pp. 132–133. 
21 De exp. med. XXIII pp. 131–132 Walzer and cf. Vegetti 1995 p. 76–77. As Vegetti reports, 
two Galenic examples could clarify what exactly the analogismós is. When it comes to 
explaining what insomnia is, Rationalists or Dogmatists will not adduce as causes observable 
elements, such as fatigue or daily regimen, but will bring the explanandum back to a 
nonobservable explanans: that is, for example, the dynamis of an unobservable element, such as 
pneuma (De exp. med. XXV pp. 138–139; XXVII p. 145 Walzer). Or else, they will explain the 
pathology by recourse, as in Erasistratus’ case, to the anatomical evidence of veins, nerves, and 
arteries and, beyond the visible structures, to the invisible triplokía (triplet of nerve, vein, and 
artery), a structure that is visible only by the logos; or, in the case of Asclepiades of Bithynia’s 
theories, the cause of disease will be attributed to the interweaving of onkoi and poroi (cf. De 
exp. med. XXVII p. 145 Walzer), cf. Vegetti 1995 p. 77.  
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Galen engages in a series of critiques against all of these medical sects 
(Empiricists,22 Methodists,23 and Rationalists/Dogmatists), carving out per 
differentiam a peculiar personal position within this variegated medical 
framework. It is against Rationalist medicine and its hidden pathophysiological 
causes in particular that he makes his more cogent and insistent criticism, and 
we will look more closely at this as we go along, as Galen himself follows in the 
footsteps of the ancient Greek rational and Rationalist medical tradition that he, 
however, harmoniously fuses with a more empirical approach.24  
                                                          
22 In the first place, he criticizes the Empiricists for two main substantive reasons. For on the one 
hand, Galen points out that experience without theoretical schemes becomes completely 
uncontrollable (De exp. med. III pp. 88–89; VII p. 94; VI pp. 92–93 Walzer and cf. Vegetti 1995 
pp. 75–77.). On the other hand, Galen realizes that, since the Empiricists disavow the importance 
of a general theoretical structure grounded on dogmatic and nonobservable entities, they fail to 
recognize the real and inner causes of the various pathologies afflicting the human body. Hence, 
for fear of failure in medical treatment, they always resort exclusively to the written records of 
all the doctor’s past experiences, which, however, only incidentally and by way of chance proved 
to be successful: thus they end up going back over the same healing strategies and, in so doing, 
commit to fallacy of therapeutic ultra-conservatism, instead of theoretically interpreting and 
deciphering all the external pathological data that have to be only confirmed by the peîra (De 
plac. Hipp. et Plat. CMG V 4.1.2 p. 578 De Lacy); cf. Vegetti 1995 p. 77. 
23 In the second place, Galen attacks the entire Methodical medical system by besieging it from 
all sides (ethical, social, and doctrinal). First of all, he views the imperial physician Thessalus 
(who re-founded Methodical medicine in Rome at the time of the emperor Nero) as the 
personification of all the vice and wickedness upsetting contemporary society as well as the 
medical technē. For Galen depicts him as the anti-physician par excellence: by continuously 
practising the art of flattering his rich Roman clients and making his way as a shameless social 
climber, he corrupts the professional and ethical status of the physician. Moreover, Galen’s 
critical remarks also concern more specifically doctrinal aspects of Methodical medicine. First 
of all, Galen reprimands the Methodists for the absence of a finalistic and providential design of 
nature, an aspect they inherit from the materialism of Asclepiades. Second, Galen points out how 
the Methodical sect can be regarded as inferior to both Dogmatists and Empiricists, as the 
Methodists disown both the combination of logos and peîra; cf. De meth. med. K. X p. 29. More 
particularly, Galen lambasts the Methodists above all for finding the rationalist recourse to 
nonobservable principles useless. From this derives their marked refusal to inquire into the 
concealed causes of the disease starting from an analysis of the outer evidence and an 
investigation of the specific nature of the patient which, however, also takes into account the 
external conditions (climate and seasons or the nature of places)in other words all the factors 
that distinguished ancient Greek rational medicine from its very beginnings. On the contrary, 
they hinge their medical art, as we have seen, upon such a reductive pathological aetiology and 
therapeutic method that they boasted that the art of medicine could be taught in only six months, 
and sarcastically claimed that, contrarily to what “Hippocrates” said, “life is long, and art is 
short” (De sectis p. 15.6; 24.22 H.; De meth. med. K. X 5.2; De praecogn. CMG V 8.1 p. 68 
Nutton). In fact, as Galen reports, Thessalus provocatively but wittingly broke with both the 
Hippocratic traditional doctrines and the teachings of established medical authorities. Thessalus 
declared that he had overcome them all en bloc; but according to Galen, “he had better compete 
with workers of his own kind: cooks, dyers, woolmen, shoemakers and tailors” (Thessalus 
himself was in fact the son of a wool weaver) cf. De meth. med. K. X 19; on Galen’s criticism 
of the Methodical sect cf. Vegetti 1995 pp. 69–70.  
24 For peîra and logos, in this hierarchical order, constitute the essential outline of Galen’s 
medical system insofar as in his view the art of medicine has been discovered and developed 
thanks to logos in union with experience (De exp. med. I p. 85 Walzer). For, to begin with, 
without the further validation given by sense-perception and experience, one may be compelled 
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For, while he is highly indebted to Alexandrian medicine’s breakthrough 
achievements in the fields of anatomy and physiology, Galen chastises these 
Rationalist physicians essentially because of the fact that in their attempt to grasp 
the invisible structures regulating the entire functioning of human nature, they 
halt prematurely without reaching the very first causative level, i.e. the primary 
elements or stoicheîa, that is, hot/cold and dry/wet, which, in Galen’s view, 
“Hippocrates” himself identified as the first basic constituents of both human 
nature and the entire cosmos. That is, the Rationalist physicians deal with the 
medical technē “regardless of the knowledge of the stoicheîa of the 
homoeomerous parts,”25 and, as a consequence, prove to be only half-
rationalists, paradoxically ending up approximating the Empiricist method. For 
neither Herophilus and Erasistratus relied on the primary elements as 
explanatory causes of physiopathology: while Erasistratus theorized the 
triplokia, the triple web of nerve, artery, and vein, as the last invisible structure 
graspable only by logos, Herophilus, according to Galen, kept himself within the 
bounds of anatomical evidence.26  
In contrast to the abovementioned Dogmatists (but also to Empiricists and 
Methodists, of course), what instead lies at the heart of Galen’s physiopathology, 
together with pneuma27 and innate heat,28 is the model of mixture or κρᾶσις of 
                                                          
either to sceptically suspend one’s own judgement or to aprioristically choose one of the possible 
theses, which, considered individually and without a further verification by direct observation, 
may give the impression of being sound (De exp. med. XXIV p. 135 Walzer). Moreover, in the 
Empirical medical method, insofar as it is grounded on cumulative autópsia and its written 
record, historía (which would find its original repertoire in the Hippocratic Epidemics) vouches 
for the diachronic, progressive, and gradual advancement of medical technē, whereas the truth 
provided by logos is all-encompassing, instantaneous, and beyond time (De exp. med. X p. 101 
Walzer). However, although Galen is profoundly convinced of the fact that peîra and logos will 
always prove to be incomplete without each other and only by working together will achieve 
best results in medicine, his preference goes undoubtedly to the logical therapeutic method 
which, contrary to the empirical approach, allows for an aetiological understanding of rare, 
unknown, and as-yet-unexperienced pathologies (De loc. aff. K. VIII 142). On the relation 
between theory and experience in Galen’s medicine, cf. Vegetti 1995 pp. 82–84.  
25 De meth. med. K. X 421.  
26 Vegetti 1994 pp. 1702–1704; Vegetti 1995 pp. 79–80. Cf. also more recently Leith 2015a (on 
the rejection by Herophilus and Erasistratus of the elementary level of the stoicheîa) and Leith 
2015b (on Erasistratus’ triplokia).  
27 Galen’s pneuma is a vaporous substance formed in part by the vaporization of the arterial 
blood and in part by the inspired air (cf. De resp. usu pp. 120–2 Furley-Wilkie) and is conceived 
of as the principal instrument of animals’ sense-perception and voluntary motion as well as the 
primary instrument of the soul (cf. De plac. Hipp. et Plat. CMG V 4.1.2 p. 446.11–14 De Lacy); 
cf. Debru 2008 pp. 271–272.  
28 Running counter to Erasistratus and other physicians, such as Praxagoras and Asclepiades 
(who believed in the acquired form of heat), Galen posited the existence of innate heat and, as a 
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the primary stoicheîa, that is, hot/cold and dry/wet, seen as the building blocks 
of the nature of the human body and of the cosmos at large, and as the hidden 
first causes of physio-pathological facts.  
On the one hand, in fact, the constitution of the human body and of its 
parts, its physical features and its so-called “natural” faculties or dynameis (as 
opposed to the “psychic” faculties, which take care of the area of sense-
perception and voluntary motion), which are responsible for generation, growth, 
and nutrition in living things, depend on the basic composition of tissues, 
ultimately deriving in turn from the primary elements and their mixtures.29 On 
the other hand, one of the types of disease that Galen theorizes is thought to be 
attributable to a bad mixture or dyskrasia of the uniform parts of the body; Galen 
in fact distinguishes eight different types of dyskrasiai, on the basis of which 
physician should elaborate a particular healing strategy,30 and he also classifies 
mixture (together with formation or diaplasis, position or thesis, power or 
dynamis) among the criteria for obtaining indications for a particular disease and 
its treatment.31 Moreover, Galen’s pharmacology also depends on the notion of 
a mixture of primary qualities, insofar as each physical object, and therefore also 
food and drugs, are possessed of a certain mixture in potentiality (a definition of 
Aristotelian origin), which releases its own powers or dynameis (which in turn 
depend on the elementary qualities, e.g. hot/cold and dry/wet) when it comes in 
contact with the mixture of the patient.32  
                                                          
follower of the theories of Hippocrates and Aristotle, assigned to it, concurrently with the 
mixture of primary elements, a pivotal role in physiology: in fact, it has a prominent role in 
digestion, in the distribution of food to the various parts of the body, and in the generation of 
humours and growth. For children grow because of it and while the infant has most innate heat, 
in the elderly innate heat withers away, and when it is finally extinguished, death takes place; cf. 
Durling 1988 p. 210 (who in his paper reconstructed the possible content of a lost treatise by 
Galen on innate heat) with references. Innate heat is defined by Galen as well-mixed “in both 
substance, as it exists primarily in blood and pneuma, and in quality, as it is a well-mixed mixture 
of heat and cold” (cf. De plac. Hipp. et Plat. V 4.1.2 p. 524, 19–22 de Lacy); cf. Durling 1988 
p. 210; cf. also Debru 2008 p. 273.  
29 Debru 2008 pp. 266–267.  
30 De meth. med. K. X 121–122.  
31 Van der Eijk 2008 pp. 295–296. As Van der Eijk points out, Galen identifies three different 
types of diseases: “diseased consisting in physiological ‘imbalances’ (dyskrasiai) affecting the 
homoeomerous parts of the body, diseases afflicting the organic parts and disease that consist in 
a breakdown of the body’s overall coherence”; cf. Van der Eijk 2008 p. 295. On Galen’s 
fundamental therapeutic principles, cf. Van der Eijk 2008 pp. 288–297.  
32 De temp. pp. 98.23–99.13 H. For the basic principles of Galen’s pharmacology cf. Vogt 2008 
pp. 304–310, esp. 307–309.  
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But what are the sources, historical and conceptual, of such a vital theory 
which, as I have just hinted, turns out to be fundamental for Galen’s entire 
medical system and which makes the core of Galen’s medical system so 
dissonant in comparison with all the other possible alternatives at his disposal, 
including those we have just sketched?  To put it simply: why κρᾶσις? 
As Vegetti observes, in contrast to the aforementioned medical alternative 
systems (Empiricists, Methodists, Rationalists/Dogmatists), Galen certainly lays 
out the foundation of a dogmatic medical doctrine, but in contrast to the other 
Dogmatists, he falls back on an “archaic” explanatory model of both physiology 
and pathological aetiology of the human body, on he bases his theory of the eight 
morbid diatheseis: the Hippocratic (and, as Vegetti purports, “pre-Aristotelian”) 
model of the mixture of hot/cold and dry/wet. According to Vegetti, this 
“archaic” recovery of the Hippocratic theory of mixture would allow Galen, on 
the one hand, to pursue one of the main objectives of his medical system, that is, 
the re-foundation of a degraded and impoverished medicine, such as that of the 
Methodists, on the basis of the old and illustrious Hippocratic tradition and, on 
the other hand, to get further and go beyond the causative level reached by the 
contemporary Rationalists, in order to gain a much deeper insight into human 
nature and its biological and pathophysiological workings.33  
Now, it seems to me that Vegetti’s claim concerning Galen’s archaism is 
correct (excluding the definition of Galen’s mixture as “pre-Aristotelian”, as I 
will explain later on), but it is not the end of the story. To begin with, it is 
certainly an indisputable fact that in the formulation of his theory of the mixture 
of hot, cold, dry, and wet as constitutive factors of the nature of the human body 
(and of the entire physical world at large), and as opposites upon whose 
symmetry (in the sense of equilibrium or due proportion)that is, eukrasia (i.e. 
good mixture as opposed to eight dyskrasiai or bad-mixtures)the health and 
well-being of the human organism depend, Galen draws on a very old and 
longstanding medical and philosophical tradition, as we will see in detail later.34 
As is well-known, this tradition goes back to the speculations of Alcmaeon of 
Croton and the early pluralists, among whom Empedocles is at the forefront, as 
                                                          
33 Vegetti 1995 p. 80.  
34 On this cf. infra p. 137 ff.  
20 
 
well as to the repercussions of these medical and philosophical tendencies in the 
early medical writings of the Hippocratic Collection.35 For by marvellously 
combining influxes coming from pre-Socratic Elementen-und-Mischungslehre 
with the awareness of the presence of humoral bodily fluids of the 
Volksmedizin,36 it is precisely the early Hippocratic medical writings that gave 
life to a synchronically multiform and versatile model of κρᾶσις (or more 
precisely, κρῆσις, in Ionic dialect), a term which explicitly means “balanced 
mixture,” principally intended both as i) a procedure through which to mix 
different ingredients endowed with strong dynamies, with the aim of obtaining a 
uniform and mild compound and ii) a state resulting from the mixture of basic 
bodily constituents of various kinds (humours, dynamies, qualities), which mix 
and in their mixing reach a balanced state. Thus, the Hippocratic concept works 
as explanatory model of both the nature of the human body (and its relation to 
the external physical environment or macrocosm) and its healthy and 
pathological states.37  
On the other hand, however, in his definition of Galen’s mixture as solely 
an “archaic” (even “pre-Aristotelian”) explanatory model, Vegetti overlooks two 
all-important aspects which instead would allow us to see Galen’s choice, on the 
contrary, as extremely up-to-date and perfectly in line with the thought of his 
time: a modern and up-to-date choice.  
In the first place, one must not forget that before Galen’s time the 
Dogmatic tradition of Pneumatic medicine had already adopted a model of 
mixture as theoretical basis for physiopathology. The Pneumatic school arose at 
the time of the emperor Claudius (1st century BCE–1st century CE), was founded 
by the physician Athenaeus of Attalia and was still active in Galen’s time. Its 
main distinguishing feature was its peculiar fusion of doctrines coming from 
Stoic natural philosophy and medical principles issuing from 
Dogmatic/Rationalist medicine.38 The Pneumatists developed a complex 
medical system organized by Athenaeus in five different areas: physiology, 
                                                          
35 Cf. Harig 1974 pp. 38–41; Longrigg 1993 pp. 52–53 and pp. 89–91; Jouanna 2002 pp. 38–
43.  
36 Cf. esp. Harig 1974 p. 41. 
37 Festugière 1948 pp. 37–38; Jouanna 1996 pp. 294–295 and infra pp. 254 ff.  
38 Wellmann 1895 p. 7. 
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dietetics, the so-called materia medica (pharmacology), pathology, and 
therapy.39 More precisely, as we will see, Athenaeus himself and his followers, 
based their medicine, and especially their physio-pathological doctrines on 
causes, such as pneuma, and hot/cold, dry/wet and their mixture, developed a 
system of nine mixtures (one eukrasia and eight dyskrasiai) on which, at least 
according to the philologist Max Wellmann, Galen’s theory of mixture seems to 
entirely rely.40 We will scale down the weight of Wellmann’s statement by 
bringing to light analogies and disanalogies between the Pneumatic formulation 
and Galen’s own,41 but for now we can certainly infer that, although it was not 
adopted by the other abovementioned medical schools, the model of the mixture 
of hot/cold and dry/wet and the scheme of mixtures resulting from different 
elementary combinations do not have to be exclusively viewed as “archaic”. For 
although originally developed by the early medical tradition, the model of 
κρᾶσις, seen as the theoretical basis of an understanding of the nature of the 
human body, underwent a momentous revival in Galen’s time in both the field 
of medicine, thanks to the Pneumatists, and in the field of the philosophy of 
nature, thanks to the Stoic/Peripatetic controversywhich at that time animated 
a vivid debate concerning modality and the inner justification of the theory of 
mixture within the respective philosophical systems.  
This in fact is the second reason why we can say that at Galen’s time the 
topic of mixture underwent a substantial renaissance, which is witnessed by a 
contemporary philosophical text, the De mixtione by the Peripatetic Alexander 
of Aphrodisias (2nd–3rd century CE).42 On the one hand, the Stoic school, from 
the time of its founder, Zeno, worked out a model of mixture, the so-called total 
mixture (ὅλων δι' ὅλων κρᾶσις), involving the four corporeal primary elements 
(fire, air, water, and earth) completely coextensive with one another (the so-
called process of ἀντιπαρέκτασις). This theory was afterwards adopted by the 
third leader of the school, Chrysippus, to explain the motion of the pneuma 
(thought of as a mixture of fire and air and essentially conceived both as the 
physical principle responsible for the psychic functions of the soul and as the 
                                                          
39 Wellmann 1895 p. 131.  
40 Wellmann 1895 p. 144–146 esp. n. 5, p. 145. 
41 Cf. infra pp. 210 ff.  
42 See infra pp. 63 ff.  
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corporeal divine principle permeating matter) through passive matter.43 Against 
this theory, which, as we will see, was the fulcrum of the entire Stoic 
philosophical system, in Galen’s time, the Peripatetic school, which propounded 
a very different model of mixture, reacted very strongly44. In fact, over time the 
Peripatetic philosophers had been working on and re-working the Aristotelian 
model of the mixture of primary elements (fire, air, water, and earth)45, an 
explanatory model which in turn benefitted from all previous speculations on 
this issue, Pre-Socratic and early medical alike;  the results of this continuous 
operation of exegesis on Aristotle’s account are distinctly visible in the 
philosophical outputs of Alexander of Aphrodisias, where not only has the 
process of mixture been interpreted somehow differently from the original 
Aristotelian account46, but the inner justification of the theory too seems to 
undergo a remarkable rethinking. If on the one hand the mixture of primary 
elements still explains, as Aristotle’s model does, the generation of the so-called 
“homoeomerous” bodies (inorganic and organic materials, such as nerves, 
sinews, flesh, cartilage, bones, and so on), on the other hand, the soul itself is 
seen by Alexander as the eidos which follows upon (epigignómenon) the mixture 
according to a certain proportion of the elementary bodies (cf. De anima 25.2).47  
From this brief overview of Galen’s contemporary medical and the 
philosophical fields of enquiry, we can certainly see that dealing with mixtures 
in the 2nd century CE was not at all out-of-date, as one could infer from Vegetti’s 
words, but on the contrary was perfectly in keeping with the timesthere is even 
evidence of a thriving literature on the topic, within both the philosophical and 
the medical fields, which is testified, on the one hand, by Alexander of 
Aphrodias’ treatise Perì kraseōs kaì auxēseōs and, on the other hand, by Galen 
himself, who wrote a medical treatise Perì kraseōn or De temperamentis in 
which he makes reference to “those who have left writings (hupomnêmata) about 
mixtures” which we can infer is a referrence to medical writings on mixtures.48  
                                                          
43 For an account of the Stoic theory of total mixture from Zeno to Chrysippus, see infra pp. 49 
ff. 
44 On the main lines of criticism against the Stoic theory of total mixture, cf. pp. 63 ff.  
45 For the main sources of Aristotelian account cf. pp. 63 ff.  
46 On the peripatetic interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of mixture cf. pp. 63 ff.  
47 See infra pp. 75 ff.  
48 De temp. p. 82.11‒12 H. Cf. Van der Eijk 2015a pp. 677–678.  
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In the present work, we will try to identify the historical and theoretical 
sources on which Galen relies in developing his model of the mixture of the 
primary elements. More specifically, we will aim at bringing to light how 
Galen’s model of mixture bears, in Galen’s own peculiar Dogmatic-but-
undogmatic way, striking resemblances to the Peripatetic model of mixture, both 
in the description of the concrete process of mixture and in the inner 
justifications that the theory proves to have within the entirety of Galen’s 
medical and philosophical system. We will also examine to what extent, by 
contrast, it distances itself from the defining traits of the Stoic total mixture. 
What will emerge from this picture will be a philosophically sound model of 
mixture which shows a clear internal logic and comes under the sway of the 
Peripatetic natural philosophy of the 2nd century CE, while in no way renouncing 
the “archaic” Hippocratic background that had already conceived mixture as 
theoretical basis both for understanding the human body’s physio-pathology and 
for the theory of health and disease. In so doing, we will also assess the 
contribution of Pneumatic medicine, which, although it has a substantially 
different starting point to Galen’s medical and philosophical system (such as, for 
instance, the theory of the primary elements), will also play a role in the 
definition of Galen’s scheme of mixtures.  
All these aspects, both those that are “archaic” and those that are more 
recent and up-to-date, which also constitute the historical and theoretical sources 
of Galen’s model of mixture, will be highlighted in the present work: this 
systematic investigation of Galen’s sources for his theory of mixture will provide 
students of Galen’s medicine and philosophy with a much deeper insight into the 
issue and also represents the major novelty of this research, as the scholarship of 
the past expressed very conflicting views on this very pointas we will see in 










1.2 Primary sources 
 
 
As is well-known, in Galen’s corpus the concept of mixture is a 
multifaceted yet central notion, linked to all the focal points of Galen’s medical 
and philosophical research: his theory of the primary στοιχεῖα and the generation 
of homoeomerous bodies, the problem of elemental constitution of a living body 
and the harmony of the elements, the body–soul relation, his considerations on 
pharmacology and therapeutics. In the present study I focus on the physical 
aspects of the issue of the mixture of the primary elements, and this defines the 
main primary sources of my study. Galen expounds his theory of primary 
elements and their mixture from an ancient physical perspective in three 
fundamental works: i) On elements according to Hippocrates (De elementis ex 
Hippocratis sententia. CMG V 1.2 De Lacy) ii) the Commentary on 
Hippocrates’ Nature of Man (In Hipp. Nat. Hom. comment. III CMG V 9.1 
Mewaldt), especially in his book I iii) the three books of On mixtures (De 
temperamentis III Helmreich), especially in his book I.  
These three texts are closely related both chronologically and in terms of 
content. On elements and On mixtures are thought by Ilberg to have been 
composed early on during his second sojourn in Rome.49 According to De Lacy, 
Galen composed On the elements long before he wrote his Commentary on 
Hippocrates’ Nature of Man,50 although the latter also belongs to Galen’s second 
stay in Rome51 
Both De elementis and the Commentary on Hippocrates’ Nature of Man 
(book I) are fundamentally based on an exegesis of the first of the three sections 
                                                          
49 Cf. Ilberg 1892 p. 513. Cf. De Lacy 1996 p. 42 for the passages where Galen indicates that De 
temperamentis closely followed De elementis; cf. also Tassinari pp. 7–9. As De Lacy remarks in 
De ord. libror. suor. pp. 85.22–26 Müller, Galen mentions the sequence De elementis, De 
temperamentis, De simplicium medicamentorum (temperamentis et) facultatibus and De 
compositione medicamentorum; cf. De Lacy 1996 p. 42. 
50 Cf. De Lacy 1996 pp. 42–43 (cf. In Hipp. Nat. Hom. comment. CMG V 9.1 3.4–19 Mewaldt). 
51 Cf. De libr. propr. pp. 113.13–18 Müller; cf. Jouanna 2012a pp. 317–18. 
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of the Hippocratic treatise De natura hominis (Ch. 1–8),52 although they 
approach the issue in two rather different ways. The first is principally conceived 
for a well-trained reader and presupposes a good knowledge of the Hippocratic 
text, whereas the second is instead a line-by-line commentary on the Hippocratic 
treatise with lemmata and textual discussions, and is intended for a wider 
audience.53 The Hippocratic treatise De natura hominis (end of the 5th century 
BCE) was held in the highest esteem by Galen and although today the treatise is 
attributed to Polybus, Hippocrates’ student,54 Galen considered the first eight 
chapters to be authentically Hippocratic, where according to him the great 
physician set out his theory of primary elements55. These two closely intertwined 
works are fundamental to the understanding of Galen´s theory of the mixture of 
the primary elements, because by elucidating his system of primary elements, in 
some passages – which we will quote throughout the dissertation – Galen also 
describes how the elements combine and mix. The third work used as primary 
source here is On mixtures where Galen treats the process of mixture of the 
primary elements as a datum on which to build further developments, both on an 
epistemological level (insofar as he would consider the process of mixture as a 
given on which to build other parts of his theory) and on an ontological level 
(since the merely physical process of mixture is the basis for understanding other 
processes). In this work, he passes on to describe, within a historical framework, 
his system of nine mixtures – eight bad mixtures and one good mixture (Book 
I), its application to physiology (Book II), and to pharmacology (Book III). Like 
the aforementioned works, On mixtures is also fundamental for our purposes, 
especially Book I. In this book, Galen on the one hand deals with physical 
aspects and offers us a glimpse into his theory of mixture; while on the other 
hand he passes on to describe his system of nine mixtures in the form of a 
polemic with his old and more recent predecessors. Throughout the present 
work, I will also make use of textual loci taken from the whole Galenic corpus 
in order to underpin my arguments.  
                                                          
52 Cf. Jouanna 2002 pp. 19–37 and also Jouanna 2012a pp. 314–315. 
53 Jouanna 2012a and cf. In Hipp. Nat. Hom. comment. CMG V 9.1 p. 3.4–19 Mewaldt. Cf. also 
Manetti and Roselli 1994 pp. 1554–1557. 
54 Cf. Jouanna 2002 pp. 55–61. 
55 Cf. Jouanna 2012a. 
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1.3 Forschungsstand concerning Galen’s theory of mixture of the primary 
elements. 
 
   
In 1974 Georg Harig published the book Bestimmung der Intensität im 
medizinischen System Galens. Ein Beitrag zur theoretischen Pharmakologie, 
Nosologie und Therapie in der Galenischen Medizin. Although dedicated to 
pharmacology, physio-pathology, and the therapeutic aspects of Galen’s 
medicine, Harig presents a chapter, entitled “Die philosophisch-medizinischen 
Voraussetzungen für die Intensitätsbestimmung in der Galenischen Medizin”, 
where he deals with the philosophical and medical origins of Galen’s doctrine 
of elements, humours, and mixture. Harig reconstructs the roots of both the four-
element theory (from Empedocles to Aristotle’s formulation in De generatione 
et corruptione) and the four-humour theory of the Hippocratic De natura 
hominis (which combine some features of the Empedoclean quadripartite 
Elementenlehre, with the awareness of the presence of the many different bodily 
humours of the Volksmedizin).56 On the one hand, in his De elementis and 
Commentary on De natura hominis Galen refers to Hippocrates (i.e. the 
Hippocratic author of De natura hominis) as the first to consider the hot, the 
cold, the dry, and the wet as the initial building blocks of the entire cosmos.57 
On the other hand, as Harig rightly remarks, Galen connects this Hippocratic 
statement to Aristotle’s elemental system of De generatione et corruptione 
insofar as he associates primary elements with primary qualities: the element is 
the body where the quality is present to the extreme degree (although, in contrast 
to later scholarship, Harig does not enquire into the differing ontological status 
of primary elements and primary qualities, treating them as entirely 
“gleichbedeutend” or equivalent).58 Harig does not dwell on the precise relation 
between elements, qualities, and humours,59 but goes on to state that the body is 
conceived by Galen as made up of a mixture of four Primärqualitaten bzw. 
Elemente (which for him are equivalent); this mixture can be simple (hot, cold, 
                                                          
56 Harig 1974 pp. 38–44.  
57 Harig 1974 pp. 45–46 with references.  
58 Harig 1974 pp. 46–47 with references.  
59 Harig 1974 pp. 48 with references.  
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dry, and wet mixtures) composite (hot and dry, hot and wet, cold and dry, cold 
and wet) or well-mixed (the good mixture, in which none of the qualities 
prevails).60 This mixture, as the Hippocratic physicians had pointed out, can be 
influenced by external and internal factors such as gender, age, location and 
climate, and customs: when the mixture is in equilibrium the individual is 
healthy, whereas when this internal balance is disrupted the body suffers and 
diseases and pains arise within it.61  
 In contrast to Harig, whose account of Galen’s elemental mixture was 
instrumental for treating the medical aspects connected to his theory of mixture, 
Paul Moraux devoted his work on Galen to philosophical topics and hence also 
to Galen’s elementary physics. In 1984 the second volume of his magisterial 
work, entitled Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen von Andronikos bis 
Alexander von Aphrodisias was published, dedicated to the Aristotelianism in 
the 1st and 2nd centuries CE. The fifth part of the second book of this volume 
deals, among others, with Galen’s theories of the primary elements and mixture: 
two specific brief sections represent the starting point of our research.  
First of all, Moraux underlines that Galen´s Elementenlehre displays 
syncretistic tendencies, as he equally attributes it to Hippocrates, Plato, Aristotle, 
the Stoics.62 Thus, in Moraux’s view, Galen himself does not regard his theory 
of elements as exclusively derived from Aristotle but as an achievement 
generally reached over time by natural philosophy.63 As Moraux notes, 
according to Galen the element is “the smallest part of that of which it is an 
element” (cf. De elem. sec. Hipp. p. 56.3 De Lacy), as “they are parts which are 
primary and simplest by nature and which are no longer capable of being 
resolved into other parts” (De elem. sec. Hipp. p. 58.2–3 De Lacy and cf. De 
plac. Hipp. et Plat. p. 490.12–13 De Lacy).64 Moreover, Galen distinguishes 
between the primary elements and the principles (archai). According to him, in 
fact, the primary elements (fire, air, water, and earth) are generated by the 
                                                          
60 Harig 1974 pp. 49–50 with references.  
61 Harig 1974 pp. 50–51 with references.  
62 Moraux 1984 pp. 299f.; cf. also p. 300 n. 195 for the references.  
63 Moraux 1984 p. 300.  
64 According to Moraux, this definition shows links with Nemesius of Emesa´s definition of 
element: “Τὸ στοιχεῖον τὸ κοσμικόν ἐστιν μέρος ἐλάχιστον τοῦ συγκρίματος τῶν σωμάτων’ 
(De nat. hom. p. 150 Morani); cf. Moraux 1984 p. 301 n. 205.  
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predominance of the corresponding pairs of four primary qualities (hot/cold and 
dry/wet) in an underlying substratum, with matter and qualities as the two archai 
constituting the primary elements.65 These primary elements, that is, fire, air, 
water, and earth, can also be designated using the names of the four qualities, 
that is the hot, the cold, the dry, and the wet. For, as Galen claims, hot, cold, dry, 
and wet can be said trichōs, i.e. in three ways: a) as a quality; b) as an unmixed 
body, i.e. the pure element which can be known by abstraction, that is fire, air, 
water, and earth, where the primary qualities (hot, cold, dry, and wet) are present 
to the extreme degree; and c) as a mixed body (i.e. a body where the quality is 
prevalent)66. Moraux provides us with a very general summary of Galen’s views 
and does not analyse or compare them with contemporary parallels such as the 
Stoic and the Peripatetic accounts.  
The same is true of Moraux’s account of Galen’s theory of mixture. On 
the whole, Moraux offers some relevant points for consideration. In the first 
place, he points out that Galen´s theory of mixture draws on the Aristotelian 
theory but is also affected by Stoic theories of mixture although he does not 
explain what exactly Galen has in common with the Stoic and the Peripatetic 
accounts.67 Secondly, he also notes that Galen recognizes a difference between 
Aristotelians and Stoics à propos the theory of mixture: according to the 
Aristotelians, the qualities are involved in the process of mixture, whereas 
according to the Stoics the bodies mix, while the qualities are present in a 
mixture intact.  However, Moraux only sketches this distinction and does not 
delve deeper into Galen’s own peculiar position within what we will see is a 
great Stoic/Peripatetic controversy68. For, according to Moraux, it is essential to 
underline that in Galen’s view there is a difference between real mixture and a 
mere juxtaposition of constituents. In the second case, the ingredients retain their 
original composition unchanged. Thus, stones, bricks, or planks remain perfectly 
intact as they were before the construction of the house. By contrast, in the real 
                                                          
 65 De elem. sec. Hipp. CMG V 1.2 p. 114.16–25; p. 126.1–11 De Lacy; cf. also in Hipp. Nat. 
Hom. comment. CMG V 9.1 pp. 17.28–18.15 Mewaldt; cf. Moraux 1984 p. 302 witn n. 207. 
Moraux observes that this distinction is surely pregalenic and that Alexander and Eudemus had 
already dealt with this topic; cf. Simpl. in Phys. 10.8–24.  
66 De elem. sec. Hipp.  CMG V 1.2 pp. 114.24–116.5 De Lacy.  
67 Moraux 1981a pp. 89–91. 
68 Moraux 1984 pp. 303-304 cf. infra pp. 86 ff. 
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mixture, exemplified by Galen through the image of the tetrapharmakon the 
final product acquires new qualitative determinations in comparison to the 
original ingredients of the mixture.69 For this reason, for example, during the 
many intervening qualitative changes the passage from the non-perceptive to the 
perceptive can take place (δύναται γὰρ ἐν πολλαῖς ταῖς μεταξὺ μεταβολαῖς τὸ 
τέως μέλαν αὖθις γενέσθαι λευκὸν καὶ τὸ τέως λευκὸν αὖθις μέλαν καὶ τὸ νῦν 
ἀναίσθητον αὖθις αἰσθητικόν):70 a new form has arisen from the many changes 
that have occurred. As Moraux observes, it is with this in mind that later in his 
Quod animi mores Galen reinterprets Aristotle´s definition of soul as the form 
of the body and holds that the capacities of the soul follow the bodily mixtures 
of the four primary elements.71 As Moraux stresses, Galen’s view of the soul 
seems to rely on contemporary Peripatetic ideas and, more precisely, shows 
close similarities with his younger contemporary Alexander of Aphrodisias’ 
doctrines on the soul.72 Galen’s theory of the soul and its relationship with the 
Peripatetic thought of his age have been discussed by previous scholarship73, 
whereas what is still lacking is a more detailed study concerning Galen’s 
elementary physics of the mechanism of mixture. In this regard, although 
Moraux’s account seems to be on the right track on several points, it proves to 
be insufficient as a rather superficial picture emerges insofar as Galen’s model 
of mixture takes the shape of an indistinguishable pastiche of syncretistically 
Stoic–Peripatetic origins without even mentioning or acknowledging his 
medical, or more precisely, Hippocratic background.  
We should go beyond Moraux’s account and highlight therefore those 
studies that have over time made important contributions to our knowledge of 
Galen’s theory of mixture and its relation with earlier and more recent reference 
models taken from natural philosophy and medicine.  
                                                          
69 De elem. sec. Hipp. CMG V 1.2 p. 70.18 De Lacy. Cf. Moraux 1981a p. 91 and Moraux 1984 
p. 304-305. On the example of the tetrapharmakon cf. more infra pp. 100 ff.  
70 De elem. sec. Hipp. CMG V 1.2 p. 72.20–22 De Lacy ; cf. Moraux 1984 p. 304.   
71 Moraux 1984 pp. 304-305 cf. Quod an. mor. K. IV 774.7-15.  
72 Cf. Moraux 1981a pp. 91–92 and Moraux 1984 pp. 304-305.  
73 On the correspondences between Galen’s and Alexander’s theories on the soul in antiquity cf. 
Michael Ephesius In Parv. Nat. 134.24–30 Wendland; and in modern scientific literature cf. 
Donini 1974, Todd 1977, Moraux 1981a and 1984 pp. 304-305, and, more recently, Tieleman 
1996b, Cordonier 2007, Caston 1997 pp. 347-354 and 2012 pp. 9-12.   
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Important points regarding Galen´s account of mixture were raised in a 
1991 article by Rosa María Moreno Rodríguez, which has two scholarly merits. 
The first is that it draws a distinction between the Hippocratic and the Galenic 
accounts of mixture. Moreno Rodríguez shows that in contrast to the Hippocratic 
treatise De natura hominis, Galen did not define the krasis as the mixture of the 
four humours but as the mixture of the four primary elemental qualities.74 While 
Galen does make use of the four humours of the Hippocratic De natura hominis 
in his physio-pathological theories, Moreno Rodríguez stresses that the 
Hippocratic four-humour doctrine is just one of the factors playing a role in 
Galen´s physio-pathology together with pneuma, innate heat, and the krasis of 
the four primary qualities.75 Moreno Rodríguez explains the relation between 
humours and elemental qualities in the course of formation and maintenance of 
the homoeomerous parts. Whereas on the one hand the four humours present in 
the menstrual blood are responsible for the formation of the simple parts of the 
embryo during the phase of embryogenesis, on the other hand the primary 
qualities enter the body and nourish the homoeomerous parts through the process 
of digestion of food and drink, which gives rise to the four humours in the 
body.76 According to Moreno Rodríguez, the homoeomerous part assumes a 
privileged position insofar as it is to be considered the elemental unity (unidad 
estequiológica) of an organic body. For the mixture of primary qualities 
determines the proper function (ergon) and properties (hardness, smell, taste and 
colour) of the homoeomerous parts and constitutes the substance of the 
anhomoeomerous parts (whose accidental properties are position, greatness, 
structure, and shape) that in turn constitute the bases of the structure of the whole 
organism.77 Moreno Rodríguez’s contribution is extremely important insofar as 
it sheds light on the articulation elements–humours–homoeomerous parts. Yet 
its major shortcomings lie, on the one hand, in the fact that it does not take into 
consideration Galen´s complex contemporary philosophical background (in 
brief: which primary elements constitute the basis of the elemental unity, the 
Stoic or the Peripatetic?) and, on the other, in the fact that it does not take account 
                                                          
74 Moreno Rodríguez 1991 pp. 92–93.  
75 Moreno Rodríguez 1991 p. 93.  
76 Moreno Rodríguez 1991 pp. 96–100. 
77 Moreno Rodríguez 1991 pp. 100–102.  
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of the intimate philosophical significance of this straightforward 
physical/physiological articulation elements–humours–homoeomerous parts.78 
In Der Begriff der Physis bei Galen vor dem Hintergrund seiner 
Vorgänger of 2001, Franjo Kovačić deals with important philosophical aspects 
of Galen’s conception of nature (in connection with his embryology, physiology, 
soul doctrines, and teleology). Kovačić also outlines the basics of Galen physics 
and, after an overview of the Platonic, Aristotelian, and Stoic conceptions of 
“nature”,79 points out that according to Galen nature is primarily defined as “the 
whole substance and the mixture out of the primary elements, hot, cold, dry and 
wet” (De temp. p. 104.1–3 H.: “φύσιν δ' ὅταν εἴπω, τὴν ὅλην οὐσίαν τε καὶ 
κρᾶσιν λέγω τὴν ἐκ τῶν πρώτων στοιχείων, θερμοῦ καὶ ψυχροῦ καὶ ξηροῦ καὶ 
ὑγροῦ”). To make this concept clearer, he enquires into Galen’s elementary 
physics and observes that it is modelled on Aristotle’s since, as in De 
generatione et corruptione, the elemental change is due to an exchange of the 
qualities within the underlying substratum.80 Out of the elemental mixture the 
homoeomerous parts arise, the perceptible elements or αἰσθητὰ στοιχεῖα. They 
are formed by the proximate (synechê) elements, the four humours of the 
Hippocratic tradition, which are placed in a so-called Zwischenstufe between 
primary elements and homoeomerous parts (although Kovačić does not develop, 
as Moreno Rodríguez does, the abovementioned physical-physiological 
articulation and, more importantly, does not clarify the reason why the 
homoeomerous parts would maintain a qualitative composition).81 More 
importantly, he points out that, analogously to Aristotle, Galen conceives of a 
physical body as a hylomorphic compound of matter and form but, in contrast to 
Aristotle, in Galen’s view the form or internal structure of the composite 
coincides with the mixture, i.e. the particular ratio, between the primary 
elements.82 
                                                          
78 Vegetti 1994 bridges this gap and underscores that it is adopted because Galen wants to 
develop a non-reductionist solidist view of the body which, in contrast to the Alexandrian 
anatomists, relies on the simplest and ultimate stoicheia, cf. more infra pp. 127 ff. 
79 Kovačić 2001 pp. 92–95 with references.  
80 Kovačić 2001 p. 97 with references.  
81 Kovačić 2001 pp. 98–99 with references.  
82 Kovačić 2001 p. 104 and cf. Quod animi mor. IV K. p. 773. Although Kovačić does not stress 
this, we should point out that the mixture is form and essence (that is, substance in the primary 
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Along the same lines, in an essay published in 2008 R. J. Hankinson 
tackles the topic of Galen´s primary elements and their mixture. Like Moraux, 
Hankinson raises some important points: the definition of primary element, the 
difference between principles and archai (for which Hankinson refers to 
Aristotle, cf. De gen. et corr. 329a27–33), and Galen’s awareness of the 
difference between the Aristotelians and the Stoics as regards the efficient cause 
of the mechanism of mixture and his preference for the former position (cf. De 
elem. sec. Hipp. pp. 136.23–138.14 De Lacy and De propr. plac. p. 116.5–19 
Nutton; cf. De nat. fac. p. 104.2–20 H.). To these points, Hankinson adds some 
further observations regarding the relation between primary qualities, primary 
elements and humours. First of all, he points out that, like Aristotle (cf. De gen. 
et corr. 330a30–331a6), Galen sets each primary element in correspondence 
with a couple of primary qualities (water is cold and moist, air moist and hot, 
fire hot and dry, earth dry and cold; cf. De elem. sec. Hipp. p. 112.24–116.5 De 
Lacy; cf. in Hipp. Nat. Hom. comment. p. 49.26–29 Mewaldt; cf. De plac. Hipp. 
et Plat. p. 502.23–5 De Lacy).83 Second, every humour is associated with a 
couple of primary qualities, as in Hippocrates De natura hominis: yellow bile is 
hot and dry, black bile dry and cold, blood moist and hot, phlegm moist and cold 
(Caus. Morb. VII 21–2).84 Third, although the humours are coupled with two 
primary qualities each and are assimilated to the primary elements (cf. De plac. 
Hipp. et Plat. p. 502.22ff. De Lacy), humours and primary elements are different, 
since in contrast with the primary elements the humours do not contain the 
primary qualities to the extreme degree (cf. De temp. 1.16–17 H.).85 Moreover, 
like Moreno Rodríguez, Hankinson argues that according to Galen the humours 
play a pivotal role in the formation and nourishment of the homoeomerous parts, 
as the maternal menstrual blood (which also contains an admixture of the two 
biles and phlegm) generates the homoeomerous parts; and in Hankinson´s view 
in this Galen follows Aristotle (De gen. an. 737b8–739b33).86 According to 
                                                          
sense, in the sense of Metaph. VII 11) and, therefore, nature qua essence (in the sense of Metaph. 
V 4 1015a).  
83 Hankinson 2008a pp. 210–217.  
84 This account is different from other passages where Galen associates each humour with a 
couple of primary qualities except the blood, which, as he declares in this passage, originated in 
a balanced mixture of the primary elements (and corresponding qualities), cf. infra p. 111 n. 271 
85 Hankinson 2008a p. 219. 
86 Hankinson 2008a p. 218.  
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Hankinson, this menstrual blood (which, in Galen’s opinion, is a mixture of 
blood, phlegm, and the two biles, each of which is associated with a couple of 
primary qualities) is responsible for “the ability to be the matter for structures 
quite different in qualitative type”, that is, the homoeomerous parts, which are 
defined as hot, cold, dry, and wet.  
In parallel with the studies of Kovačić and Hankinson, Philip Van der Eijk 
has examined the physiological side of the question and has provided us with an 
investigation that links physics and physiology. Here we will mention two 
contributions by Van der Eijk: a) a 2010 essay entitled “Von der Natur des 
Menschen. Menschenbild und Naturwissenschaft im antiken und 
frühchristlichen Denken” and b) an article of 2014 entitled “Galen on the nature 
of human beings”. Focussing on the passages mainly taken from De 
temperamentis and De foetuum formatione, these two contributions show that in 
Galen’s account of human nature there is a marked tendency to recourse to two 
antithetic explanatory strategies, one top-down and the other bottom-up. On the 
one hand, as Van der Eijk underlines, Galen identifies a unifying formative 
principlea shaping capacity residing in the embryowhich shapes the parts 
of the animal in accordance with the soul traits and which is thought of as of a 
higher and even divine origin (cf. De temp. pp. 35.17–37.1, 79.6–80.24 
Helmreich; De foet. Form. 6). On the other hand, Van der Eijk notices that Galen 
displays also a more materialistic tendency and explains physical structures and 
physio-pathological processes at work within the human beings in terms of 
primary qualities, with their mixtures defined as “states of the body and parts of 
the body, constituted by the proportion between the four elementary qualities 
hot, cold, dry and wet”. In this Galen would follow Aristotle insofar as he speaks 
of a mixture of hot, cold, dry and wet and not of humours.   
As we have seen, these contributions recently given by Kovačić, 
Hankinson, and Van der Eijk throw light on the Aristotelian background of 
Galen’s physics. More recent studies have changed the perspective a little as they 
look into the relations between Galen and his contemporary Stoic and Peripatetic 
elementary physics.  
In the first case, two scholars, Christopher Gill and Véronique Boudon-
Millot, have reconsidered the Stoic background of Galen´s theory of mixture. In 
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his most recent study, “Naturalistic Psychology in Galen and Stoicism” (2010), 
Gill in fact underlines that Galen shared a so called “high-naturalistic” approach 
to reality with the Stoics, conceived as an animated material continuum 
teleologically oriented. According to Gill, in this high-naturalistic framework the 
Stoic idea of total mixture or δι' ὅλων κρᾶσις fits into Galen’s schema very well. 
Like the Stoics, Galen was a continuist and held a theory of primary elements 
capable of mutual intertransmutation, which would have been better embodied 
by the Stoic notion of total mixture or interpenetration than the Aristotelian 
equivalent, Gill claims, insofar as the Stoic and the Galenic accounts created a 
link between the total interpenetration and the idea that living things have 
inherent vitality and the capacity for more complex functions.87 In her essay “La 
notion de mélange dans le pensée médicale de Galien: mixis ou crasis?” (2011), 
Boudon-Millot discusses philological and philosophical issues concerning the 
theory and terminology of mixture. In this section, we will focus on Boudon-
Millot’s remarks on philosophical themes related to Galen´s theory of mixture, 
leaving terminological observations for the next section. First of all, analogously 
to Moreno Rodríguez, Boudon-Millot affirms that Galenic medicine is not based 
on humoralism and that Galen´s κρᾶσις is not, or is very rarely, a mixture of 
humours. Instead it is a mixture of primary qualities88 that is performed by God 
or Nature:89 in Galen, κρᾶσις is a special term that indicates the proportion 
between opposite forces (hot/cold, dry/wet) in living bodies,90 where the primary 
qualities are not confused with one another but are conserved.91 Furthermore, 
Boudon-Millot analyses a passage from Alexander of Aphrodisias’ De mixtione 
(De mixt. 216, 14 Bruns = SVF II 473), where Alexander describes the 
Chrysippean classification of mixtures. Boudon-Millot draws a comparison 
between Galen´s conception of κρᾶσις and Chrysippus’ total mixture arguing 
that Galen´s account of κρᾶσις may have been influenced by the Stoic theory of 
mixture. Boudon-Millot claims that the Galenic and the Stoic κρᾶσις correspond 
to a certain mixture where the ingredients (bodies with corporeal qualities in the 
                                                          
87 Gill 2010, pp. 64–77, esp. 76–77. The idea is also present in vestigial form in Gill 2007, p. 
93 and 99–100. 
88 Boudon-Millot 2011 p. 262.  
89 Boudon-Millot 2011 p. 268.  
90 Boudon-Millot 2011 p. 265 cf. De temp. p. 1 H.  
91 Boudon-Millot 2011 p. 274 
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case of the Stoics and qualities alone, according to Galen) fuse together without 
qualitative mingling insofar as they are preserved intact in the mixture.92  
Other recent contributions have stressed a close relation between Galen 
and Peripatetic elementary physics. Three contributions in particular are of 
interest: a) Valérie Cordonier, “Matière, qualités, mélange. La physique 
élémentaire d’Aristote chez Galien et Alexander d’Aphrodise”; b) Inna 
Kupreeva, “Galen’s Theory of Elements”; c) Jocelyn Groisard, “Galien et 
l’alternative médicale”, a chapter of the book Mixis, devoted to the problem of 
mixture from Aristotle to Simplicius.   
In her 2007 article, Cordonier analyses the evolution of Aristotle’s doctrine 
of mixture in Galen and Alexander of Aphrodisias. She first remarks that Galen 
relies on the Aristotelian elementary physics of De generatione et corruptione 
and thought of hot, cold, dry, and wet as primary qualities undergoing a so-called 
alteration or alloiôsis according to the whole substance, allowing for both 
mixture and substantial generation.93 Now, according to Cordonier, this 
conflation can be explained by assuming, not an oversimplification of the 
Aristotlelian qualitativist physics of De gen. et corr., but the influence of Stoic 
corporealist physics on Galen. For the founder of the school, Zeno, describes the 
elemental change or tropê as a mixture that takes place through a change 
(metabolê) of the elements into one another happening when a body completely 
interpenetrates another (cf. SVF I 102). Although Cordonier does not consider 
Alexander’s criticism of Stoic corporealist physics in his De mixtione in detail, 
she postulates the same Stoic influence in Alexander’s commentary on 
Aristotle’s De sensu Ch. 3 (cf. In De sens. 63.20–65.3), where Alexander 
distinguishes between a juxtaposition of the constituents (parathesis) and mixis, 
which gives rise to the intermediate colours and which is described as a total (δι' 
ὅλων) mixture where the constituents “are changed through and through” (ὅλων 
δι' ὅλων τρεπομένων). As Cordonier remarks (although she does not take into 
account the crucial difference between the two physical systems): “Cette 
influence cryptée du Portique serait anodine si elle si limitait à une nouveauté 
                                                          
92 Boudon-Millot 2012 pp. 276–277.  
93 Cordonier 2007 pp. 90–93 with references.  
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terminologique, mais son impact s’exerce aussi sur la présentation qu’Alexandre 
fait du mélange aristotélicien, en affirmant en toutes lettres que l’interaction des 
qualités réciproquement actives et passives y permet que soit ‘générée une 
nouvelle forme, unique, issue des deux ingrédients’ (In De sens. 64.17–25). Il 
est des glissements lexicaux dont l’incidence sur l’évolution des idées est 
décisive: la façon dont Alexandre traduit ici la transformation qualitative des 
éléments en termes de génération d’une forme prise en son sens substantiel 
marque bien l’aboutissement et le dépassement des réflexions galénique et 
stoïcienne qui, comme je l’ai montré, valorisent à l’extrême la fonction 
‘générative’ du mélange et de l’altération opérée par lui”.94 
In her 2014 article Inna Kupreeva brings out Galen’s profound polemics 
against the Atomists/Corpuscularists and the Pneumatists, and argues that 
Galen’s derivation of the primary elements differs considerably from Aristotle’s 
in De generatione et corruptione II 1–4 and De Caelo III–IV (which are based 
on physical and cosmological arguments concerning the qualitative composition 
of the simple bodies or their natural motions). According to Kupreeva, in his 
new derivation of the primary elements (which, as we will see, does not exclude 
the Aristotelian background of De gen. et corr.), Galen displays an innovative 
technique taken from Aristotelian logic. By making recourse to the distinction, 
drawn by Aristotle in his Categories, between “being said of a subject” 
(synonymous predication) and “being said in a subject” (inherence), Galen 
distinguishes between the hot, the cold, the dry, and the wet qua qualities from 
the hot, the cold, the dry, and the wet, which by way of inherence can refer to 
bodies that have these qualities within them either to the extreme degree (i.e. the 
primary element) or “by prevalence” (the homoeomerous bodies). This new 
derivation leads to Kupreeva’s second point, which more clearly reveals the 
close connection between Galen’s elementary physics and Alexander’s. For 
differently from Aristotle, who spoke of elemental qualities as stoicheia, Galen 
adopts a hylomorphic analysis of the primary elements that approaches 
Alexander’s position insofar as he draws a clear difference between element and 
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quality and defines the stoicheia as qualified bodies in which the primary 
qualities are present to the extreme degree.95  
While Kupreeva unfolds the later Peripatetic background of Galen’s theory 
of elements, Groisard tackles Galen’s theory of mixture of the primary elements. 
His recent research sets the stage for novel (although still partial) achievements 
in Galen’s elementary physics and theory of mixture. In the first place, Groisard 
recognizes the syncretistic formulation of Galen’s theory of mixture: Galen 
attributes a Peripatetic theory to Hippocrates by using the Stoic terminology of 
the total mixture.96 For he adopts the common part from the Stoic and the 
Peripatetic Mischungslehren (attributing it to his predecessor Hippocrates), thus 
giving rise to a diachronic philosophical consensus and avoiding taking a 
position in their dispute on: i.e. whether it is the qualities or the bodies that 
activate the process of mixture (we will see, at any rate, that Galen does not 
remain neutral towards this Stoic/Peripatetic debate and instead, in his own 
characteristic way, takes an active position that is perfectly in line with his own 
epistemological convictions).97  
In fact, as Groisard maintains, the Aristotelian position (the qualitativist 
option) is chosen solely because it is more certain than the Stoic one (although 
Groisard does not take into account that, throughout his work, Galen refuses and 
even ridicules the fulcrum and inner justification of the Stoic theory, i.e. the 
bodily interpenetration, as we will see) and it is for this reason that Galen exhibits 
a model of mixture which presents strict resemblances with the Peripatetic model 
exemplified by Alexander’s De mixtione: both texts in fact describe the mixture 
as a progressive division of particles ending in a final unification.98  
Finally, Groisard makes some observations concerning the reversibility of 
the ingredients that have been mixed. Now, since Galen adopts the image of the 
tetrapharmakon, (which, as will become clear, in some Stoic sources is used to 
                                                          
95 Kupreeva 2014 pp. 153–196.  
96 Groisard 2016 pp. 176–178 comments on De nat. fac. K. II 5.4–17 (= De nat. fac. p. 104.2-15 
H.) 
97 Groisard 2016 pp. 181–182 comments on De meth. med. K. X 16,12–17,2 = SVF II 411.  
98 Groisard 2016 pp. 182–183 comments on De elem. sec. Hipp. CMG V 1.2 pp. 136.22–138.14 
De Lacy and De mixt. 231.12 ff. Bruns.  
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exemplify a fusion where the constituents are all dissolved without being mixed 
through and through, as in the total mixture) from this Groisard infers that when 
it comes to the topic of the reversibility of the elemental constituents, Galen, as 
it were, suddenly switches from the Aristotelian to the Stoic Mischungslehre 
(and therefore, incoherently, from a qualitativist to a corporealist physics) and 
no longer distinguishes between mixture and fusion, because he thinks that the 
ingredients are simply destroyed within the mixture, while they give rise to 
something else, a new property out of themselves.99  
These were the last relevant contributions that come out of Galen’s 
elementary physics and, therefore, the starting points of our research, which 
closely follows Groisard’s approach, although it expands the research field and 
develops a peculiar position that distances the present work from Groisard’s. For 
although, as we will see further below, we acknowledge Groisard’s identification 
of the similarities between Galen’s and Alexander’s models of mixture as a 
progressive division of corpuscles due to a qualitative interaction, therefore 
pursuing an innovative and perfectly up-to-date trend, we cannot do this without 
stressing some all-important critical points. First of all, Groisard does not 
consider the question of Galen’s Hippocratic heritage, i.e. i) how the four-
humour Hippocratic theory dovetails with the Galenic model of mixture; and ii) 
what impact the mainly Hippocratic idea of a symmetry of bodily constituents 
has on the Galenic account of mixture. Second, Groisard seems to interpret the 
Galenic sources so as to reconstruct a somewhat incoherent binary model of 
mixture, where the first phase (the progressive division) is in accord with 
Peripatetic physics, while the second phase (the reversibility, or better, the lack 
of reversibility) is in line with Stoic fusion. By contrast, we will show that by 
taking our primary sources into consideration along with a larger sample of 
evidence from the Galenic writings, every aspect of Galen’s theory of mixture 
(constituents, progressive division, qualitative change, ontological status of the 
constituents in the mixture, generation of a tertium quid, and reversibility of the 
constituents) can be more coherently embedded into a revisited and rethought 
Aristotelian physics. Finally, Groisard does not place Galen’s theory of mixture 
                                                          
99 Groisard 2016 pp. 191–192 comments on De caus. cont. CMG Suppl. Or. II p. 56.14–19 
Lyons. Cf. also Groisard 2016 pp. 194–195.   
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into a wider medical and philosophical framework. If on the one hand he neglects 
the nexuses (and the debate that has arisen) between Galen and contemporary 
Pneumatic medicine (which had already developed an idea of good mixture or 
eukrasia and a complex system of mixtures), on the other hand he does not relate, 
as we will, Galen’s theory of mixture with his own profoundly teleological 





















INTRODUCTION – PART II 





2.1 Status quaestionis  
 
 As we have seen, this thesis is composed of two parts: the first enquires 
into Galen’s theory of mixture, while the second focuses on Galen’s terminology 
of mixtures. The only specific study on Galen’s terminology of mixtures so far 
is the 2011 article, by Véronique Boudon-Millot, ‘La notion de mélange dans la 
pensée médicale de Galien: Mixis ou Crasis?’. As Boudon-Millot remarks, 
throughout his corpus, Galen makes use of two nouns to render the idea of 
mixture, κρᾶσις and μίξις, but because of the particularly high number of 
occurrences of the terms within Galen’s work (1519 for κρᾶσις and 345 for 
μίξις), she restricts her own study to some meaningful examples of the use of 
each term.100  
As Boudon-Millot observes, from De temperamentis I 1 (where Galen 
deals with the linguistic usage of the term) we can infer that he defines κρᾶσις 
as a “rapport de force entre les quatre qualités où l’une d’elles (ou bien deux 
d’entre elles dans les temperaments dits composés) est appelée à dominer les 
autres”.101 As a matter of fact, Boudon-Millot declares, κρᾶσις is constantly 
utilized to indicate the mixture of qualities (hot, cold, dry, and wet) brought 
about by God or nature in living bodies; and it preserves the meaning, already 
attested in Homeric Greek, of “mélanger pour tempérer”.102 Moreover, Boudon-
Millot is convinced that the Stoic terminology and notion of total mixture (δι' 
                                                          
100 Boudon-Millot 2011 p. 262 and p. 266 
101 Boudon-Millot 2011 p. 265, comments on De temp. I 1 (= p. 1.1 H.)  
102 Boudon-Millot 2011 pp. 266–267.  
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ὅλων κρᾶσις) deeply influenced Galen’s usage of the term and notion of 
κρᾶσις.103 
With regard to the term μίξις, in commenting on some examples of 
Galen’s usage, Boudon-Millot affirms that his notion of μίξις does not refer to 
the mixture in living beings but has the more narrow designation of a mixture of 
inanimate substances (fire, air, water, and earth).104 This type of mixture is the 
only kind that can be brought about by human beings and coincides with a 
juxtaposition of constituents or παράθεσις.105 However, this type of mixture does 
not remain a pure juxtaposition: the substances end up fusing together (here 
Boudon-Millot points to a correspondence between the Galenic usage of μίξις 
and the Stoic σύγχυσις106), and for this reason Galen privileges the term μίξις in 
pharmacological applications: by means of the μίξις of various ingredients, it is 
possible to produce a new substance, a medicament.107 Moreover, Galen’s use 
of the term μίξις remains connected with the meanings of μείγνυμι conveying 
the image of the sexual union,108 but indicates in a more technical manner the 
mixture of two substance (the male and female seeds), bringing about the 






Boudon-Millot’s study, although it stands alone, has evident limitations. 
First of all, she does not accurately examine Galen’s terminology in relation to 
the original meaning, reconstructed through an etymological investigation, of 
κρᾶσις and μίξις. Second, she establishes a terminological and conceptual 
correspondence between Galen’s use of κρᾶσις and μίξις and the Stoic, 
specifically Chrysippean, classification of mixtures without taking the 
                                                          
103 Boudon-Millot 2012 pp. 276–277. 
104 Boudon-Millot 2011 p. 268.  
105 Boudon-Millot 2011 pp. 268–269, comments on De temp. I 9 (= p. 32.5ff. H.) 
106 Boudon-Millot 2011 p. 276–277. 
107 Boudon-Millot 2011 pp. 270–272.  
108 Boudon-Millot 2011 pp. 272–273, comments on in Hipp. Nat. Hom. comment. CMG V 9.1 
p. 170.8ff. Mewaldt.  
109 Boudon-Millot 2011 pp. 273–273, comments on De sem. CMG V 3.1 p. 90.21 ff. De Lacy.  
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fundamentals of Galen’s (Peripatetic) elementary physics or his Hippocratic 
background into account. Finally, she does not identify the multiplicity of 
meanings that, as we will see later on, κρᾶσις acquires in different contexts.  
 In this thesis, I will proceed in the following way. First of all, I will give 
an overview of the meanings that the etymological and Ancient Greek lexicons 
attribute to κρᾶσις and μίξις in order to understand the situation from a 
lexicographic standpoint. Second, since – as we will see later on – Ancient 
(etymological and not) lexicons do not arrive at a univocal solution, I will 
examine the original meaning of the roots of κρᾶσις and μίξις by summarizing 
the research of Elio Montanari, who addresses the issue in a 1979 monograph, 
Κρᾶσις e μίξις: un itinerario semantico e filosofico. Third, I will connect these 
original meanings both with the terminologies of the theoretical models Galen 
seems to reference (the Hippocratic, the Aristotelian and Peripatetic, and the 
Stoic, regarding the ways in which their terminologies have already been 
investigated by the secondary literature) and with Galen’s own usage of κρᾶσις 
and μίξις. Since it is not possible for a doctoral thesis to deal with all the 
occurrences of κρᾶσις and μίξις in Galen’s corpus, I limit myself to analysing 
only the occurrences that occur in our primary sources (see above).  
 
2.3 Research objectives  
 
I will pursue four research objectives in this thesis: 
 
a) The first is to bring to light Galen’s usage of the terms κρᾶσις and μίξις, 
words which (as we will see in the third chapter) can indicate either a process 
of mixture or a state resulting from the process; by working on the basis of 
the occurrences I found in my primary sources and by supporting my claims 
through examples extracted from the entire Galenic corpus, I will investigate 
which meanings each term acquires in Galen’s work relating to the mixture 
of primary elements. 
b) The second research goal is to understand if and in what way Galen uses the 
terms κρᾶσις and μίξις differently, and in what sense the difference between 
κρᾶσις and μίξις would dovetail with Galen’s theoretical model of the 
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mixture of primary elements, which, as I will demonstrate, strictly depends 
on the contemporary Peripatetic model.  
c) Moreover, in my terminological study of Galen’s notions of κρᾶσις and μίξις, 
I would like to understand the relation between Galen’s usage of the term 
and the original meanings of these word-families (i.e. the basic set of 
meanings of these two word-families, κεράννυμι and μείγνυμι) in the form 
that they have been investigated in the secondary literature, especially by 
Montanari.  
d) Finally, I will also try to explain the relation between Galen’s own 
terminology and those of other major theoretical models in which he was 
interested (the Hippocratic, the Aristotelian/Peripatetic, the Stoic) in order to 
understand how each influenced Galen and contributed to shaping his 





























































Between Stoicism and the Peripatetic tradition. Galen’s theory of the mixture 







1 Galen’s theory of the mixture of primary elements against the background of 
the Stoic/Peripatetic controversy.  
 
 
A very useful text for starting an enquiry on Galen’s account of the mixture 
of primary elements is the treatise De mixtione by the Peripatetic Alexander of 
Aphrodisias, Galen’s (slightly younger) contemporary,110 insofar as this writing 
                                                          
110According to the traditional dates, Galen was born in 129 and died circa 199 (source: Suda); 
cf. Fazzo 2002 n. 1. However, according to Nutton it would be possible to postpone his death to 
the beginning of the 3rd century, on the basis of three main arguments: a) a passage preserved 
by an Arabic mediaeval author, as-Sijistani, reporting Alexander’s critiques of Galen´s 
agnosticism; b) the chronology of Galen´s later writings that have to be placed in the Severan 
periodNutton argues that the impressive amount of tracts from this phase could not have been 
completed by the traditional date of death; c) the authenticity of the work De theriaca ad 
Pisonem, which recounts an accident that befell the son of Piso during a performance of the 
Lusus Troiae dated to 204 CE; cf. Nutton 1995 pp. 30 ff.. Cf. also, more recently, Fazzo who 
reports that some medieval Arabic sources state that Galen and Alexander met in Rome; Fazzo 
2002 p. 111 n. 2. As for Alexander, we know that Alexander’s De fato is dedicated to the 
emperors Septimius Severus and Caracalla (who reigned jointly between 197 and 211). 
However, as Todd argues, since Geta was created Augustus in 209 but not mentioned by 
Alexander in De fato, it seems feasible that Alexander was appointed as holder of the chair in 
Peripatetic philosophy between 198 and 209 (although it is not known whether Alexander taught 
in Athens or not; cf. Sharples 1987 p. 1177 and n. 3; on this cf. also Todd, who is instead inclined 
to think that Alexander taught in Athens1976 p.  1 n. 1); on this cf. Todd 1976 p. 1 n. 2. 
Therefore, chronologically, such an encounter might have indeed happened (even before 198), 
although there are two objective elements that might jeopardize such a claim. On the one hand 
Galen never explicitly refers to Alexander of Aphrodisias, although he does mention an 
Alexander of Damascus (On prognosis K. XIV 627.3–628.4) who is said to be holder of the 
Peripatetic chair in Athens (Inquiries into Anatomy K. II 218), cf. Todd 1976 p. 6 n. 29, and 
whom an Arabic author, al Mubaššir, mistakes for Alexander of Aphrodisias and calls 
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gives us an interesting view of the contemporary debate concerning theories of 
matter in Antiquity and provides us with a clear and historically framed picture 
of models of mixture and related issues in Galen’s time. For this reason, it can 
work as a valuable reference point from which to compare Galen’s own account 
to others of his time, and to understand and elucidate this comparison as clearly 
as possible.  
In the opening chapter of his De mixtione, Alexander declares that theories 
of mixture depend on theories of matter, and the latter can be subdivided into 
atomistic and continuum theories.111 In the case of atomistic theories, Alexander 
attributes an account of mixture to Democritus and to some extent to Epicurus, 
whose theories he briefly brings into focus112 and then explicitly criticizes.113 
Alexander claims that this mixture is a mere appearance and sensory illusion; he 
describes it as a mere juxtaposition of atoms placed next to one another (and in 
fact in the case of Democritus, Alexander calls it κρᾶσις κατὰ παράθεσιν).114 
                                                          
“Alexander of Aphrodisias of Damascus”; cf. Fazzo 2002 p. 116 n. 20. Cf. Todd 1976 pp. 4–11 
and n. 29 for an account of Alexander of Damascus, with references. On the other hand, it is 
incontrovertible that Alexander of Aphrodisias knew of Galen, but he quotes him among other 
philosophers (such as Plato and Aristotle), and hence already as an auctoritas to which to appeal; 
this suggests distancealso temporally; cf. Alex. In Top. 549.24 Wallies. What seems ultimately 
more plausible in this regard is that as Galen and Alexander lived in the same period, and shared 
and displayed the same Peripatetic tendencies in their writings, although Galen eclectically 
combines the study of Peripatetic philosophy with many other philosophical inputs, as we will 
shortly see. Moreover, in this regard it has to be noted that, as far as we can gather from Greek 
and Arabic sources, they knew the same Peripatetic teachers, such as Aspasius (under one of 
whose students, probably Eudemus of Pergamum, Galen studied; cf. Moraux 1984 p. 687 n. 1), 
Herminus (contra Fazzo 2002 pp. 116–117), and Aristotle of Mytilen (cf. Todd 1976 p. 3 and 
pp. 11–12, with references, cf. also Rescher and Marmura 1965 p. 1 and p. 12 n. 5, cf. Sharples 
1987 pp. 1177–8 and n. 8 and 9 with references). For an updated and well-documented overview 
of the extant Greek and the Arabic sources at our disposal, cf. Fazzo 2002. On the basis of her 
reading of these sources Fazzo sceptically questions the orientation recently adopted by some 
scholars to interpret the Greek sources through the polemic, in Fazzo’s view more legendary 
than real, between Alexander of Aphrodisias and Galen, reported by some surviving mediaeval 
Arabic sources; cf. Fazzo 2002 p. 111ff.  
111 De mixt. 213.13 ff. Bruns. More precisely, Alexander distinguishes between those who say 
that matter is unified (corresponding to the Stoic and the Peripatetic schools) and those who say 
that it is divided and discrete (οὐ γὰρ μόνον διηνέχθησαν πρὸς ἀλλήλους περὶ τοῦδε τοῦ 
δόγματος οἱ μίαν ὕλην ὑποκεῖσθαι πᾶσι τοῖς ἐν γενέσει σώμασιν λέγοντες πρὸς τοὺς ἐκ 
διωρισμένων τε καὶ κεχωρισμένων σωμάτων ποιοῦντας αὐτήν).  
112 De mixt. 214.16–215.8 Bruns.  
113 De mixt. 215.8–216.1 Bruns.  
114 As Todd 1976 p. 184 and Groisard 2013 p. 56 aptly observe, this “Democritean theory” (De 
mixt. 214,18-28 Bruns = D.-K. 68A 64) reconstructed by Alexander seems to be a reference to 
the first model of mixture, with its juxtaposition of constituents escaping the sense-perception, 
rejected by Aristotle in De gen. et corr. I 10 328a8–16. However, as Todd notes ad loc., there is 
no good evidence for attributing the theory of a κρᾶσις κατὰ παράθεσιν to Democritus. As 
regards Epicurus, Alexander claims that the difference seems to be that according to Epicurus 
the mixture does not occur through a simple juxtaposition of corpuscles but after a reduction of 
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However, while in this writing Alexander quotes and overtly attacks both 
Democritean and Epicurean atomism, he actually dedicates much more attention 
to two rival schools, the Stoics and his own Peripatetic school.115 
On the one hand, as leading proponents of a continuum theory of matter, 
the two schools are united in their rejection of any form of atomism and the 
conviction that matter is entirely unified, continuously sub-divisible, and 
underlying everything that comes to be. Furthermore, both their elemental 
systemsalbeit formulated differentlydescend from and consist of the four 
intertransmutable Aristotelian “elements” (fire, air, water, and earth, although in 
the Aristotelian thinking they are more correctly labelled as “simple bodies”),116 
undergoing processes of mixture. 
                                                          
the latter to the elements producing them (De mixt. 214.28–215.8 Bruns = U290). This process 
of reduction of the constituents to the elements is called by Alexander ἀναστοιχείωσις (De mixt. 
215.20 Bruns). 
115 Alexander´s De mixtione is characterized, like his other monographs, by a tripartite structure: 
enunciation of the topic, a pars destruens that is a polemic section of criticism of other heterodox 
philosophical accounts relating to a given issue, and finally a pars construens coinciding with 
the exposition of Aristotle´s doctrine on a particular subject matter. Alexander´s De mixtione 
fully respects this schema. For Alexander dedicates Chapters one and two to the exposition of 
the topic of mixture and the debate concerning theories of matter in Antiquity, the Chapters three 
to twelve to description and refutation of the Stoic account, and Chapters thirteen to fifteen to 
the exegesis of Aristotle’s model. In addition, it presents a sort of polemic appendix against the 
Stoic account of growth (Ch. 16). On the structure of De mixtione cf. Groisard 2013 pp. 17–20.  
116 The origins of both the elemental systems, their association with the primary qualities, and 
reciprocal relations are difficult to track down. In the fifth century, Empedocles, together with 
the other Early Pluralists (Anaxagoras and the Atomists), exemplifies the growing conviction 
that a single underlying substance, such as were water, air, fire, or some "indefinite" principle, 
would not have been sufficient to explain the way in which natural objects and living beings can 
come to be out of the combination of the elemental substances. In contrast to his contemporaries 
(who proposed, respectively, the Everything-in-Everything theory and the atomistic solution), 
Empedocles was convinced that everything is composed out of four material elements moved by 
two opposing forces, Love and Strife, i.e. aggregation and separation (cf. D.-K. B 17, B 71 and 
alibi). These elements, which Empedocles calls more precisely “roots” (rizomata), are identified 
with fire, air, earth, and water. As regards the four primary qualities, as Lloyd points out (cf. 
Lloyd 1964 p. 100), the first extant physical theory where hot, cold, dry, and wet are regarded as 
the ultimate cosmic constituents is the Hippocratic De natura hominis. As Rashed underscores, 
this Hippocratic treatise and De victu (where fire and water are associated with the four qualities) 
are at the root of Aristotle’s qualitativism of De generatione et corruptione. For in this 
Aristotelian treatise each primary element, coming from the quadripartite Empedoclean system, 
is associated with two primary qualities (De gen. et corr. 330b3–5: fire is hot and cold, air is 
moist and hot, water is cold and moist, earth is dry and cold); cf. Rashed 2005 pp. 24–26; cf. also 
Vizgin 1980, Althoff 1992 p. 12–13 n. 8 and 9, cf. Longrigg 1993 pp. 220–226. Moreover, as 
Rashed argues, on close inspection of the text of De gen. et corr., Aristotle seems to reveal that 
he is also well acquainted with the theories of Philistion of Locris, the first to draw a connection 
between the four Empedoclean primary elements and the four dynameis (cf. fr. 4 Wellmann); cf. 
Rashed 2005 pp. 35–48, whose activity seems to be posterior to the composition of De natura 
hominis (420–400 BCE). For Philistion was active at the court of Dionysius II the Younger in 
Syracuse (cf. Ps.-Plato’s Letters II 314d = fr. 2 Wellmann); cf. Jouanna 2002 pp. 51 n. 4. In 
Philistion´s system fire is hot, air cold, water moist, and earth dry; cf. fr. 4 Wellmann. Philistion’s 
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However, as clearly emerges from the treatise, the Stoic and the Peripatetic 
schools expressed conflicting views regarding both how these primary elements 
mix with one another and which place this theory occupies within their 
philosophical systems. In this respect, Alexander’s De mixtione and his ferocious 
attack on the Stoic theory of total mixture are fundamental for reconstructing 
both theories in the way in which they presented themselves to Galen’s eyes. But 
it is also fundamental for clearly laying out the related debate which, though 
germinated centuries before, flourished to the fullest in Galen’s and Alexander’s 
time.  
For our purposes, I shall briefly summarize, on the one hand, the Stoic, 
and especially the Chrysippean, theory of total mixture together with the 
critiques offered by its opponentsprincipally Alexanderand, on the other 
hand, the Peripatetic account issuing from Aristotle. I will integrate pieces of 
evidence that we can gather from Alexander’s De mixtione with other extant 
sources in order to outline both the Stoic and the Peripatetic theories and place 
them within their respective philosophical systems. Afterwards I will deal with 
Galen’s theory of the mixture of primary elements more specifically, with a 
threefold aim.   
In the first place, I will illustrate the peculiar constitutive features of 
Galen’s theory of the mixture of primary elements, which, although it is 
formulated in very syncretistic terms and has to be understood within its 
manifold medico-philosophical milieu, reveals a proper internal coherence. 
Therefore, from this perspective my goal will be to unfold the main key issues 
relating to the physical process of Galen’s mixture and in this sense I will try to 
make clear: i) what is the exact mechanism of mixture ii) which ontological 
status pertains to the constituents in the mixture and iii) in which relation they 
                                                          
Ur-qualitativism seems to have been a deciding factor also in the development of the Stoic 
coupling between primary elements and primary qualities; and it was possibly through the 
mediation of Diocles of Carystus (a physician very close to the Peripatetic school), that it was 
adopted by the founder of the Stoic school; cf. Longrigg 1975 pp. 227–228. As well as Aristotle’s 
primary elements, the Stoic ones are capable of mutual transformation, but between the two 
systems there is a fundamental difference. While Aristotle’s primary elements turn into one 
another because of an exchange of two of the qualities within the underlying substratum, the 
Stoic elements transform into one another through a change in density and volume cf. Hahm 
1985 pp. 42–43. This difference is very clearly spelled out by Galen in De nat. fac. pp. 106.4–
107.7 H. (= SVF II 406); cf. Hahm 1985 p. 48 with n. 34. 
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stand to each other while mixed, iv) what the final outcome of the mixture is, 
and v) to what extent in Galen’s account the process of mixture is reversible.  
In the second place, while dealing with Galen’s account I will pari passu 
relate it to the above mentioned contemporary Stoic/Peripatetic controversy in 
order to show in which terms and to what extent Galen, as well as his 
predecessors and contemporaries, took an active part in this debate, preserving 
his own ideals of anti-dogmatism and faithfully sticking to his own criteria of 
truth and to his epistemological outlook.  
Finally, my aim will be to bring to light some clues that can lead us to 
establish a linkage between Galen and the contemporary Peripatetic account of 
mixture as opposed to the Stoic model of mixture, although, as we have seen, 
most recently it has been argued that there might be analogies between the 
Galenic and the Stoic theory of total mixture117. As we will shortly see, these 
analogies seem to me to hold only up to a point, whereas, as it will be shown, 
there are much more cogent reasons to think that the Peripatetic account together 
with some due integrations from Galen’s Hippocratic background would better 
fit into Galen’s own medical and philosophical system.   
 
 
1.1 The Stoic theory of δι᾿ὅλων κρᾶσις (total mixture) from Zeno to Chrysippus. 
Textual evidence, aim and justification of the theory.   
 
The Stoic idea of total mixture (ὅλων δι' ὅλων κρᾶσις), whose roots can be 
traced back to the founder of the school, Zeno,118 became over time one of the 
linchpins of Stoic physics and metaphysics, especially with the third head of the 
Stoic school, Chrysippus.  
Here I will give an overview of the textual evidence that we have for Zeno 
and Cleanthes, and then I will discuss the Chrysippean formulation in more 
detail. In analysing the sources, my focus will be to explain i) the modality of 
                                                          
117 Cf. Intr. I pp. 29ff. 
118 Regarding Zeno’s account of mixture, cf.  Mansfeld 1982 and 1983. See SVF I 102 and I 92. 
Mansfeld explicitly rejects Todd’s view that Zeno did not formulate a theory of total mixture; 
see Mansfeld 1983, p. 306 n. 1. Cf. Todd 1976 p. 30 n. 44. More recently, Collette-Dučić and 
Delcomminette have reaffirmed the Zenonian origins of the Stoic theory (Collette-Dučić and 
Delcomminette 2006 pp. 5–6 with nn. 1, 2, and 3).  
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the mixture, ii) the elements of both continuity and innovation of the 
Chrysippean model in relation to the previous Stoic accounts, iii) the aim and 
justification of the theory, and iv) critiques made against it in Antiquity, from 
the earliest criticism offered by the Academic Arcesilaus to Alexander of 
Aphrodisias (which also entails a comparison with the Peripatetic model of 
mixture).  
The textual evidence at our disposal for Zeno’s and Cleanthes’ accounts is 
scant. As we can gather from the extant sources, Zeno’s notion of mixture 
appears to be linked to the generation of the cosmos, that is, the generation of 
the primary elements and living beings within it (SVF I 102).  
In the first section of SVF I 102, which is part of Arius Didymus fr. 38 and 
reported in Stobaeus I.17, a chapter entitled “On mixture and blending” (Περὶ 
μίξεως καὶ κράσεως), we haveintegrated into a doxographical reporta 
verbatim (διαρρήδην) report of Zeno’s account of cosmogony. Zeno describes 
the cosmogony at the beginning of a new cosmic cycle when the elements change 
(the term used is τροπή) into one another: from fire comes to be water through 
air, then a portion of this water turns into earth by condensation and another 
portion into air through vaporization, and then a part of this latter changes into 
fire again through a process of rarefaction. Afterwards he adds: “τὴν δὲ μῖξιν [μ. 
secl. von Arnim; μ. <καὶ> Diels] κρᾶσιν γίγνεσθαι τῇ εἰς ἄλληλα τῶν στοιχείων 
μεταβολῇ σώματος ὅλου δι' ὅλου τινὸς ἑτέρου διερχομένου”119. In this section 
of the fragment two elements are worth stressing. The first is a rather problematic 
connection between mixture and transformation of the elements into one 
another; the second is the corporealistic view, which will also be maintained 
afterwards as the main characteristic of this theory. For the bodies are said to go 
through one another as wholes (σώματος ὅλου δι' ὅλου τινὸς ἑτέρου 
διερχομένου). 
                                                          
119 SVF I 102 (= Stob. Ecl. I 17.3 152.19 Wachsmuth = Ar. Did. fr. 38) Ζήνωνα δὲ οὕτως 
ἀποφαίνεσθαι διαρρήδην· τοιαύτην δὲ δεήσει εἶναι ἐν περιόδῳ τὴν τοῦ ὅλου διακόσμησιν ἐκ τῆς 
οὐσίας, ὅταν ἐκ πυρὸς τροπὴ εἰς ὕδωρ δι' ἀέρος γένηται, τὸ μέν τι ὑφίστασθαι καὶ γῆν 
συνίστασθαι, ἐκ τοῦ λοιποῦ δὲ τὸ μὲν διαμένειν ὕδωρ, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ ἀτμιζομένου ἀέρα γίγνεσθαι, 
λεπτυνομένου δὲ τοῦ ἀέρος πῦρ ἐξάπτεσθαι, τὴν δὲ μῖξιν [μ. secl. von Arnim; μ. <καὶ> Diels] 




The second piece of evidence at our disposal is the second part of SVF I 
102, a cosmological report by Diogenes Laertius (VII 135–136 = SVF I 102 p. 
28.22–29 and VII 142 = SVF I 102 p. 28.29–29, 2 = SVF II 581 p. 180.17–23). 
In the first part of Diogenes’ account (VII 135–136) we find a description of the 
cosmogony before the creation of the primary elements: at the beginning God 
(or intellect, fate, or Zeus) was in himself (καθ' αὑτόν) and changed the entire 
substance into water through air. As the seed is embraced in the seminal fluid, 
this too (the god), qua spermatikos logos, is left behind as such in the wet, 
making the matter adapt to the generation of the things to come next; and so he 
gives rise to the four elements first of all, namely fire, water, air, and earth. 
Further in the text (VII 142), after describing the action of God on the qualityless 
substance or prime matter, leading to the generation of the cosmos, Diogenes 
Laertius outlines the Stoic elemental cycle, which seems to correspond closely 
to Zeno’s quotation as we find it in Stobaeus, as the fire changes into ὑγρότης 
(whereas in Stobaeus and in Diogenes’ previous passageVII 135–136we 
have “water” ὕδωρ) through air, then a thicker part of this water becomes earth 
and another part becomes first air and then fire again, through a process of 
rarefaction. Afterwards Diogenes adds that out of the mixture of these 
elements120 come to be plants, animals, and the other γένη (εἶτα κατὰ μῖξιν ἐκ 
τούτων φυτά τε καὶ ζῷα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα γένη). 
                                                          
120 One of the most puzzling difficulties of Stoic physics is the coincidence between the different 
phases of the cosmogony and the elemental change. For elemental change is also used (together 
with the biological image of reproduction and birth and the body–soul relation, cf. Hahm 1977, 
pp. 57 ff.) to explain the origin of the cosmos (for Zeno’s, Cleanthes’, and Chrysippus’ 
cosmogonies, cf. the basic study by Hahm 1977 esp. pp. 57–82; for Stoic elemental change cf. 
Hahm 1985; furthermore, some cosmogonal aspects and the divergences between Cleanthes and 
Chrysippus are discussed by Salles 2009a, pp. 118–134, which is however mainly devoted to the 
topic of the conflagration or the ending phase of the world-order). In Zeno’s cosmology, there is 
a difference between the elemental change leading to the constitution of the world-order and the 
real primary elements and it is important to stress this distinction in order to precisely determine 
the constituents of Zeno’s mixture. Hahm has pointed out that the real elements come to be from 
a pre-elemental stage of pure water, cf. Hahm 1977 p. 57, and indeed in Diogenes Laertius’ 
cosmological report (VII 135–136) it is said; “In the beginning he (sc. God) was by himself; he 
transformed the whole of substance through air into water, and just as in animal generation the 
seed has a moist vehicle, so in cosmic moisture God, who is the seminal reason of the universe, 
remains behind in the moisture as such an agent, adapting matter to himself with a view to the 
next stage of creation. Thereupon he created first of all the four elements, fire, water, air, earth 
(εἶτα ἀπογεννᾶν πρῶτον τὰ τέσσαρα στοιχεῖα πῦρ, ὕδωρ, ἀέρα, γῆν)” (trans. Hicks).  More 
recently, Cooper has followed this suggestion and distinguished proto-elements of the 
cosmogony from the real primary elements originating from the watery stage; cf. Cooper 2009 
pp. 105–107. As Salles also notes, this watery stage is fundamental for Zeno’s theory of 
elements; cf. Salles 2013 p. 11 (“Cause et Matière dans la cosmologie Stoïcienne”, paper 
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Therefore, we see that the mixture of the four mutually transformable 
(corporeal) elements going through one another as wholes is used to account for 
the generation of compounded bodies. As Diogenes says afterwards in the same 
report, Zeno would have described topics concerning the generation and 
corruption of the cosmos (and presumably of the compounded bodies within it) 
in his work On the whole or περὶ τοῦ ὅλου. It therefore seems reasonable to think 
that Zeno expounded his theory of mixture in this work.  
De facto, what we can glean from the texts at our disposal is very little. 
We can safely say that Zeno formulated a theory of mixture and that the 
constituents of the mixture are the four mutually transformable corporeal 
elements, which go through one another in the process. These are two essential 
features of the theory that will also be maintained afterwards: the corporealistic 
perspective and the connection of mixture with the element theory.121 Moreover, 
it seems reasonable to think that the theory of mixture was treated in a specific 
work, On the whole, concerning topics in generation and corruption of the 
cosmos, and would have accounted for the generation of every animate and 
inanimate being (εἶτα κατὰ μῖξιν ἐκ τούτων φυτά τε καὶ ζῷα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα γένη = 
SVF I 102 = Diog. Laert. VII 142).122  
                                                          
delivered at the seminar “Causes et Principes de l’Antiquité au Moyen Age” at the Centre Leon 
Robin, Paris, 16th May). In the two accounts (Stobaeus and the second section of Diogenes’ 
report) describing Zeno’s theory of mixture, however, this distinction between proto-elements 
and real elements is not so straightforward, but if Cooper is right in distinguishing two sets of 
turning in the Zeno-Chrysippean cosmogony(i) first set of turning: proto-fire-air-water and 
(ii) second set of turning: from the proto-watery stage actual earth is produced, from the same 
water the element water is produced, and through rarefaction actual air and fire are produced; cf. 
Cooper 2009 pp. 106–107and since the mixture in both reports is said to be taking place after 
the proto-water stage, we can therefore say that in Zeno’s account the primary elements are at 
work.  
121 Collette-Dučić and Delcomminette 2006, p. 6.  
122 The gap in the evidence has been bridged by Jaap Mansfeld, who tries to clarify some 
obscurities and in the meantime give an overall interpretation of Zeno’s account of mixture. In 
the first place, Mansfeld explains the connection between the mixture and mutual transformation 
of the elements by postulating the influence of Aristotle’s theory of mixture on Zeno’s. Indeed 
the questionable link between mixture and mutual transformation of the primary elements had 
already been noted by von Arnim, who in his critical apparatus annotates γίγνεσθαι-μεταβολῇ 
vix sana; nam κρᾶσις non potest fieri τῇ εἰς ἄλληλα μεταβολῇ. Contrary to von Arnim, Mansfeld 
says that this textual problem can be solved on the assumption that here Zeno is influenced by 
Aristotle. As Mansfeld aptly observes by making reference to De gen. et corr. II 7–8, Aristotle’s 
homoeomerous parts come to be from a mixture in which the primary elements have changed 
into one another. As Mansfeld rightly points out, the coming to be of mixed compounds is a 
“special case” of the reciprocal transformation of the elements, when the contraries meet one 
another half-way; and in his view this would be the point of contact with Zeno’s account, where 
the mixture is linked to reciprocal elemental transformation, with the onlyalbeit 
considerabledifference being the corporealistic perspective; cf. Mansfeld 1983 pp. 307–308. 
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Cleanthes’ account of mixture can be gathered from a rather obscure report 
by Stobaeus Ecl. I 17.3 p. 153.7 Wachsmuth (= SVF I 497 = Ar. Did. fr. 38) 
which is part of his chapter On blending and mixture. In his meticulous analysis 
of this passage, Hahm divides Stobaeus’ paraphrase into two sections. The first 
section describes a pre-cosmic stage where a first mass of fire undergoes 
variations leading to the constitution of the world-order (διακοσμεῖν).123 The 
second section seems to preserve vague traces of Cleanthes’ doctrine of mixture 
and perhaps on the account of this it was added to Stobaeus’ chapter On blending 
and mixture. Literally, Stobaeus reports the following statement: “for as all the 
parts of a thing grow from the seeds at appointed times, so also the parts of the 
whole, among which there are for example animals and plants, grow at the 
appointed times; and as certain logoi of the parts, coming together into a seed, 
are mixed and separate out again when the parts come to be, so all things come 
from one and one is combined from all (καὶ ὥσπερ τινὲς λόγοι τῶν μερῶν εἰς 
σπέρμα συνιόντες μίγνυνται καὶ αὖθις διακρίνονται γινομένων τῶν μερῶν, 
οὕτως ἐξ ἑνός τε πάντα γίνεσθαι καὶ ἐκ πάντων ἓν συγκρίνεσθαι,) the cycle 
proceeding harmoniously on its course”. As Hahm points out, this section 
describes an alternation between the one and the many: during the process of 
                                                          
A further confirmation that Zeno was influenced by Aristotle, in Mansfeld’s view, is the 
connection between mixture and zoogony (cf. the abovementioned passage from Diog. Laert. 
VII 142 = SVF I 102 where the mixture serves as explanatory basis of the generation of animals, 
plants, and other genera: κατὰ μῖξιν ἐκ τούτων φυτά τε καὶ ζῷα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα γένη); cf. Mansfeld 
1983 p. 310. However, although Mansfeld’s interpretation of Zeno’s account may be one 
position to take into account, it seems to be lacking more stable support of textual evidence; and 
in any case, if really worked for Zeno, it seemingly did not prove to be appealing for the Stoics 
yet to come, such as Chrysippusas we will shortly see.  
123 The first change begins in the middle with a process of sinking (συνίζειν), which as Hahm 
points out, is often associated in Stoic texts with the formation of earth (SVF I 104; II 569). The 
second change seems to correspond to a process of quenching of adjacent parts (εἶτα τὰ ἐχόμενα 
ἀποσβέννυσθαι δι' ὅλου). Then, as the testimonium reports, all has become wet (Τοῦ δὲ παντὸς 
ἐξυγρανθέντος) and this image seems to refer to the second change, from earth to water. 
Afterwards the extreme part of fire (which according to Hahm coincides with the part of fire 
remaining after earth and water have been formed in the middle region) moves upwards and 
starts structuring the cosmos (ἄρχεσθαι διακοσμεῖν τὸ ὅλον). In fact, Hahm confutes this 
sequence (fire/earth/water/fire) and argues that it may be due to Stobaeus’ misunderstanding or 
to the inaccuracy of his source. According to Hahm’s reconstruction, this sequence in fact 
conflicts with the Stoic orthodox account according to which fire turns first into water through 
air. This misunderstanding might be due to the fact that Cleanthes heavily reworked Zeno’s 
account provided in On the whole, which takes up a single volume, in his On the natural science 
of Zeno, given in in two books (SVF I 481), and in the doxographic abridgement there might 
have arisen confusions; cf. Hahm 1977 pp. 240–248. Recently Salles has questioned Hahm’s 
reconstruction (Salles 2013 pp. 12–14) and is inclined to restore the sequence 
fire/earth/water/fire as originally Cleanthean and set in opposition to Zeno’s.  
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generation of the world-order the cosmos in fact consists of the four elements, 
giving rise to the parts of the whole, whereas in conflagration it consists of only 
one element, which absorbs within itself the whole substance (fire, cf. SVF I 98; 
II 596; II 618; II 626).124 In this section it seems that it is the spermatikoi logoi 
that are mixed and separated out when the parts (of the cosmos, including 
animals and plants) come to be. By comparing this account with Zeno’s, we note 
that two accounts of mixture are both related to the generation of the cosmos, 
including animals and plants. However, whereas in Zeno the mixture is 
connected with the elemental transformation and it seems to be a mixture of the 
primary elements, in Cleanthes it is the spermatikoi logoi that come together and 
mix, and once set apart give rise to the parts of the cosmos. This difference, 
however, seems to be only a matter of technical detail, as it is god (who at the 
conflagration stage is pure fire, encompassing within it the spermatikoi logoi) 
who gives rise to the other elements and then to the multiplicity of the world by 
acting on the substance or prime matter (Cf. SVF I 102 = II 580).125 In Cleanthes’ 
case too, therefore, the mixture is connected to the constitution of the world-
order and the generation of every existing thing in the cosmos.  
In the case of Chrysippus we definitely have more evidence from which to 
reconstruct his theory of total mixture126. We know from two sources that 
                                                          
124 Hahm 1977 pp. 241–242.  
125 Further, as Mansfeld notes, in Zeno’s there might also be a connection between mixture and 
spermatikoi logoi. In Zeno’s theory of reproduction, in fact (SVF I 128), the male seed is defined 
as pneuma in liquid form πνεῦμα μεθ' ὑγροῦ and as a fragment (ἀπόσπασμα) of the soul and is 
said to be mixed with the parts of the soul according to the mixture of the logos of the forefathers 
(ἀνθρώπου δὲ σπέρμα, ὃ μεθίησιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος μεθ' ὑγροῦ, συγκίρνασθαι (λέγουσιν) τοῖς τῆς 
ψυχῆς μέρεσι κατὰ μιγμὸν τοῦ τῶν προγόνων λόγου). In order to explain Zeno’s description, 
Mansfeld links this account of the male seed containing the seminal reason of the forefathers 
with the theory of the spermatikoi logoi, that is, divine enmattered seeds that grow progressively 
together with the cosmos providing it with their rational structures; cf. SVF I 102 and SVF II 
1027. For the relation between the Stoic spermatikoi logoi and theory of reproduction in its 
manifold context (with references to the Presocratics, Hippocratic medicine, Plato, and 
Aristotle), cf. the accurate study by Hahm 1977, esp. pp. 60–75. 
126 As we have no original extant Chrysippean treatise dealing with the subject, our sources fall 
into two main types. The first group includes: doxographical reports (Stobaeus Eclogae I.17.4 
153.24 Wachsmuth = Ar. Did. Fr. 28 = SVF II 471) and testimonies from biographical tradition 
(Diogenes Laertius VII 151 = SVF II 479) or summaries of Greek philosophy in religious 
writings (Hippolytus Philos. 21 571.23 DDG = SVF II 469; Philo de conf. ling. 264.23 Wendland 
= SVF II 472). The second group includes philosophical sources which contain the reception and 
criticism of the Stoic theory (Galen in Hipp. Nat. Hom. comment. CMG V 9.1 p. 19.4 Mewaldt 
= SVF II 463; Galen De elem. sec. Hipp. CMG V 1.2 p. 136.15 De Lacy= SVF 465; Plutarchus 
De comm. not. 1077e, 1078b = SVF II 465 and 1078e = SVF II 480; Alexander of Aphrodisias 
De mixtione 219.16 Bruns = SVF II 466; De mixtione 216.1 Bruns = SVF II 470; De mixtione 
216.14 Bruns; De mixtione 221.16 Bruns = SVF II 474; 226.34 Bruns = SVF II 475; De mixtione 
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Chrysippus dealt with the topic of total mixture in the third book of his Physics 
(SVF II 479) and in the first book of the Physical Enquiries (SVF II 480). The 
theory of total mixture seems to have been formulated before Chrysippus, as it 
was criticized by the Academic sceptic Arcesilaus.127 Alexander, however, 
attributes this theory directly to Chrysippus and for our purposes it is of 
relevance to note that still in the 2nd century CE, that is by Galen’s time, this was 
still the mainstream theory (SVF II 473)128.  
First of all, differently from his predecessors Zeno and Cleanthes, 
Chrysippus seems to have systematized the theory of mixture, as his theory has 
been handed down to us embedded in a tripartite classification of mixtures. In 
fact, in his De mixtione, Alexander attributes to Chrysippus the classification of 
mixture, which apart from the total mixture includes παράθεσις or juxtaposition 
by contact of the constituents, such as a heap of grains, and σύγχυσις or fusion, 
which occurs through a joint destruction or σύμφθαρσις of the constituents and 
brings about a new superior quality, such as in the case of the production of 
medicaments.129 This is the first element of innovation: the systematization of 
the typology of mixtures, since in Zeno and in Cleanthes we do not find any 
evidence of such a classification.  
As for the total mixture (δι' ὅλων κρᾶσις), according to the evidence at our 
disposal, differently from juxtaposition and fusion, a mutual coextension (called 
ἀντιπαρέκτασις or described by the correspondent verb ἀντιπαρεκτείνω, cf. SVF 
II 471, II 472, II 473 II 479)130 of the ingredients takes place so that they are 
                                                          
213.2 Bruns = SVF II 481; Alexander of Aphrodisias Quaest. II 12 57.9 Bruns = SVF II 476; 
Alexander of Aphrodisias Mant. 139.30 Bruns = SVF II 477; Simplicius In Aristot. Phys. 530.9 
Diels = SVF II 467; Themistius Paraphr. In Aristot. Phys. IV 1 p. 256 Spengel = SVF II 468; 
Plotinus Ennead. II.7.1 p. 127 Müller = SVF II 478). 
127 De comm. not. 1078b–c.  
128 It has to be noted that Alexander refers to a diversity of opinions within the Stoic school as 
regards the theory of total mixture. Although Chrysippus’ theory would have had the best 
reputation, according to Alexander, other later Stoics were influenced by Aristotle´s views on 
the theory of mixture; Alexander explicitly makes mention of Sosigenes, a student of Antipater 
(cf. De mixt. 216.4–13 Bruns); cf. Groisard 2013 pp. 58–60 
129 Apart from SVF II 473 (= De mixt. 216.14 ff. Bruns) also Arius Didymus (SFV II 471 = Ar. 
Did. Fr. 28) attributes this classification to Chrysippus; cf. also the unattributed classifications 
present in SVF II 472 (Philo De conf. ling. 264.23 ff. Wendland) and An. Lond. XIV 16–23 
Manetti. On Chrysippus’ terminology cf. ch. III pp. 213 ff. 
130 As Todd explains, the verb ἀντιπαρεκτείνω is used in ancient Greek texts to describe a process 
of coextension and it is applied to the movement of the cavalry extending in line with a wall; or 
more conceptually, it is said of a point extending and becoming equal to a line. The concept is 
also applied in theological contexts, for example Greg. Naz. Or. 43 p. 852e, which refers to a 
human ἀντιπαρέκτασις towards God; cf. Todd p. 32 n. 53 for further references. Todd’s point is 
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preserved in their own substance and qualities131 and at the same time their 
volumes completely and mutually coextend with one another: practically 
speaking, the final result is that the two bodies will coexist in the same place132.  
 The peculiarity of this mechanism of mutual coextension of the ingredient 
volumes is that it could also account for mixtures between bodies unequal in 
bulk. For according to the Stoics, this process would allow a body small in bulk 
to mix with another far greater. No matter how small a body is, through this 
process its volume will come to be coextensive with the other and every part of 
it will be present in the blend without increasing the overall volume.133 This 
borderline case is well described by the paradox of the drop of wine mixing with 
the entire sea. For if it is possible, as Chrysppus says, that “there is nothing to 
prevent a single drop of wine blending with the sea”, then “in the blending the 
drop will extend through the whole universe.”134 This Chrysippean paradox 
explicitly breaches one of Aristotle’s requisites of mixture, i.e. equilibrium 
                                                          
to stress the coextension of a small entity with a greater one. However, although this is a 
distinctive feature of the coextension, Long and Sedley point out that that is just one possibility 
and that the mechanism could account also for the mixture of bodies relatively equal in bulk; cf. 
Long and Sedley 1987 p. 293. Many sources in fact express this phenomenon by recourse to the 
expression “body going through the body” (σῶμα χωρεῖν διὰ σώματος) (SVF II 469, II 468, II 
465), which points to the reciprocity of the process. However, Todd rejects this expression as 
un-Stoic insofar as it is absent in the primary sources (what he refers to as primary sources, i.e. 
fragments with verbatim quotations); cf. Todd 1976 p. 74. Most recently, as well as Long and 
Sedley, Collette-Dučić and Delcomminette have reaffirmed the reciprocity of the process of 
coextension on the basis of their reading of the texts, cf. Collette-Dučić and Delcomminette 2006 
pp. 32–33. As Todd notes, in one case the process of coextension is associated with fusion (SVF 
II 472), but it seems to be a misunderstanding of the theory: Todd 1976 p. 51 n. 128 and pp.  56–
57 and n. 143.  
131 Cf. De mixt. 216.26–28 Bruns; Todd 1976, p. 33. Moreover, in Stob. Ecl. I.17.4 155.3 
Wachsmuth (SVF II 471 part), the qualities of each of the constituents of total mixture are said 
to συνεκφαίνεσθαι, “to show forth together”. Cf. also Philo De conf. ling. 264.23 Wendland (= 
SVF II 472). The example given by both is that of a sponge soaked in olive oil, by means of 
which the original water and wine can be recovered from the mixture.  
132 SVF II 465, II 466,  II 468, II 475, II 476, II 477, II 481.  
133 As we can infer from Alexander’s criticism in De mixt. 219.9–14 Bruns, “if they deny that 
bodies receive one another in this way, but say that insofar as they are full they go through one 
another, one might first inquire why any given body does not contribute to an increase in the size 
of a similar body in all dimensions; for by such a mutual composition quanta make their 
compound greater than each of the components” (trans. Todd). However, as Collette-Dučić and 
Delcomminette perceptively note, sometimes the mixture does produce an increase in the 
volume, cf. the example of incense and of fire (De mixt. 220.16–18 Bruns). Cf. also Plotinus’ 
report according to which the Stoics uphold that in the majority of cases there is no increase in 
volume (and therefore not in all cases), cf. SVF II 478 and cf. Collette-Dučić and Delcomminette 
2006 p. 52. This point is also made by Nolan 2006 pp. 169–170. 
134 Two fragments explicitly attribute this paradox to Chrysppus: Plutarch de comm. not. 1078e 




between the constituents. In his De generatione et corruptione (I 10 328 a 23–
31), Aristotle gives the very same example as we find in Chrysippus, namely the 
mixture of wine and water, but he clearly spells out that the mixture of a drop of 
wine with a large amount of water is not a proper mixture, but only an increase 
of the dominant body, because the drop of wine loses its εἶδος and turns into the 
whole water (οὐ ποιεῖ μίξιν, ἀλλ' αὔξησιν τοῦ κρατοῦντος· μεταβάλλει γὰρ 
θάτερον εἰς τὸ κρατοῦν, οἷον σταλαγμὸς οἴνου μυρίοις χοεῦσιν ὕδατος οὐ 
μίγνυται· λύεται γὰρ τὸ εἶδος καὶ μεταβάλλει εἰς τὸ πᾶν ὕδωρ).   
Be it a polemic answer to Aristotle or not, as it has been argued,135 this 
Stoic paradox expresses in a nutshell the Chrysippean adjustment of the theory 
of total mixture to the idea of interpenetration between pneuma and matter. For 
by accounting for a mixture between bodies unequal in bulk, it would clearly 
have been very suitable to explain how the rare, light, and tenuous pneuma can 
totally pervade far greater portions of water and earth.136 For according to Todd, 
it is highly likely that Chrysippus first adopted the theory of total mixture in 
order to illustrate the relation between pneuma and passive matter and more 
precisely pneuma’s motion through matter.137 
In Todd’s view, this theory is only an analogical and fictive example used 
by Chrysippus in order to illustrate the relation between pneuma, which in turn 
is a mixture of the active elements, fire and air, and passive matter, constituted 
by the passive elements (water and earth cf. SVF II 418). For differently from 
                                                          
135 According to Pohlenz (1947 II vol. p. 42), in this Chrysippean claim there is proof that the 
Stoa knew Aristotle’s school-works. Replying to Pohlenz, Sandbach affirms that there is no room 
for thinking that Chrysippus would have explicitly referred to Aristotle’s account of mixture in 
De gen. et corr., as there is no evidence that the early Stoics were familiar with Aristotle’s 
writings. As Sandbach says, the mixture of wine and water may have been just a common 
example, as it was an “everyday event in Greece”, cf. Sandbach 1985 pp. 33–34. Cf. Sorabji 
1988a pp. 80–81.  
136 Cf. Sambursky 1959 p. 15; Long and Sedley 1987 p. 293.  
137 Todd 1976 pp. 29–73. The connection between the theory of total mixture and the 
interpenetration of pneuma and matter clearly appears in the following passage from De 
mixtione, which also makes clear that the theory of total mixture is at the very core of the entire 
Chrysippean philosophical system (De mixt. 224.32–225.9 Bruns): “Entering the argument at 
this point one might reasonably challenge them with also claiming the existence of two universal 
principles, matter and God, of which the latter is active, the former passive; and with saying that 
God is mixed with matter and pervades the whole of it, in this way shaping and forming it and 
creating the universe. For if God is on their view bodyan intelligent and eternal pneumaand 
matter is body first there will again be body going through the body; then this pneuma will 
certainly be either one of the four uncompounded bodies which they say are also elements, or a 
compound of them (as of course they themselves say; for they certainly suppose that pneuma has 
the substance of air and fire)” (transl. Todd).  
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the physical systems of Zeno and Cleanthes, which were based on a designing 
fire releasing the vital power of heat,138 and probably following new medical 
tendencies (such as those represented by the physician Praxagoras of Cos),139 
Chrysippus put much more emphasis on the concept of pneuma, which he 
conceived as a mixture of fire and air (SVF II 841, 310, 442, 786 and cf. Galen 
Quod animi mor. IV K.  784.7–12) and both as physical principle (insofar as it 
was the main vehicle of the psychic functions and the sustaining cause of the 
cosmos) and as metaphysical entity (since it coincides with the corporeal divine 
principle permeating matter cf. SVF II 1033, 1035, 1037, 1047).  
But how can the pneuma mix with the matter so as to completely pervade 
it? That is to say, how does this process of coextension or ἀντιπαρέκτασις work? 
And if according to the Stoics two or more bodies coextend with each other so 
as to interpenetrate, would that also mean that these bodies coexist in the same 
place? And if so, how may this concretely occur?  
Many scholars have endeavored to explain the coexistence of two bodies 
in the same place through antiparektasis, proposing different solutions,140 but I 
                                                          
138 It must be underlined that Chrysippus was not the first Stoic to use the notion of pneuma. For 
Zeno had already defined the soul as πνεῦμα ἔνθερμον (cf. SVF I 135 = Diog. Laert. VII 135). 
In defining the soul as pneuma, Cleanthes followed Zeno (cf. SVF I 521 and 525), but he seems 
to have stressed the role of heat in the psychic functions of the soul; moreover, he is the first to 
make use of the term πνεῦμα in order to define the world-soul (cf. SVF I 533; Verbeke 1987 p. 
55); but in his cosmology it is also heat that is the cause of all the functions of the world-soul 
and its sustaining cause; cf. LS 47 C (= Cic. De nat. deor. II 23.5–28.30), the connection between 
soul, heat, and the sustaining principle of the world is evident from this section: “therefore, every 
living being, whether animal or vegetable, is alive on the account of the heat enclosed within it. 
From this it must be understood that the element heat has within itself a vital power which 
pervades the whole world. We shall recognize this more readily from a more detailed account of 
this all-penetrating fieriness in its entirety. All parts of the world (I shall speak only of the 
greatest) are supported and maintained by heat […] therefore the world must be god, and all the 
power of the world must be sustained by a divine element (deum esse mundum omnemque vim 
mundi natura divina contineri)”); cf. also SVF I 534. In assigning heat this primary role both in 
the psychic and cosmic domain, Cleanthes might have followed Zeno (Cf. SVF I 120); however 
he introduced the concept of tonos for the first time, which is assigned to fire, as it is defined as 
a blow of fire (πληγὴ πυρὸς ὁ τόνος ἐστί; cf. SVF I 563. Cleanthes’ idea of tonos seems to be 
more closely related to the image of plucking the chords of a musical instrument in order to 
produce harmony; SVF I 502 cf. 503 cf. Hahm 1977 esp. pp. 153–155).  
139 Cf. Hahm for an account of the influence on Chrysippus of contemporary medical ideas 
relating to pneuma as the main agent of psychic activities (with reference to Praxagoras, but also 
to the Alexandrian medicine of Herophilus of Chalcedon and Erasistratus of Ceos), Hahm 1977 
pp. 160 ff.  
140 Sorabji (1988b pp. 50–51) suggests that the paradox of two bodies existing in the same place 
can be explained by recourse to Stoic reductionism. According to the Stoic theory of the four 
categories, it is possible to distinguish a) matter, b) qualified matter, c) disposed qualified matter, 
and d) relatively disposed matter. On this cf. Menn 1999 (for an account of the gradual 
development of the Stoic theory of the categories from Zeno through Chrysippus, see esp. pp. 
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think the notion of total interpenetration between pneuma and passive matter can 
be more easily envisioned if we describe the way in which pneuma moves 
through matter. For although, as we have seen, Todd’s interpretation establishes 
a firmer link between the process of ἀντιπαρέκτασις and Chrysippus’ notion of 
pneuma, it does not make clear how the pneuma moves through matter and what 
consequences pneuma’s motion through the matter has. Fortunately, further 
studies have attempted to close this interpretative gap from two different 
perspectives, which I will try to unify here, as they appear to be complementary.  
The pneuma has tonos and moves through a tensile motion (τονικὴ 
κίνησις) conceived as a force able to go through matter141 and endowed with the 
capacity of changing the density of matter.142 Pneuma can in fact be regarded as 
a factor responsible for the phenomena of contraction and expansion of matter 
where it is the degree of density and the volume of a body that modifies.143 But 
                                                          
227 ff.). The four categories then, although they take different predicates, are not distinct, as they 
are reduced to the very same body to which they belong. Now, according to the Stoics the 
qualities are bodies, but on the basis of Stoic reductionism this it is equal to saying that the 
qualities are a human body, variously disposed (p. 50). The same argument is offered in Sorabji 
(1988a pp. 89–91). Menn replies to Sorabji that this interpretation is impossible for two reasons: 
a) qualities are pneumata (SVF II 389, II 449); all qualities are causes and all causes are 
pneumata (SVF II 340). But bodies are not only pneuma, they also contain passive matter, 
therefore they cannot coincide with the entire body of an individual, for example. b) 
Consequently, as Menn notes, quality is a part of the qualified body: the qualities are of course 
qualified bodies but qua part of a whole, the body of an individual, for example, which also 
comprehends passive matter; f. Sextus Empiricus Adv. Math. XI 24 (virtue is part of the sage, as 
a hand is = quality is a just a part of the qualified body), cf. Menn 1999 p. 222 n. 10. However, 
although qualities are indeed a part of a qualified body, they are not additionally present in the 
body, as if the individually qualified body were just the result that we obtain by adding the two 
parts. In factat least from Chrysippus onthe pneuma, which gives matter its essential 
qualitative determinations and the other properties, also providesqua sustaining cause and in 
its different degrees of hexis, physis, and psychetonos and unity through its tensile movement 
inwards and outwards: it is the unifying principle of matter, the glue which holds together and 
makes coherent a whole, which cannot be merely made up of parts, cf. SVF II 439, II 441, II 
442, II 444, II 449, II 716, II 802 (where Philo gives the example of glue), Nem. De nat. hom. 
70.6–71.4 Morani (“the tensile movement […] moves inwards and outwards, the outwards 
movement produces quantities and qualities, and the inward one unity and substance”). As 
regards another possible solution of the paradox of two bodies, cf. the illuminating contribution 
by White (1986), who proposes to distinguish a mass sense of quantity from a volume sense of 
quantity. In the Stoic total mixture, as White argues, the mass would not be subject to variation, 
but rather its volume (in my view to be read together with the account provided by Collette-
Dučić and Delcomminette, cf. below pp. 51-52). See also Lewis, who questionably stresses the 
relation between ἀντιπαρέκτασις and joint-destruction of the constituents by preserving the 
reading of the manuscripts in Diog. Laërt. VII 151 (= SVF 479): Lewis 1988 pp. 90–91; cf. also 
Cooper 2009, p. 11.  
141 Sambursky 1959, pp. 29–33.  
142 As is clear from this passage from Ps.-Censorinus 76.1-5 Jahn (absent from von Arnim’s 
collection): “Ea (sc. principia) Stoici credunt tenorem atque materiam; tenorem, qui rarescente 
materia a medio tendat ad summum, eadem concrescente rursus a summo referatur ad medium”. 
143 Hahm 1985 pp. 42 ff.  
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the tonos of the pneuma does not change only the density of matter: it also works 
as its sustaining cause as it holds matter together and provides it with unity and 
qualitative determinations144. In this way, pneuma gives matter tension and 
structure (in the different degrees of hexis, physis, and psyche, SVF II 716, II 
634 and more clearly in II 458) and continuity therefore creates a sympathy 
between the parts of the cosmos. 
Therefore, this motion of pneuma through matterwhich would lie at the 
core of the process of total coextension or ἀντιπαρέκτασις of pneuma with 
passive matterbrings about a double effect.  
On the one hand, the motion of pneuma through matter causes, as we have 
seen, a change of density in matter. Accordingly, White proposes to distinguish 
a “mass” sense of “quantity” from a “volume” sense of “quantity”. In the Stoic 
total mixture, as White argues, the mass would not be subject to variations, but 
rather its volume. Consequently, a body, while small in bulk, can have a different 
degree of density and on the account of this its volume can undergo variations 
and expand, so that it becomes equal to the volume of the other body with which 
it mixes.145  
On the other hand, pneuma’s motion through matter has a second 
important consequence: as we have seen, it gives tension to matter and works 
from within as its inner organizing and structuring principle. But how could we 
imagine this transmission of tension? By making use of a Stoic example (SVF II 
425), Collette-Dučić and Delcomminette have compared this transmission of 
tension that the antiparektasis produces to the circular undulations that can be 
                                                          
144 cf. Nemesius De nat. hom. 70.6–7.4 Morani = LS 47J, SVF II 451; cf. also SVF II 452, II 
441, II 449. This double power of the tensile motion of pneuma is also very well explained in 
SVF II 452, where it is said that the inwards motion is the cause of rarefaction and at the same 
time of being, whereas the outwards motion is cause of solidification and at the same time of 
qualitative determinations.  
145 White 1986 p. 386. Moreover, as Sorabji observes, when two ingredients mix, their volumes 
are not just added, as in the objection that Plutarchus and others raise (Plutarchus De comm. not. 
1078a–b = SVF II 465, Sextus Pyrrh. Hyp. III 60, III 96, Alex. Mant. 141.9-16, Philop. In Phys. 
213b5–14), according to which if two ingredients mix and through the mutual coextension their 
volumes become equal, but the process would bring about a doubling of volumes. The two 
volumes are not added to each other because they are not separate from each other: they form a 
whole. As Sorabji explains, “[i]f the Stoics say that the wine is spread through three litres and 
the water is also spread through three litres, why does not that make a total of six litres? The 
answer is that the wine is able to expand to three litres only because it is not separate from the 
water. In order to obtain six litres, we should need the wine and water to be separate from each 




provoked by a stone that has been cast into a pool and which propagate on the 
water’s surface. The wave extends itself through the total water surface and 
propagates until it reaches uniformity in each of its points.146 
That is the second great innovation of Chrysippus’ theory of total mixture 
(at least according to the evidence at our disposal): what we do not encounter 
either in Zeno or in Cleanthes is the connection between the theory of total 
mixture and pneuma as all-pervasive and animated principle penetrating and 
giving cohesion to matter through a tensile movement. If Cleanthes introduced 
the concept of tonos for the first time, relating it to the image of the fiery sun’s 
rays plucking and harmonizing the cosmos,147 it was Chrysippus who 
strengthened the link between pneuma qua mixture of fire and air and tonos, 
through which the interpenetration of pneuma and matter is possible.  
Recently Collette-Dučić and Delcomminette have tried to challenge 
Todd’s interpretation given in his classical study on the theory of total mixture 
(as we have already pointed out, in Todd’s view, the theory of total mixture 
proved to be only a fictive example used by Chrysippus in order to clarify the 
relation between pneuma and passive matter) and which in any case had not 
encountered widespread approval.148 Even thought it remains the main 
justification of the theory of total mixture, these scholars have drawn attention 
to the fact that this theory was not merely a “purely mental conception”149 that 
after Chrysippus would have been integrated in a later classification of mixtures, 
but would really have worked on different levels of application.150  
                                                          
146 Cf. also Todd and Collette-Dučić and Delcomminette’s remarks, which also point to the 
connection of the process of antiparektasis to the tensile movement of the pneuma; Todd 1976 
pp. 36–38; Collette-Dučić and Delcomminette 2006 pp. 32–33.  
147 Cf. the splendid image in SVF I 502: “ἄντικρυς πλῆκτρον τὸν ἥλιον καλεῖ· ἐν γὰρ ταῖς 
ἀνατολαῖς, ἐρείδων τὰς αὐγάς, οἷον πλήσσων τὸν κόσμον εἰς τὴν ἐναρμόνιον πορείαν ἄγει”. As 
we see, Cleanthes defines the sun as πλῆκτρον, and as we have previously seen (cf previous 
footnote n. 133), tonos is defined as a blow (plēgēby using the same root of πλῆκτρον) of fire.  
148 Cf. Sharples 1977 pp. 86–90; Sandbach 1978, pp. 362–263; Moraux 1981a pp. 641–646; 
Mansfeld 1982 pp. 389–391; White 1986 p. 384–385; Long and Sedley 1987 p. 287 n. 1 and p. 
293; Sorabji 1988a p. 84.  
149 Todd 1976, pp. 71–73.  
150 It seems relevant to underline that Todd’s interpretation of the theory of total mixture as a 
simple analogical example tries to escape a great difficulty of this theory: the fact that according 
to one of the two main Stoic definitions of the body, analogously to Aristotle (Phys. 204b20), 
body is definedby Apollodorusas “three-fold extension together with resistance” (cf. SVF 
III 6 = 45 E LS with SVF II 381 = 45 F LS, cf. Long and Sedley’s comments ad. loc.). Hence 
the difficulty: how is it possible for two bodies, understood as three-dimensional entities, to mix 
without an increase in overall volume? In order to give coherence to his reasoning, Todd 
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In the first place, the total mixture would explain not only the relation 
between pneuma (constituted by the active elements fire and air) and passive 
matter but also the relation between the purely active principle, God or reason, 
and the purely passive principle or prime matter151 whose primary effect is the 
production of the primary elements and therefore of pneuma, which pervades the 
qualified matter.152 Second, the scholars point to different usages of the theory 
of total mixture in physics and physiology. On the one hand, the theory really 
accounts for everyday mixtures, where already qualified bodies are involved, 
such as mixtures of liquids (a mixture of wine and water or of honey and 
vinegar)153 or of solids (such as the total interpenetration of iron and fire).154 On 
                                                          
elaborates two different and somewhat contradictory solutions. On the one hand, he denies that 
the total mixture implies a theory of body, as it is a fictional example (Todd 1976 p. 83); on the 
other hand, he says that for the everyday mixtures the standard definition of body as a three-
dimensional solid can be valid, whereas to explain pneuma’s motion through matter a more 
general Stoic definition of body than that which is capable of acting or being acted upon is 
required (cf. SVF I 90 = 45A LS and SVF I 85 = Diog. Laert. VII 134 with reference to the 
bodily active and passive principles), as if it were a “corpsenergie”, which does not necessarily 
entail bodily three-dimensionality (cf. id. p. 47 n. 113).  
151 For the difference between prime matter and (already qualified) passive matter, cf. Gourinat 
2009 p. 48 ff.; and the testimony by Diog. Laert. VII 150 (= SVF I 87 part): “The primary matter 
they make the substratum of all things: So Chrysippus in the first book of his Physics, and Zeno. 
By matter is meant that out of which anything whatsoever is produced. Both substance and matter 
are terms used in a twofold sense according as they signify (1) universal or (2) particular 
substance or matter. The former neither increases nor diminishes, while the matter of particular 
things both increases and diminishes” (trans. Hicks).  
152 That the two archai also interpenetrate each other can be inferred straightforwardly from this 
passage in De mixtione 227.5–10 Bruns: “for their theory of blending does not rely on something 
else, but their views on the soul depend on it, and their notorious Fate and their universal 
Providence gain conviction in this way if indeed their theory of principles and God, as well as 
the unification and sympathy of everything depend on it; for the God that pervades matter is all 
of these things for them” (= SVF II 475). However, it must be noted that the very elegant solution 
proposed by Collette-Dučić and Delcomminette does not perfectly match the evidence, because 
although they tend to separate god (a pure actively corporeal principle) from pneuma (an active 
but already qualified body which is in turn generated by the interpenetration of god and prime 
matter)and conversely a purely passive principle, i.e. qualityless matter, from a relatively 
passive principle, i.e. passive matter, the first distinction is much more nuanced in our texts. 
For example, in the abovementioned text we see a perfect equivalence between god (the first 
principle) and pneuma: De mixt. 224.32–225.9: “Entering the argument at this point one might 
reasonably challenge them with also claiming the existence of two universal principles, matter 
and God, of which the latter is active, the former passive; and with saying that God is mixed with 
matter and pervades the whole of it, in this way shaping and forming it and creating the universe. 
For if God is on their view bodyan intelligent and eternal pneumaand matter is body first 
there will again be body going through the body; then this pneuma will certainly be either one 
of the four uncompounded bodies which they say are also elements, or a compound of them (as 
of course they themselves say; for they certainly suppose that pneuma has the substance of air 
and fire)” (trans. Todd). 
153 Cf. Stobaeus I 17.4 155.4–5 Wachsmuth (= Ar. Did. fr. 28 = SVF II 471). 
154 Stobaeus I 17.4 154.16–17 Wachsmuth (= Ar. Did. fr. 28 = SVF II 471); De mixt. 218.1–2 




the other hand, it seems that the Stoics used the process of coextension for 
physiological purposes too, and more precisely it would have answered for living 
beings’ growth and nutrition.155  
 
 
1.2 Alexander’s criticism of the Stoic theory of total mixture. Alexander’s 
account of mixture in his De mixtione, aim and justification of the theory.  
 
 
The earliest criticism of the notion of total mixture can be traced back to 
an attack made on the Stoic theory by Arcesilaus the head of the new 
Academy.156 He claimed that if a small body could coextend with a much greater 
one, then a leg could also be chopped off, thrown into the sea, and extend to the 
extent that even Xerxes and the Greeks could fight a sea battle in it. Moreover, 
not only was the Stoic theory attacked by an exponent of the Platonic school, 
but, Galen reports, the corpuscolarist physician Asclepiades of Bithynia also 
challenged the Stoic theory of total mixture in his work On elements, although 
Galen does not dwell on the arguments that Asclepiades used against them.157 
However, according to the evidence that we have at our disposal, the Peripatetic 
Alexander was the first to elaborate a much more serried critique of the Stoic 
total mixture. In De mixtione, Alexander of Aphrodisias’ criticism against the 
                                                          
155 Cf. De mixt. 233.14–24 and 234.23–32 Bruns (= SVF II 735) cf. Collette-Dučić and 
Delcomminette 2006 pp. 58–59. Cf. Mansfeld 1982 p. 392. As Alexander claims, the Stoics 
would have found support for their view on total mixture by invoking the process growth of 
animals through nourishment, which according to them would have worked analogously. For 
according to them, if nutriment pervades the whole body as a body, then it necessarily follows 
that body goes through body; cf. De mixt. 233.14–233, 24 Bruns. As Collette-Dučić and 
Delcomminette note, the Stoics make mixture and growth equivalent to each other and therefore 
they would not have respected Aristotle’s distinction (De gen. et corr. I 10 327b13–14) according 
to which if two bodies are unequal in bulk there cannot be mixture but only an increase of the 
dominant ingredient, as the smaller would be dissolved completely into the greater. In the last 
chapter of De mixtione, Alexander also attacks this application of interpenetration to growth, for 
Alexander’s account of growth (as implying the persistence of form and, somehow, also of 
matter), cf. Kupreeva 2004a pp. 314–329. An alternative is Todd’s position, who does not 
consider this theory Stoic because of the fact that Alexander’s Chapter 16 is directed more 
generally against those who “explain growth by bodily interpenetration” (although the whole 
treatise De mixtione refers to bodily interpenetration, σῶμα διὰ σώματος χωρεῖν, as a Stoic 
theory); cf. Todd 1976, pp. 8–-84. 
156 Plutarch. De comm. not. 1078c–d. Cf. also Todd 1976 pp. 73–75.  
157 De elem. sec. Hipp. CMG V 1.2 p. 136.23–26 De Lacy. Asclepiades’ activity in Rome dates 
back to the age of Cicero and Crassus, cf. Nutton 2006a.  
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Stoic total mixture concentrates upon two key features of the Stoic theory: the 
preservation of the ingredients in the blend and their complete coextension.  
 First of all, as a good Aristotelian, Alexander cannot accept that the 
constituents are preserved intact in the mixture: according to him the constituents 
are preserved only in potentiality, while as long as they are mixed they give rise 
in actuality to a tertium quid.158 Second, Alexander seeks to undermine the 
physical process of mutual coextension or antiparektasis of bodies by bringing 
to light its difficulties and interpretative issues. More precisely, in his De 
mixtione Alexander attempts to rule it out by claiming that it is utterly absurd to 
say that a full body can contain within it another full body without an increase 
in the overall volume, as in this case the two bodies would coexist in the same 
place.159 As Collette-Dučić and Delcomminette show, in Alexander’s criticism 
a reduction of body to place seems to have occurred. For in Alexander’s view, 
the total mixture requires that a body receives within it another body, meaning 
that this body is something that is capable of receiving something else: therefore, 
it is a place. As the scholars note, this reduction of body to place would 
completely distort the Stoic conception of place. In fact, for the Stoics place does 
                                                          
158 This aspect is well illustrated by Kupreeva 2004a pp. 305–8. More precisely, Alexander 
questions the Stoic standard example of the “heated iron” (cf. Stob. Ecl. I 17.4 153.24 
Wachsmuth = SVF II 471, Alexander’s De mixt. 471 222.35–223.5 and 227.17–228.4 Bruns, 
Hierocles Elem. Eth. IV 3–10 Bastianini-Long, where the author reports the example to explain 
how the soul pervades the body), which is used to make clear the presence “in actuality” of two 
different bodies that interpenetrate one another. According to Kupreeva, Alexander makes two 
main points to reject this Stoic example. The first draws attention to the fact that when the fire 
totally pervades the iron, the permanence and coexistence of fire and iron is only a matter of 
time; as the process of burning goes on, some of the heated iron does get destroyed and the fire 
will lose its proper form; cf. De mixt. 222.35–223.6 Bruns. The next is that Alexander does not 
conceive of the heat of fire as a corporeal entity which interpenetrates another corporeal entity; 
rather, according to him the heat can be regarded as a quality which always needs a matter in 
which to subsist; cf. 227.26–228.6. It is exactly this feature of the Stoic total mixture that strongly 
clashes with the Peripatetic account; cf. Kupreeva 2004a p. 304 “The point of Alexander’s theory 
of mutual replacement is to rule out the idea that propagation of physical qualities involves 
corporeal agents other than the sensible substances in which these qualities reside. According to 
Alexander, qualities and states have no separate existence outside the material individuals in 
which they inhere. Therefore, a composite quality arising in a mixture as a result of the coming 
together of several qualified individuals cannot be regarded as an immediate product of 
ingredient qualities, as the Stoic picture suggests, so that both the old ingredient qualities and the 
new resultant quality would now be present in a mixture. Rather, when a new (composite) quality 
comes to be, the old qualities must in some sense cease to exist”.  
159 Cf. De mixt. 218.17–218.24 Bruns “It is, indeed, a natural notion that what is full can no 
longer receive anything is itself; for it is obvious that that which has space in it capable of 
receiving another body cannot be full, and on account of this natural and common preconception 
some think it reasonable that there be something receptive of bodies which we call place. For 
how could someone who did not wish to talk nonsense think that anybody, full of itself and with 
no empty interval in it, received in itself another similarly full body?”  
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not really exist but, although is probably three-dimensional (SVF II 502), it 
actually only subsists (SVF II 331 = LS 27D) since it can be defined as the 
incorporeal extension that an existent body can and does occupy (cf. SVF II 503, 
II 505).160 But where, then, does Alexander’s interpretation issue from? Todd 
plausibly explains Alexander’s argument as principally stemming from 
exegetical activity on Aristotle’s Physics and more precisely on the textual locus 
in Physics IV 1 (Phys. 209a4–7), where Aristotle dismisses the view that place 
is a body by saying that if so, two bodies would paradoxically coexist in the same 
place. This Alexandrian argument will then be reused by many other later 
commentators on Aristotle’s Physics, such as Themistius, Simplicius, and 
Philoponus.161 However, the argument does not seem to have been originally 
elaborated by Alexander, as we also find it in Plutarch’s De communibus notitiis 
adversus Stoicos (1077e), but according to Todd he may have also drawn on a 
Peripatetic source.162  
In his De mixtione, Alexander sets his own account of mixture against the 
Stoic model, and dedicates the final chapters of the work (XIII–XV) to the 
explanation of Aristotle’s account of mixture, whichas Alexander himself 
declaresdue to the Philosopher’s syntomia or concision was not so well known 
among philosophers at the time.163 His exegetical activity mainly focusses on 
the Chapter I 10 of Aristotle’s De generatione et corruptione. Alexander’s 
exegesis expands all the key points of Aristotle’s account of mixture 
(constituents, potentiality–actuality continuum, difference between mixture and 
                                                          
160 Collette-Dučić and Delcomminette 2006 pp. 52–53.  
161 Todd 1976, pp. 75–81, esp. pp. 76–77.  
162 Although his claim seems to be quite reasonable, as the paradox of the two bodies in the same 
place was widely used by Aristotle and not only with reference to his theory of place (cf. Phys. 
214b6, De gen. et corr. 321a5–6 criticism of the theory that growth occurs by body, De an. 
418b13–18 dismissal of the view that light is a body, De caelo 305a19–20 rejection of the theory 
that elements are generated by body), unfortunately Todd does not put forward a great deal of 
argument in support of his statement. On the other hand, Pohlenz maintains that this passage has 
to be considered Plutarch’s direct criticism (cf. Pohlenz 1939, pp. 29–30), whereas according to 
Mansfeld it is more likely to attribute the argument to a Skeptic Academic source; cf. Mansfeld 
1982 p. 391.  
163 The sources at our disposal for reconstructing Alexander’s theory of mixture are a) De 
mixtione Chapters 13–15; and b) Philoponus’ commentary on Aristotle’s De generatione et 
corruptione (the only commentary in Greek extant on this Aristotelian treatise), as he amply 
draws on a lost commentary on Generation and Corruption by AlexanderPhiloponus cites it 
explicitly 35 times; cf. Todd 1976, p. 251.  
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generation and corruption),164 but what seems to be much more detailed and 
original compared to Aristotle’s account in De generatione et corruptione I 10 
                                                          
164 In the first place, Alexander discusses i) the constituents of mixture: already in Aristotle the 
constituents involved in the process of mixture are said to be substances qua composite of form 
and matter (De mixt. 228, 16–17 Bruns, Alexander makes explicit what Aristotle did not specify, 
since he claims that only χωριστά can be mixedDe gen. et corr. I 10 327b27–29). It has to be 
underlined that among the constituents of a mixture the liquids are the most mixable, insofar as 
they are the most easily divisible (τὰ εὐόριστα, cf. De gen. et corr. 328b3–4); the presence of 
moisture in the ingredients is, in fact, a conditio sine qua non of the mixture; cf. Joachim 1922 
p. 186 (comm. on De gen. et corr. 328a24). The same point is made by Alexander at De mixt. 
230.34–231.1 Bruns. ii) He the deals with the preliminary requisite of mixture: interaction (the 
other being contact), i.e. poiein and paskhein. As Alexander says, interaction “occurs among 
bodies with the same underlying matter and a mutual contrariety” (De mixt. 229, 17–19 Bruns), 
and he adds that “certainly the four bodies known as elements (stoicheia) are of this sort: Earth 
and Water, Air and Fire” (De mixt. 229.30–31 Bruns). As has been recently pointed out by the 
scholarship (Todd 1976 pp. 232–233: Kupreeva 2003, pp. 307 ff.), it is possible to recognize two 
tendencies in the Aristotelian tradition of the 2nd century CE. On a merely qualitative Aristotelian 
account of the stoicheia, a hylomorphic theory has progressively gained ground. For whereas 
according to Aristotle the term stoicheia was used to refer to the primary qualities (cf. De gen. 
et corr. 330a30), as we see here in Alexander the term instead indicates what Aristotle calls more 
appropriately “simple bodies”. On the other hand, in contrast to Aristotle (cf. De gen. et corr. 
323b29–324a3), “since only those things which either involve a ‘contrariety’ or are 
‘contraries’and not any things selected at randomare such as to suffer action and to act, 
agent and patient must be ‘like’ (i.e. identical) in kind and yet ‘unlike’ (i.e. contrary) in species. 
(For it is a law of nature that body is affected by body, flavour by flavour, colour by colour, and 
so in general what belongs to any kind by a member of the same kind-the reason being that 
‘contraries’ are in every case within a single identical kind, and it is ‘contraries’ which 
reciprocally act and suffer action) and in order to avoid Stoic inferences about the causal efficacy 
of bodies Alexander relegates the causal agency to the incorporeal qualitative contrarieties 
present in the underlying matter. Alexander’s new hylomorphic formula is made explicit in De 
anima (7. 9–14 Bruns) “bodies act and are acted upon in accordance with incorporeals”; cf. 
Kupreeva 2003 pp. 307–310. In the De mixtione it is specified by Alexander that constituents act 
and are acted upon by the means of the contrary qualities “whenever the bodies that are unified 
are of the kind that have qualities by which constituents can reciprocally interact […] blending 
also occurs” (ὡς ἔχειν ποιότητας, καθ' ἃς τὰ μιγνύμενα ποιεῖν τε καὶ πάσχειν ὑπ' ἀλλήλων ἐστὶν 
οἷά τε […], τότε καὶ τούτων κρᾶσις γίνεται, De mixt. 229.3–6 Bruns, cf. De gen. et corr. 334b8–
15). Like Aristotle, Alexander claims that reciprocal interaction occurs among opposites and also 
their intermediaries. Not only is hot changed and acted on by cold (or vice versa), “but also the 
points between each of the extremes” (τὰ μεταξὺ ἑκατέρου τῶν ἄκρων, De mixt. 229.22–24 
Bruns, οὐ γὰρ μόνον τὸ θερμὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ ψυχροῦ καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ θερμοῦ μεταβάλλεταί 
τε καὶ πάσχει, οὐδὲ τὸ ὑγρὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ ξηροῦ καὶ τὸ ξηρὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ ὑγροῦ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ μεταξὺ 
ἑκατέρου τῶν ἄκρων, ὅτι κατὰ μῖξίν ἐστι τῷ πρὸς ἑκάτερον τῶν ἐναντίων τὸ μεταξὺ τὸν θατέρου 
τῶν ἐναντίων σώζειν λόγον), as happens in mixture. The mixture in fact implies a process of 
reciprocal qualitative assimilation, a two-way qualitative change, as it is defined by Frede, where 
the opposites find a common midpoint or μεταξὺ; cf. Frede 2004 p. 301. Cf. Cooper 2004 p. 321 
ff. De Haas 1999 p. 29.  iii) This entails a distinction, which Alexander clarifies, between mixture 
and coming-to-be and passing-away. For in the mixture none of the bodies exceeds another by 
its contrariety so as to destroy it. If this were so, there would be corruption and at the same time 
the generation of something else. In the mixture in fact there must be an equality of powers of 
the constituents, isotēs tōn dynameōn (De mixt. 230.14–34 Bruns). As Todd remarks, the 
difference between mixture and generation and corruption drawn by Alexander is an expansion 
of Aristotle’s remarks at De gen. et corr. 328a23–31 (cf. also the corresponding aporia in the 
trilemma at the beginning of the Chapter 1 10 327a35–327b6, and later also De gen. et corr. 
327b28–31). iv) Finally, Alexander describes the process of mixture by recourse to the 
Aristotelian distinction between potentiality and actuality. As in Aristotle, the constituents are 
said to be preserved in potentiality, while a new quality has arisen out of their mixture (De mixt. 
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is the description of the mechanism of mixture. Alexander represents such a 
process of mixing as a progressive division (or diairesis) of the constituents into 
small parts, which during the division are juxtaposed as corpuscles and become 
progressively smaller and smaller (De mixt. 231.12–231.21).165 As in Aristotle, 
                                                          
232.20–31 Bruns ; cf. De gen. et corr. 327b22–31). But which kind of potentiality are Aristotle 
and Alexander referring to? This aspect was not analysed in depth by Aristotle, but was examined 
by the commentators. As De Haas notes, it cannot be the first potentiality because the recovery 
of the constituents does not coincide with a full generation. Nor can it be second potentiality 
(namely first actuality), because the ingredients are not yet actualized. Recently De Haas has 
suggested that it can be an in-between potentiality, a third kind of potentiality, a tempered first 
actuality. Cf. De Haas 1999 p. 32. De Haas applies this notion of a third kind of potentiality to 
Philoponus’ interpretation of Aristotle’s account of mixture, which seems to have been 
influenced by Alexander’s commentary on De gen. et corr. In his commentary on De gen. et 
corr., Philoponus (188.17–25) draws a comparison to the state of the ingredients in a mixture 
and the state of a drunken geometer. The geometer is awake and she already knows geometry 
(potentiality 2), but she is not able to completely actualize this knowledge (actuality 2) because 
of her state of drunkenness (tempered actuality 2). In their reply to De Haas, Wood and Weisberg 
point out that De Haas’ tempered second potentiality (of the state of the ingredients in the mixture 
as distinct from the tempered second actuality of the drunken geometer) does not seem to match 
Philoponus’ intentions. For according to Wood and Weisberg, Philoponus’ text is somewhat 
cryptic and aims more at stressing the state of “abatement” of the potentiality rather than 
pinpointing the exact position of this third potentiality in the potentiality–actuality continuum; 
cf. Wood and Weisberg 2004, pp. 688–689.  
165 The point of departure of Alexander´s interpretation is De gen. et corr. 328a31–35, where 
Aristotle declares that the constituents of a mixture act and are acted upon one another 
reciprocally and “they combine more freely if small pieces of each of them are juxtaposed 
(παρατιθέμενα). For in that condition they change one another more easily and more quickly; 
whereas this effect takes a long time when agent and patient are present in bulk”. In this regard, 
Cooper rightly points out that the mixture is made possible through a juxtaposition of small bits 
acting and being acted upon one another and therefore shifting, “so that they lose those qualities 
which mark them off from one another and each gets in replacement a common new set of 
qualities that constitute the nature of the new substance itself”; Cooper 2004 p. 322 (original 
emphasis). In his De mixtione, Alexander returns afterwards to the dynamic of the process and 
analyses it in greater detail: cf. De mixt. 233.2–14 Bruns: “Also it is known by perception that 
the constituents first divide one another, and by their juxtaposition as corpuscles become 
malleable and are unified and assimilated in form and likeness. For as long as each constituent 
still remains with its own substance, their subsequent dissociation can also be recognized by their 
difference in colour, for as moist, easily-divided, and dissimilar bodies their division of one 
another starts from the pressure caused by the one overflowing on the other, and if they should 
also happen to be unequally balanced the heavier moves downward in dividing, while the parts 
of the lighter body yield to the heavier one and readily cover their surface. The change in qualities 
which unifies them in total similarity stops at the preceding change of placea fact also known 
by sight” (trans. Todd).  Cf. also Philoponus In gen. et corr. 199, 10 ff. Vitelli: “Δείξας ὅτι οὔτε 
κατὰ παράθεσιν ἡ μίξις οὔτε τῇ εἰς μικρὰ διαιρέσει, νῦν φησιν ὅτι εἰ καὶ μὴ ἔστιν ἡ παράθεσις 
μίξις, συντελεῖ μέντοι εἰς τὴν μίξιν ἡ εἰς μικρὰ διαίρεσις καὶ παράθεσις. (progressive division) 
ῥᾷον γάρ, φησί, τὸ μικρὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ μικροῦ πείσεται μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ μέγα ὑπὸ τοῦ μεγάλου, τὸ δὲ 
πολύ, φησίν, ὑπὸ τοῦ πολλοῦ χρονιώτερον πάσχει (speed of interaction)”. As Kupreeva observes, 
this kinetic mechanism of liquids might be compared to the original Platonic concept of 
“ἀντιπερίστασις”, or mutual replacement, used by Aristotle to indicate the meteorological 
process whereby cold and hot air separate by a mutual replacement and form homogeneous 
masses. See Kupreeva 2004a pp. 302–303. According to Groisard, the key to understanding the 
dynamics of mixture is to see a two-phase process where a progressive division of the ingredients 
into smaller particles culminates in a final unification of the substratum. See Groisard 2013, cf. 
comments ad loc. p. 106 n. 469. One of the points at issue is to what extent Alexander’s account 
of mixture as a progressive division of bodies is innovative. As far as we know from Galen, 
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the smallness of the particles is directly proportional to the ease of the qualitative 
interaction: the smaller the particles, the more easily they interact with one 
another. The process culminates in a final unification of the constituents, giving 
rise to one body both in substrate and quality, a new unified body,166 which is 
defined, as in Aristotle, as homeomerous.167  
As in Aristotle, the process of mixture is reversible, as it is possible to 
recover the constituentsalthough Aristotle does not explain how and 
Alexander has to fill the gap in order also to more distinctly mark the difference 
to the Stoic account. However, contrary to the Stoics, who according to 
Alexander purport to really recover the original constituents of the blend, 
Alexander claims that it is impossible to recover both identical and numerically 
identical ingredients. The constituents can be recovered only in their own form, 
and thus they will be only specifically, but not numerically identical.168 For if 
they were preserved intact numerically, as in the Stoic mixture, we would have 
seen only a juxtaposition, and not a blending.169 On the contrary, in order to be 
recovered they need to pass from a state of potentiality to actuality, and through 
this process of actualization they are somehow “created” (De mixt. 231, 32: 
                                                          
Theophrastus would have dealt with the topic of mixture, although Galen’s report is so concise 
that it is not possible to extrapolate a clear picture of Theophrastus’ account with reference to 
Theophrastus Galen distinguishes a mixture leading to a uniform compound from a mere 
juxtaposition of constituents (De simp. med. (temp. ac.) fac. K. XI 593.11–594.3). We can gather 
some more evidence from a brief account by the Stoic Arius Didymus (1st BCE–1st CE), who 
preserves a small fragment of a Peripatetic account of mixture: fr. 4 “Ἀριστοτέλους καὶ τῶν ἀπ' 
αὐτοῦ. Τὰ μὲν σώματα φασὶ θρυπτόμενα κατὰ μικρὰ μόρια παρατίθεσθαι ἀλλήλοις, τοὺς δ' 
ἀσωμάτους λόγους, εἴ τινές εἰσι λόγοι, συγκρίνασθαι”. As we see, the bodies are said to be 
broken into small pieces and juxtaposed to one another and it is also said that incorporeal logoi 
mix together (συγκρίνασθαι). Moraux upholds that this fragment by Arius describes a theory 
composed of two different phases, juxtaposition and final mixture (cf. the opposition μὲν/δὲ). As 
he aptly remarks, Arius’ reference to logoi (which Moraux translates as Formen or 
Eigenschaften) seems to be ascribable to a Stoic influence (cf. Cleanthes’ mixing logoi), but 
according to him this terminology would correspond to the rather Aristotelian term poiotēs, 
which can be found in other sources of the Peripatetic account (such as Galen, as we will see).  
However, Moraux ascribes this theory, which noticeably differs from Aristotle’s genuine 
account of De gen. et corr. I 10, not to an emergent Peripatetic doctrine (a solution to be 
considered, given the resemblances with Alexander) but to a doxographical simplification and 
distortion of Aristotle’s theory; cf. Moraux 1973 pp. 280–283.  
166 De mixt. 231.12–16 Bruns. Cf. also De gen. et corr. 328b22.  
167 De gen. et corr. 328a.10–13; De mixt. 231.30 with reference to milk.  
168 Cf. Philop. In gen. et corr. 191.27–28 Vitelli “διά τινων διακριτικῶν τε καὶ ἀλλοιωτικῶν 
ὀργάνων ὁλόκληρον πάλιν τὸ οἰκεῖον εἶδος ἀπολαβεῖν”. 
169 De mixt. 231.25–27 Bruns.   
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γεννήσας τρόπον τινά) from every part of the blend where they were present 
only in potentiality.170  
After having made Alexander’s account of the process of mixture and its 
reversibility clear, which in turn stems from the interpretation of Aristotle’s 
account, I will try to place this theory within the Aristotelian physical system in 
order to understand its aim and justification and to throw into sharp relief the 
difference between the Peripatetic and the Stoic systems.  
As we have seen, in De mixtione as well as in De generatione et 
corruptione I 10, the product of mixture is defined as homoeomerous. However, 
Alexander does not explicitly explain the connection between the notion of 
mixture and Aristotle’s physical system, as his main goal seems to be that of 
setting up a criticism of the Stoic account.171 But what exactly is a 
homoeomerous part, for Aristotle? In De generatione et corruptione I 10, 
Aristotle describes the result of the mixture as follows: “the result of the mixture 
                                                          
170 De mixt. 232.26–31 Bruns “with the bodies that have been blended the difference is that each 
of the things in potentiality in the body produced from the blend is separated out, changing into 
the actuality of which it was deprived because of the fact that they are reciprocally acted upon 
to an equal extent” (trans. Todd; translation modified). For Alexander’s notion of potentiality cf. 
supra n. 159. One of the three examples that Alexander gives in order to illustrate the separation 
of constituents is that of a heated stone cast into milk, which is “a homoeomerous body 
containing in potentiality both moist and solid” that “separates each of them from it, and in some 
way creates them, making the one into cheese, the other into whey, not through separating a part 
actually inherent in the milk but by creating each of them from every part” (De mixt. 231.30–
232.1 Bruns trans. Todd; slightly modified). Apart from the example i) (that of a heated stone 
cast into milk, which re-creates the solid (cheese) and the liquid parts (whey) contained in the 
milk), Alexander gives two additional examples of separation of constituents: ii) that of 
fermentation in must, separating from the whole both air and wine; and iii) the Stoic example of 
the sponge dipped into olive oil, which attracts wine from a mixture of wine and water. As 
Kupreeva underscores, i) and ii) are not properly examples of reversibility but the causal 
mechanism is the same as that in which he describes the reversibility of water and wine from the 
mixture, cf. Kupreeva 2004a, p. 308 ff., who gives a clear description of the examples that 
Alexander puts forward and brings out the inner the anti-Stoic polemic that underlies his account 
of the recovery of the ingredients as only specifically identical.  
171 For the refutation occupies the central and most extensive part of De mixtione and the anti-
Stoic polemic permeates the whole treatise, including the last chapter on growth. Groisard´s 
explanation appears less convincing, according to which Alexander does not develop the 
connection between homoeomerous parts and mixture in depth, instead opting for a much stricter 
description of the theory as concretely applied only to the liquid mixable bodies, because of a 
reaction against the broad range of applications that the Stoic account of total mixture had within 
Stoic philosophy; cf. Groisard 2013 p. LVI. On the other hand, the lack of a biological 
Hintergrund underpinning Alexander´s De mixtione can be explained as a distinctive feature of 
Alexander’s overall philosophical project, where physics is subordinated to metaphysics and 
Aristotle’s interest in empirical observation is played off in favour of his overriding concern with 
an investigation of forms; Groisard 2013 pp. 42–66.  
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(τὸ μιχθέν) must be uniform in texture throughoutany part of such a compound 
being the same as the whole, just as any part of water is water” (τὸ μιχθὲν 
ὁμοιομερὲς εἶναι, καὶ ὥσπερ τοῦ ὕδατος τὸ μέρος ὕδωρ, οὕτω καὶ τοῦ 
κραθέντος).172 In this passage the adjective ὁμοιομερής is used to indicate every 
result of a mixture, whether inorganic or organic.173 Although the terminology 
is not always straightforwardly applied by the philosopher, it seems that, when 
the adjective is used as noun, it indicates all the homogeneous bodies, both 
inanimate and animate, but with a particular emphasis on biologicalanimal 
and vegetaltissues.174  
Since the notion of a homoeomerous part embraces both the inanimate and 
animate realms, we can see how Aristotle’s account of mixture can be applied to 
                                                          
172 De gen. et corr. 328a10–13 trans. Joachim.  
173 Kullmann 1982 p. 215, and analogously Joachim 1922 p. 192.   
174 Kullmann strictly distinguishes between a more general and a technical usage of the term 
ὁμοιομερής. As an adjective, according to Kullmann, it is used in a more general sense with 
reference to the equal repartition between sea and earth (cf. Top. 135a20ff.), or with reference 
to a continuous body understood from a physical perspective (cf. Phys. 212b5); whereas as a 
substantive, it would more technically indicate the homogeneous parts of living beings; cf. 
Kullmann 1982 p. 209. However, as Kullmann also admits, Aristotle does not always use the 
substantive with reference to a living beings’ tissues, as in Meteor. IV 388a13ff.; among 
homoeomerous stuffs he also includes “metals”, such as bronze, gold, silver, tin, iron, stone (as 
we will see, this usage will be followed by Galen), as does Joachim (1922 p. 188), who 
distinguishes between animate (animal and vegetal) and inanimate (stones and metals) 
homoeomerous parts.  In the biological writings the term ὁμοιομερής is defined in opposition 
with the anhomoeomerous parts (ἀνομοιομερής), indicating the organic unities of living beings, 
which are distinguished by a proper inner function; cf. Kullmann 1982 pp. 209–210. On the other 
hand, it is true that whereas Aristotle sometimes includes metals among the homoeomerous parts, 
on other occasions he clearly draws a distinction between μεταλλευόμενα and homoeomerous 
parts understood as biological tissues (cf. Meteor. IV 384b30ff. “ἐκ μὲν οὖν ὕδατος καὶ γῆς τὰ 
ὁμοιομερῆ σώματα συνίσταται, καὶ ἐν φυτοῖς καὶ ἐν ζῴοις, καὶ τὰ μεταλλευόμενα, οἷον χρυσὸς 
καὶ ἄργυρος καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα”). For an historical overview of the development of the 
concept of homoeomerous parts from Aristotle to Bichat’s tissues, cf. Forrester 1994. Cf. also 
Chalmers 2009, who also draws attention to a possible alternative account of the homoeomerous 
parts in Meteorologica IV and De generatione et corruptione. For Chalmers argues that, 
differently from De generatione et corruptione, in Meteorologica IV some homoeomerous parts, 
such as metals and rocks, are discontinuous and have pores in their composition, the reason for 
this being a less strict application of the definition, which entails the homogeneity of the 
compound; cf. p. 21. Moreover, we have to note that in his account of mixture, Aristotle does 
not draw a distinction between two types of homoeomerous stuff (we can call them “basic”, i.e. 
that generated by a mixture of the four simple bodies, and “complex”, i.e. that generated by a 
mixture of mixtures), as Fine remarks (cf. Fine 1995 pp. 301–302). If, in fact, we inspect his 
account of mixture in De gen. et corr. (I 10, II 7–8), Aristotle puts both kinds on equal footing: 
bones, flesh (De gen. et corr. 334b30), a mixture of wine and water (De gen. et corr. I 10 
328a27), and an alloy of tin and copper (De gen. et corr. 328b8). Fine argues that in Aristotle’s 
account of mixture the hylomorphic structure of the primary elements has to be put on the same 
level as the hylomorphic structure of the mixture (the levelling version, which he opposes to the 
ascent version, the view that the hylomorphic complexity of the mixture is higher than its 
constituents).  On Aristole’s definition of ὁμοιομερής cf. also Höffe 2005 s.v.  
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two different scientific domains, that is, to both the study of the formation of 
compounds out of a mixture of primary elements (which would correspond to 
our inorganic chemistry) and biological sciences. 
 On the one hand, Aristotle’s theory of mixture, as it is formulated in De 
generatione et corruptione, together with the other Aristotelian “chemical 
treatise” Meteorologica IV,175 blazed new trails for the study of the process of 
mixture of inanimate compounds, and in this sense is regarded by scholars as the 
point of departure of both the ancient speculations on metals and their reception 
by ancient Greek alchemists,176 and also the constitution in modern times of what 
we nowadays call “chemistry.”177 However, it seems that Aristotle himself did 
not develop this scientific field very widely, although it is true that he was able 
to precisely grasp the main principle of chemistry (the transformation of the 
substances into one another and the formation of compounds out of a process of 
mixture) without making reference to modern measurement techniques.178 
Second, and more importantly, the concept of the homoeomerous part was 
broadly applied by Aristotle to his biological theories, insofar as the term 
designates organic tissues understood as one of the levels of structure in a living 
organism.179 In fact, although the main concern of De generatione et corruptione 
                                                          
175 Both treatises are linked in terms of content. In the first place in both the primary elements 
are thought of as composed of two of the four contrary powers, hot/cold and dry/wet, with two 
active (hot/cold) and two passive (dry/wet); cf. Meteor. IV 1 378b10–26 ; De gen. et corr. II 3 
330b3–5; and ibid. II 2 329b24–26. Second, in both the treatises, all the natural composite bodies 
are made of passive and active qualities, although in Meteorologica IV it is clarified that the 
passive qualities (dry/wet) work as material cause and the active qualities (hot/cold) work as 
efficient cause; cf. Meteor. 378b10–26; also 384b24–385a11. Differently from De gen. et corr., 
however, Meteorologica IV closely investigates the qualitative composition and “chemical” 
behaviour of the homoeomerous parts, as compounds of either earth or water or of both. 
However, although in De gen. et corr. Aristotle’s speculation on the homoeomerous parts does 
not pervade the whole treatise, there we find a much sharper account of the connection between 
Aristotle’s theory of mixture and the generation of the homoeomerous parts. On the link between 
De generatione et corruptione. and Meteorologica IV, cf. Frede 2004 p. 309 ff.  
176 On this cf. Viano 1996, who investigates the influence of Aristotle’s account of mixture in 
De gen. et corr. I 10 on the ideas of ancient Greek alchemists, such as Zosimus, Stephanus, and 
Olympiodorus (in whose writings Aristotle’s conceptions related to mixture can be found, such 
as the difference between potentiality and actuality in the mixture or the active role of the 
qualities in the process of mixture as efficient cause); cf. Viano 1996 pp. 189–213. 
177 Bogaard 2012, Needham 2012.  
178 Kullmann 1982 pp. 214–215. 
179 In De part. an. II 1 646a12–24, Aristotle’s describes the three syntheseis of living beings’ 
organisms: the first from elemental powers to simple compounds, the second from simple 
compounds to homoeomerous parts (that is, organic tissues like flesh, bone, etc.), and the third 
from homoeomerous to anhomoeomerous or organic parts (face, hand, etc.), cf. Lennox 2001 
comments ad 646a12–24 pp. 180–181. In his De mixtione, Alexander follows Aristotle’s 
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is that of giving a thorough account of the μεταβολαί of the substance 
(substantial generation, alteration, growth, and diminution) and to provide a 
clear description of the system of primary elements and their reciprocal 
qualitative transformation, it can be also partly seen as a prolegomenon to 
Aristotle’s biology.180 For in Chapters II 7 and II 8 of De generatione et 
corruptione the process of mixture, which was described in more general terms 
in I 10, is concretely applied to the generation of the homoeomerous parts out of 
a mixture of the primary stoicheia. In these chapters, Aristotle’s biological 
perspective comes out clearly, as the homoeomerous parts he speaks of are 
clearly animal tissues, such as flesh, marrow, and bones,181 where all of the 
simple bodies, namely fire, air, water, and earth, are equally present (in different 
proportions).182 A homoeomerous compound in fact comes to be when the 
primary elements merge together and give rise to an intermediate product, as hot 
and cold reach a common midpoint (metaxu) by acting and being acted upon by 
one another and, at the same time, dry and wet also reach a common midpoint 
by acting and being acted upon by one another through the action of the 
“immanent” tempered-hot, which, qua active quality, acts on them.183  
Two all-important and interrelated aspects concerning the nature of this 
intermediate product, the homooemerous part, remain to be clarified: the 
ontological status of the homoeomerous part and its hylomorphic analysis. 
According to Aristotle (although the principle undergoes modification in the 
tradition and in particular in Alexander), the parts of animals are not full-fledged 
substances insofar as they are not i) separate and ii) do not form a unity.184 
                                                          
terminology: in the section dedicated to growth he differentiates between homoeomerous and 
anhomoeomerous parts of the living beings’ structure; De mixt. 234.32ff. Bruns.  
180 On the link between De gen. et corr. and Aristotle’s biological works, cf. Rashed 2005 intr. 
pp. 140–186 
181 De gen. et corr. 334b24ff. “out of the elements there come-to-be flesh and bones and the like, 
the hot becoming cold and the cold becoming hot when they have been brought to the ‘mean’. 
For at the mean is neither hot nor cold”.  
182 De gen. et corr. 334b30ff.  
183 De gen. et corr. 334b8–16 and Joachim’s comments ad loc. in Joachim 1922 pp. 241–242. 
Cf. also Joachim 1904 pp. 81–86. Cf. also Joachim 1922 comm. ad De gen. et corr. 329b24–26 
in Joachim 1922 pp. 204–207. 
184 Metaph. 1040b5ff. “Φανερὸν δὲ ὅτι καὶ τῶν δοκουσῶν εἶναι οὐσιῶν αἱ πλεῖσται δυνάμεις 
εἰσί, τά τε μόρια τῶν ζῴων (οὐθὲν γὰρ κεχωρισμένον αὐτῶν ἐστίν· ὅταν δὲ χωρισθῇ, καὶ τότε 
ὄντα ὡς ὕλη πάντα) καὶ γῆ καὶ πῦρ καὶ ἀήρ· οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν ἕν ἐστιν, ἀλλ' οἷον σωρός, πρὶν ἢ 
πεφθῇ καὶ γένηταί τι ἐξ αὐτῶν ἕν”. Cf. Rashed 2005 126–127. In contrast to Aristotle, however, 
Alexander of Aphrodisias declares that parts of substances are themselves substances; cf. De an. 
6.3–4 Bruns; cf. Caston 2012 comm. ad De an. 6.3–4 Bruns p. 82. 
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However, although they cannot be substances in the fullest sense of the word, 
the homoeomerous parts are possessed of a coarse and incipient matter–form 
distinction. They are materially constituted by the primary stoicheia185 (fire, air, 
water, and earth are in fact simple bodies, whose matter in turn cannot be 
separable but is always bound up with a contrariety186), whereas their form (in 
the sense of internal structure and as opposed to matter), though rudimental and 
primitive,187 is the ratio or proportion (logos) of the primary elements within the 
mixture188even though it must be underlined, in the key textual loci dealing 
with mixture (De gen. et corr. I 10 and II 7–8), only at one point does Aristotle 
clearly speak of logos as referring to the proportion of the elements in the 
mixture: he is far more concerned with singling out a broader central region (or 
meson) out of which come the homoeomerous parts.189 Moreover, as Joachim 
remarks: “the ‘formula expressing the essential nature’ of a ὁμοιομερές (like 
bone) is the λόγος τῆς μίξεως of its constituents, i.e. the scheme of proportions 
constituting the plan of the combination. This ‘combining formula’ (a) 
adequately expresses the ‘form’ (and is therefore the scientific definition) of the 
ὁμοιομερές; and (b) states the normal or perfect development of the ὁμοιομερές, 
                                                          
185 In De gen. et corr., the primary stoicheia are understood qualitatively (cf. De gen. et corr. II 
3 330a30ff.) “Ἐπεὶ δὲ τέτταρα τὰ στοιχεῖα, τῶν δὲ τεττάρων ἓξ αἱ συζεύξεις, τὰ δ' ἐναντία οὐ 
πέφυκε συνδυάζεσθαι (θερμὸν γὰρ καὶ ψυχρὸν εἶναι τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ πάλιν ξηρὸν καὶ ὑγρὸν 
ἀδύνατον), φανερὸν ὅτι τέτταρες ἔσονται αἱ τῶν στοιχείων συζεύξεις, θερμοῦ καὶ ξηροῦ, καὶ 
θερμοῦ καὶ ὑγροῦ, καὶ πάλιν ψυχροῦ καὶ ὑγροῦ, καὶ ψυχροῦ καὶ ξηροῦ”. Cf. also Frede 2004 p. 
303. However, in De gen. et corr. II 8 334b31–335a9 esp. 334b31–32, it is said that all the 
intermediate bodies are made up of simple bodies, in patent contrast with De part. an. II 1. 
Rashed perceptively seeks to harmonize this account in De gen. et corr. II 8 with the previously 
quoted text from De part. an. II 1 646a12–24 (whereas we have seenthe homoeomerous 
parts are seen to be constituted by primary qualitative dynameis) although the question remains 
controversial since De gen. et corr. II 8 does not go much deeper into the question. As Rashed 
remarks, Aristotle’s account might appear to disagree with De part. an. II 1, but this 
disagreement seems to him to be only apparent. For, as Rashed maintains, by means of nutrition 
(the nutritional chain, from the omnivorous animal to the simple bodies, is described at De gen. 
et corr. II 8 335a9 ff.), the primary qualities together with the simple bodies are supposed to 
enter the living body, to be assimilated and thus found at the first level of composition of blooded 
animals, i.e. the homoeomerous parts; cf. Rashed 2005 pp. 128–129. 
186 Cf. De gen. et corr. 329a24–35; this matter, seen as the ultimate material substratum, has been 
traditionally identified with so-called prime matter. The question of whether in Aristotle such a 
concept exists is still hotly debated in the scholarship; for a good summary of the noteworthy 
Aristotelian passages and the main positions taken by scholars, cf. Caston 2012 pp. 76–78. 
187 Furth 1987 p. 43 n. 46.  
188 Rashed 2005 p. 127.  
189 De gen. et corr. 334b10–28. Solmsen attributes the reason for such a reluctance to Aristotle’s 
polemic against Empedocles cf. Solmsen 1960 pp. 375-377 ; cf. amplius infra.  
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its φύσις in the sense of τὸ τέλος τῆς γενέσεως (cf. e.g. Met. 1015a10–11), i.e. 
its good.”190  
However, Aristotle’s λόγος τῆς μίξεως does not have the same importance 
as the form of the entire living being. As Furth remarks, in Aristotle’s view a 
living being’s form considered as a whole cannot be reduced to the mere mixture 
of its basic constituents: there is a considerable difference between mixture and 
form as internal (biological) structure marking off a distinct type of living being 
and its distinctive activities (and if one fails to appreciate this, one falls into the 
Empedoclean trap). For it is this inner principle of organization of living being 
that, by being chronologically and logically prior and by being transmitted 
through the process of reproduction, determines the precise and eternal 
replication of the proportions of elements in the formation of the individual parts 
of a new living being belonging to a certain species: this is the reason why a 
human being begets a human being.191  
Finally, there is a last point to be dealt with in our account of the 
Aristotelian and Peripatetic models of mixture and this explicitly relates to the 
evolution of Aristotle’s philosophical system brought about by the Peripatetic 
tradition, especially by Alexander of Aphrodisias. This point concerns the 
account of the soul and the “ensouling” of a body, and its connection to the 
theory of the elemental mixture. 
 In De anima, the soul or psyché of all living beings is regarded as a form 
insofar as it is the unifying organising principle (of we spoke earlier) which is 
the source of the inner structure and the distinguishing activities that demarcate 
different types of living beings, plants and animals192 (it is defined as ἀρχὴ τῶν 
ζῴων De an. 412a7–8).  However, as Moraux notes, although the form is 
                                                          
190 Joachim 1922 p. 235 comm. ad De gen. et corr. 333b16–20. 
191 Furth 1987 and esp. pp. 42–46 for Aristotle’s criticism of the Empedoclean theory of mixture. 
Cf. De part. an. 640a10–b4. Cf. also Tracy 1969 p. 169–170 with n. 26. In natural processes, in 
fact, formal, efficient and final causes often coincide: Phys. 198a24ff: “ἔρχεται δὲ τὰ τρία εἰς ἓν 
πολλάκις· i) (formal) τὸ μὲν γὰρ τί ἐστι καὶ ii) (final) τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα ἕν ἐστι, iii) (efficient) τὸ δ' 
ὅθεν ἡ κίνησις πρῶτον τῷ εἴδει (species) ταὐτὸ τούτοις· ἄνθρωπος γὰρ ἄνθρωπον γεννᾷ“. 
192 As is well known, Aristotle defines the soul as “the form of a natural body which potentially 
has life” (De an. II 1 412a21), each type of body having a distinct form of its own (De an. I 3 
407b23–24), and, by zeroing in on the soul’s causal powers corresponding to the distinctive 
energiai of living beings, also as “the first actuality (entelecheia) of a natural body possessed of 
organs” (De an. II 1 412b5–6). On Aristotle’s definition(s) of soul within the context of De 
anima, cf. Menn 2002.  
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transmissible from the living being (which already possesses it in act) to a new 
living being, in order to guarantee the eternity of the species, the soul, insofar as 
it is form, cannot be generated from an elemental mixture and cannot even be 
said to be “generable” as the synolon is.193 
Differently from Aristotle and by probably drawing on and responding to 
the views of his predecessors, not in De mixtione but instead in De anima, 
Alexander of Aphrodisias establishes a clear link between mixture and the 
arising of soul in living things and defines the soul “as the power or the form 
that supervenes (or follows) on the blend of bodies in a particular proportion” (ἡ 
γὰρ δύναμις καὶ τὸ εἶδος τὸ ἐπιγινόμενον τῇ κατὰ τὸν τοιόνδε λόγον κράσει τῶν 
σωμάτων ψυχή cf. De an. 25.2–5 Bruns),194 comparing it to a healing power 
which emerges from a blend of drugs (cf. De an. 24.23–25.2 Bruns).195 
Alexander arrives at this definition after having considered the nature of all the 
natural bodies within the physical realm and their relation to one another. For he 
declares that, when the simple bodies (fire, air, water, and earth, which are made 
up of (prime) matter and form) mix with one another, out of this mixture arise 
compounded bodies with simple bodies as their matter and their own distinctive 
form (which although emerges from the underlying constituents no longer 
coincide with them but is over and above them). When these latter compound 
bodies in turn mix with one another and, therefore, serve as underlying matter, 
more and more complex compound bodies are generated with a higher-order 
distinctive form (NB: the compounded bodies to which Alexander refers are all 
the other natural bodies in the scala naturae, ranging from inanimate 
compounded bodies to living beings, such as plants and animals):196 each level 
                                                          
193 Cf. Metaph. 1033b5–9, b16–18, esp. 1039b20–27, cf. also 1043b16–18, 1069b35–36; cf. 
Moraux 1942 pp. 37–38.  
194 Galen reports that the Aristotelian Andronicus of Rhodes (1st century BCE) affirmed that the 
soul is “either a mixture or a dynamis that follows on the mixture” (Quod animi mor. K. IV p. 
782). According to Caston (2012 p. 114), in his De Anima Alexander would have wanted to 
defend the second alternative proposed by Andronicus while instead rejecting the simple 
harmonia-theory of the soul that stringently identified the soul with the mixture and that, 
centuries ago, had started gaining ground even among some members of Aristotle’s Lyceum. In 
general, on pre-Alexandrian Aristotelian psychology, cf. Moraux 1942 pp. 1 ff. and Caston 1997 
pp. 339–346.  
195 A blend of drugs which Caston identifies with the tetrapharmakos. Cf. Caston 2012 p. 114 
comm. ad De an. 24.23–25.2 Bruns, cf. amplius infra.pp. 100 ff. 
196 De an. 1.1–11.1 Bruns. On Alexander’s concept of prime matter and his hylomorphic analysis 
of simple and compounded bodies, cf. Caston 2012 pp. 5–6. Cf. also Moraux 1942 p. 30 ff. and 
Accattino 1995 pp. 184–197. 
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of complexity of the underlying bodies corresponds to an advancement and a 
progressive enrichment of the complexity of the formal differences which, at 
each level, from plants to human beings, are responsible for the behaviours and 
activities that distinguish each type of living being (esp. De an. 9.1–11.1 Bruns). 
To quote Alexander: 
 
If there is to be a compound natural body, over and above the simple bodies (παρὰ 
τὰ ἁπλᾶ σώματα), then it must have several simples bodies as its underlying 
subjects […] The [body] then which has many differing forms conjoined with 
matter as its underlying subject, has a nature and form that is of necessity more 
complex and more advanced, since each nature in the bodies underlying it makes 
a contribution to the form that stands over them all and is common to them 
[ἑκάστης φύσεως τῶν ἐν τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις αὐτῇ σώμασιν συντελούσης τι πρὸς 
τὸ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν κοινὸν εἶδος αὐτοῖς) For this sort of form is in a way a form of forms 
and a kind of culmination of culminations (εἶδος γάρ πως εἰδῶν γίνεται τὸ 
τοιοῦτον εἶδος καὶ τελειότης τις τελειοτήτων]. (De an. 8.5–13 Bruns, trans. 
Caston; additions in Caston’s original)  
 
As Caston clearly explains:  
 
Each new level of complexity therefore involves formal differences that cannot 
be identified with or reduced to the levels underlying it as matter. The primary 
causal explanation of behaviour distinctive of a certain level will thus always be 
‘from the top’ in terms of the higher-level form that emerges, even if the lower 
underlying levels determine which form emerges. And even there the role of form 
is still paramount. Higher-level forms emerge only in compound bodies, where 
the constituent materials are themselves bodies and so have form and matter of 
his own; and it is these lower-level forms which contribute to something 
(suntelousês ti) to the higher-level form that stands in common over them (to epi 
pasin koinon eidos). It is for this reason that Alexander describes the higher-level 
form as ‘in a sense a form of forms and a culmination of culmination’.197 
 
                                                          
197 Caston 2012 pp. 11–12; emphasis added.  
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Hence, it is understandable now why the soul is defined by Alexander as 
“as the power or the form that supervenes on the blend of bodies in a particular 
proportion,” because, at each level of organization of the living being, the form 
emerges from (epigignesthai) the mixture of all the underlying natural bodies 
(ultimately deriving in turn from the mixture of the four simple bodies, ἡ γὰρ 
γένεσις αὐτῆς (sc. of the soul) ἐκ τῆς ποιᾶς μίξεώς τε καὶ κράσεως τῶν πρώτων 
σωμάτων at De an. 24.3–4 Bruns): in this progressive hierarchy of forms the 
distinctive lower-level forms of the material constituents are responsible for the 
higher-level distinctive forms.198  
 
 As we see from this overview of the Stoic and Peripatetic accounts of 
mixture, therefore, the two accounts of mixture differ notably with regard to their 
                                                          
198 De an. 10.17–19 Bruns and cf. the very clear example of fire at 5.4–6 Bruns. For useful 
comments, supported by references to Alexandrian texts, relating to the key role played by lower-
level forms in determining higher-level forms, cf. Caston 2012 pp. 86–87 comm. ad 10.17–19 
Bruns. As Caston argues, Alexander’s non-reductive naturalism can be labelled emergentism (in 
a very similar way to that which in modern philosophy of mind is called emergentism as opposed 
to epiphenomenalism: both admit the supervenience of mental facts from physical facts but only 
the first allows for the downward causation of mental on physical; cf. Caston 1997 pp. 309–319 
and pp. 353–354. The case of Alexander of Aphrodisias is analysed at pp. 347 ff. As Accattino 
(although he is not inclined to speak of non-reductive naturalism; cf. Accattino 1995 pp. 199–
200) and more recently Caston have observed, the notion of the “supervenience” of form on 
matter (which in Alexander’s quoted text is expressed by recourse to the Greek verb 
epigignesthai) reaches back to Aristotle himself, who makes use of verbs such as gignesthai 
epì/epigignestai to express the case in which the form supervenes on or is engendered in the 
arrangement of matter, as long as the synolon of which it is form exists: in this case, therefore, 
the form “appears” in the synolon (Accattino uses the Italian “presentarsi”, which translates into 
German as “auftreten”, adopted by Frede and Patzig to express the supervenience of form on 
matter; cf. Accattino 1995 p. 198) without being subjected to generation/corruption; cf. Metaph. 
1035a5 and 12, 1036a31–2 and 1036b6. However, it must be admitted that although the notion 
of the supervenience of form on matter can be found scattered throughout Aristotle’s work, it 
seems indeed that Alexander goes a big step further than Aristotle when he says that ἡ γὰρ 
γένεσις αὐτῆς (sc. of the soul) ἐκ τῆς ποιᾶς μίξεώς τε καὶ κράσεως τῶν πρώτων σωμάτων at De 
an. 24.3–4, cf. also 26.22 (Accattino tries to brand it as an isolated statement, while it is instead, 
as we have seen, the very core and the heart of Alexander’s argument; cf. Accattino 1995 p. 200). 
Another interrelated issue concerns the priority and primacy of form over matter. Moraux 
observes that the mixture of the constitutive elements is not only the conditio sine qua non of the 
generation of the soul but also its innermost cause: therefore, rather than being a prior principle 
of internal organization/structure of a living being, the soul qua form is not only posterior to the 
mixture but is also its final “result”; Moraux 1942 p. 33. Sharples perceptively raises an objection 
to Moraux’s view by pointing out i) that in Alexander’s De anima it is clearly stated that it is the 
form of each thing which a priori determines its nature (De an. 7.4–8), and by reporting ii) a 
passage taken from a report by Simplicius (In Phys. 310.25–311.19) of Alexander’s account of 
the generation of living beings where, as in Aristotle, the form plays the overriding role of 
formal/efficient cause thought of as prior to and setting in motion the process leading to the 
formation of a new living creature; cf. Sharples 1994 pp. 163–168. It seems to be reasonable, as 
Sharples aptly underscores, to say that Alexander emphasizes just one aspect of Aristotle’s 
theory; cf. Sharples 1994 pp. 163–164. 
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theoretical frameworks and physical and metaphysical implications. In fact, 
although both the Stoic and the Aristotelian accounts could accommodate more 
common everyday processes of mixture, their substantial aims and justifications 
are fundamentally different. For while the Stoic theory seems to be principally 
used in order to explain divine pneuma’s pervasion through passive matter, 
Aristotle’s theory of mixture applies to the formation of uniform compounds, be 
they inanimate or, more importantly, biological homoeomerous stuff.199 
Moreover, we register a decisive development of the theory of mixture within 
the Peripatetic philosophical system of the 2nd–3rd century CE, insofar as 
mixture of underlying natural bodies is used to explain the emergence of the 
soul’s causal powers.  
 
 
                                                          
199 I do not agree with Salles 2008, who sees in Chrysippus a formation of homoeomerous bodies 
equivalent to Aristotle’s account. In the first place, Salles builds a Chrysippean theory of 
homoeomerous parts by making reference to just one isolated testimony, as he clearly admits; 
cf. Salles 2008 p. 15 n. 4. There is in fact only one source from which one can infer an account 
of the generation of the homoeomerous parts from a Stoic mixture of primary elements and that 
is Galen’s De causis contentivis CMG Suppl. Or. II 1.1–2.4 pp. 52-54 Lyons, where Galen 
mentions the Stoics as proponents of the theory that the bodies that Aristotle calls homoeomerous 
are generated out of the elemental mixture. On closer inspection of the text, however, one notes 
that although the Stoic theory of mixture is really connected to the formation of “homoeomerous 
bodies”, (which however recalls Aristotle’s formulation) the focus lies, consistent with the Stoic 
account, on the fact that the active elements (fire and air) work as cohesive cause of the passive 
elements (earth and water), as has been shown. In second place, one has to note that in Galen’s 
testimony the Stoic account is connected to the medical ideas of Athenaeus of Attalia, the 
founder of the Pneumatist medical school, who, as Galen reports, was a student of Posidonius 
(presumably of Apamea, the Stoic philosopher). According to Wellmann, although this medical 
school draws abundantly on Stoic theories, which are applied to their physiological doctrines 
(pneuma and its threefold degree of tensionhexis, physis, psyche, hegemonikon seated in 
the heart as ruling part of the soul, tonos, theory of the spermatikoi logoi, theory of perception), 
in some respects it also was influenced by Aristotelian ideas, such as in the case of the theory of 
reproduction (which corresponds to Aristotle’s account, where the male semen works as formal-
efficient cause and the female semen as material cause); cf. Wellmann 1895 pp. 131–158. 
Therefore, Athenaeus’ usage of the concept of homoeomerous parts, which in his view are 
permeated by pneuma (cf. De caus. content. CMG Suppl. Or. II 2.5 p. 54 Lyons), may also 
depend on the influence of Peripatetic ideas and in this he may have followed a more eclectic 
tendency, which makes its entrance in the middle Stoa with leaders such as Panaetius and 
Posidoniuswho combine Stoic conceptions with Plato’s and Aristotle’s theories; cf. Sellars 
2006 pp. 8–11; cf. Edelstein 1936 p. 288. Finally, but more importantly, it is very hard to believe 
that Chrysippus would have established a link between mixture and a corresponding equivalent 
of Aristotle’s biological homoeomerous stuff if we think that in the entire De mixtione and in the 
other pieces of evidence relating to the Chrysippean theory of total mixture there are no examples 
at all where the theory of total mixture is applied to the generation of one of the biological levels 
of living beings’ organic structure; hence it seems more appropriate and far safer to circumscribe 
the main explanatory justification of this Stoic theory and limit it to the clarification of the 
immanence of the two Stoic principles, logos and matter, as we did previously.  
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1.3 Galen’s account of the mixture of primary elements 
 
 
Galen's natural philosophy finds one of its major linchpins in the theory of 
mixture. In Galen’s case, the concept of the mixture of primary elements is 
fundamental for two main reasons. In the first place, the notion of mixture 
theoretically underpins Galen’s physiology, therapeutics, and dietetics. On the 
one hand, material substances that are used in the everyday regimen and for 
therapeutic purposes, such as food, drink, and drugs, have a particular mixture 
and of hot, cold, dry, and wet. On the other hand, as stated in De temperamentis, 
the nature of a living being is a mixture of hot, cold, dry, and wet (De Temp. p. 
104, 1–3 H.) and, therefore, its health and pathological states are conditioned by 
the balance or the imbalance of the elemental qualities. That is clearly stated in 
De temperamentis, where Galen claims that the right distribution of the primary 
elements in the mixture is cause (αἰτία) of eukrasia, good mixture, and health 
(the reference is to the spring De temp. 16.15–16 H.). Accordingly, medical 
treatment consists in the interaction between the mixture of living bodies and 
food, drink, or drugs, as these substances will replenish or reduce the quantity of 
hotness, coldness, dryness, or moistness present in the living body so as to re-
establish the right proportion.200 However, it cannot be glossed over that mixture 
is first of all and primarily a physical process, where the primary elements 
(Galen’s fire, water, air, and earth, which are simple by nature, unmixed and 
unblended, possessing a couple of primary qualities at the extreme degree)201 
mix together and give rise to all the compound physical bodies, inanimate and 
animate. As such, the concrete and physical process of mixture is an essential 






                                                          
200 Van der Eijk 2008, Van der Eijk 2011, Van der Eijk 2014a.  
201 De elem. sec. Hipp. CMG V 1.2. pp. 112.21–114.4 De Lacy. 
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1.3.1 Syncretistic approach 
 
 
But how does this process concretely occur? What does it bring about and 
how does Galen’s account of mixture relate to a long-lasting medical 
speculation, notably Hippocratic, on the concept of mixture and to its major 
contemporary models, the Stoic and the Peripatetic? One of the first crucial 
points to tackle in seeking to unravel Galen’s stunningly variegated and protean 
background is his openly syncretistic approach. For in the texts where he 
describes his theory of mixture, which he calls total (δι' ὅλων), he equally 
attributes it to Hippocrates (and the reference is more precisely to the 
Hippocratic writing De natura hominis), Aristotle, and the Stoics. Let us 
consider the texts (T1-4). 
 
T1 Galen De elementis ex Hipp. K. I 489.6–11 De Lacy 136.15–20 : 
 
καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ ὅπως δι' ὅλων κεράννυται τὰ κεραννύμενα, πότερα τῶν 
ποιοτήτων μόνων, ὡς Ἀριστοτέλης ὑπέλαβεν, ἢ καὶ τῶν σωματικῶν οὐσιῶν δι' 
ἀλλήλων ἰουσῶν, οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον ἐπίστασθαι τοῖς ἰατροῖς· ὅθεν οὐδ' Ἱπποκράτης 
ἀπεφήνατό τι περὶ τούτων, ἀλλ' ἠρκέσθη μόνῳ τῷ δι' ὅλων κεκρᾶσθαι τὰ 
στοιχεῖα.  
 
Moreover, it is not necessary for physicians to understand how things are 
mixed through and through, whether the mixtures are of qualities only, as 
Aristotle supposed, or of corporeal substances that pass through each other; that 
is why Hippocrates said nothing about these matters but was content with the 
mere fact that the elements are mixed in their entirety. (Transl. De Lacy) 
 
T2 Galen in Hipp. Nat. Hom. comment. K. XV 32.1–11 Mewaldt 18.27–19.7: 
 
ὅτι γὰρ οὐχ ἕν ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ πλείω τὰ συντιθέντα τὴν | τοῦ ἀνθρώπου φύσιν, 
ἐπιδείκνυσιν ὁ Ἱπποκράτης, οὐ μὴν ὅτι γε μηδέν ἐστι τῶν τεττάρων στοιχείων 
εἰλικρινὲς ἐν τῷ σώματι. τὴν ἀρχὴν γὰρ οὐδὲ λέγουσιν οἱ τῆς δόξης ταύτης 
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ἡγεμόνες τοῦτο. ἓν δή τι παρὰ τὰ τέτταρα, τὸ ἐξ αὐτῶν συγκείμενον, 
ἀποφαίνονται, ὥς γε τὴν τετραφάρμακον δύναμιν οὔτε κηρὸν οὔτε πίτταν οὔτε 
ῥητίνην οὔτε στέαρ, ἀλλά τι παρὰ ταῦτα ἓν ἄλλο, ὃ ἐξ ἁπάντων κραθέντων 
γέγονεν, οὔσης πάλιν καὶ αὐτῆς τῆς δόξης διττῆς· ἔνιοι μὲν γὰρ τὰς τέτταρας 
ποιότητας μόνας κεράννυσθαι δι' ὅλων ἀλλήλαις λέγουσιν, ἔνιοι δὲ <καὶ> τὰς 
οὐσίας ἀπεφήναντο202, Περιπατητικοὶ μὲν τῆς προτέρας δόξης προστάντες, 
Στωϊκοὶ δὲ τῆς δευτέρας.  
 
For Hippocrates showed that what constitutes the nature of man is not one 
thing but many, not that none of the four exists in the body in its pure state. For 
the leading proponents of this doctrine do not say that this is the principle. Rather 
they hold that there is one thing over and above the four, and which is constituted 
from them, just as the power of the tetrapharmakon is neither wax, pitch, resin, 
nor fat, but something else over and above them, which is generated from the 
mixture of all of them, although this latter doctrine comes in two forms.  For 
some people say that only the four qualities are mixed through-and-through with 
one another, while others hold that also the substances themselves are (the 
Peripatetics favour the former doctrine, the Stoics the latter). (Trans. Hankinson; 
slightly modified)  
 
T3 Galen De methodo medendi K. X 16.2–24: 
 
τὸ γὰρ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν καὶ τὸ ξηρὸν καὶ τὸ ὑγρὸν Ἱπποκράτης μὲν 
πρῶτος εἰσηγήσατο, μετ' αὐτὸν δ' Ἀριστοτέλης ἀπέδειξεν· ἕτοιμα δ' ἤδη 
παραλαβόντες οὐκ ἐφιλονείκησαν οἱ περὶ τὸν Χρύσιππον, ἀλλ' ἐκ τούτων τὰ 
σύμπαντα κεκρᾶσθαι λέγουσι, καὶ ταῦτ' εἰς ἄλληλα πάσχειν καὶ δρᾷν καὶ 
τεχνικὴν εἶναι τὴν φύσιν, ἅπαντά τε τὰ περὶ φύσεως Ἱπποκράτους δόγματα 
προσίενται, πλὴν περὶ μικροῦ τινός ἐστιν αὐτοῖς ἡ διαφορὰ πρὸς Ἀριστοτέλη (..) 
διαφέρονται δὲ ἐν τῷ τὰς μὲν ποιότητας μόνας τὸν Ἀριστοτέλη δι' ἀλλήλων ἰέναι 
                                                          
202De elementis sec. Hipp. CMG V 1.2 De Lacy p. 136.15–20. On the basis of a comparison with 
the other analogous passages listed here, where Galen assigns to the Stoics the view that the 
substances (together with the qualities) can also be mixedcf. De meth. Med. K. X 16.24 “ἀλλὰ 
καὶ τὰς οὐσίας αὐτὰς”; De nat. fac. p. 104, 12 H. “οὕτω καὶ τὰς οὐσίας”I conjecture a καὶ 
which, because of the fact that it may have been as usual paleographically abbreviated, might 
have been omitted at some point in the textual tradition.  
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καὶ κεράννυσθαι πάντῃ, τοὺς δ' ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς οὐ ταύτας μόνας, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς 
οὐσίας αὐτὰς ὑπολαμβάνειν. 
 
For Hippocrates was the first to propose the hot, the cold, the dry and the 
moist, and after him Aristotle proved them. And the followers of Chrysippus, 
when they accepted these things already to hand, were not embroiled in 
contention. Rather, they say that all the things are compounded from these (four 
elemental qualities), and that these things are affected by and act on each other, 
and that nature is craftsman. And they approve all the other doctrines of 
Hippocrates regarding nature, apart from one minor point which is a difference 
between them and Aristotle […]. However, they differ in this: Aristotle held that 
the qualities alone go through one another and mix together completely, whereas 
those from the Stoa suppose that not these qualities only but also the substances 
themselves do this. (Trans. Johnston-Horsley; slightly modified) 
 
T4 Galen De naturalibus facultatibus K. II 5.8–17 Helmreich 104.6–15:  
 
καὶ μέντοι καὶ τὸ κεράννυσθαι δι' ἀλλήλων αὐτὰς ὅλας δι' ὅλων 
Ἱπποκράτης ἁπάντων [ὧν ἴσμεν] πρῶτος ἔγνω· καὶ τὰς ἀρχάς γε τῶν 
ἀποδείξεων, ὧν ὕστερον Ἀριστοτέλης μετεχειρίσατο, παρ' ἐκείνῳ πρώτῳ 
γεγραμμένας ἔστιν εὑρεῖν. εἰ δ' ὥσπερ τὰς ποιότητας οὕτω καὶ τὰς οὐσίας δι' 
ὅλων κεράννυσθαι χρὴ νομίζειν, ὡς ὕστερον ἀπεφήνατο Ζήνων ὁ Κιττιεύς, οὐχ 
ἡγοῦμαι δεῖν ἔτι περὶ τούτου κατὰ τόνδε τὸν λόγον ἐπεξιέναι. 
 
 Hippocrates was also the first to recognize that all these qualities undergo 
an intimate mingling with one another; and at least the beginnings of the proofs 
to which Aristotle later set his hand are to be found first in the writings of 
Hippocrates. As to whether we are to suppose that the substances as well as their 
qualities undergo this intimate mingling, as Zeno of Citium afterwards declared, 





As we see, in these four passages where Galen’s syncretistic approach is 
glaringly visible, the formulation is analogous and presents only slight 
variations: in Galen’s view, in fact, Hippocrates held that the primary elements 
mix completely (δι' ὅλων κεράννυσθαι), and only afterwards did Aristotle and 
Zeno, Chrysippus, or the the Stoics generally get hold of the theorybut there 
is a difference between them. For the former was convinced that only the 
qualities totally mix, whereas the latter thought that corporeal substances or 
substances-cum-qualities also totally mix. In most cases Galen adds that it is not 
necessary for a physician to understand whether the qualities or the substances-
cum-qualities mix. For Hippocrates was merely content with the fact that the 
primary elements mix totally.  
However, the theories that Galen mentions together are really different 
from one another both in terms of modalities and purposes. First of all, Galen’s 
Hippocrates of De natura hominis does not actually set up a theory of mixture 
of the four elements at all; he rather speaks of a mixture of the four humours, 
such as blood, yellow and black bile, and phlegm.203 Second, as we saw, 
although they both rely on a system of four elements that change into each other, 
the Aristotelian and Stoic theories are different: the former is based on a 
progressive division of constituents followed by a unification brought about by 
a qualitative interaction, and the latter presupposes a coextension of two or more 
bodies. Moreover, although both models account for the everyday processes of 
mixture, their main aims and justifications are different. If Aristotle’s account 
points to the generation of homeomerous stuff, biological or inorganic materials, 
the Stoics from Chrysippus on used the total mixture to explain the complete 
interpenetration of pneuma and matter.  
                                                          
203 In this writing the Hippocratic author describes a quadripartite system of humours: 
blood, yellow and black bile, and phlegm. Each of these humours is assigned two primary 
qualities: blood is hot and moist, yellow bile is dry and hot, black bile is dry and cold, and phlegm 
is moist and cold. In this treatise the humoralistic perspective is overtly dominant and the 
humours are conceived as building blocks of the nature of the human being. They are essential 
for understanding the physiology and pathology of human beings their health and pathological 
states depend respectively on a balanced and imbalanced mixture of the four humours. The 
humoralism of the nature of the human being is clearly spelled out in Ch. 4 CMG I 1.3 pp. 
172.13–174.10 Jouanna.  
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The reason for this syncretistic conflation seems to me to be twofold. On 
the one hand such an approach can be explained in terms of an argumentative 
strategy and rhetorical use of the authorities. In fact it is typical of Galen’s 
overall thought to offer purposely syncretistic interpretations and to build 
shifting alliances in order to pursue his arguments, although he is perfectly aware 
of the doctrinal discrepancies that exist between the authorities that he quotes 
and he does this even at the cost of distorting the sources on which he draws.204 
For example, if on this occasion he teams up with these authorities, as well as 
with Aristotle, on the other hand he criticizes them both ferociously and without 
reservations for having posited the seat of the ruling part of the soul as being in 
the heart rather than in the brain, as happens in De placitis Hippocratis et 
Platonis205.  
However, this attitude and way of setting up theories cannot be reduced to 
a mere matter of rhetoric insofar as Galen, who had an eclectic philosophical 
education,206 is ultimately truly and profoundly convinced of the fundamental 
unity of the major philosophical schools with regards to some central issues and, 
thus, that their languages are translatable into one another.207 Therefore, in such 
                                                          
204 For Galen’s use of the authorities (apart from Hippocrates) cf. Donini 1974; Todd 1977 (on 
Galen’s use of Aristotle’s authority and more specifically on the reverberations of Galen’s 
medical ideas in later Peripatetic commentators); Lloyd 1988 (on Galen’s usage of authorities in 
Quod animi mores); von Staden 1991 (on Galen’s use of the sources, in general and in particular 
with regard to his acquaintance with Herophilus’ original writings and doxographical reports); 
Vegetti 1999a, 1999b esp. p. 391 (where Vegetti explains the role of Galen’s use of the Stoics 
as regards the total mixture); Tieleman 2003a pp. 39–46 (with reference to the Stoics and poetic 
tradition); Lloyd 2008, esp. p. 40 ff.  
205 See Tieleman 1996a pp. 38–60 (for an analysis of Galen’s refutation of Stoics and Peripatetics 
regarding the seat of the soul in Books 1–3 of De Placitis Hippocratis et Platonis); see also 
Vegetti 1999a pp. 333–357.  
206 At Pergamum Galen studied under students of the Platonic Gaius and the Stoic Philopator, 
and in Smyrna under another Platonist Albinus. He also studied Stoic Logic as a boy; cf. 
Hankinson 1992 pp. 3505–3507 and Donini 1992. In Rome he met the Peripatetic Eudemus who, 
according to Moraux, would coincide with the student of the Peripatetic Aspasius under whom 
Galen studied in Pergamum; cf. Moraux 1984 p. 687 n. 1.  
207 In this regard, cf. Manuli 1986; Manuli insightfully studied Galen’s lexicon and pointed out 
Galen’s tendency to set up his arguments by making use of a non-homogeneous set of concepts 
and notions bearing the hallmark of different philosophical systems, such as the Platonic, the 
Peripatetic, and the Stoic. In this respect Galen would have mirrored syncretistic lexical 
tendencies that were shared by all the major philosophical schools. However, as Manuli 
underscores, Galen’s apparent multiplicity when it comes to philosophical and scientific 
languages does not conflict with the idea of an essential conceptual homogeneity at all. In fact, 
as Manuli shows, this continuous terminological exchange is possible only if the theories 
expressed by the terminologies respect a more common criterion of truth and ultimately if they 
are translatable into Hippocrates and Plato’s language, on whose agreement Galen’s medicine 
strongly relies; cf. Manuli 1986 pp. 245–247.  
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cases he tends to minimize the doctrinal differences and to fuse them together, 
providing the best possible synthesis.208 
 What, then, would be the point of putting all these diverse theories 
of mixture together? This is explained well by Vegetti, who has already 
highlighted the strategic role that this alliance between Hippocrates, Aristotle, 
and the Stoics plays for the creation of a “friendly tradition” of continuum 
theories, as were the Aristotelian and the Stoic. If in fact we want to assimilate 
Galen’s position to one of the two main groups of ancient matter theorists, which, 
as we saw, are so neatly sketched by Alexander in his De mixtione, we can say 
that Galen was a committed continuist, on a par with Stoics and Peripatetics. 
Therefore, he could take advantage of this alliance with the Stoics and 
Peripatetics in order to achieve one of his main polemical objectives, the 
rejection of older and more recent versions of atomism and corpuscularism, such 
as that of Asclepiades of Bithynia, who claimed the existence of void and centred 
his medical theories on the general assumption that the body was made up of 
invisible particles (ὄγκοι) and channels (πόροι).209 
 Furthermore, it has to be stressed that by appealing to Hippocrates’ 
authority Galen fudges and escapes more contemporary and pressing questions, 
that is, those concerning the problem of the constituents of the mixture, which, 
                                                          
208 Hankinson 1992, on Galen’s tendency to provide synthetic medical and philosophical 
theories. In contrast to Donini, who ultimately seems to label Galen’s philosophy as scarcely 
original; cf. Donini 1992 esp. pp. 3502–3503, Hankinson tries instead to enhance Galen’s 
unconventional and innovative philosophical outlook and the coherence which underlies Galen’s 
thought: “All this [Galen’s theoretical syncretism] might give the impression that Galen was 
simply a collector and hoarder of disparate views, an intellectual magpie. This is far from being 
the case: Galen’s over-riding concern is for consistency and truthand his syncretism, far from 
being uncritical and indiscriminate, represents a conscious attempt to weld together out of the 
disparate elements provided by the tradition a set of theories of unparalleled explanatory power 
and accuracy” (p. 3508).  
209 Vegetti 1999b p. 390 and p. 392. This is much clearer in a passage from De nat. fac. p. 120.7–
21 H., where Galen speaks of two haireseis that arise in medicine and philosophy: the one school, 
which supposes that all substance subject to generation and decay, is continuous (hēnōmenē) and 
undergoes alteration (alloioûsthai), the second, which assumes substance to be unchangeable, is 
unalterable and divided into small particles. As Vegetti remarks, the first school would 
correspond to the Aristotelian, Platonist, and Stoic, whereas the second one (associated with 
further remarks concerning the lack of teleological explanation, cf. ibid. H. 121.23) would be a 
reference to corpuscolarists of any lineage; cf. Vegetti 1999b p. 390 and pp. 391–392. As Vegetti 
points out, this alliance is determinant for the creation of a “friendly tradition” of the continuum 
school; cf. Vegetti 1999b p. 391. For Galen’s rejection of atomism cf. also Hankinson 2008a; cf. 
more recently Kupreeva 2014 pp. 162–172; for an account of the medical system of Asclepiades 
of Bithynia cf. Vallance 1993; Leith 2009.  
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as we have seen, at that time profoundly stirred the major philosophical schools 
and led exponents of the Platonic and Peripatetic schools and also corpuscularist 
medicine to fight against Stoic corporealism. At first sight, to such questions 
Galen simply replies that on the basis of Hippocrates’ doctrines, what he knows 
for sure is that the primary elements mix, although he does not want to make any 
pronouncement rearding how they mix, whether the mixture involves qualities, 
as Aristotle upholds, or substances-cum-qualities, as the Stoics maintain.  
 
 
1.3.2 Galen and the Stoic/Peripatetic controversy. Qualities or bodies? 
 
 
 However, an analysis of how Galen tackles this latter issue 
regarding the constituents of the mixture may be relevant from other points of 
view. In the first place, it suggests a philosophical reflection upon the causality 
involved in the mechanism of mixture and the difference between the Peripatetic 
and Stoic accounts. Second, and more importantly, we can see how Galen copes 
with doctrinal divergences, namely in ways that are consistent with his general 
anti-dogmatic outlook and in accordance with the principles of his own 
epistemology.  
 It has been said that the aforementioned passages (T1–4), where 
Galen explains the difference between the constituents of the mixture in the 
Peripatetic and the Stoic schools, have to be considered as a piece of unreliable 
doxography, as the basic categories of ποιότης (or more precisely, ποιόν, in the 
case of the Stoics) and οὐσία differed considerably in the Stoic and the 
Peripatetic traditions.210 Actually, while it might be a piece of doxography,211 
                                                          
210 Todd 1976, p. 59. Contrary to Long and Sedley 1987 p. 172, who uses ousia as the first genus 
following Plutarch’s usage in De comm. not. 1083d, Menn proposes to replace it with 
hypokeimenon, as in Plot. VI.I 25.1–3 and Simpl. In Categ. 66.32–67.2 and 67.17–19, where the 
first genus is not ousia, but hypokeimenon. For the Stoics ousia means matter (SVF I 87 and III 
317) and actually Calcidius (SVF I 86) draws a difference between ousia (essentia, substantia) 
and hyle (silva) and explains that the first is used stricto sensu only for qualityless matter. As 
Sandbach 1985, p. 41, suggests, the term hypokeimenon does not refer to the material substratum, 
but to “any external object”; cf. Menn 1999 p. 215 with n. 1. Therefore, if ousia differently from 
hypokeimenon means matter, Galen’s association of ousia with poiotētes seems to aptly refer to 
the qualified body, i.e. to the material substratum where the poiotētes comes to be.  
211 Todd 1976, pp. 58–59.  
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and we know that Galen uses doxographic resources,212 this does not mean that 
Galen’s report has to be rejected or its significance has to be minimized. After 
all, the definition “substances-cum-qualities” that Galen attributes to the Stoics 
and that we also find in Alexander’s De mixtione as describing the constituents 
of mixture (De mixt. 216.26 Bruns) can refer to the Stoic acceptation of οὐσία as 
material substrate, whereas the quality identifies a second corporeal entity 
imbuing matter and capable of affecting it causally. For according to the Stoics, 
qualities are also bodies and therefore have causal efficacy.213 Moreover, a 
further confirmation that in those cases Galen refers to the Stoic corporealistic 
account can be seen in the fact that he alternates between the expression 
“substances-cum-qualities” and the expression σωματικαί οὐσίαι, that is, 
corporeal substances, which are said to go through one another (τῶν σωματικῶν 
οὐσιῶν δι' ἀλλήλων ἰουσῶν). 
 In the aforementioned passages (T1-4) comes up an interesting 
problem regarding the notion of mixture, namely: how do the constituents 
interact during the process of mixture? Is the interaction attributable to the Stoic 
substances-cum-qualities or corporeal substances, where the qualities are a 
second corporeal entity imbuing matter and capable of affecting it causally? Or 
rather, are qualities alone understood more Aristotelico as conceptually distinct 
from the body itself?  
 This distinction in fact entails a very different process of causation 
in each case. For in Aristotle the qualities are in fact the formal-efficient cause 
of the mechanism of mixture, since they first set in motion and carry out the 
                                                          
212 As Tieleman has shown (cf. Tieleman 2003a p. 61 ff.), Galen was well acquainted with the 
Placita tradition, i.e. a doxographic tradition which examines texts such as Ps.-Plutarch Placita 
philosophorum, Ps.-Galen Historia philosopha, and the cognate excerpts in Stobaeus Eclogae 
Physicae, as well as Theodoret’s Graecarum affectionum curatio. These texts belong to a 
tradition that can be traced back to Theophrastus Physical doctrines. For Diels’ reconstruction 
of Aetius’ hypothesis, cf. Mansfeld and Runia 1997 Ch. 1; a clear schema of the stemma is 
provided at p. 4. Cf. Van der Eijk 1999a for a clear description of the different “genres” of 
historiography and doxography in ancient medical literature, esp. pp. 11–19; cf. also Runia 1999. 
I am thankful to Prof. Tieleman for a discussion on this passage.  
213 45A-D LS = SVF I 90, SVF II 363, SVF I 518 part, SVF II 790 part, for the Stoics in fact 
incorporeal entities, such as, saybles, void, place and time, lack causal efficacy, whereas only 
bodies can act or be acted upon. For the Stoics the qualities are bodies, as according to Zeno a 
cause is “that because of which”, while the effect (that of which it is the cause) is an accident 
(symbebekos). The cause is the body, the effect is a predicate and the predicate for the Stoics is 
a sayable, and therefore, incorporeal. For example, it is because of prudence that being prudent 
occurs, because of soul that being alive occurs, because of temperance that being temperate 
occurs; cf. LS A 55 = SVF I 89 (for Chrysippus’ formulation cf. II 336) with comments ad loc.  
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process of mixture through a qualitative interaction.214 On the other hand, in the 
Stoic theory the question is slightly more complex if one does not want to 
superimpose the Aristotelian schema on the Stoic theory of causation. As 
Collette-Dučić and Delcomminette remark, it is always the active principle that 
plays the role of the causal agent, when it is pure, as in the case of the active 
principle or god or when it is present in the qualified bodies. However, since the 
ἀντιπαρέκτασις can be applied both when the constituents balance each other out 
and when they do not, we have two different state of affairs. In the first case, we 
can speak of two concomitant causes bringing about an effect (συναίτια). In the 
second case, for example the case of the well-known Chrysippean paradox of 
the drop of wine that coextends itself with the entire sea, or the case of the 
pneuma and passive matter, the first, which transfers its activity onto the other, 
can be seen as the συνεκτικὸν αἴτιον or cohesive cause, whereas the second only 
favours and supports the process and, therefore, can only be seen as a cooperant 
cause (συνεργὸν αἴτιον).215 The basic difference between the two processes of 
causation, however, remains the fact that, in contrast to Aristotle, according to 
the Stoics only bodies can act and be acted upon, which is the hallmark that they 
(as the materialists of Plato’s Sophist) assign to true beings.216 
 Although Galen gives us the impression of underestimating a 
discrepancy between the Stoics and the Aristotle, he does mention an issue that 
goes beyond the subject matter of mixture, reflecting instead a broader key 
difference between the two schools, the Stoic and the Peripatetic.217  
                                                          
214 Cf. Mourelatos 1984.   
215 For the Stoic theory of causation in general, cf. SVF II 351 = LS 55 I, with Long and Sedley’s 
comments pp. 340–343; cf. also Sambursky 1959 pp. 48–56; cf. the collection of texts and 
comments in Hankinson 1998a pp. 23ff. On the cohesive or sustaining cause, cf. Galen’s De 
causis contentivis CMG Suppl. Or. II 1.1–2.4 pp. 52-54 Lyons = LS 55 F with particular 
reference to Athenaeus’ aetiology of disease. On Galen’s theory of causation (which stems from 
a syncretistic conflation between Aristotle’s doctrine of the four causes plus an instrumental 
cause and the original Stoic account plus the introductionplausibly by Athenaeusof the 
concept of preceding cause), cf. Hankinson 1998b, and Hankinson 1994 esp. pp. 1764–1769. As 
regards the Stoic theory of causation as applied to the Stoic account of mixture, see Collette-
Dučić and Delcomminette 2006 pp. 33-34. As Collette-Dučić and Delcomminette sharply note, 
in the case of unequal bodies blending, the passive body (such as the passive matter which 
undergoes the effects of the active pneuma) acts as cooperant cause qua active (in the sense that 
the already qualified matter is not purely passive) and not qua passive, as Todd 1976 p. 43 claims.  
216 Brunschwig 1988.  
217 Apart from the polemics that have arisen with reference to the mechanism of mixture in the 
post-Hellenistic age, Stoic radical corporealism gave rise to vehement criticisms carried out by 
the Platonic, the Peripatetic, and the Epicurean schools, which ferociously attacked the Stoic 
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 Hence, if Galen had answered this question, i.e. whether it is 
qualities that mix or corporeal substances-cum-qualities, he would have been 
compelled to side with one of the two philosophical schools, and this would have 
conflicted with his own reiterated declarations of philosophical independence, 
especially with regards to ideas that he cannot be certain about.218 In the 
epistemological gradation of certitude that we find in On my own opinions, Galen 
carefully distinguishes between what he does not know and about which no 
judgement can be made, what he knows for certain (βέβαιον), and what is simply 
probable or convincing (πιθανόν), to which he often appeals in order to avoid 
the aphasia of radical Pyrrhonian Scepticism.219 And in fact, Galen speaks of 
this Stoic/Peripatetic controversy in several passages; he knows the difference 
between the two theories of mixture and the arguments that were used against 
the Stoic corporealists at the time, and, as we will shortly see, he seems to be 
determined to enter the Stoic/Peripatetic controversy, as he critically engages 
with the leading proponents of the two main contemporary models of mixture 
by taking an active thought anti-dogmatic part in the debate.  
 First of all, Galen shows that he is aware of the arguments that 
have been used against the Stoics. In a passage from De experientia medica (T5), 
a treatise handed down not in Greek but in Arabic translation, Galen 
distinguishes two different and alternative theories of matter, the atomistic and 
another based on a complete interpenetration, which seems to be the only 
possible alternativealbeit difficult to imagine. Galen then continues and says 
                                                          
claim that only bodies can have causal efficacy. For a reconstruction of the debate from the post-
Hellenistic age to Alexander of Aphrodisias, cf. Kupreeva 2003, pp. 304–315. 
218 On Galen’s anti-dogmatic eclecticism cf. Frede 1987a p. 284; Donini 1992; Hankinson 1992. 
219 De propr. plac. pp. 188.7–13 Boudon-Millot-Pietrobelli “περὶ γὰρ ἄλλων δογμάτων 
ἀποφαινόμενος ἁπλῶς, τῶν μὲν, ὡς εἰδείην τὴν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀλήθειαν, τῶν δὲ, ὡς οὐδὲν αὐτῆς 
εἰδείην, ἐν οἷς ἄρτι διῆλθον, ἄχρι τοῦ πιθανοῦ προσέρχομαι, βέλτιον μὲν εἶναι νομίζων, εἴπερ 
ἐγνώκειν οὕτω περὶ αὐτῶν, ὡς ἀποφαίνεσθαι, καθάπερ ἐπ' ἄλλων, οὐ μὴν ἀναπείθων ἐμαυτὸν, 
ὥσπερ ἕτεροι, βεβαίαν ἔχειν γνῶσιν, ὧν οὐκ ἔσχον ἀπόδειξιν βεβαίαν”. As Nutton notes, in this 
work Galen’s way of presenting his personal beliefs follows a triple schema of knowledge. For 
there are a) things that he knows to be certain, b) things that he considers plausible but as yet 
unproven, and c) things which he cannot yet clear up in his mind, such as the nature of the soul 
or the eternity of the world; cf. Nutton 1999 pp. 45–50. For Galen’s usage of πιθανόν cf. infra 
pp. 79ff. For Galen’s refutation of Pyrrhonian Scepticism and sceptical ideas in the Empiricists, 
cf. De Lacy 1991. For more in general on Galen’s epistemology, cf. Frede 1987a; Hankinson 
2008b and 2009.  
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that “[f]or that two bodies, or three and often four or five, should occupy the 
same place is a condition difficult to imagine and to think of.”220  
 
T5 De experientia medica XIX p. 122 Walzer:  
 
As for the view that composite bodies are permeated the one by the other, 
although nothing remains except this, yet it is something which one cannot easily 
imagine, and I am far from thinking of it to say, to say nothing of understanding 
it and knowing it. For that two bodies, or three and often four or five, should 
occupy the same place is a condition difficult to imagine and to think of. (Trans. 
Walzer) 
 
 Galen does not say whose theory he is attacking but we can glean 
that it is set against the atomistic theory, and is therefore continuist; in addition, 
Galen raises objections against the idea that two or more bodies cannot coexist 
in the same place, in a similar vein to Alexander’s criticism of the Stoic total 
interpenetration of bodies, as in both the cases coextension is ruled out by 
making reference to the Aristotelian paradox of two (or more) bodies in the same 
place.  
  But Galen takes an even stronger position against the Stoic theory 
of total mixture, in a passage of De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis (T6) where 
he tries to refute two theories of vision:  
 
T6 Galen De plac. Hipp. et Plat. K. V 618.1-619.2 De Lacy 452.29–454.7: 
 
Μάλιστα δ' ἂν πεισθείη τις τοῦτο γίγνεσθαι μαθὼν ὅπως εὔλογόν ἐστιν 
ὁρᾶν ἡμᾶς. ἀρχὴ δὲ καὶ τοῦδε τοῦ λόγου τοιάδε· τὸ βλεπόμενον σῶμα δυοῖν 
θάτερον· ἢ πέμπον τι πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ σὺν ἐκείνῳ καὶ τὴν ἰδίαν ἐνδείκνυται 
διάγνωσιν, ἢ εἴπερ αὐτὸ μηδὲν πέμπει, περιμένει τινὰ παρ' ἡμῶν ἀφικέσθαι 
δύναμιν αἰσθητικὴν ἐφ' ἑαυτό. πότερον οὖν αὐτῶν ἐστιν ἀληθέστερον ὧδ' ἂν 
μάλιστα κριθείη· διὰ τοῦ κατὰ τὴν κόρην τρήματος ὁρῶμεν, ὅπερ εἰ περιέμενε 
                                                          




πρὸς ἑαυτὸ παραγενέσθαι τινὰ μοῖραν ἢ δύναμιν ἢ εἴδωλον ἢ ποιότητα τῶν 
ἐκτὸς ὑποκειμένων σωμάτων, οὐκ ἂν τοῦ βλεπομένου τὸ μέγεθος ἐγνώκειμεν, 
οἷον ὄρους εἰ τύχοι μεγίστου. τηλικοῦτον γὰρ εἴδωλον ἐνέπιπτεν <ἂν> ἀπ' αὐτοῦ 
τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς ἡμῶν ἡλίκον ἐστὶν αὐτό, ὅπερ παντάπασιν ἄλογον, ἅμα τῷ καὶ 
κατὰ μίαν ῥοπὴν καιροῦ πρὸς ἕκαστον τῶν ὁρώντων, εἰ καὶ μυρίοι τύχοιεν ὄντες, 
ἀφικνεῖσθαι. τὸ δὲ ὀπτικὸν οὐχ οἷόν τε τοσαύτην ῥύσιν ἐκτεινόμενον λαμβάνειν 
ὡς περιχεῖσθαι παντὶ τῷ βλεπομένῳ σώματι· τοῦτο γὰρ ὅμοιόν ἐστι τῷ τῶν 
Στωϊκῶν σταλαγμῷ κεραννυμένῳ τῇ πάσῃ θαλάττῃ. 
 
  
A person would be most convinced that this happens when he has learned 
the probable account of how we see. This account also begins in the following 
way. A body that is seen does one of two things: either it sends something from 
itself to us and thereby gives an indication of its peculiar character, or if it does 
not itself send something, it waits for some sensory power to come to it from us. 
Which of these alternative is the more correct may best be judged in the 
following way. We see through the perforation at the pupil; if this perforation 
waited for some portion or power or image or quality of the external bodies 
underlying (our perception) to come to it, we would not discern the size of the 
object seen, which might be, for example, a very large mountain. An image of 
the size of the mountain would have come from the mountain and entered our 
eyes, which is utterly absurd. It is also absurd that at one moment of time the 
image should reach every viewer, even though they are countless. And the optic 
pneuma cannot extend itself and acquire such a stream so as to envelop the whole 
object being viewed; for this is comparable to the Stoic drop that mixes with the 
whole sea. (Trans. De Lacy) 
 
 As we see in this passage, Galen explicitly rejects the Stoic 
paradox of the drop of wine in the sea by classifying it as absurd. But which 
aspect of the theory of total mixture is Galen referring to? In the passage it seems 
that two theories are discussed. The first, according to which the object seen 
which sends something to us, seems to correspond to the Epicurean theory of 
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the eidola.221 The second, according to which a sensory power which comes 
from us to the object seen, an optic pneuma extends itself (ἐκτεινόμενον) and 
pours over (περιχεῖσθαι) the object viewed.  
 It seems therefore that the pneuma indeed reaches the object seen 
and it does this in virtue of an extension 
(οἷόν τε τοσαύτην ῥύσιν ἐκτεινόμενον λαμβάνειν). But what might be the 
connection between the Stoic total mixture and the pneuma that extends itself? I 
think that, in Galen’s view, as the optic pneuma cannot extend itself and acquire 
such a stream to pour over the object seen, in the same vein the Stoic drop of 
wine cannot extend itself and mix with the entire sea, as the total mixture is also 
seen as a process involving an extension that may or may not be mutual for the 
constituents, the ἀντιπαρέκτασις. Galen therefore seems to be painting the 
process of coextension as absurd (ἄλογον), at least the Chrysippean version 
according to which bodies unequal in bulk can equalize their volumes, as one 
constituent completely coextends with the other, which is far greater.  
 On the other hand, on the Peripatetic front, we can instead uncover 
some traces of Galen’s inclination to think that, as Aristotle held, it is qualities 
that are responsible for the mechanism of mixture. For in contrast to the passages 
already analysed, Galen’s presents his opinion in a less rigid manner where he 
summarizes his own beliefs, that is, in De propriis placitis. In this text Galen 
tackles the problem again, but he adds something more (T7): 
 
T7 Galen De propr. plac. 188.21–189.17 Boudon-Pietrobelli: 
 
ὅτι μὲν ἐκ τῆς τῶν δʹ στοιχείων κράσεως ἅπαντα τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν σώματα 
γίγνεται, βεβαίως γιγνώσκειν φημί· καὶ προσέτι δι' ὅλων αὐτῶν κεραννυμένων, 
οὐχ, ὡς Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ἡγεῖτο, κατὰ σμικρὰ μόρια καταθραυομένων. εἴτε δὲ τῶν 
σωματικῶν οὐσιῶν ὅλων δι' ἀλλήλων ἰουσῶν, εἴτε τῶν ποιοτήτων μόνων, οὔτ' 
ἀναγκαῖον εἶναί φημι γινώσκειν, οὔτε ἀποφαίνομαι. πιθανώτερον δὲ εἶναι 
νομίζω, κατὰ τὰς ποιότητας γίγνεσθαι τὰς κράσεις. 
                                                          
221 On the Epicurean theory of eidola, cf. Long and Sedley 1987 pp. 76–78 and cf. the clear 
description provided by Lucretius in De rer. nat. IV.722–822 = LS 15 D. I am very grateful to 




I declare that I know for certain that all our bodies come from a mixing 
together of the four elements, and besides through their complete mixture, not 
as Empedocles believed, through being broken up into small particles. But 
whether (this happens) because the corporeal substances go entirely through one 
another or only the qualities, I neither consider it necessary to know, nor do I 
make any definite pronouncement (about it). I think it more likely, however, that 
the mixtures occur according to the qualities. (Trans. Nutton; slightly modified) 
 
In this passage he initially says that it is not necessary to know whether the 
mixture occurs when the corporeal substances go entirely through one another 
or only the qualities, however, (δέ), he adds that he believes it is more likely 
(πιθανώτερον) that the qualities mix.  But what degree of epistemological 
certitude does the adjective πιθανός have? Debru has studied the use and 
application of the term πιθανός throughout Galen’s corpus and on the basis of 
her studies she remarks that the adjective can have different meanings in Galen.  
On the one hand, Debru shows that Galen’s πιθανός can simply mean 
“persuasive”, “convincing”, but ultimately false. In this regard, sometimes Galen 
uses this term with reference to his adversaries’ opinions or theories, which he 
commits himself to refuting and dismissing.222 On the other hand, it can also 
refer to a likely but still provisional explanation that can turn out to be true or 
false, a transitory stage in the search for truth (ἐγγὺς ἀληθείας) that needs to be 
further proved by evidence and still lacks scientific proof (ἐπιστημονικὴ πίστις). 
Furthermore, Debru adds that contrary to the “plausible which proves to be 
false”, “the plausible which proves to be true” has degrees of plausibility. For in 
these cases Galen uses comparatives and superlatives.223 Our πιθανώτερον then 
                                                          
222 Debru 1991, pp. 35–37.  
223 Debru 1991, esp. pp. 37–38. More recently, Chiaradonna has investigated Galen’s notion of 
pithanon and, in contrast to Debru (whose research findings, however, he does not discuss, but 
see above all the section “La confirmation du plausible vrai” pp. 37–38 with references), he does 
not seem to attribute to it the same positive epistemological validity, as in his view, according to 
Galen, it would solely indicate something that is merely “persuasive” and cannot be grasped by 
Galen’s two main epistemological criteria of certainty, that is, reason and experience; 
Chiaradonna 2014 pp. 72–73. On the possible sources (rhetorical, epistemological, medical) of 
Galen’s usage of pithanon, cf. the detailed survey provided by Chiaradonna 2014 pp. 73 ff.  
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seems to acquire a different status from what is simply πιθανόν. Hence, what in 
Galen is defined as πιθανόνor better, πιθανώτερονis therefore not to be 
underestimated or despised, since, although it does not coincide with the 
scientific demonstration, Galen appeals to it very often, as it gives him room for 
manoeuvre between scepticism and dogmatism and it might turn out to be useful 
for grasping his own opinions, albeit provisional, especially with reference to 
popular and controversial topics, such as the relation to the process of causation 
in the process of mixture224.  
This hint offered by Galen’s usage of πιθανώτερον seems to be further 
confirmed by a passage from De elementis (T8.1). This passage has been often 
neglected by commentators and scholars, but here we find two important 
elements worth underlining. First of all, Galen seems to take a position towards 
the issue of the causality, although indirectly and somewhat allusively; and 
second, he describes the process of mixture as a progressive division in strikingly 
similar terms to Alexander’s abovementioned exegesis of Aristotle’s account. 
 
T8 Galen De elementis sec. Hipp. K. I 489.13–490.15 De Lacy 136.22–138.14: 
 
(T8.1) εἰρήσεται δὲ κἀν τοῖς τῆς θεραπευτικῆς μεθόδου περὶ τῆς χρείας 
αὐτῶν ἐπὶ πλέον, ἐν δὲ τῷ παρόντι τοσοῦτον εἰπεῖν ἀποχρήσει πρὸς τὸν 
ἐνεστῶτα λόγον, ὅτι τῶν ὑπ' Ἀσκληπιάδου λεγομένων ἐν τῷ Περὶ στοιχείων 
βιβλίῳ πρὸς τοὺς ὅλας | δι' ὅλων κεραννύντας ἀλλήλαις τὰς οὐσίας οὐδὲν ἅψεται 
τῶν κατὰ τὰς ποιότητας μόνας κεράννυσθαι λεγόντων, (T8.2) ὥστ' εἰ καὶ μὴ δι' 
ἄλλο τι, διὰ γοῦν τό ἀσφαλὲς αἱρετέον τὸ δόγμα καὶ λεκτέον, ὡς ἐν τῷ μίγνυσθαι 
τῷ ὕδατι τὸν οἶνον, εἰ τύχοι, καὶ καταθραύεσθαι μέχρι σμικροτάτων ἑκατέρου 
τὰ μόρια δρᾶν καὶ πάσχειν αὐτοῖς εἰς ἄλληλα συμβαίνει καὶ μεταδιδόναι τῶν 
ποιοτήτων ἀλλήλοις ἑτοιμότερον, ὅσῳ περ ἂν εἰς ἐλάττω καταθραυσθῇ, καὶ διὰ 
τοῦτο κινοῦσιν ἐπὶ πλεῖστον οἱ μιγνύντες ἀλλήλοις τὰ τοιαῦτα τὴν εἰς ἐλάχιστον 
διαίρεσιν αὐτῶν μηχανώμενοι. καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον ἑνοῦσθαι τὰς ποιότητας 
ἀλλήλαις τῶν ἐπὶ πλέον ἀναμιχθέντων τε καὶ χρονισάντων ὁμολογεῖ τῷ λόγῳ. 
                                                          
224 Cf. also Nutton 1999 pp. 45–50.  
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χρόνου γὰρ δεῖται τὰ σμικρὰ μόρια τῶν κεραννυμένων, ἵν' εἰς ἄλληλα δράσῃ καὶ 
πάθῃ τελέως καὶ οὕτως ἓν ἀπεργάσηται τὸ ὅλον καὶ ὅμοιον ἑαυτῷ πάντη.  
 
(T8.1) And I shall speak at length of the use of mixtures in the books of 
Therapeutic method; but now for this present one, and also it will be enough to 
say that none of the things that Asclepiades says in his book On elements in 
answer to those who mix substances with each other through and through will 
touch those who say they (the substances) are mixed in the qualities only; 
therefore, if for no other reason, at least for safety’s sake let us pronounce as our 
choice the view that (T8.2) in the mixing of wine with water, for example, and 
in the breaking up of the parts of each into smallest bits, it happens that each of 
them acts on the other and is acted on by it (καταθραύεσθαι μέχρι σμικροτάτων 
ἑκατέρου τὰ μόρια δρᾶν καὶ πάσχειν αὐτοῖς εἰς ἄλληλα συμβαίνει), and that they 
share their qualities with each other the more readily the smaller the bits into 
which they have been broken (καὶ μεταδιδόναι τῶν ποιοτήτων ἀλλήλοις 
ἑτοιμότερον, ὅσῳ περ ἂν εἰς ἐλάττω καταθραυσθῇ); and for that reason those 
who are mixing such things together agitate them as much as possible, thus 
contriving that the division be to the smallest parts. Moreover, it is concordant 
with the reasoning that the qualities of things that have been mixed more 
thoroughly and for a long time are more closely united. The small parts of the 
things being mixed need time to complete their interaction and thus make the 
whole one and the same throughout. (Trans. De Lacy; slightly modified)   
 
As we see, Galen explicitly says that “none of the things that Asclepiades 
says in his book On elements in answer to those who mix substances with each 
other through and through will touch those who say that they (the substances) 
are mixed in the qualities only”. Galen does not say who Asclepiades’ polemical 
target is nor does he use his standard formulation “corporeal substances” or 
“substances-cum-qualities”; in this passage he only draws an opposition between 
those who mix substances and those who mix qualities (τῶν κατὰ τὰς ποιότητας 
μόνας κεράννυσθαι λεγόντων), which seems to be congruent with the other 
passages that we have analysed previously, where Galen draws a distinction 
between Aristotle and the Stoics. This time, however, Galen overtly declares that 
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at least for safety’s sake this opinion has to be favoured because it lies on firmer 
ground (ἀσφαλές): διὰ γοῦν τό ἀσφαλὲς αἱρετέον τὸ δόγμα καὶ λεκτέον. The 
usage of the verbal adjectives in –teos, which expresses the idea of duty, strongly 
emphasizes Galen’s choice (αἱρετέον/λεκτέον). However, that is still a 
somewhat indirect choice, as Galen is not saying roundly that the qualities mix, 
as Aristotle held, but that arguments that are used against those who mix 
substances cannot be used against those who mix qualities only, which in a rather 
ingenious formulation is defined by Galen as a dogma that does not explicitly 
belong to any dogma.  
 
1.3.3 Galen’s κρᾶσις as a progressive division of bodies  
 
 
We can in any case regard this as a good result, especially if we look at the 
following description of the mixture of wine and water, that occupies the second 
section of the passage (T8.2). 
In this section Galen does not use Aristotle’s technical vocabularyhe 
does not embed the process in the Aristotelian potentiality–actuality 
continuumbut nonetheless if we compare Alexander’s text (T9) to Galen’s 
(T8): 
 
T9 Alexander of Aphrodisias De mixtione 231, 12–19 Bruns = Groisard 33.1–
13; 
 
καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἡ κρᾶσις· ἡ γὰρ διὰ τοῦ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν τῶν 
παρακειμένων ἀλλήλοις σωμάτων διὰ μεταβολῆς χωρὶς φθορᾶς αὐτῶν τινος 
ἕνωσις. Συνεργεῖ δὲ τοῖς ὑγροῖς πρὸς τὴν θάττω μεταβολήν τε καὶ κρᾶσιν καὶ τὸ 
εὐδιαίρετον. διαιροῦντα γὰρ ἄλληλα πρὸ τῆς ἑνώσεως καὶ κατὰ μικρὰ 
παρατιθέμενα ἀλλήλοις, ῥᾷον καὶ θᾶττον ἀντιπάσχοντα ὑπ' ἀλλήλων, ταχέως ἕν 
τι γίνεται σῶμα καὶ κατὰ τὸ ὑποκείμενον καὶ κατὰ τὴν ποιότητα, ἐνεργείᾳ μὲν 
οὐδὲν ὂν τῶν μεμιγμένων, δυνάμει δὲ πᾶν τι, τοσοῦτον ἀπολειπόμενον τοῦ καὶ 
ἐνεργείᾳ σώζειν τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ μεμιγμένα, ὅσον διὰ τοῦ ποιεῖν τε καὶ πάσχειν 




Mixture, then, can be defined as the unification through interaction of 
bodies juxtaposed with one another by means of an alteration that excludes their 
corruption. Contributing to the rapid alteration and mixture of moist bodies is 
their easy divisibility; for they divide one another before being unified, and are 
juxtaposed together as corpuscles (διαιροῦντα γὰρ ἄλληλα πρὸ τῆς ἑνώσεως καὶ 
κατὰ μικρὰ παρατιθέμενα ἀλλήλοις), thus interacting more easily and more 
quickly (ῥᾷον καὶ θᾶττον ἀντιπάσχοντα ὑπ' ἀλλήλων), and they rapidly become 
one body both in substrate and quality (ταχέως ἕν τι γίνεται σῶμα καὶ κατὰ τὸ 
ὑποκείμενον καὶ κατὰ τὴν ποιότητα)a body not in actuality any of the bodies 
that have been mixed, but in potentiality all of them, and as long as it is deprived 
from preserving in actuality the bodies mixed in it, it is removed (from 
preserving in actuality the bodies mixed) by the interaction caused by their 
individual power (transl. Todd; slightly modified). 
 
We have some noteworthy resemblances. In the first place in both the 
accounts mixture is described as a progressive διαίρεσις of the constituents 
followed by a final unification brought about by a qualitative interaction (Galen 
in fact says that the parts of the liquids break up into small parts (καταθραύεσθαι 
μέχρι σμικροτάτων) and that each of them acts on the other and is acted upon by 
(δρᾶν καὶ πάσχειν)225 and through this fragmentation process they share their 
qualities (μεταδιδόναι τῶν ποιοτήτων ἀλλήλοις); this division ends in a final 
unification which is described some lines below, where Galen says “The small 
parts of the things being mixed need time to complete their interaction and thus 
make the whole one and the same throughout (ἓν ἀπεργάσηται τὸ ὅλον καὶ 
ὅμοιον ἑαυτῷ πάντη)”. On the other hand, as we see, Alexander says that the 
constituents divide one another before being unified, and are juxtaposed together 
as corpuscles: “διαιροῦντα γὰρ ἄλληλα πρὸ τῆς ἑνώσεως καὶ κατὰ μικρὰ 
                                                          
225 The interaction between two objects or qualities is usually denoted by the two verbs ποιεῖν 
καὶ πάσχειν. Here Galen replaces ποιεῖν with δρᾶν, which is generally used with reference to the 
actions of persons. As De Lacy and Durling note, these two verbs had already been linked by 
Plato (Phaedr. 270d4–5 and Tim. 33d1, both treatises that Galen knew very well). Furthermore, 
the two verbs were used in combination by Plutarch in a critique of Epicurus’atomism (Adv. Col. 
1110c); therefore, as the two scholar note, Galen had already a precedent for using these two 
verbs to indicate the interaction of objects and qualities; cf. De Lacy 1996 p. 174 comm. ad De 
elem. sec. Hipp. CMG V 1.2.  p. 70.16 De Lacy.  
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παρατιθέμενα ἀλλήλοις”. At the end of the process of division the constituents 
become one both in substrate and quality, “ἕν τι γίνεται σῶμα καὶ κατὰ τὸ 
ὑποκείμενον καὶ κατὰ τὴν ποιότητα”). Of course the Stoics also thought that 
matter is continuously sub-divisible,226 but it has to be added that the Stoic 
account of total mixture is assimilated to a progressive infinite division only 
from Alexander onwards, possibly because for a Peripatetic the mixture does lie 
in a division and is its characteristic feature.227 According to Collette-Dučić and 
Delcomminette, in Stoic physics infinite division would only work upstream and 
downstream in the process of mixture and does not coincide with the process 
itself but only produces bodies able to undergo infinite division as a result.228 
                                                          
226 Cf. Diog. Laert. VII 150 = SVF II 482 (part). According to Chrysippus, this division is infinite 
and would not be ad infinitum, for there is no infinite body into which division is converted; 
rather, this division is incessant (akatalēktos). On the Stoic infinite division cf. Todd (1973 pp. 
21–23), who is inclined to assimilate the Stoic notion of infinite divisibility to Aristotle’s 
potential infinite; on this cf. also Long and Sedley 1987 vol. I p. 303. Contrarily, Drozdek (2002 
p. 413 n. 29) notes that there is a difference between Aristotle´s conception of potential infinite 
and Chrysippus’; Chrysippus’ notion of an actual infinity of parts is impossible because in his 
view there are no ultimate parts (cf. SVF II 483) and not because it is possible only potentially, 
as Aristotle taught. One could object to Drozdek, however, that it is exactly from this impasse 
that Aristotle wants to extricate himself when, in his criticism of the Atomists, he propounds his 
notion of infinite division, which is only potentially and not actually possible (cf. De gen. et corr. 
316b19–21). On the contrary, more recently, Nolan 2006, has attributed a theory of physical 
continuums (body, space and time) to the Stoics, based on the concept of gunk, and leans towards 
interpreting the evidence as if the Stoics conceived physical body as actually divided into infinite 
gunks (a concept whose core idea is that “all the parts of an x physical item can be further 
subdivisible into parts”); cf. in detail Nolan 2006 pp. 162–172.  
227 Collette-Dučić and Delcomminette 2006 p. 49. In De mixtione Ch. 8 (De mixt. 221.25–222.25 
Bruns) Alexander refutes the Stoic theory of mixture as associated with the infinite division of 
bodies; cf. Todd´s comments ad loc. pp. 204–210. As Todd observes, there seems to be a 
theoretical incongruence as the whole chapter neglects two Stoic claims: i) that the constituents 
are preserved in the blend (De mixt. 216.3–31 Bruns); and ii) that mixture and juxtaposition of 
constituents are not the same thing (De mixt. 220.3–221.7 Bruns). Now, since, as Todd suggests, 
the chapter seems to be derived from Aristotle’s claim that only moist and easily divided bodies 
can be blended (cf. De gen. et corr. I 10 328a24, 328b17 and cf. De mixt. 221.26–27 Bruns) and 
that in the blending they divide and initially juxtapose as corpuscles (De gen. et corr. 328a33–
b2 and cf. De mixt. 221.26–27 Bruns), and since this phase of division of bodies becomes one of 
the main traits of the Peripatetic account, it is not unlikely that the association between total 
mixture and the divisibility of constituents arose from some form of syncretism between the 
Stoic and the Aristotelian accounts. After all, Alexander of Aphrodisias himself informs us of 
such a doctrinal syncretism when he reports that “while some of his [Chrysippus’] successors 
agree with Chrysippus, others who were later able to hear Aristotle´s theory actually express 
many of his view on blending”. More precisely, he makes mention of the case of Sosigenes (De 
mixt. 216.9–11 Bruns trans. Todd).  
228 Collette-Dučić and Delcomminette 2006 pp. 47–48. I do not agree with Nolan (2006), who 
tries to explain total mixture through an infinite division of gunks (parts having parts within 
themselves and so on without ever reaching the ultimate parts) for two reasons: a) textual 
reasons, as Nolan theorizes the concept of Stoic gunk and then in an purely abstract way applies 
it to the Stoic mixture without finding clear confirmation in the textual evidence at our disposal 
concerning Stoic mixture (cf. pp. 172–177); b) theoretical reasons, as such a process of gunky 
mixture, understood as a continuous and many-stage division into parts, where “all of the so-far 
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Moreover, the other account of mixture as infinite division that we have in 
Plotinus (SVF II 478), as demonstrated by Lacrosse, heavily depends on 
Alexander’s reception of the Stoic theory.229 By contrast, in Galen’s account we 
find two elements, which incontrovertibly point to the Peripatetic model: the 
reaction due to the qualitative interaction and a two-phases process, where the 
progressive division of bodies ends up in a final unification. 
Furthermore, and more importantly, both the accounts, the Galenic and the 
Peripatetic, very differently from the Stoic picture, show a strict link between 
easy-divisibility of the constituents and facility and speed of interaction, as 
Alexanderfollowing Aristotle230also says, “contributing to the rapid 
alteration and blending of moist bodies is their easy-divisibility”. Right after, it 
is said that the particles, “interacting more easily and more quickly, rapidly 
become one body both in substrate and quality” (ῥᾷον καὶ θᾶττον ἀντιπάσχοντα 
ὑπ' ἀλλήλων, ταχέως ἕν τι γίνεται σῶμα καὶ κατὰ τὸ ὑποκείμενον καὶ κατὰ τὴν 
ποιότητα), whereas in Galen we have the sentence “τὰ μόρια δρᾶν καὶ πάσχειν 
αὐτοῖς εἰς ἄλληλα συμβαίνει καὶ μεταδιδόναι τῶν ποιοτήτων ἀλλήλοις 
ἑτοιμότερον, ὅσῳ περ ἂν εἰς ἐλάττω καταθραυσθῇ”, i.e. “each of thethe 
particlesacts on the other and is acted on by it, and they share their qualities 
with each other the more readily the smaller the bits into which they have been 
broken”, where the term ἑτοιμότερον means at the same time more 
easilyῥᾷονand more rapidlyθᾶττον. i.e. more readily.231  
                                                          
divided proper parts of the blend contain proper parts of both the blended substances” and which 
(contrary to the Peripatetic account) never culminates in a final unification, would give rise to 
an endless multiplication of the number of bodies within a mixture (cf. esp. p. 175), whereas in 
the Stoic account of mixture the bodies are preserved and their number is not multiplied in the 
mixture: a body although theoretically infinitely divisible is notin actualitycomposed of 
infinitely many corpuscles. For the Stoics in fact clearly rejected that the infinitely divisible 
contains an actual infinity of parts (as Nolan would suggest): Stobaeus I 142.2–6 = SVF II 482 
(LS 50A): “Chrysippus said that bodies are divided to the infinity, and likewise things 
comparable to bodies, such as surface, line, place, void and time. But although these are divided 
to infinity, a body does not consist of infinitely many bodies, and the same applies to surface, 
line and place” (trans. Long and Sedley; emphasis mine); cf. also comments by Long and Sedley 
ad loc., cf. Long and Sedley 1987 pp. 301–304. For Nolan´s arguments against Stoic potential 
infinity cf. Nolan 2006 pp. 179–180.  
229 Lacrosse 2007 pp. 53–66.  
230 De gen. et corr. 328a33 “Καὶ μικρὰ δὲ μικροῖς παρατιθέμενα μίγνυται μᾶλλον· ῥᾷον γὰρ καὶ 
θᾶττον ἄλληλα μεθίστησιν”.  
231 Given the strong similarities between Galen’s and Alexander’s accounts, we may indirectly 
note Alexander does not seem to have originally formulated this model of mixture, if we assume 





1.3.4 Mixture, change and the ontological status of the primary elements in the 
mixture (actuality or potentiality?). The example of the τετραφάρμακος and the 
generation of a tertium quid 
 
 
As we have seen, one of the main differences between the Stoic and the 
Peripatetic models of mixture concerns the ontological status of the primary 
elements in the mixture. To briefly sum up the conclusions that we have hitherto 
drawn, according to Aristotle’s theorization the primary elements are preserved 
in the mixture only in potentiality, whereas they give rise in actuality to a tertium 
quid, the homoeomerous body; on the other hand, in the Stoic total mixture, 
instead, the active (air and fire, whose mixture in turn generates the pneuma) and 
passive elements (water and earth, that is, inert matter) interpenetrate each other 
and are compresent in a pervaded state.  
Another further step towards a more thorough comprehension of Galen’s 
account of mixture of primary elements will be to identify Galen’s own position 
concerning the ontological status of the primary elements within the elemental 
mixture. In order to better sketch its contours, we will begin by considering two 
parallel passages (T10 and T11), respectively from Galen´s De elementis and his 
Commentary on the Nature of Man, where the physician-cum-philosopher 
glosses De natura hominis´ incipit on the basis of his own textual 
interpretation232 and vehemently admonishes those who refuse to believe that 
fire, water, air, and earth are the primary elements of all living beings: 
                                                          
namely to show that such similarities may be explained by the common Peripatetic milieu on 
which they both drew and relied.  
232 De nat. hom. CMG I 1.3 p. 164.3–7 Jouanna:  Ὅστις μὲν οὖν εἴωθεν ἀκούειν λεγόντων ἀμφὶ 
τῆς φύσιος τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης προσωτέρω ἢ ὅσον αὐτῆς ἐς ἰητρικὴν ἀφήκει, τούτῳ μὲν οὐκ 
ἐπιτήδειος ὅδε ὁ λόγος ἀκούειν· οὔτε γὰρ τὸ πάμπαν ἠέρα λέγω τὸν ἄνθρωπον εἶναι, οὔτε πῦρ, 
οὔτε ὕδωρ, οὔτε γῆν, οὔτ' ἄλλο οὐδὲν, ὅ τι μὴ φανερόν ἐστιν ἐνεὸν ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ· ἀλλὰ τοῖσι 
βουλομένοισι ταῦτα λέγειν παρίημι”. This passage is well known (as it is placed right at the 
beginning of the treatise, when the Hippocratic author detaches medical science from 
philosophical discourse and attacks elemental theorists) and the problematic nature of Galen´s 
exegesis. For by propounding a particular philological reading of the text (based on the 
translation of πάμπαν as “wholly” and on the separation of ἐνεὸν “to be present within” into ἓν 
ἐὸν “the one thing”), Galen moulds the Hippocratic passage to fit his overall aim, i.e. that of 
demonstrating that Hippocrates did not actually criticize those who posited fire, air, water and 
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T10 Galen De elementis sec. Hipp. K. I 451.9 – 453.6 De Lacy 96.1–23:  
 
(1) φαίνεται τοίνυν ὁ μὲν Ἀριστοτέλης τε καὶ Ἱπποκράτης ὡσαύτως 
διατεθεῖσθαι τὸν λόγον, οἱ δ' ἐξηγηταὶ μὴ παρακολουθεῖν· οὐ γὰρ διὰ τοῦτ'  εἶπεν 
ὁ Ἱπποκράτης οὐκ ἐπιτήδειον εἶναι τὸν λόγον τοῖς εἰωθόσιν ἀκούειν περὶ φύσιος 
ἀνθρωπίνης προσωτέρω ἢ ὁκόσον αὐτέης ἐς ἰητρικὴν ἀφήκει, διότι 
καταγιγνώσκει τῶν ἀέρα καὶ πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν στοιχεῖα τιθεμένων, ἀλλ' ἀπ' 
ἀρχῆς ἄχρι τέλους τοῖς ἓν ὁτιοῦν αὐτῶν εἰποῦσιν εὑρίσκεται | μεμφόμενος, ἐπεὶ 
ἐκεῖνό γε δεινῶς ἄλογόν ἐστιν, εἰ, διότι μηδὲν τῶν τεττάρων εἰλικρινὲς ἐν τῷ 
σώματι φαίνεται, διὰ τοῦτ' ἀπιστηθήσεται πάντα· (2) κατὰ γὰρ τὸν αὐτὸν οἶμαι 
τρόπον ἀπιστήσει τις ἐκ κηροῦ καὶ ῥητίνης καὶ πίττης καὶ στέατος συγκεῖσθαι 
τὴν τετραφάρμακον καλουμένην, ὅτι μηδὲν αὐτῶν ὁλόκληρον καὶ παντελὲς ἐν 
αὐτῇ περιεχόμενον φαίνεται. […] μὴ τοίνυν μηδ', ἐπειδὴ καὶ κατὰ τὰ τῶν ζῴων 
σώματα τῶν τεττάρων στοιχείων οὐδὲν εἰλικρινὲς οὐδὲ παντελές ἐστιν, 
ἀπιστῶμεν ἐκ τούτων αὐτὰ κεκρᾶσθαι | μηδὲ διὰ τοῦτο τὸν μὲν κόσμον ἐκ τῶν 
τεττάρων   εἶναι συγχωρῶμεν, ἀφαιρώμεθα δὲ τὰ ζῷα τῆς ἐκ τούτων γενέσεως, 
ὥσπερ ἔξωθέν ποθεν ἥκοντα καὶ οὐκ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ γεγονότα. ἢ δεῖξαί μέ σοι 
κελεύεις γῆν ἐν τοῖς τῶν ζῴων σώμασιν εἰλικρινῆ καὶ ἄμικτον αὐτὸς μηδ' ἐν τῷ 
κόσμῳ τοιαύτην δεῖξαι δυνάμενος;  
 
(1) It appears, then, that Aristotle and Hippocrates have ordered their arguments 
in the same way but that the commentators do not understand them. When 
Hippocrates says that his discourse is of no use of those who make a habit of 
listening (to discourses) about the nature of man that go ‘beyond what is relevant 
to the art of medicine’, he does not say this because he is condemning those who 
make fire, air, water, and earth the elements; on the contrary, from start to finish 
we find him censuring those who say that some one of these is the element. For 
it is frightfully illogical to reject them all because no one of the four is seen in 
                                                          
earth as the basic building blocks of living bodies, but just those who believed that only one of 
them was the basic element. Jouanna´s translation differs from Galen´s interpretation; cf. 
Jouanna´s comments ad loc. in Jouanna 2002 pp. 225–226 and pp. 229–230. Hankinson (2015 
pp. 425 f.) defends Galen´s reading (cf. his translation “Whoever is in the habit of listening to 
those who discuss the nature of man in terms further from those which pertain to medicine will 
not find this discourse congenial to him. For I say that man is neither wholly air, nor fire, nor 
water, nor earth, nor anything else which is not evidently the one thing in man, but rather leave 
them to those who wish to say such things”).  
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the body in its pure form; (2) by the same reasoning, I fancy a person will not 
believe that the so-called tetrapharmakos is a compound of wax, resin, pitch, and 
tallow, because none of these is found contained in it as a complete whole […]. 
Then let us not refuse to believe that the bodies of animals are a mixture 
composed of the four elements just because none of the four is either pure or 
complete in them; and let us not for this reason grant that the cosmos is formed 
from the four [elements] but exclude animals from generation out of these 
[elements], as if they came from somewhere outside and were not generated in 
the cosmos. Or do you ask me to show you earth pure and unmixed in the bodies 
of animals, when you yourself cannot even show me such earth in the cosmos? 
(Trans. De Lacy) 
 
T11 Galen in Hipp. Nat. Hom. comment. K. XV 17.16–18.7 Mewaldt 11.22–
12.2:  
 
(1) τοὺς γὰρ ἐκ πυρὸς καὶ γῆς ὕδατός τε καὶ ἀέρος ἀλλήλοις κραθέντων 
ἡγουμένους τὰ σώμαθ' ἡμῶν γεγονέναι | μοχθηρῶς ἄν τις ἀξιώσειε κρίνεσθαι 
ὕδωρ ἢ πῦρ ἢ γῆν ἢ ἀέρα δεικνύειν ἐν ἡμῖν ἤ, μὴ δεικνύοντας, ἐξελέγχεσθαι 
φάσκειν. (2) ὅμοιον γὰρ τοῦτο τῷ κατὰ τὴν ‘τετραφάρμακον’ δύναμιν ἀξιοῦν 
ἤτοι κηρὸν ἢ πίτταν ἢ στέαρ ἢ ῥητίνην εἰλικρινῆ δεικνύειν ἤ, μὴ δυναμένοις 
δεῖξαι, μὴ συγχωρεῖν ἐκ τούτων αὐτὴν συγκεῖσθαι· (3) ἐν γὰρ τῷ ‘κεκρᾶσθαι’ 
φάναι ’τὰ τέτταρα’ τὸ μηδὲν εἰλικρινὲς αὐτῶν εἶναι δηλοῦται. 
 
(1) For one might wrongly think it incumbent upon those who suppose that 
our bodies are generated from a mixture of fire and earth, water and air either to 
show that water or fire or earth or air exist separated within us, or, if unable to 
do so, to admit they have been refuted. (2) This is like thinking that, in the case 
of power of the ‘tetrapharmakos’ you must either show it to be pure wax, or 
pitch, or fat, or resin, or, if you are unable to show this, that you must concede 
that it is not composed of these things. (3) For in saying that these things are 
mixed, one makes it clear that no one of them exists in its pure state. (Trans. 




 As Kupreeva has shown, Galen’s implicit polemical target in the former 
passage, which is taken from I 5 De elementis (and, in filigree, also of the parallel 
passage from Galen´s Commentary on Nature of Man) is the physician 
Athenaeus of Attalia together with his followers, the Pneumatists.233 For 
Athenaeus of Attalia believed that the four elements of living bodies do not 
coincide with the cosmic elements (fire, air, water, and earth), but merely with 
the primary qualities (the hot, the cold, the dry, and the wet), only insofar as they 
constitute the nature of living beings234.  The main substantive reasons that 
Athenaeus of Attalia seems to have given for rejecting the cosmic elements are, 
first of all, that they cannot be manifestly discovered in living bodies by the 
means of sense-perception and, second, that they fall outside the realm of the 
medical art and, consequently, cannot be used in order to account for 
physiological and pathological processes going on in living bodies.235  
 By delving a little deeper into Galen’s defence of the explanatorily 
validity of the cosmic elements within the domain of medical art, it is possible 
to gather and bring to light some reflections relating to the ontological status of 
the primary elements in Galen’s mixture in order to answer the following 
questions: in which state are the primary elements in the mixture? Do they 
remain as such in the mixture or do they undergo any change? And, if so, do they 
get completely destroyed? Or are they preserved, and, if so, are they preserved 
                                                          
233 Cf. Kupreeva 2014 p. 178.  
234 Cf. Introd. s. medic. K. IX XIV 698.5–12 = SVF II 416, cf. Kupreeva 2014 pp. 172–178.  
235 Cf. De elem sec. Hipp. CMG V 1.2 p. 104.6–11 De Lacy “Perhaps the followers of Athenaeus 
will say that they themselves make no statement about these things because they are outside the 
medical art; they are content to make hot, cold, dry and wet, which they can clearly point to even 
in animals (κἀν τοῖς ζῴοις ἐναργῶς δεῖξαι δύνανται), the elements both of bodies and of the 
whole of medicine” (trans. De Lacy). As Kupreeva maintains, the first line of defense that Galen 
sets up against Athenaeus and his followers is methodological, as Galen did not 
methodologically approve of Athenaeus´ conviction that the principles of the medical field (and 
therefore the theory of elements too) should be kept separated from those of natural philosophy. 
On the contrary, in Galen´s opinion the two domains are strictly connected to each other and, 
more precisely, he clearly says that medicine is a handmaiden of the coming-to-be-and-passing-
away; cf. De elem. sec. Hipp. CMG V 1.2 pp. 92.26–94.2 De Lacy. The second line of defense 
he sets up in favour of the cosmic elements, which he clearly distinguishes from the 
homoeomerous part, is logical, as Kupreeva notes. By possibly drawing on the well-known 
distinction made in Aristotle´s Categories between “being said of a subject” (synonymous 
predication) and “being said in a subject” (inherence), differently from the Pneumatists, Galen 
distinguishes between the hot, the cold, the dry, and the wet qua qualities from the hot, the cold, 
the dry, and the wet, which by way of inherence can refer to the bodies that have these qualities 
within them either to the extreme degree (i.e. the primary element) or “by prevalence” (the 
homoeomerous bodies). Kupreeva 2014 pp. 181–194; cf. De elem. sec. Hipp. CMG V 1.2 pp. 
114.13–116.5 De Lacy. 
104 
 
in actuality or in potentiality, as, respectively, in the Stoic and in the Aristotelian-
Peripatetic account? 
 In order to start our enquiry, we can glean from the texts previously 
quoted that Galen argues that it is absurd to believe that bodies of living beings 
are not constituted by fire, air, water, and earth, only because we cannot clearly 
point to and manifestly identify these in living bodies. For in the mixture the 
primary elements have become indistinguishable from one another. As Galen 
says, “no one of the four is seen in the body in its pure form” (cf. T10.1 “μηδὲν 
τῶν τεττάρων εἰλικρινὲς ἐν τῷ σώματι φαίνεται”) and further down, “none of 
the four is either pure or complete” in the body (cf. T10.2 “οὐδὲν εἰλικρινὲς 
οὐδὲ παντελές ἐστιν”): if the primary elements are mixed, this means that they 
are not present in their pure form and have become indistinguishable in the 
mixture and, therefore, do not appear as such in the living beings’ bodies (cf. 
T11.3 “for in saying that these things are mixed, one makes it clear that no one 
of them exists in its pure state (ἐν γὰρ τῷ ‘κεκρᾶσθαι’ φάναι ’τὰ τέτταρα’ τὸ 
μηδὲν εἰλικρινὲς αὐτῶν εἶναι δηλοῦται)”). The state of indistinctness of the 
primary elements in the mixture is further clarified by the example of the 
τετραφάρμακος, a drug made up of four different ingredients (according to LSJ, 
tallow, wax, pitch, and resin): just as in the τετραφάρμακος, it is impossible to 
clearly recognize the individual ingredients of which it is composed, as they have 
become indistinguishable in the mixture; in the same way we cannot discern the 
cosmic elements whose mixture constitutes every living body (cf. T10.2 “by the 
same reasoning, I fancy a person will not believe that the so-called 
tetrapharmakos is a compound of wax, resin, pitch, and tallow, because none of 
these is found contained in it as a complete whole”). Plus, the mixture has given 
rise to a power that no longer coincides with its basic constituents but is 
something over and above them (cf. T11.2 “This is like thinking that, in the case 
of power of the ‘tetrapharmakos’ you must either show it to be pure wax, or 
pitch, or fat, or resin, or, if you are unable to show this, that you must concede 
that it is not composed of these things”).236 Mixture then coincides with a non-
pure state of the primary elements in the mixture: if something is mixed, it cannot 
                                                          
236 Τετραφάρμακος -ον is properly a compound adjective: it can be used as neuter noun or as 
adjective referring to the feminine substantive δύναμις; cf. Montanari 2000 s.v.  
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be seen in its pure state and distinguished from others; if something is visible 
and in its pure state, it cannot be mixed.237 Galen complements his argument by 
adding that saying that our bodies are composed of fire, air, water, and earth does 
not entail charging the natural philosopher with also demonstrating that simple 
bodies (fire, air, water, and earth) exist qua separated in the mixture (cf. T11.1 
“For one might wrongly think it incumbent upon those who suppose that our 
bodies are generated from a mixture of fire and earth, water and air either to 
show (δεικνύειν) that water or fire or earth or air exist separated within us, or, if 
unable to do so, to admit they have been refuted (τοὺς γὰρ ἐκ πυρὸς καὶ γῆς 
ὕδατός τε καὶ ἀέρος ἀλλήλοις κραθέντων ἡγουμένους τὰ σώμαθ' ἡμῶν γεγονέναι 
| μοχθηρῶς ἄν τις ἀξιώσειε κρίνεσθαι ὕδωρ ἢ πῦρ ἢ γῆν ἢ ἀέρα δεικνύειν ἐν ἡμῖν 
ἤ, μὴ δεικνύοντας, ἐξελέγχεσθαι φάσκειν)”). For according to Galen, it is 
possible to think that the living bodies are made up of fire, air, water, and earth, 
although they do not exist separated within us (κρίνεσθαι […] ἐν ἡμῖν): if they 
did, it would be possible to show and to detect them by sense-perception, but 
they are things that do not noticeably present itself to our senses. What Galen 
seems to be indicating in using the verb “κρίνεσθαι” with reference to the 
primary elements is the condition whereby the primary elements do not undergo 
                                                          
237 As Kupreeva stresses, this argument seems to have been popular in philosophical texts of 
Galen´s time; Proclus attributes it to the philosopher Numenius, cf. fr. 51 des Places = Proclus, 
in Tim. 9. 4–5 Diehl: “Numenius who believes that everything is mixed and nothing is simple 
(Νουμήνιος μὲν οὖν πάντα μεμῖχθαι οἰόμενος οὐδὲν οἴεται εἶναι ἁπλοῦν)”, trans. Kupreeva. As 
Kupreeva observes, Proclus quotes Numenius in a section of his Commentary concerning the 
text of Tim. 31b, where Timaeus describes the demiurgic activity of the Platonic God and says 
that anything created has to be visible and tangible and, since fire is needed for the creation of 
anything visible and earth for anything tangible, the Demiurge starts shaping the body of the 
world out of fire and earth, which, however, need to be bound together by a mean; this mean, as 
explained further below, is represented by the intermediate elements, air and water (cf. Tim. 32b). 
According to Kupreeva, Numenius´ interpretation of the Platonic passages implies that no one 
of the cosmic elements exists in its pure form and that all the existent bodies are mixed. Kupreeva 
contends that Galen´s position in this regard is slightly different, as although Galen admits that 
it is impossible to discover pure elements in the cosmos, the cosmic elements do exist “for 
anyone who has intellect”: in fact, they can be only intellectually grasped. Cf. Kupreeva 2014 
pp. 195–196. More precisely, cf. De elem. sec. Hipp. CMG V 1.2 p. 96.23–98.11 De Lacy, where 
Galen upholds that there is no pure and unmixed earth (εἰλικρινῆ καὶ ἄμικτον), neither in living 
bodies nor in the cosmos itself, because any part of the earth (where the predominant quality is 
the dry) immediately participates or shares (μετέχω) in the other elements. The element pure and 
unmixed can be in fact envisioned only through a mental act (ἣν δὴ καὶ στοιχεῖον ἐπινοοῦμεν), 
for the pure earth is dense, heavy, and dry and cold to the extreme degree (ἐσχάτως), and such 
an element can be only imagined as it does not concretely exist in the universe. In the cosmos, 
in fact, there are only earthy bodies (γεῶδες σῶμα), which in nature acquire different forms: an 
earthy body could be not only a stone, but also a part of a living being such as for instance bones, 
cartilage, or hair.  
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any change and can be distinctly perceived and indicated in the living body. 
Therefore, we can glean from Galen’s argument against Athenaeus and the 
Pneumatists that he would reject that the constituents would exist as such and 
qua separated in the mixture. What Galen seems instead to have in mind when 
he says that no element is preserved as such in the mixture in its pure form and 
that each of them became indistinguishable in the mixture is that a sort of change 
has taken place in the mixture: a change which has brought about a new and 
distinct outcome which cannot be identified with the basic constituents and 
which is comparable to a new and different power arising from a blend of drugs.   
For this reason, we will begin by exploring the basics of Galen’s theory of 
change, and then see which place, among the changes, mixture occupies in the 
Stoic and Peripatetic tradition. Finally, we will describe in which way Galen 
conceived of mixture as change: this will lead us to respond to our initial 
question regarding the ontological status of the elements. If in fact we want to 
show that Galen’s model of mixture is philosophically consistent and sets itself 
in line with an Aristotelian and, more importantly, a contemporary Peripatetic 
framework, then we have to prove that its main features are all in accord with 
the Aristotelian/Peripatetic equivalent. 
 
 Right at the beginning of his De naturalibus facultatibus Galen 
distinguishes two primary and simple types of motion (κίνησις): qualitative 
change or alloiôsis (the most general category which includes all kinds of 
qualitative changes between opposites, especially the most basic ones between 
hot/cold and dry/wet) and transference or phora, i.e. change of place. Moreover, 
Galen adds two compounded qualities of motions, growth (auxêsis) and wasting 
(phthisis), which he describes as “when something becomes bigger from having 
been smaller or smaller from having been bigger, but preserves its proper form” 
and other two unspecified kinds of motions, generation and corruption.238  
                                                          
238 De nat. fac. p. 101.16-106.3 H. As Hankinson notes, Galen does not classify generation and 
corruption as primary (as Aristotle did), but he does think that, as well as qualitative alteration, 
they involve hot/cold and dry/wet although perhaps not exclusively; see Hankinson 2014 pp. 
957 ff. Generation/corruption and qualitative alteration are considerably different in Aristotle’s 
thought as, according to Aristotle, alteration (alloiôsis) is a qualitative change that does not imply 
a modification in the substratum (as for example when someone healthy becomes sick or a non-
musician  becomes a musician); cf. De gen. et corr. I 4. Even though Galen here evidently relies 
on Aristotle’s theory of change, he probably did not feel the need to embark on such metaphysical 
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In his continuist physics of elements, Galen’s primary elements come to 
be through the predominance of the four primary qualities in a common 
underlying substratum, which is qualityless, eternal, ungenerated, and 
incorruptible,239 substratum and qualities being distinguished rather as principles 
(or archaì) of the primary elements.240 Every element, which is simple by nature, 
unmixed and unblended, is distinguished by two primary qualities: water is cold 
and moist, air moist and hot, fire hot and dry, earth dry and cold, although the 
display more of the first quality than the second.241 These four qualities, hot, 
cold, dry, and wet, which cannot exist separately from the bodies who display 
the qualities at the extreme degree (the primary elements),242 are responsible for 
the interaction between the elements themselves243 by completely altering the 
                                                          
subtleties for the sake of medicine and physiology and does not differentiate in a clear-cut 
manner generation/corruption from qualitative alteration. Cf. De temp. p. 4.5–22 H.: “καὶ γὰρ δὴ 
καὶ τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τὴν ἀλλοίωσιν καὶ τὴν μεταβολὴν ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων εἰς τὰ ἐναντία 
γίγνεσθαι. τίς γοῦν εἰπών, ὅτι τὸ λευκὸν ἠλλοιώθη τε καὶ μετέβαλεν, ἐγένετο γὰρ θερμόν, οὐκ 
ἂν εἴη καταγέλαστος; ἐπιζητεῖ γὰρ ὁ λόγος οὐ τὴν κατὰ τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν ἀντίθεσιν, ἀλλὰ 
τὴν κατὰ τὸ χρῶμα· μεταβάλλει γὰρ τὸ μὲν λευκὸν εἰς τὸ μέλαν, ὥσπερ γε καὶ τὸ μέλαν εἰς τὸ 
λευκόν, τὸ δὲ θερμὸν εἰς τὸ ψυχρόν, ὥσπερ αὖ καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν εἰς τὸ θερμόν· οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ μὲν 
ὑγρὸν εἰς τὸ ξηρόν, τὸ δ' αὖ ξηρὸν εἰς τὸ ὑγρόν. εἰ γὰρ δὴ φάσκοι τις ἠλλοιῶσθαι τὸ σῶμα τῷ 
τέως ὑγρὸν ὑπάρχον εἶναι τανῦν λευκὸν ἢ τῷ τέως ξηρὸν ὂν τανῦν φαίνεσθαι μέλαν, οὐκ ἂν 
ὑγιαίνειν δόξειεν. εἰ δέ γε τὸ ὑγρὸν νῦν ξηρὸν φαίη γεγονέναι ἢ τὸ πρότερον ὑπάρχον μέλαν νῦν 
εἶναι λευκὸν ἢ | ἐκ θερμοῦ ψυχρὸν ἢ ἐκ ψυχροῦ θερμὸν γεγονέναι, σωφρονεῖν τ' ἂν δόξειεν ὁ 
τοιοῦτος καὶ λέγειν τὰ εἰκότα. τὸ γὰρ μεταβάλλον, ᾗ μεταβάλλει, ταύτῃ μεταχωρεῖν δεῖ πρὸς 
τοὐναντίον” (For indeed generation, alteration and change come about from opposites to 
opposites If, for example, one were to state that the white had undergone alteration and change, 
and so become hot, would this not be ridiculous? For the argument requires an opposition of 
colour, not one in terms of the hot and the cold. The white may change to the black, and indeed 
the black to white and the hot may change to the cold, as also the cold to the hot. Similarly, too, 
the wet may change to the dry, or, conversely, the dry to the wet. If someone were to state that 
the body has undergone alteration in the sanse that what was once wet is now white, or in the 
sense that what was once dry now appears black, this person would seem insane. If, however, 
one were to say that once wet body has now become dry, or that the body that was previously 
black is now white, or that it has become cold from (being) hot, or hot from being cold, such a 
person would seem to be sensible and to say the appropriate things. For what is changing must, 
in the respect in which it is changing, be moving towards the opposite)” (trans. Singer). 
239 De elem. sec. Hipp. CMG V 1.2 p.  90.6–8 and p. 114.16–19 De Lacy. 
240 In Hipp. Nat. Hom. comment. CMG V 9.1 p. 17.28–18.15 Mewaldt and De elem. CMG V 1.2 
p. 126.7–12 De Lacy. Hankinson 2008a p. 214 points out that for the distinction between 
elements and principles Galen is indebted to Aristotle (cf. De gen. et corr. 329a27–33). 
241 Cf. De elem. sec. Hipp. CMG V 1.2 112.24–116.5 and cf. also In Hipp. Nat. Hom. Comm. 
CMG V 9.1 p. 49.26–9 Mewaldt. Differently from the Stoics, who assign a quality to each 
primary element, and similarly to Aristotle (De gen. et corr. 330a30331a6 and esp. 331a1–6), 
Galen attributes two qualities to each element, although he recognizes that the Stoics differ from 
Aristotle in supposing that air is cold (while for Aristotle air is moist and hot, cf. De simpl. K. 
IX p. 510); cf. Hankinson 2008a p. 215.  
242 De elem. sec. Hipp. CMG V 1.2 p. 124.19–21 De Lacy.  
243 De elem. sec. Hipp. CMG V 1.2 p. 100.22–23 De Lacy “ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς ποιότητας αὐτῶν, καθ' 
ἃς εἰς ἄλληλα δρᾶν καὶ πάσχειν πέφυκεν”. As we will see, in more functionalist contexts, instead 
of the general poiotês Galen uses the more specific term dynamis (simple oneshot/cold and 
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underlying substance so as to cause two qualitative changes or alloiôseis: i) the 
reciprocal transformation of the primary elements into one another (which from 
an orthodox Aristotelian standpoint would correspond to substantial 
generation/corruption) and ii) the generation of plants and animals: literally 
Galen says that the qualities are the artisans of plants and animals244 (that is, 
mixture).  
The first kind of change, that is, the reciprocal transformation of the 
primary elements into one another, needs a qualityless bodily substrate, i.e. that 
which changes, and the elemental qualities, which bring about the change 
through the exchange of qualities. In this way, by altering their internal 
qualitative composition, the four qualities, subsisting in the material substrate, 
give rise to four primary elements, which are the result of the conjunction of the 
two principles, matter and qualities.245 Needless to say, this way of accounting 
for the elemental transformation is quite far from the Stoic standard elemental 
change, which Galen knew very well and which was due to processes of 
contraction and expansion starting from a first primary element, fire, the element 
                                                          
dry/wetor derivative, as we will see) which indicates a natural capacity co-ordinated to a 
specific energeia or activity. Differently from the Stoics and Aristotle (who strictly distinguish 
between activehot and coldand passive qualitiesdry and wetAristotle: De gen. et corr. 
II 2 329b24–26 Mete. IV I 378b12–26; Stoics: 47D–G LS), Galen considers them all active 
although he declares that hot and cold are more so: De nat. fac. pp. 106.4–107.6 H.; cf. 
Hankinson 2008a p. 217.  
244 De elem. sec. Hipp. CMG V 1.2 p. 118.20–21 and ibid. p. 128.11–13 “αὗται γὰρ μόναι τὴν 
ὑποκειμένην οὐσίαν ἀλλοιοῦσαι τῆς τ' εἰς ἄλληλα μεταβολῆς τῶν στοιχείων εἰσὶν αἴτιαι καὶ 
φυτῶν καὶ ζῴων δημιουργοί (they alone by altering the underlying substance, cause the elements 
to change into each other, and they are the artisans of plants and animals)” (trans. De Lacy). As 
Kovačić underscores, the definition of primary qualities as δημιουργοί finds a correspondent in 
Aristotle; Mete. IV 384b26–28, 388a26 ff., 389a27 ff.; cf. Kovačić 2001 p. 99 n. 39.  
245 In Hipp. Nat. Hom. comment. CMG V 9.1 pp. 17.28–18.15 Mewaldt “However these (the hot, 
the cold, the dry and the wet) are not yet elements of the nature of man (or anything else), but 
rather its principles. This was confused already by the ancients, who did not arrive at the 
distinction between principle and element because they were able to use the term ‘element’ for 
principles as well. None the less, these two things are clearly distinct from each other, the one 
being the smallest part of the whole, the other that into which this smallest part itself can be 
divided conceptually. For one cannot split fire itself into two other bodies and show it to be a 
mixture of them, just as one cannot with earth or water or air. But it is possible to conceive of the 
substance of the changing thing as one thing and the change of it as another, since the body 
which changes is not the same as the change which occurs in it. For what changes is the 
substrate, while the change in it comes about as a result of the replacement of qualities: so when 
the extreme of heat has come to be in it fire is produced, as too is air when it receives the extreme 
of moisture. And in the same manner, earth comes to be when this substrate, which is without 
any of the qualities as far as its own nature is concerned, receives into itself dryness without heat, 
and so does water when it receives cold” (trans. Hankinson; emphasis mine).  
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par excellence from which all the others would derive.246 Galen’s description of 
the reciprocal transformation of primary elements into one another is clearly 
modelled on Aristotle’s treatment of elemental change in De generatione et 
corruption, where matter is thought of as inseparable from and always bound up 
with the contrary qualities of the two contrarieties (hot/cold and dry/wet; cf. De 
gen. et corr. II 1 329a24–26). When the contrary qualities completely overpower 
their opposites within the underlying substratum, the primary elements transform 
into one another: from fire to air, air to water, water to earth, and so on, cyclically 
and from each one to every other one (De gen. et corr. II 4). As Kupreeva rightly 
emphasizes, this Galenic analysis closely parallels Aristotle’s analysis of change 
in Physics 1.7–9 as based on three principlesform, matter, and 
privationalthough Galen endeavours to harmonize the Aristotelian doctrine 
with the new ontological background provided by later Peripatetic speculation 
upon the subject. If in fact Aristotle was more inclined to speak of elemental 
qualities as stoicheia,247, Galen, on the contrary, differentiates in a clear-cut 
manner element from quality and defines the stoicheia as qualified bodies where 
the corresponding qualities are present to the extreme degree,248 and in this he 
                                                          
246 De nat. fac. pp. 106.4–107.7 H. (= SVF II 406), SVF II 413 (Chrysippus’ account) and I 102 
(Zeno’s account) and cf. supra p. 41 n. 113. It seems important to point out that in his De 
elementis (CMG V 1.2 pp. 87.10–89.22 De Lacy) Galen rejects Presocratic theories of change, 
which are seen as elemental cycles due to contractions and expansions and as starting from just 
one element (either water, or air, or earth and fire), and might be interesting to ask whether Galen 
really wants to denigrate the ancient Presocratic theories of elemental change or whether this 
rebuttal instead conceals an attack on new up-to-date theories of elemental change which, with 
the due differences, were owed to processes of evaporations and rarefactions, such as those 
formulated by the Stoics (whom he could not openly criticize, unless he wanted to renounce his 
delicate system of anti-atomistic/corpuscolarist alliances). Of course, such a claim would need a 
more detailed and separate study, but it is certainly notable that our physician-cum-philosopher 
dismisses elemental change theories described in very analogous terms to those set up by the 
Stoics.  
247 De gen. et corr. 329b13 and 330a30. 
248 CMG V 1.2 pp. 114.25–116.5 De Lacy “καὶ μὴν εἰ τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν καὶ τὸ ξηρὸν καὶ 
τὸ ὑγρὸν ἐλέγετο τριχῶς, ἢ ὡς ποιότης ἢ ὡς ἄμικτον ἢ ὡς μεμιγμένον σῶμα, φαίνεται δ' οὔθ' ἡ 
ποιότης στοιχεῖον οὔτε τὸ κεκραμένον σῶμα καὶ μεμιγμένον, ὑπολείπεται τοίνυν τὸ ἄκρατόν τε 
καὶ ἄμικτον σῶμα καὶ ἁπλοῦν ταῖς ποιότησι τὸ στοιχεῖον εἶναι. πάλιν οὖν ἥκεις ἐπὶ πῦρ καὶ ἀέρα 
καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν, ἐν οἷς πρώτοις ἄκρα θερμότης καὶ ψυχρότης καὶ ξηρότης καὶ ὑγρότης ἐστί 
(And if we spoke of hot, cold, dry and wet in three ways, as quality or as unmixed body or as 
mixed body, and if it is evident that neither the quality nor the mixed and blended body is an 
element, then what is left is that the body that is unblended and unmixed and simple in its 
qualities is the element. So you have again come to fire and air and water and earth, which as 
primary bodies possess extreme heat, cold, dryness, and wetness” (trans. De Lacy).  
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seems to continue the track pursued by his younger contemporary Alexander of 
Aphrodisias.249  
The second, qualitative changeas we have seenfor which the elements 
are responsible is the creation of animals and plants and of any other existent 
being populating our world. Although with due differences, which we have 
inquired into above, in the Stoic and in the Peripatetic traditions this function is 
carried out by mixture and, in both cases, mixture is associated with the concept 
of the change of primary elements. In the Aristotelian/Peripatetic tradition, 
mixture was essentially regarded as a particular kind of qualitative change that 
did not coincide with generation/corruption, alteration (in the orthodox 
Aristotelian sense given in De gen. et corr. I 4), or growth.250 More precisely, it 
has been defined as a two-way qualitative change,251 where the opposites (whose 
                                                          
249 On this cf. Kupreeva 2014 pp. 192–194. For the new hylomorphic status attributed to the 
stoicheia by Alexander of Aphrodisias cf. also supra n. 159. Besides, we can observe that, 
analogously to Alexander (cf. De an. 7.9–14 Bruns and De mixt. p. 229, 3–6 Bruns) and 
differently from Aristotle, Galen ascribes causal agency exclusively to the qualitative 
contrarieties present in the substrate, as he points out by endorsing the same Peripatetic formula 
that will be adopted by Alexander: the primary bodies act and are acted upon in accordance with 
the qualities; cf. De elem. CMG V 1.2 p. 100.22–23 De Lacy “ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς ποιότητας αὐτῶν, 
καθ' ἃς εἰς ἄλληλα δρᾶν καὶ πάσχειν πέφυκεν”.  
250 Cf. the next footnote. 
251 Frede 2004 p. 301 and Cooper 2004 p. 321. Cf. also De Haas 1999 p. 29. The particular status 
given to mixture in the Aristotelian account, which does not coincide with the other changes 
analysed in depth by Aristotle (generation/corruption, alteration in the Aristotelian orthodox 
sense, growth/diminution) is made explicit in the opening lines of Aristotle’s exposition of 
mixture in De generatione et corruptione (I 10 327a30–327b10), which we will briefly bring 
into focus. In this section, Aristotle deals with an initial trilemma against mixture and then 
carefully distinguishes mixture from generation and corruption, growth and alteration. See De 
gen. et corr. 327a34 ff. Some unnamed objectors held that mixture is impossible as i) either the 
ingredients persist intact in the mixture, and therefore there cannot be mixture since the 
constituents do not undergo any change or modification; or ii) one of the ingredients passes away 
and, therefore this is not mixture either, as it no longer contains both the ingredients; or iii) both 
the ingredients get destroyed in the mixture and, a fortiori, the corruption of both the constituents 
cannot be mixture either. In order to cope with this trilemma, Aristotle shows how mixture is a 
special case of change and outlines its differences in comparison with all the other mentioned 
processes of change that he had treated previously. On the one hand, mixture differs from 
generation and corruption, as in the latter case one thing completely changes into another, as 
when fire burns wood and, therefore, there is γένεσις of fire and φθορά of wood. On the other 
hand, mixture does not coincide with growth, as in that case one of the bodies would perish and 
change into the predominant constituent: the food in fact does not mix with the body but is 
assimilated by it; De gen. et corr. 327b13–14. Cf. also Joachim 1922 p. 179. The last two 
examples show that mixture is a process different from case ii) of the trilemma (where one of 
the constituents perishes), while the example given by Aristotle at 327b12, where he claims that 
burning pieces of wood do not mix with each other would rule out case iii) (where both of the 
constituents perish in the supposed process of mixture); cf. Frede 2004 p. 291 n. 6; cf. Joachim 
1922 p. 178. Finally, according to Aristotle, mixture is not identical with alteration (ἀλλοίωσις) 
either. If a body becomes white or if a lump of wax takes a particular shape this does not mean 
that the body has mixed with white or that the lump of wax has mixed with shape: an alteration 
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nature is preserved in potentiality while in actuality they give rise to a tertium 
quid) destroy each other’s excesses and find a common midpoint (or 
μεταξὺthe tertium quid) by reciprocally assimilating to each other.252 In fact, 
in contrast to elemental change, where one or two of the contrary qualities within 
the contrarieties completely master and prevail over their opposites (determining 
in this way the generation of one element and the destruction of the other), in 
mixture the qualities meet half-way and, therefore, generate an intermediate 
body, the homoeomerous part.   
In the Stoic tradition, instead, together with σύγχυσις (fusion), σύστασις 
(condensationwhich, as we have seen, regulates Stoic elemental change), and 
σύμφυσις (natural conjunction of matter and pneuma), mixture or δι' ὅλων 
κρᾶσις falls under the changes or μεταβολαί of substance (cf. SVF II 471), but 
in contrast to Aristotle’s account, its constituents (the active elements and the 
passive elements interpenetrating one another) always remain distinguishable in 
the mixture (cf. SVF II 472Philoand SVF II 473Alexander) and are 
compresent in a pervaded state (as we have seen, the bodily qualities of each of 
the constituents of total mixture are said to συνεκφαίνεσθαι, “to show forth 
together”; cf. supra), while, in its continuous inwards and outwards motions and 
by modifying the density of the matter, the pneuma (the mixture of fire and air) 
                                                          
and not a mixture has taken place, for the thing which is qualified and the quality which qualifies 
it are both preserved (οὐδὲ τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὸ λευκὸν οὐδ' ὅλως τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰς ἕξεις οἷόν τε 
μίγνυσθαι τοῖς πράγμασιν · σωζόμενα γὰρ ὁρᾶται); De gen. et corr. 327b13–14. Cf. ^^also 
Joachim 1922 p. 179. These examples have the effect of dismissing case i) as a mixture; cf. Frede 
2004 p. 292 n. 7. It is important to note with De Haas that although Aristotle very attentively 
differentiates between mixture and alteration, in the final statement of Chapter I 10 mixture is 
defined as “the unification of mixables when “altered” (ἡ δὲ μίξις τῶν μικτῶν ἀλλοιωθέντων 
ἕνωσις), that is to say, it is then the result of a particular kind of qualitative change; De Haas 
1999 p. 29.  
252 While in De generatione et corruptione I 10 Aristotle illustrates in general terms the process 
of interaction between the ingredients during the mechanism of mixture, later on in the same 
treatise (II 7) he sharpens the focus and applies it to the production of homoeomerous parts. As 
Aristotle declares, things, which share the same matter as the ingredients involved in the process 
of mixture, reciprocate and act and are acted upon (“Τὰ μὲν οὖν ἀντιστρέφει, ὅσων ἡ αὐτὴ ὕλη 
ἐστί, καὶ ποιητικὰ ἀλλήλων καὶ παθητικὰ ὑπ' ἀλλήλων”; De gen. et corr. 328a19–21), and when 
there is a certain balance between their ‘powers of action’ ("Ὅταν δὲ ταῖς δυνάμεσιν ἰσάζῃ πως, 
which we will examine later in this chapter), and none of the constituents can overpower the 
other, then “each of them changes out of its own nature towards the dominant: yet neither 
becomes the other, but both become an intermediate with properties common to both (τότε 
μεταβάλλει μὲν ἑκάτερον εἰς τὸ κρατοῦν ἐκ τῆς αὑτοῦ φύσεως, οὐ γίνεται δὲ θάτερον, ἀλλὰ 
μεταξὺ καὶ κοινόν)”, cf. De gen. et corr. 328a29–31 (trans. Joachim).  
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holds the matter together and provides it with unity and qualitative 
determinations (cf. SVF II 452). 
Now, after having introduced Galen’s primary elements as qualitatively 
alterable by the means of the interaction of their primary qualities, and after 
having seen that this qualitative alteration gives rise to the reciprocal 
transformation of the primary elements into one another, in order to pursue our 
main objective, that is to demonstrate that Galen’s model of mixture shows stable 
philosophical coherence, it is crucial to understand how the primary elements act 
and behave in the case of Galen’s mixture.  
Galen’s treatment of mixture as change also seems to closely resemble 
Aristotle’s picture: as we see in the following texts (T12, T13, T14), the primary 
qualities are thought of as extremes with latitude between them and, in the 
process of mixture, they do not change into one another (as in the elemental 
change) but into an intermediate stage or μεταξὺ under the influence of their 
reciprocal interaction.  
 
T12 Galen In Hipp. Nat. Hom. comment. K. XV 52.15-18 Mewaldt 29.11–14: 
 
ταῦτα γὰρ ἄκρας ἔχει καὶ ἀμίκτους ποιότητας, ἐξ ὧν ἀλλήλαις κεραννυμένων τὰ 
μεταξὺ σώματα πάντα γίνεται κατ' ἐπικράτειαν, οὐ κυρίως ὀνομαζόμενα θερμὰ 
καὶ ψυχρὰ καὶ ξηρὰ καὶ ὑγρά.  
 
For these [four elements] possess the qualities in their extreme and unmixed 
form, from which, when they are mixed with one another, all the intermediate 
bodies come to be which are called hot and cold and dry and moist not strictly 
but in respect of predominance. (Trans. Hankinson) 
 
T13 Galen In Hipp. Nat. Hom. comment. K. XV 55.3-11 Mewaldt 30.19–25:  
 
Τοιαύτη, φησίν, οὐ μόνον ἡ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου φύσις ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν 
ἄλλων ἁπάντων, ἐκ θερμοῦ δηλονότι καὶ ψυχροῦ καὶ ξηροῦ καὶ ὑγροῦ 
κεκραμένη τῶν ἁπλῶν καὶ ἄκρων. τὰ γὰρ ἐν τῷ μεταξὺ πάντα τὴν κρᾶσιν ἐκ 
τούτων ἔσχηκεν. ἀδιανόητον οὖν γίνεται τὸ λέγειν ἐκ τῶν μεταξὺ τὴν κρᾶσιν 
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γίνεσθαι τῶν ἐν τῷ μεταξύ. τοῦτο δ' οὐκ αἰσθάνονται λέγοντες οἱ ἐκ τῶν κατὰ 
τὸ σῶμα βλεπομένων ὑγρῶν καὶ ξηρῶν θερμῶν τε καὶ ψυχρῶν τὴν φύσιν ἡμῶν 
συγκεῖσθαι φάσκοντες.  
 
‘Such’, he says, is not only the nature of man, but also ‘of everything else’, 
that is, one mixed from the simple and extreme hot and cold, dry and wet, since 
all the intermediate things are mixed from these. Thus it becomes unthinkable to 
say that the mixture of the intermediate things comes to be from the intermediate 
things; but those who say that our nature is put together from the visible wet, 
dry, hot and cold things in the body do not realize that this is what they are 
saying. (Trans. Hankinson; slightly modified) 
 
T14 Galen De temperamentis K. I 554.13-555.10 Helmreich 29.4–18: 
 
οὔσης γάρ τινος ἀκράτου καὶ ἀμίκτου ποιότητος, θερμότητός τε καὶ 
ψυχρότητος καὶ ξηρότητος καὶ ὑγρότητος, ὅσα ταύτας ἐδέξατο σώματα, θερμὰ 
δηλονότι καὶ ψυχρὰ καὶ ξηρὰ καὶ ὑγρὰ τελέως τε καὶ ἀκριβῶς ἐστι. ταυτὶ μὲν 
οὖν μοι νόει | τὰ τῶν γιγνομένων τε καὶ φθειρομένων ἁπάντων στοιχεῖα, τὰ δ' 
ἄλλα σώματα τά τε τῶν ζῴων καὶ τὰ τῶν φυτῶν καὶ τὰ τῶν ἀψύχων ἁπάντων, 
οἷον χαλκοῦ καὶ σιδήρου καὶ λίθων καὶ ξύλων, ἐν τῷ μεταξὺ τῶν πρώτων 
ἐκείνων τετάχθαι. οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν οὔτ' ἄκρως θερμὸν οὔτ' ἄκρως ψυχρὸν οὔτ' 
ἄκρως ξηρὸν οὔτ' ἄκρως ὑγρόν ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ἤτοι μέσον ἀκριβῶς ὑπάρχει τῶν 
ἐναντίων, ὡς μηδὲν μᾶλλον εἶναι θερμὸν ἢ ψυχρὸν ἢ ξηρὸν ἢ ὑγρόν, ἢ θατέρῳ 
τῶν ἄκρων προσκεχώρηκεν, ὡς μᾶλλον εἶναι θερμὸν ἢ ψυχρὸν ἢ μᾶλλον ξηρὸν 
ἢ ὑγρόν.  
 
Since there is such a thing as an unmixed and unblended qualityheat, 
coldness, dryness, and moistureevidently the bodies that have received these 
qualities will be hot, cold, dry or wet in the complete and precise sense. Now, I 
want you to conceive these [bodies] as the elements of all things which are 
subject to generation and decay, and the other bodiesthose of animals, plants 
and all inanimate things, such as bronze, iron, stone or woodas having been 
placed in between those primary ones. None of them is either hot, cold, dry or 
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wet in the extreme sense; rather, it is either precisely in the middle of the 
opposites, so that it is to no greater extent hot, cold, dry, or wet, or else it is closer 
to one or other of the extremes, so that it is hot to a greater extent than it is cold, 
or dry to a greater extent than it is wet. (Trans. Singer; slightly modified)  
 
Although their contexts are different,253 all the three texts clarify the 
difference between primary elements that have within them primary qualities to 
the extreme degree and elemental composites or mixed bodies. On the one hand, 
we find the primary elements that possess extreme, simple, and unmixed primary 
qualities (cf. T12 “ταῦτα γὰρ ἄκρας ἔχει καὶ ἀμίκτους ποιότητας” and T13 “τῶν 
ἁπλῶν καὶ ἄκρων sc. ποιοτήτων”) in the complete and precise sense (cf. T14 
“τελέως τε καὶ ἀκριβῶς”). On the other hand, when the primary elements mix, 
they give rise to the mixed bodies and these texts provide us with more evidence 
so as to determine exactly how the contrary qualities behave during the 
qualitative change implied by mixture. Analogouly to Aristotle’s account, the 
contrary qualities in the contrarieties (ἐναντιώσεις) are endowed with latitude, 
going from extreme and simple hot to extreme and simple cold (and the same 
holds for the other contrariety, dry/wet): when they mix (T12 “ἐξ ὧν ἀλλήλαις 
κεραννυμένων”), they come over each other (T14 cf. the use of the verb 
προσχωρέω “approaching”, “coming/going over”). They can meet either right at 
the centre of the opposite extremities (T14 “μέσον ἀκριβῶς […] τῶν ἐναντίων”) 
or closer to each of the extreme poles, in which case the mixed bodies can be 
called “hot”, “cold”, “dry”, and “wet” by prevalence (κατ' ἐπικράτειαν). These 
bodies are called in the Aristotelian fashion in between or intermediate bodies 
(T12 “τὰ μεταξὺ σώματα”), because they are generated when the primary 
elements, which are defined as the elements of all things subject to generation 
and corruption (T14 “τὰ τῶν γιγνομένων τε καὶ φθειρομένων ἁπάντων 
                                                          
253 Both (T13), i.e. the commentary on De nat. hom. CMG I 1.3. p. 172.2–5 Jouanna and (T14), 
i.e. the commentary on De nat. hom. CMG I 1.3 p. 172.8–9 Jouanna, are inserted in a context of 
criticism (based on the exegesis of the Hippocratic De nat. hom.) of some unnamed physicians 
who deem the visible forms of hot, cold, dry, and wet contained in the homoeomerous parts to 
be the primary elements of the nature of the human being (and therefore are charged with 
mistaking already mixed bodies for primary elements) and that we can now safely identify as the 
Pneumatists. (T15) is instead taken from De temperamentis I 8, where Galen takes stock of the 
previous arguments and draws a distinction between elements (where the primary qualities are 
present to the extreme degree) and elemental composites (where the primary qualities are present 
by predominance) before expounding his system of nine mixtures.  
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στοιχεῖα”; the use of these terms is an explicit a reference to On generation and 
Corruption), meet between their opposites. They coincide with the bodies of 
living and non-living things: that is, animals, plants and inanimate beings, such 
as bronze, iron, stone or wood (T14 “and the other bodiesthose of animals, 
plants and all inanimate things, such as bronze, iron, stone or woodas having 
been placed in between those primary ones (τὰ δ' ἄλλα σώματα τά τε τῶν ζῴων 
καὶ τὰ τῶν φυτῶν καὶ τὰ τῶν ἀψύχων ἁπάντων, οἷον χαλκοῦ καὶ σιδήρου καὶ 
λίθων καὶ ξύλων, ἐν τῷ μεταξὺ τῶν πρώτων ἐκείνων τετάχθαι)”).  
But there is more: as in the Aristotelian/Peripatetic model of mixture, the 
primary elements are instead preserved in potentiality, while they give rise in 
actuality to a new product out of themselves. This is very clearly spelled out in 
our next text:  
 
T15 Galen De plac. Hipp. et Plat. K. V 676.5-14 De Lacy 502.14–21: 
 
ἀκριβέστερον <δὲ> φαίνεται καὶ μέντοι καὶ χρησιμώτερον ἰατρῷ περὶ αὐτῶν ὁ 
Ἱπποκράτης γεγραφώς. ἐκ μὲν γὰρ τῶν τεσσάρων στοιχείων φησὶ γεγονέναι τὸ 
σῶμα καλῶν τοὐπίπαν ἀπὸ τῶν δραστικῶν ποιοτήτων αὐτά, τὸ μὲν ξηρόν, τὸ δ' 
ὑγρὸν καὶ τὸ μὲν θερμόν, τὸ δὲ ψυχρόν· οὐ μὴν κατ' ἐκεῖνά γε τὸν περὶ τῶν 
νοσημάτων λόγον ἐποιήσατο.  δυνάμει μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ἐν τοῖς σώμασιν, ἐνεργείᾳ 
δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ τὰ ἐξ αὐτῶν γεγονότα διὰ μέσων τῶν τροφῶν, αἷμα καὶ 
φλέγμα καὶ ἡ ξανθὴ καὶ μέλαινα χολή· 
 
What Hippocrates wrote about these matters is seen to be more precise and 
indeed more useful to a physician. He says that the body has been generated from 
the four elements, naming them generally by their active qualities, the one dry, 
the other moist; the one hot, the other cold. But he did not formulate his account 
of diseases in terms of these qualities. For the qualities are in the body 
potentially, not in actuality; in actuality are rather the things generated from the 





 The passage is taken from the 8th Book of De Placitis Hippocratis et 
Platonis where, after a brief summary of the contents of the first six books, Galen 
proceeds to his theory of elements and underlines the points of contact between 
Hippocrates’ De natura hominis and Plato’s Timaeus extensively quoting from 
both works. In the present passage, in accordance with his systematic project of 
updating Hippocratic medicine, Galen tries to convince the reader that although 
Hippocrates thought of the human body as made up of the four elements (in 
Galen’s view analogously to what Plato’s Timaeus had said), he formulated his 
account in terms more suitable for a physician and named the elements by their 
active qualities (the hot, the cold, the dry, and the wet). Thissays Galendoes 
not hold for the aetiology of disease developed in that treatise, whichGalen is 
forced to admitwas instead clearly based on the four humours. Galen justifies 
this discrepancy between a genuinely Hippocratic humoral pathological 
aetiology and the Galenic image of Hippocrates as four-element-theorist by 
resorting to the Aristotelian distinction between potentiality and actuality. As he 
straightforwardly declares, Hippocrates already knew that the qualities are in the 
body (which arises from the mixture of the four qualities) in potentiality, not in 
actuality; in actuality we rather have the four humours generated from the 
qualities by means of nutriment (διὰ μέσων τῶν τροφῶν). This passage, then, 
gives us further confirmation of what we have been pursuing so far and it 
represents a key text as it unequivocally provides us with an adequate response 
to the question concerning the ontological status of the constituents in the 
mixture. The primary qualities are thus preserved in potentiality in the mixture 
and, as we see, Galen does not go deeper into accounting for which kind of 
potentiality he is referring to (as later commentators on Aristotle did): although 
they are not conserved as such in the mixture, they are not destroyed altogether, 
but nor do they remain intact and preserved in actuality.254  
 Finally, there is a last point to which we should call attention. In his De 
generatione et corruptione II 7 Aristotle speaks in passing of a ratio or 
                                                          
254 As we see, although analogously to the Aristotelian/Peripatetic account, Galen understands 
mixture as a type of half-way qualitative change and the qualities as potentially preserved in the 
mixture, in this text he speaks of the four humours of the Hippocratic tradition as a tertiary 
product arising from the mixture of primary qualities which, indeed, does not sound as 
Aristotelian. We will explore the issue in the next section of the present chapter.  
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proportion that brings about the homoeomerous parts, explaining in this way the 
great variety of homoeomerous stuff in the physical world, each homoeomerous 
part corresponding to a specific proportion of the qualities within the mixture: 
we saw that this λόγος of mixture (i.e. the proportion of the elements in the 
mixture) has already been considered a rudimental and primitive form of the 
homoeomerous part (not comparable, however, to the form of living things, 
conceived as wholes, which is the explanatory cause of this proportional 
relation). However, in Aristotle’s conception hot/cold and dry/wet give rise to 
μεταξύ bodies or intermediate bodies, that is, bodies that are generated when the 
opposites meet in a central and broad region. This is one thing; it is something 
else to say what Galen had stated in the previous passages: i.e. that a single and 
distinctive power arises out of the mixture and this power no longer coincides 
with each of is basic constituents. It is over and above them: that is, it is different. 
Moreover, as we saw at the beginning of this section, Galen sets forth the topic 
of change within the elemental mixture by recourse to an example which de facto 
falls outside of Aristotle’s discourse on mixture, and this is the image of the 
tetrapharmakos and of the power that emerges from this four-fold drug, which 
is indeed absent from Aristotle’s original account. In order to clarify this, we will 
quote two additional texts belonging to two different contexts255 (one of which 
                                                          
255 In the first case, Galen inserts this statement in a wider context where, commenting on a 
Hippocratic passage (De nat. hom. CMG I.3 pp. 164.8–166.11 Jouanna), he tries to demonstrate 
that in his De natura hominis Hippocrates refuted only those who believed that human nature 
was made up only of one element and not those who thought it was made up of all the four 
elements. In the second case, in his De causis contentivis he enters into a polemic with the 
Pneumatist Athenaeus of Attalia, who postulated three kinds of pathological causes (cohesive, 
prior and external causes); cf. De caus. cont. CMG Suppl. Or. II 2.2–3 p. 54 Lyons: “Athenaeus’ 
three types are as follows: first that of the cohesive causes, then that of the prior causes while the 
third type is comprised of the matter of the immediate cause. This latter term is applied to 
externals whose function is to produce some change in the body, whatever this change may be. 
If what is thus produced in the body belongs to the class of what causes disease, then, while it 
has not yet actually given rise to a disease, it is known as a prior cause. Alterations are produced 
in the natural spirit (i.e. pneuma) by these causes together with those that are external, leading 
to moisture, dryness, heat or cold, and these are known as the cohesive causes of disease. For, 
in Athenaeus’ view, the spirit (i.e. the pneuma) having penetrated the homoiomerous parts of the 
body, changes them through its own change and assimilates them to itself” (trans. Lyons; original 
italics). As is clarified further below, the cohesive cause is the pneuma whose qualitative 
composition has been modified, sometimes directly by an external cause (such as for the example 
the sun’s heat) and sometimes indirectly through the mediation of a prior or predisposing cause, 
which Athenaeus and the Pneumatists locate in the body’s humours. More precisely, in the text 
we cited Galen rejects Athenaeus’ view according to which once changed by an external or prior 
cause the pneuma would in turn change the composition of the homoeomerous parts: in Galen’s 
view, pneuma (in the Stoic view a mixture of fire and air) has to be completely mixed with the 
other elements in order to give rise to the homoeomerous parts.  
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has been previously cited; we will reproduce it again with the original 
numeration for the sake of clarity): 
 
T2 Galen in Hipp. Nat. Hom. comment. K. XV 32.1–11 Mewaldt 18.27–19.7: 
 
ὅτι γὰρ οὐχ ἕν ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ πλείω τὰ συντιθέντα τὴν | τοῦ ἀνθρώπου φύσιν, 
ἐπιδείκνυσιν ὁ Ἱπποκράτης, οὐ μὴν ὅτι γε μηδέν ἐστι τῶν τεττάρων στοιχείων 
εἰλικρινὲς ἐν τῷ σώματι. τὴν ἀρχὴν γὰρ οὐδὲ λέγουσιν οἱ τῆς δόξης ταύτης 
ἡγεμόνες τοῦτο. ἓν δή τι παρὰ τὰ τέτταρα, τὸ ἐξ αὐτῶν συγκείμενον, 
ἀποφαίνονται, ὥς γε τὴν τετραφάρμακον δύναμιν οὔτε κηρὸν οὔτε πίτταν οὔτε 
ῥητίνην οὔτε στέαρ, ἀλλά τι παρὰ ταῦτα ἓν ἄλλο, ὃ ἐξ ἁπάντων κραθέντων 
γέγονεν, οὔσης πάλιν καὶ αὐτῆς τῆς δόξης διττῆς· ἔνιοι μὲν γὰρ τὰς τέτταρας 
ποιότητας μόνας κεράννυσθαι δι' ὅλων ἀλλήλαις λέγουσιν, ἔνιοι δὲ <καὶ> τὰς 
οὐσίας ἀπεφήναντο, Περιπατητικοὶ μὲν τῆς προτέρας δόξης προστάντες, 
Στωϊκοὶ δὲ τῆς δευτέρας.  
 
For Hippocrates showed that what constitutes the nature of man is not one thing 
but many, not that none of the four exists in the body in its pure state. But the 
leading proponents of this doctrine do not say that this is the principle. Rather 
they hold that there is one thing over and above the four, and which is constituted 
from them, just as the power of the tetrapharmakon is neither wax, pitch, resin, 
nor fat, but something else over and above them, which is generated from the 
mixture of all of them, although this latter doctrine comes in two forms. For 
some people say that only the four qualities are mixed through-and-through with 
one another, while others hold that also the substances themselves are (the 
Peripatetics favour the former doctrine, the Stoics the latter). (Trans. Hankinson; 
slightly modified, italics mine).  
 
T16 De causis contentivis CMG Suppl. Or. II 3.2–3 p. 56 Lyons:  
 
For the spirit (i.e. the pneuma) does not preserve its original state at all when it 
is blended with other bodies in the total intermingling of the four elements. 
Rather from the four is produced a fifth substance, which is not identical with 
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any one of its ingredients. An illustration of that point is the unguent known as 
‘The Quadruple’ (i.e. the tetrapharmakos). When we make this we mix wax, 
pitch, resin and tallow and as these are completely intermingled none of them 
remains afterwards in its former state. Rather a fifth medicament is produced 
which is not the same as any of those four, since in the process of intermingling 
not one of them preserves and maintains its nature intact. (Trans. Lyons; italics 
mine) 
 
As Moraux has noted, Galen’s mixture is thought of as a type of qualitative 
change giving rise to a different product which acquires new qualitative 
determinations that no one of the primary elements possessed before.256 As 
Moraux rightly observes, he makes use of the example of the τετραφάρμακος 
that we find in the Stoic Mischungslehre in order to illustrate what fusion 
(σύγχυσις) is.257 What Morauxdoes not explain, however, is why Galen would 
have adopted this very example referring to the Stoic fusion and whether this 
example, taken from the Stoic doctrines, actually dovetails with an overall 
account, which, as I wish to claim, has its conceptual counterpart in the 
Aristotelian/Peripatetic model of mixture. Is he lacking of consistency on this 
very point?  
If we sift through the testimonies that we possess, we realize that, in 
contrast to the Stoic total mixture, fusion is the only mixture in the Chrysippean 
system in which i) the ingredients (which are always conceived of as qualified 
bodies going completely through one another; cf. SVF 471 and An. Lon. col. 
XIV, 18) are jointly destroyed in the mixture: they disappear and vanish 
completely and are no longer conserved (cf. SVF II 472 “Σύγχυσις δέ ἐστι φθορὰ 
τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ποιοτήτων” and further down “ἑκάστη μὲν αὐτῶν ἠφάνισται, 
πασῶν δὲ φθορὰ”; SVF II 473 “δι' ὅλων τῶν τε οὐσιῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ἐν αὐταῖς 
ποιοτήτων συμφθειρομένων ἀλλήλαις […] “κατὰ σύμφθαρσιν”; cf. also An. 
                                                          
256 Moraux 1984 p. 739 ff.   
257 Moraux 1981a p. 91. To be more precise, while the other sources generically speak of medical 
drugs or unguents in connection with fusion (SVF II 471, 473), Philo SVF II 472 and the text of 
Anonymous Londinensis (An. Lon. col. XIV 19–20 Manetti) mention the tetrapharmakos as an 
example of fusion. 
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Lon. col. XIV, 14258); ii) the elements give rise to a new superior (corporeal) 
quality out of the mixture (SVF II 471 “Τὴν δὲ σύγχυσιν δύο ἢ καὶ πλειόνων 
ποιοτήτων περὶ τὰ σώματα μεταβολὴν εἰς ἑτέρας διαφερούσης τούτων ποιότητος 
γένεσιν”; cf. SVF II 472 “εἰς διαφερούσης μιᾶς (sc. ποιότητος) γένεσιν and further 
down μίαν ἐξαίρετον ἄλλην ἐγέννησε δύναμιν”; cf. SVF II 473 “τῶν μιγνυμένων 
ἄλλου τινὸς ἐξ αὐτῶν γεννωμένου σώματος”; An. Lon. col. XIV, 19–20 “μίαν 
ὑπεράνω ἀποτελέσῃ ποιότητα”). As we see, Stoic fusion is considerably at 
variance with Stoic total mixture, since in the latter the ingredients i) totally 
bodily interpenetrate each other and qua bodily interpenetrated (and not qua 
separated, as in the case of unchanging constituents) persist as such and in 
actuality in the mixture; ii) do not give rise, out of the mixture, to a new product 
ontologically superior in comparison with the original and starting ingredients.  
Certainly, if we look more deeply and attentively at Galen’s usage of this 
Stoic example, we find some additional elements concerning his conception of 
mixture and, once more, elements which depart from the defining features of the 
Stoic total mixture. For in contrast to the Stoic total mixturebut analogously 
to Stoic fusionthe primary elements in the mixture give rise to a new product 
that is superior to the four elements and even goes beyond them: a product that 
not only comprehends them all, but also generates an outcome belonging to a 
higher ontological rank (cf. T2 “they hold that there is one thing over and above 
the four, and which is constituted from them, just as the power of the 
tetrapharmakos is neither wax, pitch, resin, nor fat, but something else over and 
above them, which is generated from the mixture of all of them”; and cf. T16 “a 
fifth medicament is produced which is not the same as any of those four”).  
However, although the analogy with the Stoic fusion that Galen himself 
offers in these texts can be taken as a forceful instrumentum cognoscendi, we are 
quite far from saying that Galen’s concept of mixture can be smoothly 
superimposed on that of Stoic fusion. On the contrary, I am trying to show that, 
while by making usage of a Stoic example Galen elegantly seeks to wrap his 
account of mixture in a Stoic cloak, his model of mixture turns out to reveal 
increasingly deeper links with the Aristotelian/Peripatetic model.  
                                                          
258 On σύμφθαρσις in the Stoic classification of mixture and in particular in connection with 
fusion, cf. Manetti 1999a p. 552–554. 
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To begin with, like all the other Stoic changes, fusion too implies corporeal 
causality and, as we have had occasion to see, Galen casts serious doubts on 
Stoic corporeal causality259. On the contrary, in the wake of a reinterpreted 
Aristotelian theory, he never misses the opportunity to remark that it is owing to 
the primary qualities that primary elements can act and be acted upon and are 
changeable, i.e. alterable in their entirety. Mixture, too, is regarded following 
Aristotle as a qualitative change, called alloiôsis, whereby the opposite qualities 
meet half-way between the extreme poles of a contrariety and give rise to a third 
product out of the mixture, as we have shown. 
Second, whereas in the Stoic account of fusion the constituents are not 
preserved at all, since they totally vanish because of their undergoing a joint-
destruction or σύμφθαρσις, according to Galen, we have seen that as in the 
Aristotelian/Peripatetic model of mixture, the primary elements are instead 
conserved in potentiality, while they give rise in actuality to a new product.  
 Third, if we think about it, the way in which Galen alludes to the nature 
of this third product endowed with a set of new qualitative determinations 
(which are compared to an arising dynamis), marking off something of distinct 
type which is no longer identical with the starting basic elements260 again bears 
striking resemblances (not indeed with the orthodox Aristotelian model of 
mixture, but) with Alexander of Aphrodisias’ notion of the supervenience of a 
new distinctive form on the matter of the underlying costituents.261  
                                                          
259 See supra pp. 86 ff. 
260 Cf. T2 “they hold that there is one thing over and above the four, and which is constituted 
from them, just as the power of the tetrapharmakos is neither wax, pitch, resin, nor fat, but 
something else over and above them”, and T16 “Rather from the four is produced a fifth 
substance, which is not identical with any one of its ingredients”. An illustration of this point 
is the unguent known as “The Quadruple” (i.e. the tetrapharmakos): “Rather a fifth 
medicament is produced which is not the same as any of those four”. 
261 As we have seen, in his De anima Alexander uses the example of a blend of drugs to express 
the emergent power of the soul. According to Caston, he echoes the Galenic example of the 
tetrapharmakon here, which generically refers to the notion of emergent power (the three cases 
we analysed are not set within a psychological context); cf. Caston 1997 p. 350 with n. 102. As 
we see, whereas in the Stoic doctrine of mixture the account of fusion is suited to illustrating the 
production of drugs, medicaments, and ointments from various ingredientsamong which the 
tetrapharmakos is also mentioned, Galen instead makes use of this latter Stoic image merely 
by way of example while alluding instead to the elemental mixture. In the textual evidence 
available to us there is just one case in which Stoic fusion is not applied to the production of 
drugs, and this is not properly a Stoic text. It is a text which in using the Stoic classification of 
mixtures drew on a source that in turn Galen may have known and used. I am referring to the 
doxographical section of the medical work by the so-called Anonymous Londinensis, (1st century 
CE), which consists of three sections. The first parts, partial and mutilated at the beginning, deal 
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This explanatory model is put into practice by Galen when he has to 
explain the process whereby the stoicheia give rise to the homoeomerous parts. 
This process is described as made up of progressive and gradual mixtures which 
are envisioned as qualitative alterations or alloiôseis brought about by the four 
                                                          
with the definitions of some important medical concept (cols. 1–4.17). The second part, to which 
we are now referring, deals extensively with the causes of diseases and formally quotes 
“Aristotle” as its source (cols. 4.18–21.9) though it was attributed to Aristotle’s pupil Meno by 
Diels, whose work was usually referred to as Menoneia. According to Diels the Anonymous may 
have known it through the mediation of the work Areskonta by Alexander Philaletes (1st century 
BCE–1st century CE). More recently, Manetti arguescontra Dielsthat the Anonymous may 
have used the material directly; cf. Manetti 1999b pp. 99 ff. The third part is a physiological text 
mainly devoted to theories of digestion and the assimilation of food (cols. 21.10–39); cf. Manetti 
1999b p. 98. This second doxographical section can be further subdivided into two parts: the first 
summarizes the views of physicians who attributed the causes of diseases to the perittomata 
arising from digestion, while the second deals with the physicians who opted for an aetiology of 
disease based on the equilibrium of the bodily stoicheia. Among the second group of physicians, 
a special place is held by Plato, whose doxa is the first and the largest of the second section of 
the doxography, which relies upon a paraphrasing of the contents of Plato’s Timaeus dealing 
respectively with the formation of the bodily parts from the primary elements (Tim. 42e–43a), a 
summary of Plato’s physiology and anatomy (Tim. 73bff.), and his pathologic aetiology (Tim. 
82aff.); cf. Manetti 1999a pp. 547–548. The first section is of most interest for us, since it 
explains what is considered to be Plato’s view on the generation of bodily parts from the mixture 
of the primary elements. According to the text, Plato affirmed that our bodies are made up of the 
four primary elements, κατὰ σύμφθαρσιν, i.e. joint-destruction (XIV, 12–14 Manetti). Our author 
then introduces the Stoic classification of mixtures: joint-destruction or fusion (in the text the 
corresponding Greek terms are used almost synonymously), juxtaposition (called μίξις), and total 
mixture (XIV15–25 Manetti), and adds that joint-destruction or fusion (i.e. the kind of mixture 
then to which he had previously attributed the formation of bodily parts) occurs when the bodies 
go through one another and give rise to a new superior quality, as in the tetrapharmakos (14.14–
20 Manetti). As Manetti rightly hypothesizes, the source of this portion of text seems to be a 
Stoic exegesis of Plato’s Timaeus, although it is not yet clear when and how it was originally 
composed. For a survey of all references to the Stoic classification of mixtures applied to the 
Timaeus cf. Manetti 1999a pp. 554–555. Galen could have known about the application of the 
Stoic theory of mixture to Plato’s Timaeus and he could have known this through two different 
channels: 1) through the so-called Menoneia (in Galen’s time there was a medical work in 
circulation, the Medical Collection, which was attributed to Aristotle but was widely assumed to 
have been written by his pupil Meno: this workwhether by Meno’s or notcontained the 
second part of the Anonymous’ doxography on the causes of disease), which he surely knew and 
quotes as one of the main sources of his element and mixture theory (cf. In Hipp. Nat. Hom. 
comment. CMG V 9.1 p. 15.26-16.2 Mewaldt “If you want to research into the doctrines of the 
ancient doctors, it is open to you consult the books of the Medical Collection, ascribed to 
Aristotle, but generally agreed to have been written by Meno who was his pupil, for which reason 
some people refer to these books as ‘Menonian’. For it is clear that this Meno researched 
diligently into what still survived in his time of the books of the ancients, and collected from 
them their doctrines”); and 2) through the tradition of commentary on Plato’s Timaeus (to which 
he himself dedicated an exegetical work, in whose fragments, however, we find no evidence of 
the Stoic classification of mixtures as applied to Plato’s text). This is striking and can help us to 
understand why does Galen makes use of this Stoic image, referring therefore to Stoic fusion, 
when expounding his theory of the mixture of the four primary elements. Probably his 
acquaintance with the application of the Stoic theory of mixtures to the Timaeus, whether or not 
it was mediated by the doxographic tradition, even more than the familiarity with the other Stoic 
classifications of mixtures tout court, was decisive for the formulation of such a 
theoryparticularly one given in such terms that explains the formation of the different parts of 
human bodies through the image of tetrapharmakos (instead of the production of medicaments 
et similia).  
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basic qualities and their powers. In the process of alteration, the qualitative 
composition of the basic constituents is affected and the new body is provided 
with a new set of properties determining the transition ἐξ εἴδους εἰς εἶδος: 
 
T17 Galen De simp. med. (temp. ac) fac. K. XI 545f.:  
 
Διττῶν δ' οὐσῶν τῶν ἀλλοιώσεων κατὰ γένος, τῶν μὲν εἰδοποιῶν, αἳ δὴ 
καὶ κυρίως καὶ πρώτως ἀλλοιώσεις ὀνομάζονται, τῶν δὲ καταθραυουσῶν τε καὶ 
συναγουσῶν τὰ μόρια τοῦ σώματος ἡμῶν, ἃς καταχρώμενοι μᾶλλον ἢ κυρίως 
ὀνομάζοντες ἀλλοιώσεις καλοῦσιν, τὰς τῶν φαρμάκων δυνάμεις ἐν ταῖς πρώταις 
φαμὲν περιέχεσθαι. μηδενὶ γὰρ δύνασθαι μεταβάλλειν ἐξ εἴδους εἰς εἶδος ἄνευ 
τοῦ θερμανθῆναί τε καὶ ψυχρανθῆναι καὶ ξηρανθῆναι καὶ ὑγρανθῆναι. λέγω δὲ 
ἐξ εἴδους εἰς εἶδος, ὅταν ἐξ ἄρτου καὶ πτισάνης καὶ φακῆς αἷμα καὶ φλέγμα καὶ 
χολὴ γίγνηται ξανθή τε καὶ μέλαινα, κᾀκ τούτων πάλιν ὀστοῦν καὶ πιμελὴ καὶ 
νεῦρον καὶ σὰρξ, ἀρτηρία τε καὶ φλὲψ, ἕκαστόν τε τῶν ἄλλων τοῦ ζώου μορίων. 
[…] ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ πέττεσθαι κατά τε τὴν γαστέρα καὶ τὰς φλέβας εἰς αἷμα καὶ 
φλέγμα μεταβάλλων, εἶτ' ἐκ τούτων εἰς ὀστοῦν καὶ σάρκα καὶ τἄλλα τοῦ 
σώματος μόρια, κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν ὅλην ἀλλοιοῦται καὶ τῆς ἀρχαίας ἐξίσταται 
φύσεως, εἰς ἕτερον εἶδος μεθιστάμενος. οὐ μὴν ἐξ ἄλλου τινὸς ἢ ἐκ τοῦ θερμοῦ 
καὶ ψυχροῦ καὶ ξηροῦ καὶ ὑγροῦ τὰς εἰς ἕτερον εἶδος οὐσίας ἀλλοιώσεις τε καὶ 
μεταβολὰς ἐδείχθη δεχόμενα τὰ πάθη τοῦ σώματος σύμπαντα.  
 
And since the alterations are twofold in kind (on the one hand, those that 
make up the substantial form (of the bodily parts), which we call alterations in 
the proper sense and primarily, and, on the other, those that break up and bind 
together our bodily parts, which we call alteration, using the term in an improper 
sense rather than properly), we say that the capacities of drugs fall within the 
first group. For [we say] that it is not possible for anything to change from one 
substantial form to another without being heated, cooled, dried, or moistened. 
What I mean when saying from one substantial form to another, is when out of 
bread, barley and lentil are generated blood and phlegm and bile, both the yellow 
and the black, and out of these [are generated] in turn bone, fat, nerve and flesh, 
artery and vein, and each of the animal’s parts. […] However, during the 
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digestion process in the stomach and in the blood vessels, [the food], changing 
into blood and phlegm, and after that from those into bone, flesh and other parts 
of the body, alters in its entire substance and leaves its previous nature turning 
into another substantial form. It was shown that all the affections of the body are 
subject to change and alteration of the substance into another kind certainly not 
from anything else than from hot, cold, dry and wet.262  
 
 As we see, in this passage Galen distinguishes a proper (cf. κυρίως καὶ 
πρώτως) from an improper use (cf. καταχρώμενοι μᾶλλον ἢ κυρίως ὀνομάζοντες 
ἀλλοιώσεις καλοῦσιν) of the term ἀλλοίωσις. The first is used for the so-called 
εἰδοποιοὶ qualitative alterations, i.e. the change which allows for a passage ἐξ 
εἴδους εἰς εἶδος, which is a change like the effects released by a real φάρμακον 
(cf. τὰς τῶν φαρμάκων δυνάμεις ἐν ταῖς πρώταις φαμὲν περιέχεσθαι). By 
contrast, the second usage of the term can be regarded as a misuse, as it identifies 
the process whereby parts of the human body have been just broken up and then 
re-joined and bound together (τῶν δὲ καταθραυουσῶν τε καὶ συναγουσῶν τὰ 
μόρια τοῦ σώματος ἡμῶν). As Galen clarifies afterwards, he refers to 
medications like a bandage, which after a traumatic event allows the body to 
close the wound.263  
What is of interest here is that the action of the drug, which by means of 
the four qualities and their powers (heating, cooling, drying, and moisteining) is 
able to provoke a qualitative alteration within the human body, is likened to the 
qualitative alterations involved in the formation of the constitutive parts of the 
human being. Here we face a hierarchical sequence of alloiôseis which are 
deemed to be the kind of change that allows for the transition ἐξ εἴδους εἰς εἶδος 
and from simpler to more complex bodies:264 bread, barley and lentils (made up 
                                                          
262 As Van der Eijk has noticed, in the syntagm “τὰς εἰς ἕτερον εἶδος οὐσίας ἀλλοιώσεις τε καὶ 
μεταβολὰς”, οὐσία can be taken either with ἀλλοιώσεις τε καὶ μεταβολὰς or with εἶδος. It is very 
difficult to decide, but one can surmise that, since Galen is speaking here of the alteration 
according to the entire substance (κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν ὅλην), the first option might be preferable.  
263 De simp. med. (temp. ac) fac. K. XI p. 546.5 “εἰ δέ τι τέμνον ἡμᾶς, ὥσπερ ὕαλος ἢ ξίφος, ἢ 
θλῶν, ὡς λίθος καὶ μόλυβδος, ἢ συνάγων τὰ κεχωρισμένα, καθάπερ ἐπίδεσις ἀλλοιοῖ πως τὰ 
μόρια ταῦτα, οὐκ εἶναι φάρμακα’.  
264 In T17 it is not so straightforward that the transition from εἶδος to εἶδος goes hand in hand 
with an advancement and a gradual enrichment of the complexity of the bodies involved in the 
process of alteration. However, T17 can be partly superimposed on another textual locus taken 
from De elementis (De elem. sec. Hipp. CMG V 1.2 p. 126, 1 ff. De Lacy), where Galen 
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of fire, air, water, and air, which are in turn constituted by a material substrate 
and qualities), through a qualitative alteration, acquire new qualitative 
determinations (cf. “οὐ μὴν ἐξ ἄλλου τινὸς ἢ ἐκ τοῦ θερμοῦ καὶ ψυχροῦ καὶ 
ξηροῦ καὶ ὑγροῦ τὰς εἰς ἕτερον εἶδος οὐσίας ἀλλοιώσεις τε καὶ μεταβολὰς 
ἐδείχθη δεχόμενα τὰ πάθη τοῦ σώματος σύμπαντα”)265 and give rise to the four 
Hippocratic humours, which, in the same way give rise in turn to the 
homoeomerous parts, namely bone, fat, nerve, and flesh. At each stage a 
complete qualitative transformation takes place, so that the body leaves its 
previous nature and turns into a new body endowed with new properties different 
in kind (cf. “κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν ὅλην ἀλλοιοῦται καὶ τῆς ἀρχαίας ἐξίσταται 
φύσεως, εἰς ἕτερον εἶδος μεθιστάμενος”).266 
                                                          
illustrates the progressive degrees of composition of the organism from the primary stoicheia 
(consisting of a material substrate and qualities) to foods and drinks (made up of primary 
elements), to the four humours (produced by foods and drinks), to the homoeomerous parts 
(generated in turn by the four humours). As it is evident, in this ascention each previous level is 
included in the successive one. The text will be analysed in greater detail in the next paragraph: 
for the moment we limit ourself to noticing that by comparing the two passages we see that the 
levels of formal differences correspond to a gradual scale of complexity ranging from the 
simplest to increasingly more complex bodies.  
265 As has been showed in other works, notably in De elementis, by means of hot/cold and dry/wet 
and their respective capacities the πάθη of a body undergo alteration and change so the body can 
acquire a new structure and a new set of properties differing in kind. As we see, Galen uses the 
term πάθος somewhat differently from Aristotle: generally, the term does not designate a 
specifically different quality (cf. Top. 145a3–12, although sometimes it does, cf. Part. an. 
678a33f.), and in fact in De gen. et corr. I 4 the qualitative alteration is seen as a change of pathe 
(the substratum remaining unaltered, as when someone gets sick or from sick becomes healthy 
again). Galen does not seem to make such a distinction: i) on the one hand he speaks of a change 
of pathe which brings about a new body distinct in kind, while ii) on the other hand he compares 
this qualitative alteration to that caused by a pharmakon which theoretically has to re-establish 
the healthy condition of the organism.  
266 Cf. Galen’s usage of the verb μεθίστημι indicates a transformation and a change in the mixing 
bodies (cf. for a parallel De gen. et corr. I 10 328a34 contra Rashed 2005, and contra Giardina 
2008a, who thought of a change of place as the mixing of a bodies’ particlesbut the verb 
indicates the transformation, i.e. the qualitative alteration, of the bodies during the process of 
mixture; on this cf. Bonitz s.v.: at the end of the chapter mixture is in fact defined as “the 
unification of the mixables that have been qualitatively altered” 328b22). As Kupreeva has 
shown, the same process of qualitative alteration is adopted in Galen’s account of the emergence 
of sense-perception from the elemental composites. In his De elementis Galen makes it clear that 
the primary elements can be either perceptive or imperceptive, as Hippocrates did not clearly 
prove this point; but even if they were imperceptive, the passage from being imperceptive to 
being perceptive would still be possible thanks to their capability of undergoing affection (as 
they are παθητικά), that is, the fact that they can be subject to change (μεταβολή) and qualitative 
alteration (ἀλλοίωσις). As Kupreeva underscores, qualitative alteration and change play an 
important role in explaining this transition, since it is possible that in the course of many partial 
qualitative alterations (ἐν πολλαῖς ταῖς κατὰ μέρος ἀλλοιώσεσι γενέσθαι ποτὲ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν 
σῶμα), by changing and altering and mixing continuously, the imperceptive can finally become 
perceptive (Kupreeva 2014 pp. 169–170 and De elem. sec. Hipp. CMG V 1.2 p. 70.12–18 De 
Lacy). The shift from imperceptive to perceptive, therefore, is possible only because Galen’s 
elements can undergo change, in contrast to both the Atomists/Corpuscularists and Empedocles. 
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Let us gather the results of the last section: i) we showed that as in the 
Aristotelian account Galen conceived of mixture as a two-way qualitative 
change (he calls it alloiôsis without precisely distinguishing it from substantial 
generation/corruption and mixture in the proper sense); ii) we understood that as 
in Aristotle’s account the basic constituents of the mixture are preserved in 
potentiality (Galen does not inquire which kind of potentiality this is); iii) we 
illustrated how, by making usage of a Stoic example, that of the tetrapharmakos, 
but actually paralleling a Peripatetic development of the theory of mixture, Galen 
tries to display the emergence, during a process of alloiôsis, of new qualitative 
determinations supervening on a previous structure that determines the 
generation of a new body distinct in kind. 
 A central problem, however, still remains. As we have hinted more than 
once, in the Aristotelian/Peripatetic tradition the tertiary new product arising 
from the mixture of the primary elements is the homoeomerous part, whereas in 
the latter texts Galen openly declares that the primary qualities are only in 
potentiality in the bodies, whereas in actuality they give riseunexpectedlyto 
the four humours of the Hippocratic tradition (blood, yellow and black bile, 
phlegm). If, as I wish to argue, Galen’s theory of mixture came from a reworking, 
which however benefits from variegated contributions (notably Stoic superficial 
influences), of the Aristotelian/Peripatetic account, we would expect a different 
formulation. What, then, is the relation between the Hippocratic four humours 
and the Aristotelian homoeomerous parts? What is the final outcome of Galen’s 
mixture? And how can the primary qualities pass from a stage of potentiality to 
a stage of actuality by means of digestion (διὰ μέσων τῶν τροφῶν)? We will 




                                                          
According to Galen, in fact, these theories could not account for such a transition and he 
elucidates his point with the example of housebuilding: a new house made of bricks, stones, 
timbers and tiles will never acquire any new different property than those that its constituents 
have. In the same way, a juxtaposition of constituents cannot allow the structure to acquire any 
novel property different in kind (ἑτερογενὲς), as can happen in the case of alterable primary 
elements which by changing and altering continuously can determine the emergence of a novel 
property different in kind, e.g. sentience (De elem. sec. Hipp. CMG V 1.2 p. 72.16–22 De Lacy; 




1.3.5 Mixture and generation. Humours or homoeomerous parts? 
 
 
As we have seen, in Aristotle’s account the final product of a mixture, the 
homoeomerous part, must be homogeneous throughout: any part of the 
compound must be the same as the whole, just as any part of water is water. 
Though Aristotle does not develop a descriptive nomenclature, in Meteorologica 
IV 10 he lists several kinds of homoeomerous parts: metallic substances (such 
as bronze, gold, silver, tin, iron, and the like), animal and vegetal material (which 
can be solids such as flesh, bone, sinew, skin, intestine, or liquids such as blood, 
bile, semen, milk, or in the case of plants wood, bark, leaf, and the like).267 In 
several passages of his works Galen refers to Aristotle’s terminology and clearly 
adopts it (listing among homoeomerous parts animate and inanimate 
materials),268 although in his De homoeomerum partium differentia he criticizes 
Aristotle’s definition because the parts are not only similar (homoios) but also 
specifically identical.269 As we see from the passages of De elementis (T18), the 
                                                          
267 Meteor. IV 384b30ff.  Aristotle distinguishes solid and fluid homoeomerous parts in De part. 
an. II 2 647b10–19. As Lennox notes, the homoeomerous parts are a) matter (moist and dry) for 
(and also final cause, as they are for the sake of) the anhomoeomerous parts and they i) contribute 
to being and ii) contribute to functioning; b) nourishment for the anhomoeomerous parts (moist); 
c) residues (ta perittōmata) of the moist and dry nutrients (both moist and dry), whether useless 
such as urine or faeces, or useful such as male semen and menstrual blood, which are formed 
from the residual blood. Among the homoeomerous parts blood (which is essentially hot, but not 
intrinsically hot) has a special status insofar as it is the final nourishment and, therefore, the 
constituent matter of the other homoeomerous parts, from whence they derive growth and 
nourishment; cf. De part. an. 650b2–12; cf.  Lennox 2001 passim pp. 185–200, comm. ad 
647b20–650b2. 
268 Cf. De hom. part. diff. I p. 45.1–22 Strohmaier. In several passages of his work Galen 
acknowledges Aristotle’s authorship of the term, for example De san. tuend. CMG V 4.2 p. 
169.10–11 and ibid. p. 184.22–23 Koch. Moreover, it has to be noted that in Hipp. Nat. Hom. 
comment. CMG V 9.1 p. 6.14–15 Mewaldt, Galen also attributes to Aristotle the definition, 
which is rather Galenic, of homoeomerous parts as στοιχεῖα πρὸς τὴν αἴσθησιν, while in Hipp. 
Nat. Hom. comment. CMG V 9.1 p. 6.18–20 Mewaldt, and analogously in Quod animi mor. K. 
IV p. 773.16 Galen claims that Aristotle calls ὁμοιομερῆ the first product of the mixture of hot, 
cold, dry, and wet, which Plato calls πρωτόγονα (Quod animi. mor. K. IV p. 773.14-17 “ἐκ 
τούτων καὶ χαλκὸς καὶ σίδηρος καὶ χρυσὸς ἥ τε σὰρξ νεῦρόν τε καὶ χόνδρος καὶ πιμελὴ καὶ πάνθ' 
ἁπλῶς τὰ πρωτόγονα μὲν ὑπὸ Πλάτωνος, ὁμοιομερῆ δ' ὑπ' Ἀριστοτέλους ὀνομαζόμενα 
γέγονεν”). As Moraux notes, the reference must be to Plato’s Politicus (288e5 and 289b1), where 
Plato actually uses the adjective πρωτογενής and not πρωτόγονον; thus, Moraux hypothesizes a 
lapsus by Galen, p. 343 n. 29, on Galen’s usage of Aristotle’s notion of the homoeomerous part. 
Cf. also Grimaudo 2008 pp. 48–52.  
269 De hom. part. diff. I p. 47, 19ff. Strohmaier; cf. Moraux 1985 pp. 338–339.  
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homoeomerous parts are, as in Aristotle, one of the levels of the animals’ organic 
structure:   
 
T18 De elem. sec. Hipp. K. I 479.10-480.8 De Lacy 126.1–12 : 
 
φέρε γὰρ ἵν' ἐπ' ἀνθρώπου διέλθω τὸν λόγον, ἐκ πρώτων οὗτος καὶ 
ἁπλουστάτων αἰσθητῶν στοιχείων ἐστὶ τῶν ὁμοιομερῶν ὀνομαζομένων ἰνὸς καὶ 
ὑμένος καὶ σαρκὸς καὶ πιμελῆς ὀστοῦ τε καὶ χόνδρου καὶ συνδέσμου καὶ νεύρου 
καὶ μυελοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων, ὧν τὰ μόρια τῆς αὐτῆς ἀλλήλοις ἰδέας ἐστὶ 
σύμπαντα. γέγονε δὲ ταῦτα πάλιν ἔκ τινων ἑτέρων προσεχῶν ἑαυτοῖς στοιχείων, 
αἵματος καὶ φλέγματος καὶ χολῆς διττῆς, | ὠχρᾶς καὶ μελαίνης, ὧν ἡ γένεσις ἐκ 
τῶν ἐσθιομένων καὶ πινομένων, ἃ δὴ πάλιν ἐξ ἀέρος καὶ πυρὸς ὕδατός τε καὶ γῆς 
ἐγένετο, ταῦτα δ' οὐκ ἐξ ἑτέρων σωμάτων, ἀλλ' ἐξ ὕλης τε καὶ ποιοτήτων ἐστί. 
καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πυρὸς μὲν καὶ ἀέρος ὕδατός τε καὶ γῆς ἀρχὰς εἶναι λέγομεν, οὐ 
στοιχεῖα, ταυτὶ δ' αὐτὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων στοιχεῖα. μόρια γάρ ἐστιν ἐλάχιστα 
τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων ἁπλᾶ καὶ πρῶτα. 
 
Now let me go through the account as it applies to a human being: he is 
made of the primary and simplest visible elements, those called homoeomerous, 
fiber, membrane, flesh, fat, bone and cartilage, ligament, nerve, marrow and all 
the other (structures) whose parts all have the same form. These in turn have 
been generated from certain other elements closest to themselves, blood, 
phlegm, and the two kind of bile, yellow and black, their genesis is from the 
things we eat and drink, which in turn were produced from air, water and earth. 
And these last are not from other bodies but from matter and qualities. That is 
why we say that there are first principles, not elements, of fire and water, air and 
earth, and that the latter are themselves the elements of all other things. (Trans. 
De Lacy) 
 
 As we see from this passage, Galen draws a distinction between primary 
elements, fire, air, water, and earth, proximate elements (προσεχῆ τοῦ σώματος 
ἡμῶν στοιχεῖα), that is, the humours, and homoeomerous parts (ὁμοιομερῆ), 
which he also calls perceptible elements (αἰσθητὰ στοιχεῖα). In other passages 
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of his work Galen also goes beyond the level of the homoeomerous parts and 
upholds the existence of the so-called anhomoeomerous parts,270 overtly 
recalling Aristotle’s articulation in dynameis (hot, cold, dry, and wet, which in 
Galen are replaced by the primary elements, fire, air, water, and earth) of 
homoeomerous and anhomeomerous parts, which Aristotle spells out clearly in 
his De partibus animalium.271  
However, as we saw in the above quoted passage, in contrast to Aristotle, 
who locates the humours on the same level as the homoeomerous parts,272 Galen 
introduces what has been defined by Kovačić as a “Zwischenstufe”:273 the 
humours that are in fact defined as “proximate elements”.274 These humours, 
which are said to be the peculiar elements of the blooded animals,275 directly 
stem from the Hippocratic tradition and are blood, yellow and black bile, and 
phlegm.276 
                                                          
270 Galen’s articulation into elements–homoeomerous parts–anhomoeomerous parts is clearly 
expressed in De san. tuend. CMG V 4.2 p. 184.20–26 Koch; cf. also De elem. sec. Hipp. CMG 
V 1.2 p. 126.19–26; in Hipp. Nat. Hom. comment. CMG V 9.1 p. 6.12–20 Mewaldt; De plac. 
Hipp. et Plat. CMG V 4.1.2 p. 500, 4–26 De Lacy; De morb. diff. K. VI 841.1–10. 
271 De part. an. II 1 646a13–24.   
272 De part. an.  II 2 647b 10–14 e 30–35, 648a 19–23, II 3 649b 20–650a 2. As shown by Van 
der Eijk, although Aristotle is acquainted with the four humours of the Hippocratic De natura 
hominis (in De hist. anim. 550b9–10 he mentions phlegm and yellow and black bile as residues, 
together with faeces; this is the only passage where these three humours are listed together), he 
does not seem to set up a real humoral system, as it occurs in the Hippocratic De natura hominis. 
For, in the first place, Aristotle regards phlegm and the two biles as useless residues and, 
therefore, it is highly unlikely that he assigned these bodily fluids a pivotal role in determining 
health and the pathological states of living beings. Second, van der Eijk points out that the 
Aristotelian notion of perittōma was not even known in the Hippocratic Corpus and was 
introduced into Greek medicine only after the second half of the fourth century BCE, possibly 
by Aristotle himself; cf. van der Eijk 2005, pp. 152–155, esp. p. 153.  
273 Kovačić 2001 pp. 98–99.  
274 Further down in De elem. sec. Hipp. CMG V 1.2 pp. 138.15–140.14 De Lacy, Galen also 
goes into more detail about this midlevel and clarifies the meaning of “proximate matter”: “It 
now time to proceed to the second discourse. After Hippocrates had proved that the elements 
common to all things are the hot, the cold, the dry and the wet, he then passed to another kind of 
element, no longer primary or common, but peculiar to sanguineous animals. For blood, phlegm, 
yellow and black bile are the elements of the coming into being of all sanguineous animals, not 
of man only; peculiar to man are the least parts, which are also called homoeomerous […]; but 
between these parts and those [elements] are in men the four humours, and in each of the other 
animals whatever may be the proximate matter of their coming into being. ‘Proximate’ is the 
term customarily applied to the matter from which a thing first comes into being when it has no 
need of any intermediate alteration”. 
275 De elem. sec. Hipp. CMG V 1.2 p. 138.18 De Lacy.  
276 In fact, the two four-humour systems present a few divergences that are worth underlining. 
In Galen’s case, as it is decidedly shown in De plac. Hipp. et Plat. (CMG V 4.1.2 p. 502, 22ff. 
De Lacy), phlegm and the two biles are clearly associated with a couple of primary qualities 
analogously to the Hippocratic four-humour theory (phlegm is cold and wet; yellow bile hot and 
dry; black bile cold and dry), but differently from the Hippocratic De natura hominis they also 
have a particular distinguishing primary element (phlegm corresponds to water; yellow bile to 
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Thus, at first glance, insofar as we can gather from Galen’s clearly spelled 
out articulation of i) primary elements, ii) primary humours, and iii) 
homoeomerous parts, it seems that the very first outcome of the mixture of 
primary elements is not the homoeomerous parts themselves, as it occurs in 
Aristotle, but the primary humours, which in turn form the homoeomerous parts. 
Furthermore, as Galen defines the humours as the most peculiar elements of all 
the blooded animals, it seems that the very first building blocks constituting the 
nature of all the blooded animals are, in lieu of the primary elements, the four 
humours of the Hippocratic tradition. 
Hence, at this point we must tackle two all-important complementary 
issues, that is, i) whether the four Galenic humours can be compared and 
correspond to the four Hippocratic humours of De natura hominis and, therefore, 
whether they can also be taken in Galen’s case to be the real building blocks of 
the nature of the human being; ii) in which relation the four humours stand to 
the homoeomerous parts, which in Aristotle’s conception are the result of the 
elemental mixture.  
Therefore, the first question worth asking is: Do these Galenic humours 
really work in the same way as in the Hippocratic treatise Nature of Man, and 
can they also be conceived in Galen’s case as the ultimate structures to which all 
the blooded animals can be reduced? The answer seems to be negative, first of 
all for historical reasons, as, over time, during the long period separating Galen 
                                                          
fire; black bile to earth). Moreover, similarly to Aristotle, but differently from De natura 
hominis, blood seems to have a privileged status in comparison to the other humours. For in the 
abovementioned passage from De Placitis blood is defined as perfect and it is said to come to be 
out of a balanced mixture of all the primary elements (ἡ δ' ἐξ ἁπάντων τῶν τεττάρων στοιχείων 
σύμμετρος κρᾶσις ἐγέννησε τὸ ἀκριβὲς αἷμα). In addition, in other passages of his work Galen 
tends to highlight the special status held by the blood: in Galen’s commentary on the Nature of 
Man blood is considered to be most closely affiliated to the nature of the human being (In Hipp. 
Nat. Hom. comment. CMG V 9.1 p. 41.2 “οἰκειότατος ὢν τῇ φύσει χυμός”) and the most well-
mixed, where no quality predominates over the other (In Hipp. Nat. Hom. comment. CMG V 9.1 
p. 51.2–3 Mewaldt “τὸ αἷμα […] εὐκρατότατον”), while in De temperamentis it is defined as the 
most useful and suitable (De temp. II 3 p. 59.20–60.5 H. “ὁ μὲν χρηστότατός τε καὶ 
οἰκειότατος”). On Galen’s system of humours cf. Jouanna 2012b and Schöner 1964, who in fact 
remarks that differently from the quadripartite system of De natura hominis, both in Galen’s in 
Hipp. Nat. Hom. comment. (CMG V 9.1 p. 50.19–51.5 Mewaldt) and in De plac. Hipp. et Plat. 
we find an alternative humoral quadripartite schema. In fact although every humour is associated, 
as in Hippocrates’ De natura hominis, with a couple of qualities, this does not happen in the case 
of the blood, which is said to come to be from a balanced mixture of hot, cold, dry, and wet (or 
the equivalent primary elements fire, air, water, and earth); cf. Schöner 1964 pp. 88–89. 
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from Hippocratic medicine, the conception of body itself inevitably changed, 
along with the progress of the medical techne. 
For in the Hippocratic De natura hominis, the human being was conceived 
as a mere mixture of humours prevailing over one another in accordance with 
the seasons and with the ages, and health and pathological states were 
prevalently investigated from a hydromechanic perspective, which was 
understandably derived from accurate clinical observations of the Hippocratic 
doctor working on his patients. And the etiology of disease was principally 
explained on the grounds of excessive or excessively scarce quantities of 
humours that could be extracted from the organism by means of specific 
hydragogue drugs.277 However, after Aristotle, who mentions a treatise of his 
On dissections278 and seems to have practiced animal dissection, albeit 
superficially, over time the medical science also began to explore the solid parts 
of living beings’ bodies, especially in the Hellenistic period with the anatomical 
discoveries of Erasistratus and Herophilus, who were mainly active in 
Alexandria and practiced dissection and also vivisection on human subjects. By 
Galen’s time the study of anatomy was an essential part of the medical 
curriculum.279 As is well known, Galen, too, was a great anatomist: he studied 
anatomy in Pergamum with Satyrus and in Smyrna with Pelops (the student of 
the great anatomist Numisianus), and afterwards in Alexandria he met 
                                                          
277 De nat. hom. CMG I 1.3 ch. 5 p. 176.11–178.2 and ch. 6 p. 178, 10–14 Jouanna.  
278 De hist. an. 497a32ff., 525a8ff., 566a14ff.; De gen. an. 746a14ff.; De part. an. 684b4ff.  
279 On hydromechanic humoral processes in the Hippocratic De natura hominis, on Hippocratic 
empirical method and clinical observation, on the passage from the Hippocratic purely external 
investigation to the practise of dissection on living subjects (whose first tracesbefore 
Aristotlecan be dated back to the Hippocratic treatise De morbo sacro, where the author 
mentions the possibility of carrying out a post-mortem dissection on the brain of goats, cf. De 
morb. sacr. 11 L. VI 382.6 ff., and which reached its apogee with the dissection and vivisection 
performed by the Alexandrian anatomists in the Hellenistic age), cf. Lloyd 1979 pp. 146–169. 
Moreover, on Hippocratic humoralism also cf. Moreno Rodríguez 1991 pp. 92–95 and Jouanna 
2002 pp. 39–55 and Jouanna 2012b on the different humoral systems of the Hippocratic Corpus 
and on the later reception of De natura hominis’ quadripartite model in ancient Greek medicine. 
On Erasistratus of Ceos, his life and anatomical discoveries, cf. Garofalo 1988 pp. 17–29; on 
Herophilos of Chalcedon, his life and dissection/vivisection practises cf. von Staden 1989 pp. 
35–43 and pp. 138–153. For the economic, cultural, religious, political, philosophical interactive 
factors that made possible dissections and, above all, vivisections viable practices in Alexandria 
see von Staden 1992, esp. pp. 231–234. 
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Numisianus’ son, Herakleianos. He also held anatomical skills in high regard as 
a fundamental prerequisite of the good physician.280  
Therefore, for Galen the bodies of living beings do not reduce to mere 
congeries of liquids mixing and separating with one another, as over time in the 
eyes of scientists they gradually acquire volume, shape, and a more solid internal 
structure. In fact in Galen’s representation of the human body the four 
Hippocratic humours do not fluctuate at all, but are thought of as functional to 
and playing a pivotal role in the formation and sustenance of the homoeomerous 
parts.  
On the one hand, during the embryonic stage the solid parts of the embryo, 
the homoeomerous parts, are generated from menstrual blood, which also 
contains phlegm and the two biles mixed together.281 This maternal blood is 
thought to be responsible for growth and nutrition of the embryo in its first 
phases of life.282 On the other hand, as argued by Moreno Rodríguez, through 
the process of digestion of foods and drinks which give rise to the four humours 
in the body, the primary elements and their primary qualities enter the body283 
                                                          
280 For Galen’s anatomical apprenticeship cf. Manetti and Roselli 1994 pp. 1589–1593 and the 
accurate overview provided by Garofalo 1994 pp. 1791–1795; moreover, cf. Vegetti 1994 on 
Galen’s commitment to anatomy as part of his medical programme, pp. 1681–1686, and on the 
spectacular character of Galen’s anatomical demonstrations, p. 1690–1695. 
281 In Hipp. Nat. Hom. comment.  CMG V 9.1 p. 32.14–25 Mewaldt “Having completed his 
account of the common elements, he [Hippocrates] now turns to the case of blooded animals, of 
whom man is one, in the present passage, saying that our original generation comes to be from 
blood and phlegm and the two biles, and also that our maintenance throughout our lives is derived 
from them, and that these are the whole nature of man, the humours being contained in the solid 
parts, and of the solid parts themselves which derive their own generation from them in the first 
formation of the embryonic animal. For he will show a little later on that all the parts are 
generated from the menstrual fluid, which is not pure blood, but has within itself both phlegm 
and the two biles” (Transl. Hankinson); a more precise account of the shaping of the embryo is 
provided in De fac. nat. p. 107.24–112.5 H.; cf. also De elem. sec. Hipp. CMG V 1.2 142.14–17 
De Lacy. For this cf. also Hankinson 2008a pp. 217–218.  
282 In Hipp. De nat. hom. comm. CMG V 9.1 p. 50.15 Mewaldt; this maternal blood is always in 
the body and can be extracted through phlebotomy; cf. In Hipp. Nat. Hom. comment. CMG V 
9.1 p.  39.23 ff. Mewaldt  “But we talk of two types of blood: which is manifestly evacuated as 
a result of phlebotomy and wounds, and which contains a portion, as we have indicated, of both 
types of bile and of phlegm; while the other is pure, unadulterated, and unmixed with the 
humours. And it is from blood in the first sense that it is perhaps correct to say that the foetus is 
formed” (trans. Hankinson).  
283 In Galen’s view food and drink, which are made up of primary stoicheia, are turned into 
chymos in the stomach through an alloiōsis. Then the chymos is expelled into the pylorus, and 
from the duodenum to the jejunum, and afterwards to the liver, the organ responsible for 
haematopoiesis, through the mesenteric veins; cf. Powell 2003 pp.13–18. It is in the liver that 
the second process of digestion takes place, leading to the production of blood through an 
alterative concoction; cf. Moreno Rodríguez 1991, pp. 97–98.  For the genesis of blood and 
yellow bile in the liver cf. De nat. fac. p. 182ff. H.; for an account of both black bile (as a residue 
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and nourish the homoeomerous parts.284 In fact, although Galen makes use of 
humours in order to explain some pathological processes,285 in his view they do 
not coincide with the very first and ultimate building blocks of living beings’ 
organic structure but merely provide the link between the cosmic external 
elements and the homoeomerous parts. In this sense the process of digestion is a 
key phase in the life of a living being, which allows entrance into the organism 
of the primary elements and their qualities that, contrary to the view of 
Hippocratic medicine, are regarded as the very basic building blocks of the 
organism out of whose mixture living beings and their parts are formed.286 
 But if the humours do not coincide with the very first building blocks of 
the nature of the human being, what then is the meaning of this clear-cut 
articulation of blooded animals’ bodily structure that Galen so precisely depicts 
in his De elementis, assigning to the four humours such a special and privileged 
status?  
                                                          
of the digestive process, which escapes alteration and is drawn into the spleen) and phlegm 
(which is described as a humour that escapes the first digestion and undergoes alteration only 
when it is carried out through the body), cf. De nat. fac. p. 201ff. H., cf. also Moreno Rodríguez 
1991 pp. 98-99. The humours are contained in food potentially: if the innate heat is moderate, 
blood is produced; otherwise phlegm and yellow bile are produced, depending on whether the 
food or drink is respectively either colder or hotter than the right measure; cf. Powell 2003 p. 13. 
284 De nat. fac. p. 254.19–255.25 H. 
285 Siegel in fact speaks of two complementary aspects of Galen’s pathology, the humoral and 
the morphological (cf. Siegel 1968 pp. 205–215), and accurately classifies Galen’s pathological 
states caused by the imbalance of the four different humours.  
286 Moreno Rodríguez 1991 p. 99. Moreno Rodríguez, however, draws a distinction between 
primary elements and primary qualities by saying that while the first, which are contained in 
food and drink, have to be considered “elementos de comunicación intraorgánica”, it is the 
second (the qualities) that are assimilated in the organism and play a role in physiological 
processes (see also Hankinson 2015 pp. 439–440). Galen distinguishes primary qualities from 
primary elements, where the qualities are present to the extreme degree (and he upholds this by 
saying that hot, cold, dry, and wet we can mean both; cf. De elem. sec. Hipp. CMG V 1.2 pp. 
114.24–116.5 De Lacy), but in his polemics against Athenaeus of Attalia he argues that there is 
no reason to doubt that the very cosmic elements, fire, air, water, and earth, are present in the 
nature of the human being, although they have become indistinguishable in the mixture; cf. De 
elem. sec. Hipp.  CMG V 1.2 102.1–7 De Lacy: “Athenaeus of Attalia made hot, cold, dry and 
wet the elements of man, and at the same time he claimed that the elements are clearly visible 
and do not require proof, sometimes calling them qualities and powers, on occasion granting that 
they are bodies, then afraid to agree that they are water, air, fire and earth”; and more clearly 
ibid. CMG V 1.2 p. 96, 1 De Lacy: “When Hippocrates says that his discourse is of no use to 
those who make a habit of listening (to discourses) about the nature of man that go /beyond what 
is relevant to the art of medicine’, he does not say this because he is condemning those who make 
fire, air, water, and earth the elements; on the contrary, from start to finish we find him censuring 
those who say that some one of these is the element. For is frightfully illogical to reject them all 
because no one of the four is seen in the body in its pure form; by the same reasoning, I fancy a 
person will not believe that the so-called tetrapharmakos is a compound of wax, resin, pitch and 
tallow, because none of these is found contained in it as a complete whole”. For Galen’s criticism 
of Athenaeus of Attalia’s theory of primary elements, cf. Kupreeva 2014, pp. 172ff.  
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In my opinion this can be interpreted as a formal rehabilitation of the four 
Hippocratic humours as first constituents of the nature of the human being and 
of all blooded animals, especially in one of his treatises where Galen clearly feels 
the weight of the Hippocratic legacy, and pays homage to the great and highly 
esteemed physician. In connection to this, Galen’s emphasis on the humours as 
proximate stoicheia that are said to be common to all the blooded animals can 
be regarded as a way to pursue one of the main objectives of his medical 
program, as we read in his De optimo medico cognoscendo: the recovery of 
Hippocratic knowledge and medical doctrines in order to restore Hippocratic 
medicineespecially in light of his polemic against the Methodists and above 
all against the Neronian physician Tessalus, who disregarded Hippocrates’ 
medicine and purported to teach the art of medicine in six months.287  
However, despite this strong Hippocratic legacy, it is undeniable that over 
time, from De natura hominis to Galen’s medicine, the idea of humours as the 
constituents of the organism remarkably changed in medical imagery, insofar as 
they no longer coincided with the real building blocks of the nature of the human 
being but were fully incorporated into the solid anatomical structure of the 
human body as the source of growth and nutrition of the homoeomerous parts. 
As we have seen, Galen’s homoeomerous part is not made up tout court of a 
mere mixture of humours, understood as having no link to the external cosmic 
elements, but of a mixture of primary elemental qualities that enter the body 
through the humours.288 Therefore, it is understandable that the very first unity 
                                                          
287 De opt. med. cogn. CMG Suppl. Or. IV V p. 69.1 ff. Iskandar, As Vegetti shows, one of the 
fundamental points of Galen’s medical programme, which is dealt with in De optimo medico 
cognoscendo, was called good training in the Hippocratic medical works. On the one hand, Galen 
is profoundly convinced of the fact that they still offer valid doctrinal contents, although they 
need to be updated. On the other hand, the reference to Hippocrates is regarded by Galen as 
essential insofar as it guarantees the unity and continuity of the medical tradition and could act 
as trait d’union between the best medical schools, such as the Dogmatist and Empiricist schools, 
against charlatans or parvenus of the medical science, like the Methodists; cf. Vegetti 1994 p. 
1681. For Galen’s criticism of Thessalus and the principles of the Methodic medical school, cf. 
Vegetti 1994 pp. 1672–1682.  
288 That is all the more true if we think that Galen sometimes openly says that the homoeomerous 
parts come to be directly from a mixture of the primary elemental qualities, while he completely 
skips any reference to the so-called Zwischenstufe, as comes to light in De const. art. med.ad 
Patr. CMG V 1.3 p. 86, 3ff. Fortuna: “χρὴ γὰρ οὐ μόνον, ὅτι θερμοῦ, καὶ ψυχροῦ, καὶ ξηροῦ, 
καὶ ὑγροῦ κερασθέντων ἕκαστόν τι γίγνεται μόριον, ἐγνωκέναι τὸν ἰατρὸν, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατ' εἶδος 
ἐπελθόντα, τίς μὲν ἡ τῶν ὀστῶν ἐστι κρᾶσις, ὁποία δ' ἡ τῶν σαρκῶν τε, καὶ νεύρων, καὶ φλεβῶν, 
ἑκάστου τε τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἁπλῶν (For it is necessary for the physician to know not only that 
each determined (sc. homoeomerous) part (μόριον) come to be out of a mixture of hot, cold, dry 
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formed by the primary elements, which Moreno Rodríguez calls the unidad 
estechiológica,289 and which turns out to be essential for Galen to develop his 
own solidist conception of body, is the Aristotelian homoeomerous part.  
Accordingly, we see more clearly why Galen adopted a theory of mixture, 
which patently draws on the contemporary Peripatetic background and cannot 
be answered for by the Stoic account. In fact, contrary to the Stoic model, whose 
main aim seems to be that of clarifying the inner cohesive structure of the cosmos 
(against which Galen sets up a striking criticism in his De causis contentivis),290 
the Aristotelian theory of mixture explained the generation of the homoeomerous 
parts and, therefore, could have a much wider application in the biological and 
                                                          
and wet (θερμοῦ, καὶ ψυχροῦ, καὶ ξηροῦ, καὶ ὑγροῦ κερασθέντων), but also, when he tackles the 
problem from the point of view of the species, (it is necessary for him to know) which is the 
mixture of bones, of what sort is that of flesh and of nerves and of veins and of each of the other 
simple [parts])”. As we clearly see, in this passage Galen speaks of the homoeomerous parts as 
generated directly out of a mixture of primary qualities, insofar as they constitute their inner 
structure and composition. And indeed this qualitative understanding of the homoeomerous parts 
is also clearly put into practice when he concretely deals with the homoeomerous parts, as he 
focuses on their qualitative composition and points out their differences as regards hot, cold, dry, 
and wet by comparing them to an ideal (and real, as we will see further below) midpoint where 
no one of the qualities predominates over one another; cf. the very detailed description of the 
homoeomerous parts of the human body in evidently qualitative terms of hot, cold, dry, and wet 
in De temp.  pp. 57–60 Helmreich.  
289 Moreno Rodríguez 1991 p. 91. 
290 Galen De causis contentivis CMG Suppl. Or. II 6.2–6 pp. 60-62 Lyons (trans. Lyons): “We 
hear a number of people say that amongst the propositions that are intrinsically acceptable 
without established proof is that no body in any state whatsoever can exist without having a 
cohesive cause. They say, though, that this cause is not to be found in all bodies but, rather, it 
exists in those whose substance it is particularly difficult to resolve and dissipate, such as 
adamant, rock, bones, iron and other similar things. But this remark of theirs is inconsistent in 
that, if every single extant thing needs a cohesive cause without which it cannot exist, that cause, 
as it is one of the existing things, must inevitably have another cohesive cause itself, which, in 
turn, must have yet another and that will go on ad infinitum, nor can we stop at any stage of the 
process. But they may say that some existing things cohere through their own nature, while others 
need something else to hold them. It follows that what has an easily dispersed substance is more 
likely to need a cohesive cause […] while the need will not affect bodies whose substance is 
firmly compact. For that reason wood, rock, silver, gold, iron, copper and other similar things 
are put down without having anything to contain or hold them, while water, wine, vinegar and 
honey are stored in jars and containers, because they are not self-coherent. It is not logical, then, 
for solids to need a cohesive cause in that the fact that they are solid and hard depends on this 
very quality, I mean that of self-coherence. This is one of the criticism that can be levelled against 
the Stoic theory, I mean that an earthy body, like adamant and rock, should be held together by 
a substance of the class of the spirit (i.e. pneuma). For we find that this latter is naturally quick 
to disperse, while the dissolution of the earth is a slow process.” Here we see that Galen sets up 
a critique of the Stoic theory according to which the active elements (fire and air whose mixture 
gives rise to the pneuma) hold together the passive and material ones (earth and water) that lie 
at the very core of the Stoic theory of total mixture. As it is clear from the text, Galen takes this 
position to be absurd: solid objects are cohesive, he maintains, just because that is exactly what 
solidity amounts to: “the fact that they are solid and hard depends on this very quality, I mean 
that of self-coherence”. 
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medical fields. The homeomerous parts, which are conceived as one of the levels 
of the organic structure, were in fact particularly suited to embodying a more 
organic and “solidist” conception of the body, which was dominant after the 
anatomical discoveries.  
But, why was the mere “solidist” view of the Alexandrian anatomists not 
so satisfying for Galen? As Vegetti points out, the answer lies in the fact that the 
Alexandrian anatomists limited themselves to what is visible without reaching 
the very first level of the nature of the human being, the primary stoicheia. And 
for this reason the Aristotelian model was attractive to Galen, because it 
permitted bringing back the medical discourse to the homoeomerous and hence 
to the first basic building blocks of the universe, the stoicheiain view of 
Galen’s polemic against the great anatomists, Herophilus and Erasistratus, 
whom Galen assimilates to the Dogmatists. In fact, if on the one hand 
Erasistratus recognized the existence of the triplokia, the triplet of nerve, artery, 
and vein, as the last structure graspable, Herophilus, according to Galen, limited 
himself to the anatomical evidence and affirmed “ἔστω ταῦτα εἶναι πρῶτα, εἰ καὶ 
μή ἐστι πρῶτα”“be they the first things, although they are not the first”.291 
Therefore, the recovery of the Aristotelian theory of mixture, its further 
Peripatetic development and the generation of the homoeomerous parts out of it, 
can be explained by reference to Galen’s aim of avoiding narrowing the medical 
                                                          
291 De meth. med. K. X 107.16 = Fr. 50b von Staden. For Galen’s critique of the non-reductionist 
Alexandrian anatomy, cf. Vegetti 1994 pp. 1702–1704. For Galen’s re-establishment of 
anatomical knowledge on a reduction to the very first principle of nature, that is the stoicheia, 
and on the Aristotelian causal sequence (elements–homoeomerous parts–anhomoeomerous 
parts), cf. Vegetti 1994 pp. 1710–1714. As von Staden remarks, it is necessary, however, to draw 
a distinction between Galen´s portrait of Herophilus and Herophilus´ real methodological 
outlook, insofar as it can be gathered from the extant evidence. As von Staden shows, giving an 
accurate and genuine description of Herophilus´ scientific method is a much more difficult task, 
as the surviving testimonies present three very different emphases. In the first place, there are 
some testimonies that place Herophilus among the Dogmatists, those physicians who looked for 
causal explanations and aimed at grasping the invisible by the means of deductive and inductive 
logical strategies. Another group of texts give a completely different account, as they describe 
Herophilus as an Empiricist, since he would have relied more on empirical data than theoretical 
medicine. There is a third group of texts, von Staden notes, which show a more sceptical 
inflection and according to which Herophilus would have underestimated the investigation of 
the causal explanation of appearances, which would have represented the last graspable level of 
reality. Despite these very different accounts of Herophilus´ methodological posture, von Staden 
has clearly shown that the Alexandrian physician attached high value to the theoretical 
explanation of the appearances (phainomena) in his physiological and pathological theory, and 
more precisely would have emphasized the suppositional nature of the causes and in so doing 
may have been influenced by Aristotle´s notion of hypothetical necessity as opposed to absolute 
necessity; cf. von Staden 1989 pp. 115–137 with references.   
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investigation to what is visible from the anatomical evidence, but to instead 
provide medical science with stronger theoretical tools that could conceptually 
grasp the reality of things.  
 
 
1.3.6 Mixture and symmetry. Galen and the Hippocratic legacy 
 
 
As we have seen, in the time between Hippocratic medicine and Galen, 
knowledge of the human body and its conceptualization changed 
remarkablyand this holds also for the theory of mixture. As we have noted, 
after the ground-breaking Alexandrian discoveries relating to the field of 
anatomo-physiology, the human body was no longer considered a mere mixture 
of liquid humours postulated on the basis of outward evidence. For the first time, 
Alexandrian physicians systematically explored the anatomical structure of the 
human body and described in minute detail its internal organs and their physio-
pathology, developing a solidist model of body. In Galen’s medical outlook there 
is a perceptible need to render an image of the human body as close as possible 
to, and competitive with, these new standards. For this reason, Galen adopts the 
four intertransmutable elements of contemporary continuist (profoundly 
Peripatetic and certainly anti-atomistic) physics, although he maintains and 
balances them with the Hippocratic scheme of four humours: in Galen’s 
physiology the four humours, as we have seen, play the most important role in 
the formation and nourishment of the solid homoeomerous parts, insofar as, in 
the embryogenesis’ phase and through the digestion process, they allow the 
entrance of the four primary elements and their qualities into the body; on the 
causal connection, of Aristotelian origin, elements-homoeomerous parts, which 
are mediated through the four humours of Hippocratic tradition, Galen founds 
his own peculiar (and different from the Alexandrian) solidist conception of the 
body. 
Insofar as it was the bedrock on which he built his vision of the entire 
bodily structure, Galen’s notion of the mixture of hot/cold and dry/wet also had 
to bolster a proper and coherent theorization concerning, on the one hand, the 
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definition of human bodily health and the body’s preservation over time and, on 
the other hand, the insurgence of pathology as well as its clinico-therapeutic 
treatmentall aspects which pertained more specifically to the medical field. As 
a matter of fact, in the writings that best explain his theory of mixture, Galen’s 
own considerations on the concepts of health and disease polarise on two 
interrelated ideas: the ideas of elemental συμμετρία or proportion292 and of 
εὐκρασία or good mixture (in the sense that the first causes the second). In his 
commentary on the Hippocratic Nature of Man, Galen plainly declares that 
health lies in the συμμετρία of the primary elements (hot, cold, dry, and wet) 
within the mixture (a state which he calls εὐκρασία), whereas disease arises 
whenever this equilibrium is disrupted. He attributes this formulation to some of 
the Rationalist doctors and philosophers, and, in primis, to Hippocrates, who is 
designated as the pioneer (ἡγεμών) of this theory of health as συμμετρία of the 
                                                          
292 As a specialist in the notion of symmetry, H. Weyl, remarks, “the Greeks never used the word 
‘symmetric’ in our modern sense [i.e. the case of the bilateral symmetry, or plane symmetry, 
where the points of a figure are equally distant to the left and to the right of its axis or midline; 
cf. Weyl 1952, preface pp. 1–2.]. In common usage summetros means proportionate, while in 
Euclid it is equivalent to our commensurable” (Weyl 1952 p. 75). For the Greek word συμμετρία 
had one fundamental meaning in Ancient Greek: proportionality. Originally, in earlier 
occurrences of the term or of the correspondent adjective (σύμμετρος), this sense of the term as 
“proportionality” occurs in three quite different contexts: a) in literary texts conveying the 
general meaning of “proportion” in the sense of “of equal measure, similar” (cf. Aesch. Ch. 230, 
Eur. El. 533 and fr. 676, cf. Montanari 2000 s.v. σύμμετρος) or “of the same age, contemporary” 
(Cf. Aesch. Ch. 610, Soph. Ant. 387, Eur. Alc. 26 Montanari 2000 s.v. σύμμετρος), which 
presupposes the operation of measuring by comparison or συμμέτρησις; b) in mathematical texts 
conveying the meaning of commensurability, the fact that two quantities show a common unity 
of measure, that is, a rational number resulting from a proportion (cf. Plato Theaet. 147d and 
148a–b; Aristotle Nic. Eth. 1112a23 and Metaph. 1061b1). The term συμμετρία becomes 
technical in Euclid’s treatise Elements; cf. Euclid’s definition of symmetry as commensurability 
between geometrical magnitudeslengths, areas and volumesin Book 10, def. 1; on this cf. 
Hon and Goldstein 2008 p. 2 and pp. 70–71); c) in “evaluative” (aesthetic/moral) contexts where 
συμμετρία is conceived as a property of single parts as integrated into a unified whole, since they 
respect a certain internal proportion so that a mean between excess and deficiency is reached. In 
these contexts, it means more exactly due/right proportion and is applied to two main interrelated 
subdomains: c.1) that concerning the enquiry into beauty and goodness, on the one hand (cf. 
Plato Tim. 87c–e, where it is argued that a living being must be symmetrical, i.e. well 
proportioned, in order to be beautiful and that the most important symmetry is that between soul 
and body, which is fundamental for a healthy life; cf. also Phil. 26a; cf. also Aristotle’s Metaph. 
1078b1, where Aristotle defines beauty as resulting from the synergic interaction of “order”, 
“symmetry”, that is, good proportion of the parts of a unified whole, and “definiteness”; on this 
cf. Hon-Goldstein 2008 p. 2 and pp. 93–96) and, on the other hand, c.2) the other relating to the 
idea of suitability, convenience, and appropriateness of someone/something (cf. Aesch. Eum. 
532, Montanari 2000 s.v. σύμμετρος. Cf. Plato Laws 625d; and Nic. Eth. 1104a17–25, where 
symmetry qua appropriateness, i.e. moderation, is viewed as a midpoint between excess and 
deficiency and is regarded as the leading moral principle ruling good conduct in life; on this cf. 
Hon and Goldstein 2008 p. 2 and pp. 93–96). 
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four elements, as we see from passages T19293 and T20, and whose position he 
endorses (T21): 
 
T19 Galen in Hipp. Nat. Hom. comment. K. XV 60.4-61.3 Mewaldt 33.1–13:  
 
I 20 [CMG I 1.3 172.15-174.2 Jouanna] Ὑγιαίνει μὲν οὖν μάλιστα, ὅταν 
μετρίως ἔχῃ ταῦτα τῆς πρὸς ἄλληλα δυνάμεως καὶ τοῦ πλήθεος καὶ μάλιστα, ἢν 
μεμιγμένα ᾖ.  
 
Κατὰ πάντας ἰατρούς τε καὶ φιλοσόφους τοὺς τελείους δογματικοὺς ἡ 
συμμετρία τῶν στοιχείων ὑγείαν ἐργάζεται. διττῆς δ' οὔσης τῷ γένει τῆς ἐν ταῖς 
λογικαῖς αἱρέσεσι στοιχειώσεως, ἡ μὲν ἑτέρα κατὰ παράθεσίν τε καὶ περιπλοκὴν 
τῶν πρώτων σωμάτων τὰς γενέσεις τῶν συνθέτων γενέσθαι φησίν, ἡ δὲ ἑτέρα 
κατὰ κρᾶσιν. ἡ μὲν οὖν προτέρα τὴν συμμετρίαν ἐν τῇ ποροποιίᾳ τίθεται, ἡ δὲ 
ἑτέρα κατὰ τὴν εὐκρασίαν τῶν στοιχείων ὑγιαίνειν ἡμᾶς φησιν, ἧς δηλονότι 
δόξης ὁ Ἱπποκράτης ἐστὶν ἡγεμών. οὔσης δὲ διττῆς συμμετρίας, τῆς μὲν ἐν τῇ 
δυνάμει τῶν κεραννυμένων, τῆς δὲ ἐν τῷ ποσῷ τῆς οὐσίας, ἑκατέρας 
ἐμνημόνευσεν ὁ Ἱπποκράτης εἰπών· τῆς τε δυνάμεως καὶ τοῦ πλήθεος.  
 
I 20 So it is particularly healthy when these things (sc. the four humours) 
maintain a balance of their power and their quantity in relation to one another, 
and in particular when they are mixed together. 
 
According to all perfect dogmatic doctors and philosophers, it is the 
proportionality of the elements (ἡ συμμετρία τῶν στοιχείων) that creates health. 
But element-theory takes two different forms among the rationalist schools; the 
one says that the generation of composite bodies comes to be as a result of the 
juxtaposition and interweaving of the primary bodies, the other as a result of 
their mixture. The former account locates the proper proportion in the creation 
of the pores, while the latter doctrine, of which Hippocrates was evidently the 
                                                          
293 I quote in full just one passage by way of example, as in Galen’s work statements like this are 
recurrent; see also: In Hipp. Nat. Hom. comment. CMG V 9.1 pp. 21.25–22, 11 Mewaldt; De 
plac. Hipp. et Plat. CMG V 4.1.2 p. 308.25–34 De Lacy.  
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pioneer, asserts that we are healthy in relation to the proper blending of the 
elements (κατὰ τὴν εὐκρασίαν τῶν στοιχείων ὑγιαίνειν ἡμᾶς φησιν). Since 
proportionality takes two forms, one consisting in the power of the things mixed, 
the other in the quantity of their substance (τῆς μὲν ἐν τῇ δυνάμει τῶν 
κεραννυμένων, τῆς δὲ ἐν τῷ ποσῷ τῆς οὐσίας), Hippocrates mentioned both 
when he said “of their power and their quantity”. (Trans. Hankinson) 
 
T20 Galen in Hipp. Nat. Hom. comment. K. XV 61.13-62.5 Mewaldt 33.12–
17: 
 
I 21 [CMG I 1.3 174.2–3 Jouanna] Ἀλγέει δ' ὅταν τι τούτων ἔλασσον ἢ 
πλέον γένηται ἢ χωρισθῇ ἐν τῷ σώματι καὶ μὴ κεκραμένον ᾖ τοῖς πᾶσιν.  
 Ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς ὑγείας τὴν ἀκριβῆ συμμετρίαν ἐν ποσότητι καὶ δυνάμει 
καὶ τῇ δι' ὅλων ἔθετο κράσει, κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς νόσου τὰ 
τούτων ἐναντία τίθεται, τὸ μὲν ἔλασσον ἢ πλέον εἴς τε τὸ ποσὸν τῆς οὐσίας καὶ 
τὴν δύναμιν ἀνάγων […].  
 
I 21 It suffers when one of them becomes either too small or too great, or 
is separated in the body and is not mixed with all the others. 
 
Just as he located health in the precise proportionality in quantity and 
power and in the through-and-through mixture, in the same way he locates 
disease in the contraries of these things, referring the too small and the too great 
to the quantity of substance and its power […]. (Trans. Hankinson) 
 
T21 Galen De sanitate tuenda K. VI 15.9-15 Koch p. 9.8–13: 
 
συμμετρία γὰρ δή τις ἡ ὑγεία κατὰ πάσας ἐστὶ τὰς αἱρέσεις, ἀλλὰ καθ' 
ἡμᾶς μὲν ὑγροῦ καὶ ξηροῦ καὶ θερμοῦ καὶ ψυχροῦ, κατ' ἄλλους δὲ ὄγκων καὶ 
πόρων, κατ' ἄλλους δὲ ἀτόμων ἢ ἀνάρμων ἢ ἀμερῶν ἢ ὁμοιομερῶν ἢ 
ἀνομοιομερῶν ἢ ὅτου δὴ τῶν πρώτων στοιχείων, ἀλλὰ κατὰ πάντας γε διὰ τὴν 





For health is definitely a balance of some kind, according to all the sects; 
it is just that in our view it is a balance of wet, dry, hot and cold, while others 
hold that it is a balance of masses and channels, others a balance of atomsor 
of 'unjointeds', indivisibles, homogeneous or non-homogeneous partsor any 
such primary element. But certainly all agree that it is through the balance of 
these that we perform our activities with the different parts of the body. (Trans. 
Singer) 
 
As we can gather from the above-quoted passages, in Galen’s view, 
according to all the Dogmatic schools of medicine and philosophy the health of 
living beings lies in the συμμετρία of the elements. However, he draws a 
distinction between two forms of this element-theory. According to a first 
formulation, physical elements can be conceived as juxtaposing and 
interweaving building blocks (κατὰ παράθεσίν τε καὶ περιπλοκὴν τῶν πρώτων 
σωμάτων),294 such as in the four-element Empedoclean and in the atomistic 
theories, as well as in the medical theory of Asclepiades of Bithynia and other 
later corpuscularians, which Galen groups together here without distinguishing 
“discontinuist” from contiguity theorists, though in contrast to the Atomists, 
Empedocles did not admitas is well knownthe presence of void in his 
physical doctrines. According to these theorists, συμμετρία consists in ἐν τῇ 
ποροποιίᾳ, i.e. in the creation of pores: this is a technical term from Methodist 
medicine but is here syncretistically referred to Empedocles and the 
atomists/corpuscularians.295 According to the second formulation, continuum 
                                                          
294 Cf. also In Hipp. Nat. Hom. comment. CMG V 9.1 p. 27.17 ff.  
295 At De meth. med. K. X 268.9–16 Galen attributes the usage of the terms ποροποιία and 
μετασύγκρισις (alluding to a qualitative modification of the pores) to the Methodic physician 
Thessalus, and remarks that this conception differs from the dogmatic Asclepiades’ use (from 
which, however, it stemmed), which was based on the symmetry of the pores; on this cf. 
Grimaudo 2008 p. 42 n. 13). Although in the passage I quoted no critique emerges, elsewhere 
Galen violently criticizes the Methodist theory of health as it presupposes the existence of the 
void by means of which the onkoi can circulate through the poroi. For example, in the Adversus 
Iulianum, Galen admonishes the opinion of the Methodist physician who, in a work entitled On 
the Physical and Psychical Diseases, defined health as a well-proportioned and commeasured 
state of “contractions and relaxations” of the human body’s structures (cf. Adv. Iul. CMG V 10.3 
p. 42.2–5 Wenkebach “σύμμετρον δὴ κατάστασιν καὶ μεμετρημένην συναγωγῆς τε καὶ χύσεως 
ὑποστησάμενοι ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπείων συγκριμάτων ὄνομα αὐτῇ ἐθέμεθα ὑγείαν”). The usage of 
the terms συναγωγή and χύσις is equivalent to that of στέγνωσις and ῥύσις, the conditions to 
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theorists (i.e. the above-mentioned “friendly tradition of the continuum”, 
constituted by Hippocrates as forerunner and, after him, the Peripatetic and Stoic 
schools)296 envision health as a symmetry of the four intertransmutable elements, 
that is, their good mixture or eukrasia (κατὰ τὴν εὐκρασίαν τῶν στοιχείων 
ὑγιαίνειν ἡμᾶς). Furthermore, Galen asserts that there are two kinds of 
συμμετρία: i) “one consisting in the power of the things mixed (ἐν τῇ δυνάμει 
τῶν κεραννυμένων)” and ii) “the other in the quantity of their substance (τῆς δὲ 
ἐν τῷ ποσῷ τῆς οὐσίας)”. Galen adds that Hippocrates had already recognised 
these, as in De Natura hominis the Hippocratic author says that the body is 
healthy “when these things maintain a balance of their power and quantity in 
relation to one another (ὅταν μετρίως ἔχῃ ταῦτα τῆς πρὸς ἄλληλα δυνάμεως καὶ 
τοῦ πλήθεος)”the original Hippocratic text referring, on the one hand, to the 
capacity or dynamis of each of the four humours (i.e. a capacity which can be 
stronger or weaker) and, on the other, to their concentration in the body or 
plēthos.297 What Galen precisely intends when he mentions this twofold 
symmetry we will clarify further below, but it is evident that in contrast to the 
Hippocratic author he clearly refers to the primary elements. Moreover, as Galen 
reports, Hippocrates would have located instead disease in the asymmetry of 
hot/cold and dry/wet, that is, when the quantity of their substance and their power 
are too small or too great (cf. T20 “τὸ μὲν ἔλασσον ἢ πλέον εἴς τε τὸ ποσὸν τῆς 
οὐσίας καὶ τὴν δύναμιν ἀνάγων”). As we gather from (T16), Galen underwrites 
the second view, i.e. the idea of health as a symmetry of four intertrasmutable 
bodily elements (and conversely disease as an asymmetry of primary elements) 
and ascribes it to Hippocrates’ De natura hominis as precursor. 
                                                          
which the simplistic Methodist pathological aetiology ascribes the arising of diseases; cf. 
Grimaudo 2008 p. 43 n. 15.  
296 Cf. De plac. Hipp. et Plat. CMG V 4.1.2 p. 308.25–34 De Lacy.  
297 Cf. De nat. hom. CMG I 1.3 pp. 172.15–174.2 Jouanna. It has to be pointed out that whereas 
in the Hippocratic passage, the Hippocratic author is referring to the four humours, as we infer 
from T16, Galen extends this reasoning to the primary elements, hot/cold and dry/wet, which he 
claims that Hippocrates discovered and which are the constitutive building blocks of the four 
humours, cf. supra. On the connection between dynamis and the verb dynamai in the Hippocratic 
corpus, cf. Plamböck 1964 p. 64: “Überhaupt hat man sich die Beziehung zwischen Substantiv 
und Verbum als sehr eng vorzustellen; dynamis ist nichts weiter als die Substantivierung der im 
Verbum präsenten Vorstellung, und im Verbum ist nach allem, was sich erkennen läßt, der 
Begriff ‘Können, Vermögen’ nicht sekundär und erst abzuleiten, sondern ursprünglich angelegt. 
Mit gleicher Ursprünglichkeit bezeichnet daher auch dynamis substantivisch das allgemeine 
‘Vermögen (etwas zu tun)’”.  
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In defining health as a symmetric or well-proportioned mixture or eukrasia 
of the opposite constituents, Galen’s primary elements of hot/cold and dry/wet, 
and disease as arising from their asymmetric or disproportionate mixture, Galen 
relies, as has been noted by Vegetti,298 on an “archaic” and even “pre-
Aristotelian” aetiological account of health and disease, which lies at the very 
root of Ancient Greek medicine.  
In fact, in early Greek medical texts, ranging from a fragment attributed to 
Alcmaeon of Croton (V BCE, D.-K. 24B4) to various medical works belonging 
to the Corpus Hippocraticum (such as, for instance De vetere medicina, De victu, 
Aphorismi, and De natura hominis, all dating back to the end of the 5th century 
BCE or the beginning of the 4th century BCE), the notions of μέτρον and 
συμμετρία make their appearance. These notions are implemented in the idea of 
a living organism conceived of as constituted by different opposite bodily 
constituents,299 which are mixed with one another and correlated to, and 
influenced by, the external physical forces governing nature, thought of as the 
macrocosm interacting with the human body’s microcosm: the measure and 
symmetry of the opposites, with regard to their quantity and quality, are in fact 
regarded as the most fundamental factors that allow the generation of a new and 
healthy living organism and that, if preserved through dietary regimen (based 
basically on the consumption of foods and drinks and on the execution of 
physical exercises), guarantee over time the maintenance of its state of health 
and well-being.300 Although the concept of συμμετρία as applied to the medical 
                                                          
298 Vegetti 1994 pp. 1712–1713 and Grimaudo 2008 pp. 53–55. 
299 Tracy 1969 pp. 67–68 and ff. In his analysis of the general theory of health and disease 
common to many pre-Aristotelian medical writers who have in common the idea of health as 
symmetry/due proportion, Tracy singles out different kinds of bodily opposite constituents 
(variously named: ποιά, δυνάμιες, χυμοί, and στοιχεῖα) depending on the medical author: i) 
Alcmaeon of Croton: hot, cold; bitter, sweet; moist, dry etc., ii) Menecrates: blood and bile (hot), 
breath and phlegm (cold), iii) Petron of Aegina: the hot (dry), the cold (moist), iv) Philistion of 
Locri (whose elementary system stems directly from the Empedoclean one): fire (hot), air (cold), 
water (moist), earth (dry), v) the Hippocratic author of Ancient Medicine: bitter, sweet; acid, 
astringent; salt, insipid; hot, cold etc., vi) the Hippocratic author of Nature of Man: phlegm (moist 
and cold), blood (moist and hot), yellow bile (dry and hot), black bile (dry and cold), vii) the 
Hippocratic author of Airs, Waters, Places: hot, cold, dry and wet, viii) Regimen I: fire (hot and 
dry), water (cold and moist). 
300 Triebel-Schubert 1989 pp. 194 ff; cf. Alcmaeon of Croton D.-K. 24B4, who provides us with 
the first Greek definition of the notions of health and disease: “Ἀ. τῆς μὲν ὑγιείας εἶναι 
συνεκτικὴν τὴν ἰσονομίαν τῶν δυνάμεων, ὑγροῦ, ξηροῦ, ψυχροῦ, θερμοῦ, πικροῦ, γλυκέος καὶ 
τῶν λοιπῶν, τὴν δ' ἐν αὐτοῖς μοναρχίαν νόσου ποιητικήν· φθοροποιὸν γὰρ ἑκατέρου μοναρχίαν. 
καὶ νόσον συμπίπτειν ὡς μὲν ὑφ' οὗ ὑπερβολῆι θερμότητος ἢ ψυχρότητος, ὡς δὲ ἐξ οὗ διὰ πλῆθος 
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τροφῆς ἢ ἔνδειαν, ὡς δ' ἐν οἷς ἢ αἷμα ἢ μυελὸν ἢ ἐγκέφαλον. ἐγγίνεσθαι δὲ τούτοις ποτὲ κἀκ τῶν 
ἔξωθεν αἰτιῶν, ὑδάτων ποιῶν ἢ χώρας ἢ κόπων ἢ ἀνάγκης ἢ τῶν τούτοις παραπλησίων. τὴν δὲ 
ὑγείαν τὴν σύμμετρον τῶν ποιῶν κρᾶσιν”. In the text, the bodily organism is conceived as a 
complex of uncountable opposite powers (dynameis), each of which is opposed to another 
(moist/dry; hot/cold; bitter/sweet, etc.). The health or well-being of the living organism is 
thought to depend on the dynamic equilibrium of the opposite powers counterbalancing each 
other (ἰσονομίαν τῶν δυνάμεων), whereas disease occurs when one of the constituents of the pair 
of opposites prevails over the other (τὴν δ' ἐν αὐτοῖς μοναρχίαν νόσου ποιητικήν). At the end of 
the fragment, health is defined as the symmetric/well-proportioned mixture of the qualities, τὴν 
δὲ ὑγείαν τὴν σύμμετρον τῶν ποιῶν κρᾶσιν. Although this last reading has been questioned by 
several philologists and has been considered as due to a later interpolation of the text in this 
process of transmission (for a discussion on this please refer to Montanari 1979 pp. 190–194), 
and despite the highly metaphorical political lexicon of the rest of the fragment (the usage of 
both ἰσονομία and μοναρχία has a strongly political flavor; cf. Vlastos 1953 pp. 337–366; cf. 
Tracy 1969 p. 23 with n. 4;  Cambiano 1983; Kouloumentas 2014 pp. 873–874), it is true that 
Alcmaeon’s definition of health and disease conveys the idea, common to all subsequent 
Hippocratic speculation, that, while disease is caused by the excess or the deficiency of one of 
the opposite dynameis, health lies in the perfect mean between these two extremes. As Grimaudo 
has shown, the concept of symmetry in medical texts of the Hippocratic collection proves to be 
extremely ductile and lends itself to various conceptualizations concerning the arising of health 
and pathological states that build on different theoretical starting points; cf. Grimaudo 2008 p. 
36 ff. As for the main Hippocratic texts where this versatile notion of measure and symmetry 
emerges, cf. De vetere medicina, where the Hippocratic author seeks to establish criteria for a 
good proportion between dietetic prescriptions and the particular individual constitution of the 
patient (whose body’s response to the medical treatments, τοῦ σώματος τὴν αἴσθησιν, is regarded 
as a μέτρον, a practical-empirical norm marking off the right quantity and blend of nutriment 
from the excessive and deficient; cf. De vet. med. CMG I 1 p. 41.19–22 Heiberg). In De vet. med. 
CMG I 1 p. 39, 6–26 Heiberg, the notion of symmetry emerges as soon as the author states that 
nutriments, of whichever type (solid foods, gruels, or liquid potions depending on the health state 
of the patient), should be proportionate in their blend and quantity (ταῦτα τῇσί τε κρήσεσι καὶ 
τῷ πλήθεϊ […] ὡς μετρίως ἔχοι); cf. also Aph. V 62 L. IV 556 (where it is affirmed that the 
uterus’ symmetric/well-proportionate mixture of either qualitative oppositions, hot/cold and 
dry/wet“ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων τὴν κρᾶσιν […] ξύμμετρον”makes women fertile); and De nat. 
hom. CMG I 1.3 pp. 170.11–172.2 Jouanna, where the Hippocratic author explains that the four 
primary qualities have to be proportionate and equal to each other“μετρίως πρὸς ἄλληλα ἕξει 
καὶ ἴσως”in order to make possible the generation of a new living being; ib. CMG I 1.3 pp. 
172.13–174.3 Jouanna: a key passage of the treatise where the author focuses on the humoral 
constitution of the human being and clarifies that humans are healthy when the four humours are 
well-proportioned as regards quality and quantity“ὁκόταν μετρίως ἔχῃ ταῦτα τῆς πρὸς 
ἄλληλα δυνάμιος καὶ τοῦ πλήθεος”, whereas the organism is diseased when one of the 
humours, whose quantity increases or decreases excessively, separates off from and is no longer 
mixed with the others. The reflections of the Hippocratic author of De victu focus on the pivotal 
role played by food and physical exercise in the determination of a healthy state: a reciprocal 
and balanced relation between diet and physical activity is regarded as the main factor generating 
health; cf. De victu CMG I 2.4 pp. 200.30–202.2 Joly (‘ἔστι δὲ προδιάγνωσις μὲν πρὸ τοῦ 
κάμνειν, διάγνωσις δὲ τῶν σωμάτων τί πέπονθε, πότερον τὸ σιτίον κρατέει τοὺς πόνους, ἢ οἱ 
πόνοι τὰ σιτία, ἢ μετρίως ἔχει πρὸς ἄλληλα· ἀπὸ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ κρατέεσθαι ὁκοτερονοῦν νοῦσοι 
ἐγγίνονται· ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ ἰσάζειν πρὸς ἄλληλα ὑγιείη πρόσεστιν”; cf. also ib. CMG I 2.4 p. 190, 
25–27 Joly); cf. also ib. CMG I 2.4  p. 124.17–21 Joly, where it is added that if it were possible 
to establish the exact quantity of food and physical exercises for each patient, this would help us 
to find the path to health (“εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἦν εὑρετὸν ἐπὶ τούτοισι πρὸς ἑκάστην φύσιν σίτου μέτρον 
καὶ πόνων ἀριθμὸς σύμμετρος μὴ ἔχων ὑπερβολὴν μήτε ἐπὶ τὸ πλέον μήτε ἐπὶ τὸ ἔλασσον, 
εὕρητο ἂν ἡ ὑγείη τοῖσιν ἀνθρώποισιν ἀκριβῶς”). 
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field might have mathematical roots,301 in early medical texts the term and its 
derivatives indicate, more specifically, a condition of due or right proportion, 
which cannot be expressed in precisely mathematical terms,302 between opposite 
                                                          
301 According to Triebel-Schubert, the spread of this notion of symmetry to the medical field 
would have occurred in line with the insurgence of new mathematical developments in the 
doctrine of proportions under the primary influence of Pythagorean mathematical thought, and 
would have been due to intense processes of interaction between the mathematical and life 
sciences. This phenomenon has to be seen as rooted in the wider cultural framework of this age, 
which is characterized by a tendency to “mathematize” various aspects of reality: from the 6–
5th century BCE onwards, in fact, this “mathematizing” tendency (and the notion of 
symmetry/proportion into the bargain) started to flourish and pervaded the socio-political 
dimension (together with its moral/aesthetic implications), several disciplines, including natural 
philosophy and medicine; as a consequence, it would have surfaced also in early medical texts; 
cf. Triebel-Schubert 1989 pp. 190–192. 
302Triebel-Schubert sees the reference to symmetry in medical texts as strictly mathematical and 
draws a distinction between two different notions of symmetry recognizable in early Hippocratic 
texts: an “arithmetisch bestimmbaren gemeinsamen Maß” and a “qualitativ bestimmbaren Maß, 
dass durch einen gemeinsamen λόγος für als inkommensurabel erkannte Größen definiert sein 
soll”; as regards the second type, whose traces seem to her to be recognizable in the medical 
theories propounded by the author of De vetere medicina, she brings it back to the work of 
Hippocrates of Chios (5th century BCE), who, by proposing the first documented solution to the 
cube-doubling problem, extended the Proportionslehre to the incommensurable quantities for 
the first time; cf. Triebel-Schubert 1989 pp. 192–193. Pace Triebel-Schubert, however, this latter 
Hippocratic text leads us with Schiefsky to interpret the issue in another way. For De vetere 
medicina 9 (the same chapter quoted by Triebel-Schubert in her account) contains the core of 
the author’s argument according to which, on the one hand, the level of medical ἀκρίβεια or 
accuracy attainable is limited while, on the other hand, since there is an infinite variety of human 
natures, in the definition of an healthy diet, the stochastic art of medicine must aim at a “measure” 
(Δεῖ γὰρ μέτρου τινὸς στοχάσασθαι) that cannot be expressed in terms of weight units and precise 
quantities (οὐδὲ σταθμὸν, οὐδὲ ἀριθμὸν). Rather, this measure coincides with what he defines as 
“τοῦ σώματος τὴν αἴσθησιν” (i.e. the reaction of the individual’s body to the medical treatments; 
for an exhaustive summary of the different interpretations of this expression cf. Schiefsky 2005 
pp. 196 ff.), which can help the doctor to understand whether he has acted in the right way. In 
the first place, Schiefsky remarks that here the term μέτρον undergoes a “shift in meaning” 
(which is to be expected from an author striving to express abstract thoughts in the absence of a 
strictly technical medical terminology). In fact, the meaning of this term approximates that of 
the term μέτριον (due measure or mean between excess and defect; cf. Plato Polit. 284e2–8). 
Second, Schiefsky observes that although the term μέτρον may also refer to the measure of 
content of the dietary prescriptions, the point of the Hippocratic author seems instead to be a 
negative one: as human nature is too complex and at variance from one an individual to another, 
and is not explainable in terms of a small set of elements or philosophical hypotheseis, there is 
also no indication of a precise and exactmathematicalmeasure as regards quantity or weight 
(in a word: a standard and absolute criterion valid for all) to which to appeal in order to match 
the dietetic needs of a patient’s constitutionexcept the empirical response of each individual 
body to medical cures and regimen (cf. also the abovementioned passage in the previous 
footnote, from De victu CMG I 2.4 pp. 200.30–202.2 Joly); cf. Schiefsky 2005 pp. 186–188 and 
p. 193; cf. Grimaudo 2008 p. 38.  It has to be noted, moreover (although in his commentary 
Schiefsky neglects this detail), that in the passages from De vet med. the notion of quantity of 
food (De vet. med. CMG I 1 p. 39.6–26) is not expressed by recourse to the term ἀριθμὸς, which 
individuates quantity as arithmetically measurable, but by the term πλῆθος, which stems from 
the same root as the verb πίμ-πλη-μι “to fill”, and indicates, less precisely, the “great 
quantity/abundance” of something (cf. German Fülle), often in the sense of “concentration” or 
“multitude” (said often of human beings); cf. Frisk 1973 s.v. πίμπλημι. The same term is referred 
to the quantity of humours in the passage of De nat. hom. quoted by Galen (De nat. hom. CMG 
I 1.3 pp. 172.13–174.3 Jouanna).  
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factors so that a dynamic equilibrium (μετριότης) between extremes is 
established:303 as long as the various bodily constituents are symmetric with each 
other, in the evaluative sense of being well-proportioned, the body is healthy and 
vigorous, but as soon as this proportion is altered and the balance is broken, as 
one of the constituents prevails over the other, pain and ailment occur and the 
organism is diseased.304 All the more, in Hippocratic medicine it is the notion of 
mixture itself, i.e. κρῆσις, of various constituents that proves to be inextricably 
bound up with that of μετριότης, i.e. with the idea of equilibrium and right 
proportion: in Hippocratic writings κρῆσις is essentially regarded as an 
intrinsically well-balanced and well-proportioned mixture (be it a process or a 
state). To labour the point, in the Hippocratic corpus κρῆσις does not mean every 
proportional relation among bodily or cosmic constituents within the mixture, 
but only the good, positive, healthy ones.305  
In his text dedicated to the theory of mixture, the De temperamentis, Galen 
puts into practise this “archaic” conception of health as a symmetry of basic 
bodily constituents (his primary elements), but at the same time he innovates it 
by combining it with a gradualist account of health and disease: this implies an 
account of symmetry which, although it has the Hippocratic model as its basic 
starting point, is enriched – differently from what Vegetti thought - with new 
(markedly Aristotelian) connotations.  
In De temperamentis, Galen envisions his κρᾶσις as constituted by 
“portions” or μοῖραι of hot/cold and dry/wet in the contrarieties or ἀντιθέσεις, 
which can be equal (ἴσος)306a condition which is called ἰσομοιρία, or equal 
portioning/distribution of hot/cold and dry/wet in the mixture, a term of 
                                                          
303 Tracy 1969 pp. 67–68 and ff. 
304 This “archaic” account of health and disease, on which Galen is patently drawing, will not 
remain confined but will spread outside the strictly Hippocratic medical field. In fact, it will only 
later be taken up by prominent philosophers (notably Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics) in order, 
on the one hand, to study human nature in the broader context of cosmology, physics, and 
physiology as closely interrelated with psychological investigation, and in order to be used as a 
powerful analogy in the realm of ethical and political field in explaining the individual’s moral 
life and the collective life of the state, cf. Grimaudo 2008 p. 39 with n. 9 for the references.  
305 Tracy 1969 p. 73. We will refer to the point concerning the Hippocratic notion of κρῆσις as 
balanced mixture in the section dedicated to the terminology of mixture, cf. infra p. 213.  
306 De temp. p. 1.2 H. et alibi. 
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Hippocratic origin: 307 in this case the mixture will be defined as εὔκρατος,308 
ἀρίστη,309 μέση,310 or a εὐκρασία311 or well-proportionate mixture, i.e. a 
σύμμετρος312 κρᾶσις. When instead one or two of the portions of hot/cold and 
dry/wet is greater (πλείων)313 than the other opposite, or when one or two of 
them prevail over the other (the verbs used to express such a concept are mainly 
πλεονεκτεῖν,314 κρατεῖν,315  and ἐπικρατεῖν316), the mixture will be defined as 
badly mixed δύσκρατος,317 a δυσκρασία318 or a disproportionate mixture, i.e. a 
ἄμετρος κρᾶσις.319 Let us consider in detail how Galen accounts for the 
insurgence of disease as resulting from a disproportionate or bad mixture: 
 
T22 Galen De temperamentis K. I 520.12-522.1 Helmreich 8.4–27: 
 
(1) ἔστω γὰρ εὔκρατον εἶναι τὴν ὑγρὰν καὶ θερμήν, ὥσπερ αὐτοὶ 
βούλονται. παραλελοίπασιν ἄρα τὴν ἀντικειμένην τῇ ψυχρᾷ καὶ ξηρᾷ 
δυσκρασίᾳ, ἐν ᾗ τὸ ὑγρὸν πλεονεκτεῖ καὶ τὸ θερμόν. ἀλλ' αὐτή, φασίν, ἐστὶν ἥδε. 
καὶ πῶς ἐνδέχεται καὶ πλεονεκτεῖν ἅμα καὶ μὴ πλεονεκτεῖν τὸ θερμὸν | καὶ 
κρατεῖσθαι καὶ μὴ κρατεῖσθαι τὸ ψυχρόν; εἰ μὲν γὰρ εὔκρατός ἐστιν, οὐδὲν 
οὐδενὸς ἀμέτρως ἐπικρατεῖ, εἰ δὲ δύσκρατος, ἀνάγκη πλεονεκτεῖν τι τῶν ἐκ τῆς 
ἀντιθέσεως. (2) ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο, φασίν, ἴδιόν ἐστι τῆς εὐκράτου τὸ κρατεῖν ἐν 
                                                          
307 De temp. p. 16.15 H. cf. also 12.13 H. (referred to the spring), et alibi. The usage of this term 
in Galen stems from a Hippocratic expression. In Aer. CMG I 1.2 p. 54.4–20 Diller, the 
Hippocratic author establishes a comparison between Europe and Asia and says that Asia is more 
cultivated and the habits of people are more moderate as a result of “the good mixture of the 
seasons (ἡ κρῆσις τῶν ὡρέων)”, a condition which coincides with an equal portioning of the 
elementary forces governing nature (isomoiriē).  
308 De temp. p. 7.4, p. 7.12, 7, 27, 8.3, 40.4 H., et al.  
309 De temp. p. 24.17 H. et al. 
310 De temp. p. 24.17 H., et al.  
311 De temp. p. 9.12 H., et al. 
312 De temp. p. 40.4 H., et al. 
313 De temp. p. 1.20 H., et al. 
314 De temp. p. 1.19, p. 2.2, p. 8.7, p. 8.8–9, 8.11–12, 8, 22 H., et al. 
315 De temp. p. 8, 9–10, 8.14, 8.17 H., et al.  
316 De temp. p. 8.11, 9.25–26, 11.11, 16.12–13 H., et al. 
317 De temp. p. 8.11 H., et al.  
318 De temp. p. 8.7 H., et al.  
319 De temp. p. 13.11 H., et al. As is well known, in his De temperamentis Galen distinguishes 
an exactly symmetric and thus perfect mixture from eight asymmetric and thus bad mixtures 
(four simple, resulting from the prevalence of one element: hot mixture, cold mixture, wet 
mixture, dry mixture, and four composite, resulting from the prevalence of one element of each 
contrariety: hot and wet mixture, hot and dry mixture, cold and wet mixture, cold and dry 
mixture). On this scheme of mixtures and its origins amplius infra pp. 210 ff. 
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αὐτῇ τὸ μὲν θερμὸν τοῦ ψυχροῦ, τὸ δ' ὑγρὸν τοῦ ξηροῦ. κρατήσαντος γὰρ δὴ 
τοῦ ψυχροῦ μετρίως μέν, οὐκ ἀγαθὴν εἶναι τὴν κρᾶσιν, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον, νόσον 
ἤδη γίγνεσθαι, καθάπερ, εἰ καὶ σφοδρῶς κρατήσειε, θάνατον. οὕτω δὲ κἀπὶ τοῦ 
ξηροῦ συμπίπτειν ἐν ἀρχῇ μὲν δυσκρασίαν, ἐπὶ πλέον δὲ νόσον, ἐπὶ πλεῖστον δὲ 
κρατήσαντος θάνατον, ὥσπερ οὐχὶ κἀπὶ τῆς ὑγρᾶς καὶ θερμῆς ταῦτα 
συμπίπτοντα. (3) τίς γὰρ οὐκ ἂν ὁμολογήσειεν, ἐπειδὰν μὲν ἐπ' ὀλίγον ἢ τὸ 
θερμὸν τοῦ ψυχροῦ τύχῃ πλεονεκτῆσαν ἢ τὸ ὑγρὸν τοῦ ξηροῦ, δυσκρασίαν οὕτω 
γιγνομένην, ἐπειδὰν δ' ἐπὶ πλέον, νόσον, ἐπειδὰν δ' ἐπὶ πλεῖστον, θάνατον; ὁ γὰρ 
αὐτὸς ἐπ' ἀμφοῖν λόγος. ἢ μηδὲ τὰς ἀμέτρως ὑγρὰς καὶ θερμὰς καταστάσεις 
αἰτιώμεθα μηδ' ὅσα μεθ' ὑγρότητος ἀμέτρου νοσήματα συνίσταται θερμά, μηδὲ 
ταῦθ' ὁμολογῶμεν εἶναι νοσήματα.  
 
(1) Let it be granted that the well-mixed is the wet and hot mixture, as they 
themselves claim. In that case they have omitted the bad-mixture which is 
opposed in nature to the cold and dry one, in which there is a predominance of 
the wet and the hot. But, they say, that is the same one. But how can it be allowed 
that the hot can be both predominant and not predominant, and that the cold can 
be both dominated and not dominated? For if it is well-mixed, then there is no 
immoderate dominance of one thing over another; if badly-mixed, then one 
element of the opposition must be predominant. (2) But, they say, this is 
precisely the specific characteristic of the well-mixed mixture, that in it the hot 
dominates the cold, and the wet the dry. They say that with a moderate 
dominance of the cold, the mixture is not good; with a greater one, sickness 
comes about; and, with a very strong dominance, death (κρατήσαντος γὰρ δὴ 
τοῦ ψυχροῦ μετρίως μέν, οὐκ ἀγαθὴν εἶναι τὴν κρᾶσιν, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον, νόσον 
ἤδη γίγνεσθαι, καθάπερ, εἰ καὶ σφοδρῶς κρατήσειε, θάνατον). And so too with 
the dry: they say that to begin with there arises a bad-mixture; if it increases, 
sickness; and if it dominates to a very high degree, death (οὕτω δὲ κἀπὶ τοῦ 
ξηροῦ συμπίπτειν ἐν ἀρχῇ μὲν δυσκρασίαν, ἐπὶ πλέον δὲ νόσον, ἐπὶ πλεῖστον δὲ 
κρατήσαντος θάνατον), as if these things did not also arise in the case of the wet, 
hot mixture. (3) Surely everyone would concede that if there happens to be a 
slight predominance of hot over cold, or of wet over dry, a bad-mixture comes 
about; if that predominance is greater, sickness; and if it is very great indeed, 
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death (ἐπειδὰν μὲν ἐπ' ὀλίγον ἢ τὸ θερμὸν τοῦ ψυχροῦ τύχῃ πλεονεκτῆσαν ἢ τὸ 
ὑγρὸν τοῦ ξηροῦ, δυσκρασίαν οὕτω γιγνομένην, ἐπειδὰν δ' ἐπὶ πλέον, νόσον, 
ἐπειδὰν δ' ἐπὶ πλεῖστον, θάνατον)? Exactly the same argument applies in both 
cases. Otherwise we would not even attribute ill effects to those states which are 
immoderately wet and hot (τὰς ἀμέτρως ὑγρὰς καὶ θερμὰς καταστάσεις); nor 
concede that those hot diseases which come about in conjunction with 
immoderate wetness (μεθ' ὑγρότητος ἀμέτρου) are diseases at all. (Trans. 
Singer) 
 
The passage is set within the context of an overview of the most 
distinguished mixture-theorists, among the doctors and philosophers who 
preceded Galen. More precisely, Galen is attacking some of them, who remain 
anonymous, and who think that the mixtures are four (hot and wet, hot and dry, 
cold and wet, and cold and dry) and that the εὔκρατος and ἀρίστη κρᾶσις 
coincides with the hot and wet mixture (T22.1). These thinkers claim that “with 
a moderate dominance of the cold, the mixture is not good; with a greater one, 
sickness comes about; and, with a very strong dominance, death”, and the same 
applies to the case of the predominance of the dry element over the wet (T22.2). 
Galen approves this reasoning but, in contrast to his opponents, he extends it to 
the hot and wet mixture (T22.3).  
As we anticipated, Galen “archaically” conceives of disease as arising due 
to an imbalance or disproportion in the elementary composition of the mixture 
but also embraces a gradualist account of the pathological aetiology. For he, as 
well as the medical thinkers to whom he refers, distinguishes three different 
degrees of disproportionate mixture: i) a slight (ἐπ' ὀλίγον) predominance of one 
or two elements in the contrarieties corresponds to a state of δυσκρασία or bad-
mixture (which does not entail disease and in fact, elsewhere, is also defined 
ὑγιεινή δυσκρασία320); ii) a greater (ἐπὶ πλέον) predominance of one or two 
elements in the contrarieties, which corresponds to a state of νόσος or sickness, 
elsewhere defined νοσώδης δυσκρασία;321 iii) a very great predominance one or 
two elements, where (ἐπὶ πλεῖστον) θάνατος or death takes place. On the 
                                                          
320 De temp. p. 63.13–14 H. 
321 De temp. p. 63.18 H. 
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contrary, as Galen states later in De temperamentis, the equal distribution of 
hot/cold and dry/wet is the cause of εὐκρασία and health (ἡ τῆς τῶν τεττάρων 
κράσεως ἰσομοιρία τῆς τ' εὐκρασίας αὐτοῦ καὶ τῆς ὑγιείας αἰτία).322 
But how can the physician distinguish between a ὑγιεινή and a νοσώδης 
δυσκρασία? As we see in T23, the gap between healthy and morbid dyskrasia 
cannot be measured in mathematical terms, but has to be reckoned on the basis 




T23 Galen De temperamentis K. I 609.1-610.1 Helmreich 63.3–19: 
 
(1) ἐπιδέδεικται γὰρ ἡμῖν καὶ δι' ἄλλων, ὡς ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν οὐ σμικρὸν 
ὑποθέσθαι πλάτος τῆς ὑγιεινῆς καταστάσεως· ἀλλὰ καὶ νῦν φαίνεται σχεδὸν ἐν 
ὅλῳ τῷ λόγῳ τὴν μὲν εὔκρατόν τε καὶ μέσην φύσιν οἷον κανόνα τινὰ τῶν ἄλλων 
ἀεὶ τιθεμένων ἡμῶν, ὅσαι δ' ἐφ' ἑκάτερα τῆσδε, δυσκράτους ἀποφαινόντων· 
ὅπερ οὐκ ἂν ἦν, εἰ μὴ τὸ μᾶλλόν τε καὶ ἧττον ἡ ὑγιεινὴ κατάστασις ἐδέχετο. 
ἄλλη μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ἡ ὑγιεινή, ἄλλη δ' ἡ νοσώδης δυσκρασία· νοσώδης μὲν ἡ ἐπὶ 
πλεῖστον ἀποκεχωρηκυῖα τῆς εὐκράτου, ὑγιεινὴ δ' ἡ ἐπ' ὀλίγον. (2) ὁρίσαι δ' οὐδ' 
ἐνταῦθα μέτρῳ καὶ σταθμῷ τὸ ποσὸν ἐγχωρεῖ, ἀλλ' ἱκανὸν γνώρισμα τῆς 
ὑγιεινῆς δυσκρασίας τὸ μηδέπω μηδεμίαν ἐνέργειαν τοῦ ζῴου βεβλάφθαι 
σαφῶς. ὅσον δ' οὖν μεταξὺ τοῦ τ' ἄκρως ἐνεργεῖν καὶ τοῦ βεβλάφθαι σαφῶς 
ἐνέργειαν ὑπάρχει, τοσοῦτον καὶ τῆς ὑγιείας τὸ πλάτος ἐστὶ καὶ τῆς κατ' αὐτὴν 
δυσκρασίας. τούτῳ δ' ἐφεξῆς ἐστιν ἡ νοσώδης δυσκρασία, ὅταν γε διὰ 
δυσκρασίαν νοσῇ τὸ ζῷον. 
 
(1) It has also been shown by us in other works that it is necessary to posit 
a considerable latitude of the healthy state (ὑποθέσθαι πλάτος τῆς ὑγιεινῆς 
καταστάσεως); but it is apparent, now too, in practically the whole of the 
argument, that we always set up the well-mixed, middle nature as a kind of 
standard (τὴν μὲν εὔκρατόν τε καὶ μέσην φύσιν οἷον κανόνα τινὰ), any 
deviations from which, in either direction, we declare to be badly-mixed. Now, 
                                                          
322 De temp. p. 16.15–16 H.  
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this would not be so if it were not the case that the healthy state admitted of 
different degrees (εἰ μὴ τὸ μᾶλλόν τε καὶ ἧττον ἡ ὑγιεινὴ κατάστασις ἐδέχετο); 
for a healthy bad-mixture and a morbid bad-mixture are two different things, the 
deviation from the norm being a great one in the latter case and a small one in 
the former. (2) Here again, it is not possible to define the quantitative 
determination through measure and weight units (ὁρίσαι δ' οὐδ' ἐνταῦθα μέτρῳ 
καὶ σταθμῷ τὸ ποσὸν ἐγχωρεῖ); but (the fact that) there is not yet any clear 
damage to any of the animal’s activities is a sufficient indicator of the healthy 
bad-mixture. And so whatever there is between best performance and clear 
damage to an activity represents the extent of the latitude of health and of the 
healthy bad-mixture (ὅσον δ' οὖν μεταξὺ τοῦ τ' ἄκρως ἐνεργεῖν καὶ τοῦ 
βεβλάφθαι σαφῶς ἐνέργειαν ὑπάρχει, τοσοῦτον καὶ τῆς ὑγιείας τὸ πλάτος ἐστὶ 
καὶ τῆς κατ' αὐτὴν δυσκρασίας). Next after this comes the morbid bad mixture, 
which is when the animal is actually sick because of bad-mixture. (Trans. Singer; 
translation modified) 
 
Galen posits the well-mixed and middle nature as a kind of standard 
(κανών) on the basis of which we can define all the others: if there is any 
deviation from this precise standard, it will be defined as badly mixed. But there 
are healthy and morbid dyskrasiai, the difference being that while the healthy 
dyskrasia shows a small deviation from the standard, the morbid dyskrasia 
shows a greater deviation (cf. T23.1). For between perfect health and real disease 
there are different degrees (τὸ μᾶλλόν τε καὶ ἧττον) within a certain range or 
latitude (πλάτος cf. T23.1–2) and the passage from a healthy to a morbid 
dyskrasia cannot be measured in mathematical terms (cf. T23.2 “οὐδ' ἐνταῦθα 
μέτρῳ καὶ σταθμῷ”) but has as its indicator (γνώρισμα) the impairment of 
activity. In fact, in Galen’s view, health not only coincides with a perfect 
equilibrium between opposites, that is, the perfectly healthly state, but between 
this and disease there are slight deviations on both the sides of the equilibrium 
point, a Breite der Gesundheit, as Almberg defines it with explicit reference to 
Galen’s gradualist approach to health and disease in De temperamentis.323 More 
precisely, Galen says that there is a latitude of health and of the healthy dyskrasia 
                                                          
323 Almberg 1949 pp. 22 and f.  
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(τῆς ὑγιείας τὸ πλάτος ἐστὶ καὶ τῆς κατ' αὐτὴν δυσκρασίαςwe will come back 
to this expression). Within this broad latitude we find all the concrete realizations 
of an individual’s health, which, although distant from the absolute healthly 
state, are in any case counted as healthy conditions as long as the individual’s 
activity is not clearly impaired.324  
The notion of τῆς ὑγιείας πλάτος is tied up with the issue of the elemental 
symmetry of the elements within the bodily mixture insofar as it is the elemental 
symmetry that creates health.325 As we have seen (T19), Galen affirms that 
“Hippocrates” had already recognized two symmetries: one according to πλῆθος 
and one according to δύναμις, and he re-interprets “Hippocrates’” words as 
referring to τὸ ποσὸν τῆς οὐσίας and to δύναμις τῶν κεραννυμένων. But how 
should we interpret Galen’s conception, given that (differently from the 
Hippocratic one) it refers to the state of the primary elements within the mixture? 
As we have seen, in the passage from his Commentary on the Nature of Man 
Galen does not go into this question; therefore, we must look elsewhere in order 
to answer it. Again, the first book of Galen’s De temperamentis, which in its 
second part (Ch. 6–9) investigates the μέση or σύμμετρος κρᾶσις in its twofold 
sense, turns out to be extremely helpful. 
 
T24 Galen De temperamentis K. I 546.5-548.7 Helmreich 23.24-25.4:  
 
(1) ἐπειδὰν μὲν ἁπλῶς οὐσία τις εὔκρατος λέγηται καὶ ταύτης δέ τις ἑτέρα 
ξηροτέρα καὶ θερμοτέρα καὶ ψυχροτέρα καὶ ὑγροτέρα, τὴν μὲν εὔκρατον 
ἐνταῦθα τὴν ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων ἀκριβῶς ἴσων συνελθόντων ὀνομάζομεν, ὅσον δ' 
ἀπολείπεται τῆσδε καὶ πλεονεκτεῖ κατά τι, τῷ τοῦ πλεονεκτοῦντος ὀνόματι 
προσαγορεύομεν· (2) ἐπειδὰν δ' ἤτοι φυτὸν εὔκρατον ἢ ζῷον ὁτιοῦν εἴπωμεν, 
οὐκέθ' ἁπλῶς ἀλλήλοις ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ λέξει τἀναντία παραβάλλομεν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς 
                                                          
324 The issue concerning the τῆς ὑγιείας πλάτος is systematically tackled by Galen in his De 
sanitate tuenda, among other works; cf. Grimaudo 2008 pp. 73–97. As Grimaudo remarks (in 
Grimaudo 2008 p. 85 with n. 20), in his Ars medica Galen describes a sort of graphic where he 
posits as the two extremes as the perfect healthy state and the diseased condition, while in the 
middle are the intermediate healthy states; cf. Ars med. pp. 284.20–286.3 Boudon-Millot. As 
Boudon-Millot refers, real graphics illustrating Galen’s notion of health-latitude have indeed 
been handed down to us in some of the manuscripts containing Galen’s Ars medica; cf. Boudon 
1994 p. 1481 with n. 41.  
325 Cf. De san. tuend. CMG V 4.2 pp. 7.35–8.3 and p. 8.15–20 Koch.  
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τὴν τοῦ φυτοῦ φύσιν ἢ τὴν τοῦ ζῴου τὴν ἀναφορὰν ποιούμεθα, συκῆν μὲν 
εὔκρατον. εἰ τύχοι, λέγοντες, ὅταν, οἵᾳ μάλιστα πρέπει τὴν φύσιν ὑπάρχειν συκῇ, 
τοιαύτη τις ᾖ, κύνα δ' αὖ καὶ σῦν καὶ ἵππον καὶ ἄνθρωπον, ἐπειδὰν καὶ τούτων 
ἕκαστον ἄριστα τῆς οἰκείας ἔχῃ φύσεως. (3) αὐτὸ δὲ δὴ τοῦτο τὸ τῆς οἰκείας 
φύσεως ἔχειν ἄριστα ταῖς ἐνεργείαις κρίνεται. καὶ γὰρ καὶ φυτὸν καὶ ζῷον ὁτιοῦν 
ἄριστα διακεῖσθαι τηνικαῦτά φαμεν, ὅταν ἐνεργῄσῃ κάλλιστα. συκῆς μὲν γὰρ 
ἀρετὴ βέλτιστά τε καὶ πλεῖστα τελεσφορεῖν σῦκα· κατὰ ταὐτὰ δὲ καὶ τῆς 
ἀμπέλου τὸ πλείστας τε καὶ καλλίστας ἐκφέρειν σταφυλάς, ἵππου δὲ τὸ θεῖν 
ὠκύτατα καὶ κυνὸς εἰς μὲν θήρας τε καὶ φυλακὰς ἄκρως εἶναι θυμοειδῆ, πρὸς δὲ 
τοὺς οἰκείους πρᾳότατον. (4) Ἅπαντ' οὖν ταῦτα, τά τε ζῷα λέγω καὶ τὰ φυτά, 
τὴν ἀρίστην τε καὶ μέσην ἐν τῷ σφετέρῳ γένει κρᾶσιν ἔχειν ἐροῦμεν οὐχ ἁπλῶς, 
ὅταν ἰσότης ἀκριβὴς ᾖ τῶν ἐναντίων, ἀλλ' ὅταν ἡ κατὰ δύναμιν αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχῃ 
συμμετρία. τοιοῦτον δέ τι καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην εἶναί φαμεν, οὐ σταθμῷ καὶ 
μέτρῳ τὸ ἴσον, ἀλλὰ τῷ προσήκοντί γε καὶ κατ' ἀξίαν ἐξετάζουσαν. ἰσότης οὖν 
κράσεως ἐν ἅπασι τοῖς εὐκράτοις ζῴοις τε καὶ φυτοῖς ἐστιν, οὐχ ἡ κατὰ τὸν τῶν 
κερασθέντων στοιχείων ὄγκον, ἀλλ' | ἡ τῇ φύσει τοῦ τε ζῴου καὶ τοῦ φυτοῦ . 
πρέπει δ' ἔσθ' ὅτε τὸ μὲν ὑγρὸν τοῦ ξηροῦ, τὸ δὲ ψυχρὸν τοῦ θερμοῦ πλέον 
ὑπάρχειν. οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίαν χρὴ κρᾶσιν ἔχειν ἄνθρωπον καὶ λέοντα καὶ μέλιτταν 
καὶ κύνα. πρὸς δὴ τὸν ἐρόμενον, ἧστινός ἐστι κράσεως ἄνθρωπος ἢ ἵππος ἢ βοῦς 
ἢ κύων ἢ ὁτιοῦν ἄλλο τῶν πάντων, οὐχ ἁπλῶς ἀποκριτέον.  
 
(1) When some existent object is called well-mixed in absolute terms, and 
some other is called drier, hotter, colder or wetter than it, the one that we are 
calling well-mixed, in this context, is that [which is composed] from a precise 
equality of opposites coming together (ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων ἀκριβῶς ἴσων 
συνελθόντων), while whatever has some deficiency or predominance in relation 
to this we refer to by the term for whatever predominates. (2) When, however, 
we speak of a well-mixed plant or animal, we are not with this kind of verbal 
expression comparing opposites with each other in the absolute sense, but rather 
using as our point of reference the nature of the plant or animal in question. We 
would say, for example, that a fig-tree was well-mixed, if it were one possessed 
of that nature which is most appropriate to a fig-tree; and the same of a dog, pig, 
horse or human being when each of these, similarly, was in the best state with 
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regard to its own nature (τῆς οἰκείας ἔχῃ φύσεως). (3) And this matter of ‘being 
in the best state with regard to its own nature’ is evaluated in terms of the 
activities (αὐτὸ δὲ δὴ τοῦτο τὸ τῆς οἰκείας φύσεως ἔχειν ἄριστα ταῖς ἐνεργείαις 
κρίνεται). And we say in fact that both a plant and an animal of any kind are best 
disposed precisely when they perform their activities at best (ὅταν ἐνεργῄσῃ 
κάλλιστα) The excellence (ἀρετὴ) of a fig-tree, for example, consists in its 
bringing to fruition the most and the best figs; in exactly the same way, that of a 
vine [consists in its] producing the most and the best grapes; that of a horse in 
running very fast, and that of a dog in extreme spiritedness in hunting and 
guarding, combined with very great docility towards the members of its own 
household. (4) We will, then, speak of all theseI mean, animals and plantsas 
having the best, middle type of mixture within their own genus, not in the 
absolute sense (τὴν ἀρίστην τε καὶ μέσην ἐν τῷ σφετέρῳ γένει κρᾶσιν ἔχειν 
ἐροῦμεν οὐχ ἁπλῶς), when there is a precise equality of opposites, but when they 
have that good balance which accords with their capacity (ἀλλ' ὅταν ἡ κατὰ 
δύναμιν αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχῃ συμμετρία). We state that justice, too, is something of 
this kind, in that it examines what is fair not by a fixed rule, but according to 
what is fitting and appropriate. And so, in the case of all well-mixed animals and 
plants, their equality of mixture is not that [defined] by the volume of the 
elements in the mixture, but that appropriate (πρέπουσα) to the nature of that 
animal or plant. Sometimes it is appropriate (πρέπει) for there to be more wet 
than dry, or more cold than hot (δ' ἔσθ' ὅτε τὸ μὲν ὑγρὸν τοῦ ξηροῦ, τὸ δὲ ψυχρὸν 
τοῦ θερμοῦ πλέον ὑπάρχειν). For it is not right for a human being, a lion, a bee 
and a dog to have the same sort of mixture. Indeed, when someone asks, what is 
the mixture of a human being, or of a horse, an ox, dog or any other creature at 
all, the question cannot be answered in absolute terms (πρὸς δὴ τὸν ἐρόμενον, 
ἧστινός ἐστι κράσεως ἄνθρωπος ἢ ἵππος ἢ βοῦς ἢ κύων ἢ ὁτιοῦν ἄλλο τῶν 
πάντων, οὐχ ἁπλῶς ἀποκριτέον). (Trans. Singer; slightly modified) 
 
In this passage Galen indeed identifies two kinds of symmetry: an absolute 
symmetry, i.e. ἁπλῶς, according to the whole substance, and a non-ἁπλῶς, one 
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according to the living beings (animals and plants).326 On the one hand, within 
the whole category of the substance or οὐσία (which is the highest genus 
comprehending within it, apart from inanimate things, living beings and 
plants),327 there is a precise, perfect, complete, and absolute elemental symmetry 
that coincides with the “precise equality of opposites coming together” (ἐκ τῶν 
ἐναντίων ἀκριβῶς ἴσων συνελθόντων),328 that is, the condition of isomoiria, to 
which we have previously referred, which leads to the precise middle between 
all the extremes (τὸ τῶν ἐσχάτων ἁπάντων ἀκριβῶς μέσον).329 This kind of 
symmetry seems to be directly translatable into mathematical terms as it implies 
an ἰσότης ἀκριβὴς τῶν ἐναντίων,330 a precise equidistance from the extremes. 
On the other hand, in the realm of living organisms, plants and animals, the 
midpoint is not absolute and not mathematically determinable but is assessed 
from the capacity or dynamis of the animal or plant in question, performing at 
best their distinctive activities.  
As Almberg notes, in this passage Galen echoes the Aristotelian 
distinction, made in the Nicomachean Ethics, between an absolute τοῦ 
πράγματος and a relative πρὸς ἡμᾶς μέσον. The first μέσον is one and the same 
for everyone and it is determinable by an arithmetic proportion, in the same way 
in which six is the middle between two and ten. On the other hand, the second 
μέσον is not one and the same for all, but has to be assessed πρὸς ἡμᾶς “in 
relation to us”: for example, a good trainer has to administer the right quantity 
of food to her athletes not by taking into account the exact arithmetic middle, but 
by considering their own special needs. If in fact the middle between ten and two 
minas of food is six minas of food, even this quantity can be excessive or 
deficient depending on the individual: for Milo, who is a skilful athlete, this 
                                                          
326 Cf. De temp. pp. 19–27 H. Galen’s discourse here is dense in teleological implications, which 
will be tackled in the next chapter. Here we shall focus on Galen’s notion of twofold symmetry 
and its reference models.  
327 Cf. infra. pp. 219 ff. 
328 De temp. p. 23.26–27 H. 
329 The connection between isomoiria and the precise equality of opposites is made explicit in 
the summary of the first book, which Galen sets up at the beginning of the second book; cf. De 
temp. p. 40.18–19 H.  
330 De temp. p. 24.18 H. 
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quantity would be insufficient, but, on the contrary, for a novice the same 
quantity would prove instead to be excessive.331  
For although the physician may have knowledge of the absolute and 
mathematical criterion of judgement (and, as we will see, Galen has this in 
mind), when he has to judge the health of a living organism, he has to do it by 
considering the very nature of the organism, which can be healthy not in an 
absolute sense but to a certain extent. In fact, as in Aristotle’s speculation, health, 
as well as justice (analogously to all the other poia and then moral virtues) cover 
“the more and the less”, i.e. admit of degrees within a relative symmetry:332 there 
are the healthier and the less healthy but nonetheless healthy within a certain 
                                                          
331 Eth. Nic. 1106a28–b5 “τὸ δ' ἴσον μέσον τι ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεως. λέγω δὲ τοῦ μὲν 
πράγματος μέσον τὸ ἴσον ἀπέχον ἀφ' ἑκατέρου τῶν ἄκρων, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἓν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ πᾶσιν, 
πρὸς ἡμᾶς δὲ ὃ μήτε πλεονάζει μήτε ἐλλείπει· τοῦτο δ' οὐχ ἕν, οὐδὲ ταὐτὸν πᾶσιν. οἷον εἰ τὰ 
δέκα πολλὰ τὰ δὲ δύο ὀλίγα, τὰ ἓξ μέσα λαμβάνουσι κατὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα· ἴσῳ γὰρ ὑπερέχει τε καὶ 
ὑπερέχεται· τοῦτο δὲ μέσον ἐστὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν ἀναλογίαν. τὸ δὲ πρὸς ἡμᾶς οὐχ οὕτω 
ληπτέον· οὐ γὰρ εἴ τῳ δέκα μναῖ φαγεῖν πολὺ δύο δὲ ὀλίγον, ὁ ἀλείπτης ἓξ μνᾶς προστάξει· ἔστι 
γὰρ ἴσως καὶ τοῦτο πολὺ τῷ ληψομένῳ ἢ ὀλίγον· Μίλωνι μὲν γὰρ ὀλίγον, τῷ δὲ ἀρχομένῳ τῶν 
γυμνασίων πολύ. ὁμοίως ἐπὶ δρόμου καὶ πάλης”. Cf. Almberg 1949 and Grimaudo 2008 p. 106–
107. This very passage has been thoroughly analysed by Brown (1997 pp. 77–93). Brown’s aim 
is to subvert the general assumption that the expression “the mean relative to us” means “relative 
to the individual” understood as the individual (moral) agent. On the contrary, Brown argues that 
the expression can instead be explained as “relative to us as human beings”, and that this 
interpretation better squares with Aristotle’s theory of êthikê arête; cf. esp. pp. 80–81. Although 
Brow’s point may be correct, however, in the abovementioned passage of Galen’s it is remarked 
that the physician should assess the symmetry of the mixture on the basis of the best state with 
regard to one’s own particular nature (τὸ τῆς οἰκείας φύσεως ἔχειν ἄριστα); therefore, Galen 
would intend this meson to zero in on the particular nature of the living being and to refer to the 
midpoint of its species and genus. 
332Cf. Categ. 10b26–11a5. The close connection between Galen’s theory of health platos and 
this Aristotelian passage from the Categories is pointed out by Grimaudo 2008 pp. 93–95. Cf. 
also Eth. Nic. 1173a23–28. Even if it is true that the idea of health admitting of degrees is to be 
found in Aristotle’s work, the awareness of the arising of disease as a gradual transition from the 
normal to the pathological sporadically emerges before this, in the treatises of the Hippocratic 
corpus. If on occasion the Hippocratic doctors thought of the passage from the normal to the 
pathological state as due to a sudden and triggering metabolê (cf. Jouanna 1999 pp. 328–331), 
on other occasions they seem to be perfectly convinced that health is instead a matter of degree. 
Jouanna reports some interesting examples: i) a first example from On joints where the 
Hippocratic author says that people suffering from the outwards dislocation of both thighs, 
whether from birth or through trauma, can enjoy reasonably good health (ikanôs hugiéroi) if 
there are no further complications; cf. Art. 56 pp. 200.12–201.7 Kühlewein L. IV 242.19-244.10; 
ii) an example from Aphorisms where the persons whose nostrils are naturally watery, and whose 
seed is watery, are defined as “below the average when in health” (hugiaínousi noseróteron); cf. 
Aph. VI 2 L. IV 562.11-12 ii) a third illuminating example from De vetere medicina, where the 
Hippocratic author observes that whereas the great majority of men do not suffer from 
discomforts of a change in the rhythm of their daily meals, others do, as they are weaker. He 
adds: “a weak man is but one step removed from a sickly man, but a sickly man is weaker still, 
and is more apt to suffer distress whenever he misses the due season”; cf. De vet. med. CMG I 1 
p. 43.23–27 Heiberg. As Jouanna remarks, this first Hippocratic formulation was to reappear as 
the Broussais’ principle in the 19th century in the work of the philosopher Auguste Comte; cf. 
Joaunna 1999 pp. 333–335. Cf. also Grimaudo 2008 pp. 65–66.  
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degree. Hence, health cannot be judged on the basis of a fixed and numerically 
translatable reference point, but on the basis of the specific nature of the animal 
or plant and of what is fitting and appropriate (τῷ προσήκοντί γε καὶ κατ' ἀξίαν) 
to that nature. And what is fitting and appropriate for the nature of a certain plant 
or an animal has to be evaluated on the basis of activities (ταῖς ἐνεργείαις 
κρίνεται)333 such that, therefore, “the excellence (ἀρετὴ) of a fig-tree, for 
example, consists in its bringing to fruition the most and the best figs; in exactly 
the same way, that of a vine [consists in its] producing the most and the best 
grapes; that of a horse in running very fast, and that of a dog in extreme 
spiritedness in hunting and guarding, combined with very great docility towards 
the members of its own household”. 
Almberg’s claim, in my view, is correct, but on both the sides of the 
question (that of the absolute and that of the relative τὸ σύμμετρον or μέσον334) 
there are a few points to be added and clarified.  
                                                          
333According to Aristotle, in fact, health as well as every moral excellence of the soul or virtue 
lies in the middle between excess and deficiency and can be judged from the respective activities 
of the body and of the soul (cf. Nicomachean Ethics 1104a11–27); for the analogy between 
health and moral excellence of the soul, cf. Tracy 1969 pp. 222–231.  
334 When Galen speaks of midpoint, τὸ μέσον and τὸ σύμμετρον have the same meaning, that is, 
the equilibrium point between excess and deficiency. The mathematical concept of συμμετρία 
as commensurability/proportion is strictly linked to that of μεσότης. The term, which derives 
from the same root as μέσον (i.e. “that which finds itself in the middle”, “middle”, “mid-point” 
as referred to space, time, quantity, or social classes, age, or morality; cf. Frisk 1973 and 
Montanari 2000 s.v. μέσον), plus the feminine suffix for abstract nouns -της, has different 
meanings in Ancient Greek language and especially in Ancient Greek mathematics. In primis, 
in Ancient Greek language it designates the abstract condition of being at the centre of something 
(Montanari 2000 s.v. μεσότης, cf. Plato Laws 746a). Second, it indicates an intermediate position 
(of a certain condition, quality, or quantity) between two extremes with regard to the process of 
sense-perception (Cf. Arist. De an. 424a4; cf. Montanari 2000 s.v. μεσότης), virtue (Montanari 
2000 s.v. μεσότης; cf. Arist. Nic. Eth. 1106b27), or stylistic register (Montanari 2000 s.v. 
μεσότης; cf. Dion. Dem. 3.3). In regard to mathematical texts, μεσότης first designates the middle 
space in general (cf. Pythagorean Occellus D.-K. 48.8). Moreover, it can indicate the mean 
mathematically understood as the middle term in a three-member progression, that is, the 
midpoint between two extremes (D.-K. 44A24, 32). Third, the common mathematical meaning 
of μεσότης is proportion or progression. This is in fact “the oldest word for proportion of any 
kind however determined” (Burnet 1900 pp. 69–70, quoted in Tracy 1969 p. 344.) and designates 
the first three types of proportionsarithmetic, geometric, harmonicthat are usually traced 
back to Pythagoras: in fact, its meaning would later on have also covered that expressed by the 
term ἀναλογία, which originally referred exclusively to geometric proportion. Therefore, when 
the term μεσότης is applied to mathematics, it indicates the relationship between two extremes 
joined by a mean (i.e. a mathematical proportion), as the whole proportion or only the middle 
terms, and when this notion is instead applied to physical realities, it rather describes, 
analogously to one of the meanings of symmetry, a physical state in which extremes of any kind 
are balanced in a mean, based on the notion of μεσότης in Ancient Greek mathematics; cf. Tracy 
1969 p. 344 ff. 
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In the first place, that is in the case of the absolute elemental symmetry, 
rather than resorting to arithmetic proportions, in his De temperamentis Galen 
describes the perfect midpoint by appealing to powerful spatial 
conceptualizations envisaging the two contrarieties hot/cold and dry/wet as one-
dimensional and numerically computable spatial extensions and the parts of 
elemental substance as equal volumes within the mixture. In De Temperamentis 
I 9, Galen teaches how to re-create a perfect midpoint between hot and cold and 





T25 Galen De temperamentis K. I p. 560.17-562.3 Helmreich p. 32.27-33.20:  
 
(1) ἀπὸ γὰρ τοῦ θερμοτάτου πάντων τῶν εἰς αἴσθησιν ἡκόντων, οἷον ἤτοι πυρὸς 
ἤ τινος ὕδατος ἄκρως ζέοντος, ἐπὶ τὸ ψυχρότατον καταντῶντες ἁπάντων ὧν 
ἴσμεν, οἷον ἤτοι κρύσταλλον ἢ χιόνα, νοήσαντές τι διάστημα, μέσον ἀκριβῶς 
τοῦτο τέμνομεν. οὕτω γὰρ ἐξευρήσομεν τῇ νοήσει τὸ σύμμετρον, ὅπερ 
ἑκατέρου τῶν ἄκρων ἴσον ἀπέχει. (2) ἀλλὰ καὶ κατασκευάσαι πως αὐτὸ 
δυνάμεθα τὸν ἴσον ὄγκον κρυστάλλου μίξαντες ὕδατι ζέοντι. τὸ γὰρ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν 
κραθὲν ἴσον ἑκατέρου τῶν ἄκρων ἀφέξει τοῦ τε καίοντος καὶ τοῦ νεκροῦντος 
διὰ ψῦξιν. οὔκουν οὐδὲ χαλεπὸν ἔτι τοῦ κραθέντος οὕτως ἁψαμένους ἔχειν τὸ 
μέσον ἁπάσης οὐσίας ἐν τῇ κατὰ τὸ θερμόν τε καὶ ψυχρὸν ἀντιθέσει καὶ 
μεμνῆσθαι τούτου καὶ κρίνειν ἅπαντα τἆλλα καθάπερ τινὶ κανόνι 
παραβάλλοντας. (3) καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ ξηρὰν γῆν ἢ τέφραν ἤ τι τοιοῦτον ἕτερον 
ἀκριβῶς αὐχμηρὸν ἀναδεύσας ὕδατι κατὰ τὸν ὄγκον ἴσῳ τὸ μέσον ἐργάσῃ 
σῶμα τῆς κατὰ τὸ ξηρόν τε καὶ ὑγρὸν ἀντιθέσεως. οὔκουν οὐδ' ἐνταῦθα χαλεπὸν 
οὐδὲν ὄψει θ' ἅμα καὶ ἁφῇ τὸ τοιοῦτον σῶμα διαγνόντα παραθέσθαι τῇ μνήμῃ 
καὶ τούτῳ κανόνι τε καὶ κριτηρίῳ χρῆσθαι πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἐλλειπόντων ἢ 
πλεοναζόντων ὑγρῶν τε καὶ ξηρῶν διάγνωσιν. ἔστω δὲ δηλονότι τὸ κρινόμενον 




(1) We start from the hottest of all things that reach our senses, such as fire, or 
water at its extreme boiling point, and go down to the coldest of all those we 
know, such as ice or snow; we conceptualize a line (τι διάστημα) between them; 
and we divide this line at its precise midpoint. In this way we will find out 
conceptually the point of good balance, which is equidistant from each of the 
extremes (οὕτω γὰρ ἐξευρήσομεν τῇ νοήσει τὸ σύμμετρον, ὅπερ ἑκατέρου τῶν 
ἄκρων ἴσον ἀπέχει). (2) But we can also in a way create it physically, by 
combining an equal volume of ice and boiling water (τὸν ἴσον ὄγκον 
κρυστάλλου μίξαντες ὕδατι ζέοντι). For that which is made from a mixture of 
both these will be equidistant from the two extremes, that which burns and that 
which causes death by cold. And so it is no difficult matter, either, to touch the 
product of this mixture and so to hold that which is at the midpoint amongst all 
existent objects (τὸ μέσον ἁπάσης οὐσίας) as regards the opposition of hot and 
cold, and to remember this, and to evaluate all other objects by using this as a 
standard (καθάπερ τινὶ κανόνι) with which to compare them. (3) Furthermore, if 
you add dry earth, ash, or some other such thing that is in the precise sense dried-
out, to an equal volume of water (ὕδατι κατὰ τὸν ὄγκον ἴσῳ), you will produce 
a body that is in the middle with regard to the opposition of dry and wet. Here, 
too, it is no difficult matter to distinguish such a body by both sight and touch, 
to consign it to the memory and to use the object as the yardstick and criterion 
(κανόνι τε καὶ κριτηρίῳ) for the distinguishing of objects which are deficiently 
or excessively wet and dry. Of course, the body that one is evaluating should be 
hot to a well-balanced extent. (Trans. Singer; slightly modified)  
 
As we see from the passage, τὸ σύμμετρον, the perfect 
Gleichgewichstpunkt between the extremes with respect to the whole substance 
(τὸ μέσον ἁπάσης οὐσίας) can be obtained either mentally or physically. In the 
first case, one should conceptualize a spatial extension (νοήσαντές τι διάστημα 
cf. T25.1) between the extremes of hotness and coldness which can be 
experienced through sense-perception (corresponding, for example, respectively 
to fire or snow/ice); this extension has to be divided at its precise middle: in this 
way it is possible to visualise a perfect midpoint that is equidistant from extreme 
hot and extreme cold (ὅπερ ἑκατέρου τῶν ἄκρων ἴσον ἀπέχει). In the second 
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case, although human beings cannot totally mix the primary elements with each 
other as the Demiurge or Nature can in order to create natural homoeomerous 
parts (as opposed to artificial)335 they can physically re-create and re-produce 
(cf. the usage of the verbs in T25.2 κατασκευάζειν, and in T25.3 ἐργάζεσθαι) 
the midpoint by mixing equal volumes (cf. the usage of ὄγκος cf. T25.2 and 
T25.3) either of ice and of boiling water (in order to reach τὸ σύμμετρον between 
hot and cold) or of dry earth and water (in order to reach τὸ σύμμετρον between 
dry and wet, given the equilibrium in the other contrariety; cf. T25.3). The term 
ὄγκος (which here of course has no connection with Asclepiades’ theories) 
indicates, more precisely, “bulk”, “mass”, or, perhaps more correctly in the case 
of Galen’s usage, “volume”, i.e. a physical magnitude quantifiable through a 
precise numerical measurement.336 This procedure reproduces in greater scale 
what happens in the case of elemental mixtures performed by nature or God, 
where the perfect midpoint or τὸ σύμμετρον is reached when there is a perfect 
equality according to the bulk/volume of the elements within the mixture (ἰσότης 
κατὰ τὸν τῶν κερασθέντων στοιχείων ὄγκον)337 that can, at least theoretically, 
                                                          
335 De temp. 34.5–7 H.; for more on this see the next section.  
336 The term occurs frequenty in Plato, where it indicates the bulk, mass, or volume of a body or 
also a sum of elements translatable into numbers; cf. μήτε ὄγκῳ μήτε ἀριθμῷ as referring to 
something that cannot increase or decrease, Tht. 155a; τὸν αὐτῶν ὄ. τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ δεῖ τάξασθαι, 
“it is necessary to establish their total number” (in reference to citizens), Lg.737c; τὸν τῶν 
σαρκῶν ὄ. ib. 959c; σμικρᾶς πόλεως ὄ., a city of small size, Plt. 259b; in the Timaeus the term 
refers to the mass of the solid figures, cf. Tim. 32a. In contrast to Cornford (who interprets the 
word as probably referring to cubes, that is, cubic numbers, in combination with dynameis or 
squares (cf. Cornford 1935 pp. 44–51 with n. 1 at p. 50), Tracy observes that the translation of 
ὄ. as “physical masses” or “bulks” of the cosmic solids, fire, air, water, and earth (cf. Tracy 1969 
p. 79–81 with n. 6), is indeed confirmed by other passages in Timaeus where the term is referred 
to the mass of the cosmic elements (cf. 54d and 56c (referring to the four elements), 56d 
(referring to water and air), 58e and 59a (referring to water), 60c and 60e (referring to earth) et 
al). The term occurs also in Aristotle, where it often indicates the volume or the space occupied 
by a body; cf. Ph. 203b28; De gen. et corr. 321a11 (where the point is the increase of volume 
occupied by a certain mass of water when it turns to air); and De gen. et corr. 326b20, where the 
meaning is clearly volume, as Aristotle says that for every body there will be a void equal to its 
volume (esp. παντὶ σώματι τὸν ὄγκον ἴσον ἔσται κενόν). 
337 De temp. p. 24.24 H. The point is also made in De temp. p. 25.13–14 H. We have already 
pointed out that Galen’s primary stoicheîa are formed by two archai, a material substrate and 
four opposite qualities (which are inseparable from one another); cf. In Hipp. Nat. Hom. 
comment. CMG V 9.1 p. 17.28–18.15 Mewaldt; and endowed with the alterative capacities or 
powers (dynameis) of heating, cooling, drying, and wetting (De nat. fac. pp. 109.13–110.6 H.). 
In Galen’s notion of symmetry according to τὸ ποσὸν τῆς οὐσίας, the qualitative aspect, however 
present (as inseparable from the material substrate), does not play the major role, as the focus is 
on the quantitative units of the elemental substance joining together in the mixture. This is 
another Aristotelian feature of Galen’s physics: although Aristotle had conceived his primary 
stoicheîa in privileging their qualitative aspects, as we have seen, in his De gen. et corr. he 
clearly differentiates the numerically determinable quantity (τὸ ποσὸν) of the simple bodies from 
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be translated into precise measure units.338 Galen’s idea of absolute and perfect 
symmetry with regard to the quantitative aspects of the genus of the whole 
substance (which in his commentary on Nat. Hom (T19) he defines as symmetry 
according to τὸ ποσὸν τῆς οὐσίας) and as applied to the primary elements within 
the krasis undergoes a process of mathematization and spatialization. Here there 
are two different spatial visualizations are at work: i) the first envisions each 
contrariety as a numerically measurable one-dimensional spatial extension, that 
is, a line (διάστημα)339 at whose extremes there are hotness and coldness or 
dryness and wetness of the krasis, and at the centre of which are their midpoints; 
ii) the second explains the four elements within the perfect symmetric mixture 
as equal and calculable three-dimensional volumes (onkoi) of the elemental 
substance.340  
In so doing, Galen’s model of mixture distances him from both the 
Hippocratic and the Aristotelian/Peripatetic model, taking a peculiar position.  
On the one hand, Galen recovers the generic Hippocratic notion of τὸ 
σύμμετρον as a well-proportioned mean between excess and deficiency, as 
applied to the building blocks of human nature and giving rise to health and well-
                                                          
their dynamis or power of action; cf. De gen. et corr. 333a20–23: “If it is meant that they are 
comparable in their amount (κατὰ τὸ ποσόν), all the ‘comparables’ must possess an identical 
something whereby they are measured. If, e.g. one pint of Water yields ten of Air, both are 
measured by the same unit; and therefore both were from the first an identical something” (trans. 
Joachim)where by τὸ ποσὸν Aristotle seems to intend the volume of the simple bodies, that 
is, the space they occupy that can be measured as some unit, in this case the pint.  
338 On Galen’s τὸ σύμμετρον with respect to the whole substance as mathematically determinable 
cf. also Grimaudo 2008 p. 106. Grimaudo, however, attributes only inanimate things to Galen’s 
genus of ousia, whereas here Galen is discussing, on the contrary, the absolute mean in relation 
to all ὄντα, that is, all existent things, including plants and animals. So much so that, apart from 
the present example, which Galen makes for illustration’s sake, this absolute σύμμετρον with 
respect to all physical bodies subjected to generation and corruption, coincides, as we will clarify 
later on, with the skin of the hand; cf. De temp. p. 37 H. 
339 The term is technical in Euclides’ geometry and means “radius” (of a circle; cf. El. 1.1 et al.), 
but, as regards the present passage, I perfectly agree with Singer’s translation, as here διάστημα 
seems to mean “spatial extension”; cf. Arist. Phys. 209a4 where διαστήματα are the three-
dimensions, length, breadth, and depth.  
340 There are two main reasons why I interpret Galen’s onkos as referring to what for us is volume 
(as distinct from mass): i) a logical one: let us think of equal masses instead of equal volumes in 
the mixture: we would obtain a disproportionate mixture as equal masses of fire, air, water, and 
earth cannot of course be of equal volume, or, therefore, dimension (in fact when water turns to 
air its volume considerably increases), whereas an equal volume and therefore dimension of the 
elemental substance would normalize the equilibrium in the mixture; ii) Galen’s Aristotelian 
physical background: like Aristotle, Galen speaks of the τὸ ποσόν of fire, air, water, and earth, 
and when in De gen. et corr. (a text that, as we have seen, Galen knew very well) Aristotle, like 
Galen, distinguishes between τὸ ποσόν and dynamis of simple bodies and identifies the 
quantitative aspects of the simple bodies with the measure of their volume rather than their mass. 
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being; but, on the other hand, in contrast to the Hippocratic authors, he contrives 
to mathematize it. If in fact the Hippocratic authors strove, without success, to 
find real μέτρον and ἀριθμὸς to determine the correct quantity of food, drink, 
and physical exercise for the patient or to better understand the dynamics of the 
bodily constituents (humours, dynameis, qualities) at play within the living 
organism, Galen’s idea of absolute and perfect symmetry is backed up by 
forceful numerically mensurable and spatializing visualizations of the perfectly 
symmetric midpoint between the elemental constituents of the human body. 
On the other hand, in bringing out an absolute and numerically 
determinable mean, in certain respects he also goes beyond the Aristotelian and 
the Peripatetic accounts of mixture. In fact, neither in Aristotle’s model of 
mixture (De gen. et corr. I 10 and then II 7-8) nor in Alexander of Aphrodisias’ 
account (De mixtione 13-15) can we find any such parallels. Although Galen 
thinks of his stoicheîa from a Peripatetic standpoint and thus as endowed with 
extreme qualities within one contrariety, by means of which the elements are 
able to act and be acted upon and find an equilibrium point during the interaction 
process, he is much more precise in his determination of the absolute and perfect 
mean.  
Both accounts, in fact, the Aristotelian and the Peripatetic, underscore the 
importance of an equal balance of their constituents (as regards both quantity 
and powers of action)341 which, by balancing each other out and, hence, 
establishing a certain ratio or logos between them,342 meet at an intermediate 
pointbut this mean was above all envisaged as a “gradual” mean, because it is 
described as having considerable reach and not as indivisible,343 an account that 
was instrumental for explaining the extreme variety of homoeomerous parts in 
the world, each one arising from a different elemental combination.  
Though Galen shares this gradual account of the mean, it is noteworthy 
and meaningful that in their accounts of mixture neither Aristotle and Alexander 
labour to find the exact middle or symmetric point344 as meticulously and as 
                                                          
341 De gen. et corr. 238a23–28; De mixt. 230.29–30 Bruns. 
342 De gen. et corr. 334b8–17. 
343 De gen. et corr. 334b26–30. 
344 The perfect middle mixture is not described in both the accounts. Solmsen observes that only 
in this textual locus of the sections concerning the exposition of the model of mixture does 
Aristotle refer to a proportion or logos between the contrarieties, as he was more interested in 
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minutely as Galen does by providing abstract and (at least theoretically) 
numerically translatable conceptualizations for thinking the matter. In all 
likelihood this is attributable to the powerful influence that logico-mathematical 
knowledge exerted on Galen’s thought,345 on his accurate method of reasoning 
(which is based on an axiomatic method consisting of definitionsobtained 
through a diairetic procedureand a priori truths),346 but, more deeply still, also 
on the actual ontological structure of the world as he conceived of it.347 Galen’s 
point is here not only to make as intelligible as possible the kernel of his physics, 
the perfect and absolute mixture of opposites, but also, and more importantly, to 
found his art of medicine on more solid bases, since identifying the absolute 
midpoint between hot and cold and between dry and wet, and, therefore, the 
                                                          
developing the qualitative aspects of his physics, in contrast to Empedocles (who set up 
proportions of fire, air, water, and earth within the human body) and to the mathematical 
structure underpinning Timaeus’ world, where mathematical proportions inform matter (whose 
primary elements take the shape of solid figures made up of basic triangles)  and constitute all-
pervading principles of unity of both the cosmic and the human body (on the usage of Plato’s 
theory of proportions and of the mean as applied to the physiology of the Timaeus cf. Tracy 1969 
pp. 77–156); cf. Solmsen 1960 pp. 375-377. It is also true that in De generatione et corruptione 
there is another passage in which Aristotle tries to pave the way for a mathematical abstraction 
of physical facts. For, when in De gen. et corr. 322b32 ff. he speaks of contact (the preliminary 
condition for mixture, as we have seen), he states that the notion of contact can properly (κυρίως) 
be applied to both physical bodies and to mathematical objects, i.e. to “things which have 
‘position’. And ‘position’ belongs only to those things which also have a Place” (trans. Joachim). 
This hint at the mathematization of physical phenomena is, however, not pursued systematically 
in De generatione et corruptione, and, apart from the above-quoted fleeting mention of the 
proportion or logos between the qualities it does not play a central role in Aristotle’s account of 
mixture.  
345 Cf. Vegetti: “Galeno indica con chiarezza a più riprese quale sia il modello epistemologico 
che il suo programma di rifondazione della medicina assume con riferimento costante. Si tratta 
del sapere matematico, tanto nelle sue versioni teoricamente più pure, come la geometria e 
l'aritmetica quanto in quelle che presentano aspetti osservativi ed applicativi, come l'astronomia 
e l'architettura: un sapere costituitosi attraverso la gloriosa tradizione di Euclide, Ipparco, 
Archimede, Aristosseno e Aristarco, cui Galeno si riferisce come ai massimi tra gli antichi (De 
methodo medendi I 1 K. X 12). Il carattere fondamentale del modello matematico consiste 
secondo Galeno nella sua capacità di costruire un sapere saldo e unificato, dotato di certezza nei 
limiti del possibile, ed esente perciò dalle diaphoniai che lacerano tanto la filosofia quanto la 
medicina. Questo risultato è possibile in virtù della struttura epistemologica che governa le 
matematiche”, in Vegetti 1978 p. 21. Cf. Hankinson 1991 p. 20: “The mathematical principles 
are important in two respects. Firstly, they show that Galen’s respect for mathematics was not 
merely idle and peripheral, but deep-seated and influential; mathematical axioms can be put to 
use even in practical science like medicine. And secondly, it shows the strength of Galen’s belief 
that the logical theories of the Stoics and the Peripatetics need to be supplemented by form of 
reasoning to be found among the mathematicians, and which will not yield comfortably to the 
strictures of either Peripatetic categorial syllogistic or the Stoic sentential calculus”, Hankinson 
1991 p. 20.  
346 Hankinson 1991, pp. 15–22; on the connection between Galen’s demonstrative method and 
the logico-mathematical model cf. also Hankinson 2008b, pp.165–169.  
347 Hankinson 1991 p. 21.  
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perfect mixture with respect to the whole substance, served to provide an 
absolute standard (canon, yardstick, reference model) to which to compare and 
judge all other mixtures in an absolute way.348 The perfect mixture generated by 
the midpoint between hot and cold, dry and wet, respectively, represents the 
heart of Galen’s natural philosophy and medicine and it is not only a pure 
abstraction insofar as it has a real physical counterpart, a part of the human body: 
the skin of the hand, but of a particular hand, a hand that is not to be judged but 
which has to judge the qualitative composition of whichever physical body is 
subject to generation and corruption, as we will see later on in the next chapter.  
Now, let us tackle the second type of symmetry, i.e. the κατὰ δύναμιν 
συμμετρία. Amberg has the great merit of having brought to light the ethical 
Aristotelian background of Galen’s De temperamentis and the theory of health 
gradualism; however, two additional points need to be made, at least. 
 On the one hand, it has been noted that, although according to Galen an 
actual μέτρον does really exist (and coincides with the most exact symmetron), 
when it comes to assessing the health conditions of a patient (or of any other 
living being), Galen’s puts aside mathematical measurements and closely 
scrutinizes the nature of the living beingwhich is not solely due to the 
influence of the Aristotelian ethical works, but has also much in common with 
the observations in this respect of the Hippocratic author of De vetere medicina 
9.349 In fact, in the passage we quoted above, Galen emphasizes the importance 
of appraising the peculiar “nature” of the living being.350 
                                                          
348 Cf. amplius infra. pp. 219 ff.  
349 Cf. Grimaudo 2008 pp. 107–111. As well as the author of De vetere medicina, Galen values 
and acknowledges the importance of the stochazesthai in order to hit the mean between what the 
body lacks and what has in excess. As Vegetti observes, in fact the high profile of Galen’s 
medicine (which is cited in the great philosophical debates, benefits from the axiomatic 
demonstrative method, and holds logico-mathematical foundations) has to coexist with the lower 
profile of medicine, to which also pertains the dimension of the conjectural/stochastic art of the 
physician: “una medicina dal 'profilo basso' non più impegnata nei grandi dibattiti ideologici, 
incapace di usare il linguaggio della teleologia e della teologia […]. Affiora intanto, sul piano 
epistemologico, il carattere stocastico, congetturale della techne, costretta a procedere per 
tentativi e per approssimazioni in assenza di una scienza certa dei sintomi”, Vegetti 1981, pp. 
57–59. However, in the case of the stochazesthai too, Galen tries to find a common midpoint 
between exact knowledge and rough approximation and works out what he himself defines as 
τεχνικὸς στοχασμός, i.e. a skilful conjecture, which over time is progressively refined in order 
to find the right proportion in dietary regimen; on this aspect cf. Grimaudo 2008 pp. 116–122. 
350 In this stance, Galen follows the Hippocratic physicians. The statements of the Hippocratic 
author of De loc. in hom. 2 are famous: “The nature of the body is the beginning point of medical 
reasoning”. As Jouanna reports, Galen was familiar with this formula: “Galen attributed it to 
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On the other hand, even though Almberg focuses on the Aristotelian 
ethical concept of the “mean relative to us”, he does not spell clearly out the 
physical and physiological side of the question which is stringently linked to 
Galen’s theory of mixture as dependent on the Aristotelian/Peripatetic model: 
clarifying the physical and physiological articulation (mixture–dynamis–
energeia) turns out to be vital for understanding what exactly this κατὰ δύναμιν 
συμμετρία consists in. 
As is well known, the concept of nature is multiform in Galen’s thought, 
but, as has been highlighted, the most important and primary sense, which Galen 
attributes to “Hippocrates”, is that which is most in keeping with ousia of the 
nature itself, that is, the “mixture of hot/cold and dry/wet”. In his De 
temperamentis Galen points out: “when I say ‘nature’ (physis) I mean the entire 
substance (ousia) and mixture (krasis) from the primary elements: hot, cold, dry 
and wet”.351 Therefore, for the physician, considering the peculiar nature of 
                                                          
Hippocrates himself and reproached his contemporaries for praising the precept without 
following it. He remarked ironically upon this situation in the following terms: ‘They devote 
themselves with such ardor to this task that they disregard in the case of each part of the body 
not only its substance, its texture, its shape, its size, and its connection with adjacent parts, but 
even its position’ (cf. Med. Phil. 1)”, Jouanna 1999 p. 345. Jouanna remarks that by physis the 
Hippocratic writers meant “human nature” par excellence, although the term does not refer to 
just any human nature but predominantly to the healthy one at every level of its organisational 
patterns (elementary, anatomical, physiological): nature is the “natural organisation” of the body. 
The Hippocratic physicians also knew that these natures changed considerably from individual 
to individual (and in this sense the term would also mean “constitution”) and in relation to 
different factors (climate, places, age, regimen, diseases); cf. De fract. 7 and De hum. 16. 
Moreover, Jouanna identifies the birth of the principle of natura medicatrix in the Hippocratic 
Collection: the nature that cures herself, for example in Epidemics VI 5.1: “The body’s nature is 
the physician in disease. Nature finds the way for herself, not from thought. For example, 
blinking, and the tongue offers its assistance, and all similar things. Well trained, readily and 
without instruction, nature does what is needed”. These pre-teleological statements about nature 
will be brought to completion by Aristotle, according to whom, as is well known, “final cause 
and the Good is more fully present in the works of Nature than in the works of Art”; cf. De part. 
an. 639b19–21. For the Hippocratic concept of nature cf. Jouanna 1999 pp. 344–347 and, more 
specifically, for the plurality of individual natures in the Hippocratic Collection cf. Andó 2002.  
351 Cf. De temp. p. 104.1–2 H. In his classical essay on Galen’s concept of nature, Jouanna 
distinguishes several meanings of the word physis in Galen’s work: i) the most important one, 
i.e. ousia or krasis of hot/cold and dry/wet; ii) the visible form of the body or possibly the 
arrangement of its parts. Now, these two first meanings were adopted by later Alexandrian 
commentators of Hippocrates and Galen (6th–7th century CE), who added other two definitions 
of nature: iii) an organising ability (τὴν διοικοῦσαν τὰ σώματα) and iv) an impulse of souls 
(ὁρμὴν τῶν ψυχῶν). Jouanna recognizes the source of the Alexandrians’ third definition in 
Galen’s Commentary on Hippocrates’ Epidemics VI, where Galen defines nature by saying: “by 
the word physis we should understand the ability (dynamis) residing in the very bodies that were 
organised by her” (“ἐνοικοῦσαν αὐτοῖς τοῖς σώμασι τοῖς διοικουμένοις ὑπ' αὐτῆς”, cf. Gal. In 
Hipp. Epid. VI comment. 5.1 CMG V 10.2.2 p. 253.19–21 Wenkebach). In this sense the term 
physis would mean the organising principle of the world and the existent things within it 
according to a teleological design; cf. Jouanna 2012c p. 288 ff. with references.  
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whichever living being or of its own constitutive parts consists primarily in 
evaluating the ousia qua krasis of hot/cold and dry/wet. But what is dynamis and 
what is its connection with energeia or activity? And, above all, what is the link 
between mixture and dynameis? We will explain gradually this articulation in 
order to make clear the close connection between a mixture conceived of more 
Aristotelico and Galen’s theory of gradual health.  
To begin with, we have seen that the only perfect midpoint or to symmetron 
within the realm of all bodies subjected to generation and corruption is the skin 
of the hand, and we have also seen that all the other bodies generated from the 
primary elements are Aristotelically called “metaxu” bodies (whose midpoint 
between hot/cold and dry/wet cannot coincide with the most exact one: we have 
only one perfect midpoint): we infer three relevant points from this. i) No other 
bodies, except the precise midpoint, are generated when the qualities encounter 
the precise middle of the contrariety; ii) all the other bodies are generated from 
a particular qualitative combination of the elements, i.e. when the constituents 
find a relative midpoint, for one quality in a contrariety does not have to 
completely overcome the other, as in that case there would be destruction (or 
when referred to living beings, from a medical perspective, simply death); and 
iii) the possibility of the manifold and different qualitative combinations 
explains the variety of all the “metaxu” bodies subjected to generation and 
destruction. 
Second, as we have seen, the primary qualities hot/cold and dry/wet 
involved in the mixture, which meet in a broader central region (Aristotelically 
conceived, as we have seen), dispose of and act in accordance with basic 
causative powers or the dynameis352 of heating, cooling, desiccating, and 
                                                          
352 What exactly is dynamis, then, according to Galen? As Van der Eijk perceptively remarks, 
Galen’s usage of the term dynamis is rather ambiguous insofar as it has both a medical and 
philosophical background and has both a passive sense (of undergoing a change, for example 
the capacity of becoming hot; cf. De temp. pp. 87.1–90.21 H.) and, above all, an active sense (of 
bringing about a change, the capacity to cause something else to become hot); cf. Van der Eijk 
2005 pp. 295–297. In his De simpl. med. (temp. ac), Galen defines dynamis as an αἰτία δραστική, 
an “active cause”, which in turn is divided into two interrelated stages: i) a dynamis “being about 
to” (ἐν τῷ μέλλειν ἐστίν), which, if everything runs smoothly, gives rise to ii), a dynamis κατ' 
ἐνέργειαν (a dynamis in action); cf. De simp. med. (temp. ac) fac. K. XI p. 380. The concept of 
dynamis, we see, is strictly correlated to that of energeia: “all genuine energeiai presuppose the 
existence of a co-ordinate dynamis: energeia is a dynamis in action”, as Hankinson observes 
(Hankinson 2014 p. 952). Hankinson also clarifies the differences between Galen’s and 
Aristotle’s notions of dynamis: “Galen characteristically will have nothing to do with such 
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moistening. According to their particular combination, which, as we have seen, 
can vary within a certain gradual range within the krasis, these basic dynameis 
are responsible for a proliferation of myriads of further derivative dynameis353 
which, in turn, are responsible for the energeiai or activities, which in turn 
produce some appropriate outcomes, i.e. erga or products.354 For example, in the 
phase of embryogenesis, the mixture of the four basic dynameis depend,355 on 
the one hand, on derivative dynameis such as those of bone-producing, nerve-
producing, cartilage-producing (which once in action become real energeiai),356 
and, on the other hand, on the products of these energeiai, i.e. erga, such as 
“bone”, “nerve”, “cartilage”, and so on357. This holds for the embryogenesis and, 
as we see, explains the generation of the homoeomerous parts of the organism: 
analogously, on these general powers or dynameis of hot/cold and dry/wet 
depend the many specific powers involved also in growth, nutrition (the entire 
De naturalibus facultatibus is devoted to investigate these dynameis), and the 
functioning of every organ of the body, including all the individual’s 
psychological characteristics.358 
                                                          
metaphysical extravagances as pure actuality. Galen’s concept, then, is not exactly Aristotle’s; 
and in any case dunamis, in a variety of senses, had a long philosophical, and indeed medical, 
history independent of Aristotle, with which Galen was intimately familiar. No significant role 
is played in Galen by the notion of the actualization of potential states; and as a consequence we 
find no echo of the Aristotelian distinction between first and second potentiality. In its central 
Galenic sense, an energeia is something which something does, where merely existing or 
persisting is not, as such, a matter of actually doing anything”, Hankinson 2014 p. 952.  
353 The point is clearly made by Hankinson: “Galen tackles these issues in more detail at Nat. 
Fac. II 11–19 = 108.21–114.17. Dealing first with generation, he says (rather vaguely) that once 
conception has taken place in the animal (or germination in the case of a seed) ‘very many parts 
become constituted in the substance undergoing generation, which differ in moisture, dryness, 
heat and cold, and all the other qualities which are derivative of these’ (11, = 108.25–109.3), 
which include those distinguished by touch: hardness, softness, viscosity, brittleness, lightness, 
weight, rarity, density, smoothness, roughness, thickness, thinness ‘which are well discussed by 
Aristotle’ (12, = 109.7–12). The derivatives associated with taste, smell and sight are too well 
known to be worth enumerating (12, = 109.12–13)”, Hankinson 2014 p. 960.  
354 On the causal link between dynamis, energeia, and ergon cf. De nat. fac. p.107.15–22 H.  
355 The causal link between the mixture of the four (elements endowed with four basic dynameis) 
and energeia is made explicit at De nat. fac. p. 106.4–6 H.: “It seems to me that the vein and 
each of the other parts act in the way it does as a result of some particular mixture of the four 
(Ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν καὶ ἡ φλὲψ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων ἕκαστον διὰ τὴν ἐκ τῶν τεττάρων ποιὰν 
κρᾶσιν ὡδί πως ἐνεργεῖν δοκεῖ)”. Hankinson explains this relation as the emergence or 
supervenience of derivative specific powers upon the basic ones; cf. Hankinson 2014 p. 969, we 
have already tackled this issue in 1.3.4 and we will shortly come back to this topic in 1.3.7.  
356 De nat. fac. pp. 109.13–110.6 H. 
357 De nat. fac. pp. 105.10–106.1 H.  
358 Hankinson 2014 pp. 957–967.  
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Given this causal link between mixture, dynamis, and energeia, we can 
understand the reason why (T24.4) “sometimes it is appropriate (πρέπει) for 
there to be more wet than dry, or more cold than hot (δ' ἔσθ' ὅτε τὸ μὲν ὑγρὸν 
τοῦ ξηροῦ, τὸ δὲ ψυχρὸν τοῦ θερμοῦ πλέον ὑπάρχειν) For it is not right for a 
human being, a lion, a bee and a dog to have the same sort of mixture”. Every 
energeia of every living being (plant or animal) ultimately depends on a 
“particular mixture”, a ποιὰ κρᾶσις (i.e. a krasis with a particular qualitative 
composition; a krasis where the midpoint is not perfectly symmetric), and the 
variety of possible particular kraseis explains the variety of erga and energeiai 
of each living being:359 as long as the living being works and works well 
(physically and psychically), we should infer that this living being is healthy360 
and its krasis (which is not the most perfect and symmetric krasis) has found a 
relative equilibrium state between the opposites:361 it has matched its proper 
κατὰ δύναμιν συμμετρία. On the contrary, if it departs from this relative 
equilibrium point its activity will be impaired (the healthy dyskrasia also has 
a latitude and degrees; cf. T23.2 “πλάτος τῆς κατ' αὐτὴν [health] 
δυσκρασίας”); as long as the krasis hits the target of relative symmetric mean, 
everything functions properly, but as soon as the krasis is disproportioned and 
                                                          
359 Cf. De san. tuend. CMG V 4.2 p. 9.4–8 Koch. An illuminating passage: “εἴπερ οὖν αἱ 
διαφοραὶ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν ταῖς τῶν κράσεων διαφοραῖς ἀκολουθοῦσιν, ἀνάγκη τοσαύτας 
εἶναι τὰς τῶν κράσεων διαφοράς, ὅσαιπέρ εἰσι καὶ αἱ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν“ 
360 We have to note that this focus on the good functioning of the energeiai as criterion for 
judging the healthy state of the living being has an impact on Galen’s definition of health: archaic 
definitions of health as symmetry in fact coexist with a more modern definition of health as τὸ 
τῆς χρείας ἀπαρεμπόδιστον; cf. De san. tuend. CMG V 4.2 pp. 10.34–11.25 Koch (whereas, 
conversely, the discrimen between health and disease was defined as the “perceivable damage 
of an activity”; cf. one example, among many, from De san. tuend. CMG V 4.2 p. 12.20–22 
Koch “ἡ τῆς ἐνεργείας αἰσθητὴ βλάβη”), providing the first functionalist definition of health in 
Western thought; cf. Grimaudo 2008 pp. 57–59. 
361 That there is a causal relation between krasis and energeia is all the more clear from the fact 
that, as has brought to light by Van der Eijk, in his De temperamentis Galen mentions the 
energeia (either of the entire organism or of a part of it) as a criterion for assessing the bodily 
mixture (apart from i) the sense of touch, ii) inferences from external signs and symptoms, iii) 
theoretical reasoning about causes or logismos, and iv) the more invasive methods of venesection 
and dissection), Van der Eijk 2015a pp. 691–692. In our terminology, as well as in Galen’s, there 
is a certain ambiguity in the usage of the term krasis. As we can see in all the texts quoted, it 
refers either to the krasis of a part (with a corresponding energeia) or to the krasis of an entire 
living being; cf. T18.4: “Indeed, when someone asks, what is the mixture (and not the 
mixtures) of a human being, or of a horse, an ox, dog or any other creature at all, the question 
cannot be answered in absolute terms (πρὸς δὴ τὸν ἐρόμενον, ἧστινός ἐστι κράσεως ἄνθρωπος 
ἢ ἵππος ἢ βοῦς ἢ κύων ἢ ὁτιοῦν ἄλλο τῶν πάντων, οὐχ ἁπλῶς ἀποκριτέον)”. 
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loses its relative balance, the activity in question is impaired: the healthy 
dyskrasia oversteps its relative platos and turns into a ill dyskrasia.  
If in fact we look at the issue more closely, all Aristotle’s poiá (in contrast 
to substance or ousía) and therefore also hot/cold and dry/wet admit of degrees 
by “the more and the less.”362 Therefore, although Almberg unravels Galen’s 
references to Aristotelian ethical theories, this notion of gradual health can now 
                                                          
362 As Lennox has shown, in fact, the Aristotelian concept of “the more and the less” can be also 
applied to Aristotle’s biological issues and, more specifically, to the formation of the parts of 
animals. The concept has its roots in Plato’s Philebus and, more specifically, in the discussion 
concerning the mixture of the limited and the unlimited, during which Socrates affirms that “drier 
and wetter, higher and lower, quicker and slower, greater and smaller, and everything that we 
brought together a while ago as belonging to that kind of being which admits of the more and 
the less” (25c5–8). As Lennox remarks, Aristotle’s “the more and the less” play an important 
role in distinguishing the categories of substance, quantity, and quality. In Categories 3b33, it is 
said that substance does not admit of degrees, whereas quality does; cf. Cat. 10b26–28 (where it 
is declared that “qualities” admit of a more and less; for one thing is called more or less pale than 
another). Therefore, as Lennox notes, while Socrates cannot be more or less human than Callias, 
he can be more or less pale than the latter. Lennox tries to harmonize the achievements of 
Metaphysics with the doctrine of the Categories, which is still free from the matter/form 
distinction. In reporting a passage from Metaphysics H.3 (“just as a number does not possess the 
more and the less, neither does the substance in virtue of the form (kata to eidos), but if it does 
possess the more and less, it is substance with the matter that does so; cf. Metaph. 1044a10–11), 
Lennox observes that of course, as already noted, Socrates cannot be more or less human than 
Callias kata to eidos, “that is, the account which refers to them in abstraction from the different 
ways in which they actually embody human characteristics will not mention the more/less 
variations between them. But Socrates and Callias are ‘this matter and this form here, and 
humans are such taken generally’ (Metaph. Z.8 1033b24–6, 10 1035b28–32, 11 1037a5–7); and 
as suchas substances with matter (ousia meta tês hulês)they can differ by the more and the 
less”, Lennox 1987 p. 345. Given these theoretical premises, Lennox goes on to explain the 
different formations of homoeomerous parts themselves out of hot/cold and dry/wet and 
therefore also the specific differentiae of the parts of animals (ultimately constructed out of the 
primary elementshot, cold, dry, and wet, and out of the second-order qualities, such as 
lightness, heaviness, density, rarity, roughness, smoothness, and so on which follow from the 
primary; cf. De part. an. 646a13–21) and even the specific functioning of their organs with 
respect to a certain genos (cf. esp. p. 346 and p. 357–358) as depending on the perceptible 
qualities, whichlike all the other poiáadmit of degrees and of the more and the less; cf. 
Lennox 1987 p. 346: “thus, should one wish to distinguish one sort of bird from another, it will 
be in part by noting the differences in degree between the parts of one and the parts of 
anotherthicker or thinner bone or blood, heavier or lighter body, thicker or thinner beak, and 
so on”. For this is in turn the premise that permits us to think both the individual’s differentiae 
within a certain species (eidos) and the differentiae of one species within a certain genus (genos), 
as based on the principle of the more and the less; cf. Lennox 1987 pp. 346 ff. (cf. Lennox’s 
statement on p. 347: “not only can the differentiating features be said to differ in degree from 
one form of a kind to anotherthe forms of the kind themselves can be said to differ by degree, 
or by the more and the less, from each other”, where kind translates genos). Galen does not 
clearly appeal to Aristotle’s metaphysical matter/form distinction in his reasoning, as applied to 
the biological genos/eidos progressively divisional and variable account (cf. Lennox 1987 p. 
348) but, from his functionalist perspective, he certainly echoes this since, as in Aristotle’s 
biological works, it is “the more and the less” principle as applied to the primary contrarieties of 
hot/cold and dry/wet that determines the individual’s activities and outcomes (energeiai and 
erga), stemming from the mixture, that can be evaluated on the basis of the relative symmetric 
midpoint of a certain species and genus.  
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be more deeply linked i) to the fact that within the very physical mixture there 
are different degrees that distance themselves on both the sides from an absolute 
midpoint; and ii) to the fact that specific dynameis depend on the many possible 
particular qualitative compositions or diaphorai of the kraseis (i.e. kraseis with 
a relative midpoint admitting of degrees) and, therefore, energeiai (and erga) of 
living beings.  
There is a last point to which we will briefly refer. We have said that Galen 
“archaically” thinks of health as a symmetry and disease as an asymmetry of the 
bodily constituents. This prompts the question as to what to do in case of a 
possible imbalance of the bodily constituents. In this Galen proves to be very 
“archaic” insofar as he conceives, like the Hippocratic physicians, the treatment 
of the imbalance of the bodily constituents as a “correction” and “re-balancing” 
of the bodily quanta and qualia363 through dietetic and pharmacological 
prescriptions. He calls this correction ἐπανόρθωσις,364 that is, a “correction” 
aiming at obtaining again an “orthē” krasis. The mixture of the body in fact 
becomes “right” when the physician intervenes in order to “right” it, i.e. “to set 
it upright”. The adjective ὀρθός is largely used in Ancient Greek in both literal 
and figurative senses and in geometry is said of “right angles”.365 The usage of 
this term seems to have Hippocratic origins: in De arte it refers to a metaphor of 
the prodigious, demiurgic, correcting power of the medical art to raise a patient 
                                                          
363 In his review of the Hippocratic pre-Aristotelian writers, Tracy highlights this aspect. See his 
discussion in Tracy 1969 pp. 32–67. In Hippocratic medical texts the identification of the right 
proportion as regards quantity and quality was to be taken into account for the preservation of 
health. i) The Hippocratic author of De vetere medicina: in this treatise the physician aims at 
finding a diet proportionate to the stronger or weaker constitutions of the patients and for this 
reason he tries to find the right proportion (which as we have seen, had to be based on the reaction 
of the individual body) with regard to the quantity of food and with regard to the quality (not too 
strong and not too weak), by recourse to processes of mixture and concoction; cf. De vet. med. 
V; ii) the Hippocratic author of the companion piece to De nat. hom., the so-called Regimen in 
Health (whose unity with the rest of the treatise, De nat. hom., has been strenuously defended 
by Jouanna (2002 pp. 34–35)), states that the physician should establish the right quantity and 
quality of food and drink depending on the season: since a certain season in fact determines the 
abundance and the strength of the correspondent humour, the diet should act quantitatively and 
qualitatively in order to counterbalance the effects of the predominance of a particular humour 
within the body (Ch. 1–4). For example, Chapter 1 states that in order to reach a re-balancing of 
the body, during the winter (the cold and moist season which favours the production of phlegm) 
one has to eat as much and drink as little as possible (plus dry and minus wet); the food must be 
bread and roasted meats (plus dry) and the drink preferably wine (plus warm); cf. Tracy 1969 
esp. pp. 37–39 and pp. 50–51.  
364 Cf. among other examples Adv. Lyc. CMG V 10.3 p. 6.9 Wenkebach and De meth. med. K. 
X 940.7-8 (where it is used the corresponding verb ἐπανορθόω).  
365 Cf. Chantraine 2002 s.v.  
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suffering from an obscure disease by “shaping his body aright”.366 As Vegetti 
aptly remarks, a physician cannot “create” a physical body from the elements as 
the demiurgic activity of a god or nature can, but (besides re-creating the mixture 
only in a secondary sense), he can “correct” the bodily mixture: his intervention 
consists in a “readjustment” (i.e. is an epanorthotikos intervention)367 of the 
qualia and quanta of a body.  
 
T26 Galen De elementis sec. Hipp. K. I p. 474.2-17 De Lacy pp. 118.23-120.9: 
 
(1) […] ἵνα σώζηται, διττῆς καὶ τῆς ἐπανορθώσεως δεῖται, τῆς μὲν ἑτέρας 
τὸ ὑπερβάλλον ἐν ταῖς ποιότησι κολαζούσης, τῆς δὲ λοιπῆς τὴν τοῦ κενουμένου 
βάσιν ἀναπληρούσης. (2) ἡ μὲν καθαιροῦσα τὴν ἀμετρίαν ἐναντία δήπου 
ποιότης ἐστὶ τῆς πλεοναζούσης, ἀλλ', ἡ δὲ τὸ λεῖπον ἀναπληροῦσα ποιότης 
ἐναντία μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, ὁμοιοτάτην δ' εἶναι χρὴ τῇ κενωθείσῃ πρότερον οὐσίᾳ· 
μέλλει γὰρ ἀντ' ἐκείνης ἔσεσθαι τῷ ζῴῳ. τουτὶ μὲν οὖν ἐστι τὸ τρέφεσθαι τοῖς 
σώμασιν ἔκ τινος οὐσίας ὁμοίας τῇ πρότερον κενωθείσῃ γιγνόμενον. ὅθεν οἶμαι 
καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ἐκείνην τροφὴν ὀνομάζομεν. (3) ἡνίκα δὲ κατὰ ποιότητα μόνον 
ἀλλοιοῦν βουλόμεθα τὸ ὑποκείμενον, οἷς μὲν τοῦτο δρῶμεν, οὐ τροφάς, ἀλλὰ 
φάρμακα προσαγορεύομεν. οὐκ ἔχοντες δ' εὑρεῖν χωρὶς οὐσίας οὐδὲ μίαν 
ποιότητα σὺν ταῖς οὐσίαις αὐτὰς ἀναγκαζόμεθα παραλαμβάνοντες ἐπιφέρειν 
τοῖς δεομένοις σώμασιν. 
 
(1) […] in order to be preserved [the substance of all the bodies subjected 
to generation and corruption] needs a double correction, one that curbs excess in 
the qualities, the other that refills the place of that which was lost. (2) But the 
                                                          
366 Cf. the beautiful passage from De arte XII describing the θαῦμα of the medical techne: “Now 
the power of the art, when it raises a patient suffering from an obscure disease, is more surprising 
than its failure when it attempts to treat incurables […] And the arts that are worked in materials 
easy to shape aright using in some cases wood, in others leather, in othersthese form the great 
majority—paint, bronze, iron and similar substances—the articles wrought, I say, through these 
arts and with these substances are easily shaped aright (Ἐπεὶ τῆς γε τέχνης τὴν δύναμιν, ὁκόταν 
τινὰ τῶν τὰ ἄδηλα νοσεύντων ἀναστήσῃ, θαυμάζειν ἀξιώτερον, ἢ ὁκόταν ἐγχειρήσῃ τοῖς 
ἀδυνάτοις […] τοῖσιν εὐεπανορθώτοισι σώμασι δημιουργεῦνται μετὰ τούτων δημιουργεύμενα 
εὐεπανόρθωτα)” (trans. Jones). Here the compound adjective εὐ-επανόρθωτος is used, while the 
verb ἐπανορθόω is used at De arte I. These are the only occurrences within the Hippocratic 
Collection.  
367 Vegetti 1981 p. 58. 
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(quality) that purges the imbalance is of course the opposite of the excessive 
quality, whereas that which supplies the lack is not a quality but must have the 
closest resemblance to the substance that was lost earlier; for it will be its 
replacement in the animal. This is [what is meant by] the feeding of bodies; it 
comes from some substance similar to that which was lost earlier, and that, I 
think is why we call that substance food. (3) But when we want to change the 
substrate in quality only, what we use for this we do not call food, but drugs. Yet 
since we cannot find even one quality apart from substance, we are compelled 
to take the qualities with the substances and administer to the bodies that need 
them. 
 
As we see from passage T26.1, the correction (ἐπανόρθωσις) is regarded 
as twofold (in the same way as the symmetry is twofold): it is i) quantitative 
(active on the quantum of the bodily substance in order to replenish the volume-
deficit, τῆς δὲ λοιπῆς τὴν τοῦ κενουμένου βάσιν ἀναπληρούσης) and ii) 
qualitative (τῆς μὲν ἑτέρας τὸ ὑπερβάλλον ἐν ταῖς ποιότησι κολαζούσης). The 
primary elements are Aristotelically conceived as a substrate that changes, where 
the change comes about as a result of an exchange of qualities (T26.3 “κατὰ 
ποιότητα μόνον ἀλλοιοῦν […] τὸ ὑποκείμενον”), the substrate being bound up 
with the contrarieties (T26.3 “οὐκ ἔχοντες δ' εὑρεῖν χωρὶς οὐσίας οὐδὲ μίαν 
ποιότητα”). The archaic aspect, however, clearly stands out, insofar as here two 
original Hippocratic principles are at work in order to restore the quantitative 
and qualitative symmetries: that of the i) contraria contrariis and that of the ii) 
similia similibus.368 The first correction is associated with a change as regards 
                                                          
368 Similia and contraria are categories that emerged in pre-scientific/popular thought (in 
collections of sayings and proverbs, in the Homeric poems);  in the wake of the birth of scientific 
thinking, they are adopted by Pre-Socratic philosophers to explain the formation and destructions 
of the cosmos (Empedocles’ Love and Strife, Eraclitus’ harmony of contraries). The “similar” is 
closely associated with the idea of growth, addition, attraction, whereas the “contrary” is closely 
associated with the sense of harmony, of symmetry, of health conceived as balanced krasis of 
opposite constituents (Ferrini 1996 pp. 15–18). The principles of the similar and the contrary 
also underpin (although not exclusively) the method of therapeutic treatment of disease in the 
Hippocratic Corpus, even though the remedy of the contraria contrariis is much more 
predominant than that of similia similibus (which in the Corpus is predominantly used to 
understand physical phenomena). In De loc. in hom. 42, 8–10, two therapeutic principles are 
straightforwardly announced together: i) αἱ ὀδύναι γίνονται· ὑγιαίνονταί τε αἱ ὀδύναι τοῖσιν 
ὑπεναντίοισιν and ii) Ἄλλος ὅδε τρόπος· διὰ τὰ ὅμοια νοῦσος γίνεται, καὶ διὰ τὰ ὅμοια 
προσφερόμενα ἐκ νοσεύντων ὑγιαίνονται· (cf. the other examples from many Hippocratic 
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the quality of the body: “the (quality) that purges the imbalance is of course the 
opposite of the excessive quality” (cf. T26.2 “ἡ μὲν καθαιροῦσα τὴν ἀμετρίαν 
ἐναντία δήπου ποιότης ἐστὶ τῆς πλεοναζούσης”): these remedies are called 
drugs. The second correction is envisioned as a replenishment of the volume-
deficit of the bodily substance by adding a substance that has to be the most 
similar to the one lost (cf. T26.2 “ὁμοιοτάτην δ' εἶναι χρὴ τῇ κενωθείσῃ 
πρότερον οὐσίᾳ”: here is the quantitative aspect which counts, τὸ ποσὸν τῆς 
οὐσίας): these remedies are called foods.369 
Let us take stock of the findings we have attained in this section. Galen 
indeed displays some “archaic”, “Hippocratic”, and “pre-Aristotelian” traits: 
          i)Health conceived as a symmetry or balance and disease 
conceived as an asymmetry of bodily constituents within the mixture. 
ii) Attention to the individual nature of the organism in the 
evaluation of the condition of the patient: in this case exact numerical 
measurements are not useful. 
iii) Therapeutic treatment seen as “correction” in the sense of 
restoration and re-balancing the bodily constituents as 
regards “quantity” and “quality” through dietetics and 
pharmacology. 
iv) Adoption of the Hippocratic therapeutic principles of 
similia similibus and contraria contrariis. 
 
However, as we have seen, by drawing on deeply Aristotelian and 
Peripatetic physical (and ethical) doctrines, Galen innovates this “archaic” 
notion of health as a symmetry of the bodily constituents within the mixture: 
                                                          
writings which Ferrini extensively quotes, among others De victu, De nat. hom., De morbo sacro, 
Epidemics; cf. Ferrini 1996 pp. 22–35).  
369 The third book De temperamentis is dedicated to the therapeutic aspects of food and drugs, 
i.e. to the mixtures in potentialitybut this goes beyond the scope of this thesis. Knowledge of 
the qualia and the quanta of substances are at the basis of Galen’s method of healing. As Van 
der Eijk notes, in his Therapeutics to Glaucon the first requirements are that the physician must 
have knowledge of i) the quality and the quantity of the remedies (poiotês kai posotês tôn 
boêthêmatôn); ii) the mode of their application; and iii) the ability to discern the right time of 
application (the kairos, this is also a typically Hippocratic concept; as Van der Eijk notes this 
echoes the first Hippocratic Aphorism, “Occasion is fleeting”, kairos oxus); cf. Van der Eijk 




i) He distinguishes an absolute and mathematical (spatialized and, 
at least theoretically, numerically calculable) symmetric midpoint within the 
mixture (according to the quantity of the substance) from a relative and not 
mathematically determinable symmetric meson (according to the dynamis). 
ii) He builds on the Aristotelian ethical notion of a “mean relative to 
us” to develop his gradualist theory of health: when it comes to health, there is 
no absolute and mathematical mean, but only a mean in relation to the 
individual’s nature (but we have seen that the germinal roots underlying this 
theory can be found in the Hippocratic corpus and we have also understood that 
Galen shares this gradual account of health with some other unnamed 
physicians). 
iii) We have also seen that Galen’s mixture has a platos (analogous 
to the Aristotelian extended meson of the mixture): the variety of the mixtures 
explain the variety of dynameis and, hence, of the activities of the living being 
(see the causal connection between mixture–dynamis–energeia): each particular 
mixture with its relative midpoint generates a particular (dynamis and then) 
energeia. 
iv) Every healthy mixture with a relative midpoint (therefore a 
healthy dyskrasia) has a platos and admits of degrees: if one bodily activity 
works well, this signifies that the mixture hits its relative mean (otherwise the 
activity would be impaired); hence, the platos of the healthy dyskrasia and its 
relation to the good functioning of the living organism are also factors to take 
into account when we speak of Galen’s gradualism: this account enables us to 
keep track of what happens on the physical/physiological level.  
 
In sum, if in fact the first symmetry (quantity) is the key to the “perfect”, 
“absolute”, and “exact” knowledge of the quantitative aspects of the krasis of 
every physical body (i.e. which quantity of hot, cold, dry, and wet possesses a 
certain krasis), the second (the dynamis and hence the correspondent activity) is 
an “imperfect” and “relative” but “functionalist” symmetry. This relative 
symmetry of hot/cold and dry/wet can be assessed from the external activities and 
it is functional since, although not completely accomplished and not numerically 
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measurable, in any case it allows the living organism to live well and according 
to its own nature and to perform its various activities, physical and psychical, at 
its best. Though relative and imperfect, this is a “whatever works” symmetry. 
 
 
1.3.7 The reversibility of the process of mixture  
 
 
So far we have been dealing with different aspects of the mixture of 
primary elements (activators, process of progressive division, ontological status 
of the elements in the mixture, alteration and generation of a tertium quid, 
absolute and relative equilibrium point of the constituents) and we have 
examined the strict dependence of Galen’s model of mixture on the Peripatetic 
model (although it presents some further developments permitting him to adapt 
his account of mixture to his medical and philosophical system). It is now time 
to analyse what happens in the case of the reversibility of the process of mixture: 
that is, the moment in which one recovers the constituents of the mixture. 
 Before properly approaching the phase of reversibility, we should first 
point out that Galen distinguishes two types of mixtures: i) those performed by 
God and/or Nature and ii) those also performed by human beings. This will lead 
us to better understand where to situate Galen’s theory of mixture within his 




T27 Galen De temperamentis K. I pp. 562.15-563.13 Helmreich p. 34.5-19: 
 
Τὸ μὲν οὖν ὅλα δι' ὅλων αὐτὰ κεράσαι, τὸ θερμὸν λέγω καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν καὶ 
τὸ ξηρὸν καὶ τὸ ὑγρόν, ἀδύνατον ἀνθρώπῳ. γῆ γὰρ ὑγρῷ | φυραθεῖσα μέμικται 
μέν, ὡς ἄν τῳ δόξειε, καὶ οὕτω κέκραται πᾶσα παντί, παράθεσις μήν ἐστι τὸ 
τοιοῦτον κατὰ σμικρὰ καὶ οὐ δι' ὅλων κρᾶσις, ἀλλὰ τὸ δι' ὅλων ἄμφω κεράσαι 
θεοῦ καὶ φύσεως ἔργον, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον, εἰ καὶ τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν ὅλα δι' 
ὅλων ἀλλήλοις κεραννύοιτο. τὸ μέντοι παράθεσιν ἐργάσασθαι τοιαύτην, ὡς 
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ἐκφεύγειν τὴν αἴσθησιν ἕκαστον τῶν ἁπλῶν σωμάτων, οὐ φύσεως τοῦτό γε 
μόνης ἢ θεοῦ τοὖργον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡμέτερόν ἐστιν. οὐδὲν γὰρ χαλεπὸν ὑγροῦ καὶ 
ξηροῦ μέσον ἐργάσασθαι πηλὸν ἐκ τῆς τοιαύτης μίξεως, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ θερμοῦ 
καὶ ψυχροῦ, καί σοι φανεῖται τὸ τοιοῦτον σῶμα καὶ τῇ θερμότητι μὲν εὔκρατον, 
ἀλλὰ καὶ σκληρότητος καὶ μαλακότητος ἐν τῷ μέσῳ.  
 
 
The total mixing of one with the other, I mean of hot, cold, dry and wet, is 
not possible for a human being. When earth is kneaded together with [something] 
wet, it seems to one that it has been combined, certainly, and in this sense a 
whole has been mixed with a whole; but in fact such a process is a placing 
alongside each other of very small parts, not a total mixture; the total mixing of 
the two is the work of God, and of Nature, especially in the case where the hot 
and the cold undergo total mixture with each other. However, to bring about a 
setting-alongside such that each of the simple bodies escapes perception, is not 
the work of Nature alone, nor of God, but is achievable by us too. For it is not at 
all difficult by this kind of combination to produce clay which is at the midpoint 
between wet and dry and also between hot and cold; and such a body will appear 
to you well-mixed in terms of hotness, as well as at a midpoint between hardness 
and softness. (Trans. Singer) 
 
 
As we see from the text, Galen distinguishes between i) a mixture, which, 
as we have seen, using a Stoicizing terminology, he calls total (a δι' ὅλων 
κρᾶσις), which is due to the work of nature and/or God; and ii) a mixture which 
he calls παράθεσις […] κατὰ σμικρὰ, that is, a juxtaposition of small particles: 
this is not only the product of Nature and/or God but is also attainable by human 
beings (οὐ φύσεως τοῦτό γε μόνης ἢ θεοῦ τοὖργον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡμέτερόν ἐστιν). 
Within this second mixture each of the simple bodies escapes sense-perception 
(ὡς ἐκφεύγειν τὴν αἴσθησιν ἕκαστον τῶν ἁπλῶν σωμάτων).  
In order to appreciate the difference between these two kinds of mixture 
we have to clarify i) what Galen means when he mentions Nature and God in 
this passage; ii) why he says that these total mixtures of hot/cold and dry/wet can 
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be performed by Nature and/or God; and iii) which different products bring 
these two kinds of mixtures about. 
When Galen wrote De temperamentis, he had already written, during his 
first sojourn in Rome, the first book of De usu partium, completing it during his 
second sojourn in Rome in all likelihood after the writing of De 
temperamentis.370 As is well known, in his De usu partium Galen speaks more 
Platonico of a good and wise Demiurge who would have shaped the world and 
the bodies of inanimate and animate beings within it.371 When in the passage 
under consideration Galen speaks of a θεός who shapes the material elements in 
order to give form to living beings, it is plausible that he is referring to the same 
demiurgic entity as that present in De usu partium, although in De temperamentis 
the presence of such a divine principle is only touched upon. As highlighted by 
Kovačić, in De usu partium, Nature is described as a good, sapient, and creative 
agent (that which Kovačić calls ΦYΣIΣ, which stands in a synonymical relation 
with the divine Demiurge) that, however, actualizes itself more Aristotelico in 
an immanent principle that shapes a particular organism specifically different 
from within (that which Kovačić calls φύσις) according to a general teleological 
plan (that which Kovačić names Φύσις).372  
As noted by Van der Eijk, De temperamentis (and more generally Galen’s 
attempts to give an account of human nature) shows a striking combination of 
“top-down” and “bottom-up” explanatory strategies. As Van der Eijk remarks: 
 
 
On the one hand, [in his account of ‘human nature’] Galen highlights the 
presence of formal, formative and unifying principles that are of a ‘higher’, even 
‘divine’ origin, that are at work within the material structure of the human body 
and without which the explanation of its functioning and organic unity is not 
possible or at any rate not complete. Yet alongside these undeniable Platonist 
and Aristotelian tenets, we also encounter tendencies that rather belong to a 
‘materialistic’, or at least anti-metaphysical framework. There is a marked 
                                                          
370 Ilberg 1892 pp. 512–513.  
371 Moraux 1984 pp. 326–327 with references.  
372 Kovačić 2001 pp. 210–210 and pp. 86–87. These meanings are summarized in the fourth 
definition of physis given by Galen and singled out by Jouanna; cf. the previous footnote n. 351. 
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tendency, especially in Galen’s works on human physiology and pathology, to 
explain physical structures, systems and processes predominantly in terms of 
elements, elementary qualities, and their proportions.373 
 
 
 Galen’s conception of God and nature as creative agents whichby 
making use of the primary qualities as if by moulding themgive form to 
specifically different existent beings, would fall within the framework of a 
“higher level” teleological explanation as opposed to a “lower level” material 
explanation.374 However, as we can observe in the text under consideration, 
Galen declares that this total mixture is produced (cf. the use of the term ἔργον) 
by Nature and/or God; therefore he seems to be raising doubt regarding whether 
it has a natural or divine origin.375 I believe that this total mixture has to be 
identified with the capacity that Nature and/or God possess of giving rise to 
every existent animate and inanimate being within the cosmos out of a mixture 
of hot/cold and dry/wet (that is, of giving rise to their homoeomerous, 
constitutive parts).376 When it comes to the formation of human beings, in his 
De temperamentis Galen speaks of a shaping capacity which by following a 
teleological design or prôtos logos is present in nature and uses the primary 
                                                          
373 Van der Eijk 2014a p. 97.  
374 The difference between the two levels can be straightforwardly seen, as Van der Eijk remarks 
(cf. van der Eijk 2014a pp. 117–118), when Galen draws a distinction between bodily 
characteristics necessarily following from the mixtures of the body and those that are instead 
part of the so-called “the original plan”. De temp. p. 69.14–22: “But the hair on the head, in the 
eyebrows and in the eyelashes is already present in childhood; for this is generated not in the 
manner of the grass, but in the manner of plants that have been fashioned by nature in the original 
plan (kata prôton logon hupo tês phuseôs apeirgasmenais): they are not a necessary consequence 
of mixtures (ouk ex anankês hepomenais tais krasesin), as has been shown, too, in The 
Usefulness of the Parts. Nonetheless, even in this case, though their existence is due to the craft 
of nature (tên tês phuseôs technên), their being black or redor having any other distinct 
characteristic – is a necessary consequence of the mixture due to age” (trans. Singer). In this 
remarkable passage, we note the opposition between features that have been shaped, in the 
manner of plants, by a demiurgic nature kata prôton logon (i.e. the teleological organization of 
nature; cf. Jouanna 2012c pp. 292 ff. and De plac. Hipp. et Plat. CMG V 4.1.2 p. 360, 13 De 
Lacy), whose features necessarily (i.e. in the manner of the grass) follow from the mixtures (such 
as the color of the hair). As Jouanna clarifies, the same analogy between grass/plants and features 
that are a necessary consequence of the bodily mixtures/features that are part of the original plan 
is re-used by Galen in his De usu part. p. II.159.21 ff. H.; cf. Jouanna 2012c pp. 293–294. For 
the meaning and possible translations of the expression kata prôton logon hupo tês phuseôs cf. 
Jouanna 2012c p. 294 f.   
375 I owe some reflections on this point to my supervisor, Prof. Ph. Van der Eijk. 
376 Later on, in fact, Galen refers to the skin of the hand as the end product of the mixture of 
hot/cold and dry/wet performed by nature or God; cf. De temp. p. 34, 20–35.2 H. 
179 
 
qualities as its instruments (literally organa) in order to fashion the animal’s 
parts in accordance with the soul traits and create, therefore, an individual 
living being specifically different (a thing that is impossible for human beings) 
and whose originGalen thinksmay be divine and come from above.377 It is 
                                                          
377 In two main passages of De temperamentis, Galen deals with the shaping capacity of Nature 
and wonders whether it may come from the mixtures themselves or whether it has a divine origin 
and comes from above. i) De temp. p. 36.20–24 H.: “for the man who is ‘well-fleshed’ to this 
degree is not just in the middle state with regard to moisture and dryness, but has also got an 
excellent shaping, which may be possibly follow from the good mixture of the four elements, 
but perhaps has some other source of a more divine nature, from above (οὐ μόνον γὰρ ὑγρότητός 
τε καὶ ξηρότητος ἐν τῷ μέσῳ καθέστηκεν ὁ οὕτως εὔσαρκος ἄνθρωπος, ἀλλὰ καὶ διαπλάσεως 
ἀρίστης τετύχηκεν, ἴσως μὲν ἑπομένης τῇ τῶν τεττάρων στοιχείων εὐκρασίᾳ, τάχα δέ τινα 
θειοτέραν ἀρχὴν ἑτέραν ἐχούσης ἄνωθεν)” ii) De temp. p. 79, 20–28 H.: “[the shaping capacity] 
is present in nature and is like a craftsman and shapes the parts in a way which is in accordance 
with the character traits of the soul (τῆς διαπλαστικῆς ἐν τῇ φύσει δυνάμεως οὐ μέμνηνται 
τεχνικῆς τ' οὔσης καὶ τοῖς τῆς ψυχῆς ἤθεσιν ἀκολούθως διαπλαττούσης τὰ μόρια)”. Concerning 
this capacity, Aristotle too, raised the question of whether this capacity perhaps derives from 
some more divine cause (θειοτέρας τινὸς ἀρχῆς), rather than simply that found in the hot, the 
cold, the dry, and the wet. Those who make rash assertions on this difficult issue, attributing this 
shaping to the physical qualities alone, therefore seem to me to be wrong. For it is logical that 
these latter are only the instruments by which it takes place, while that which actually does the 
shaping is something different (εὔλογον γὰρ ὄργανα μὲν εἶναι ταύτας, τὸ διαπλάττον δ' ἕτερον). 
Cf. the comments on these passages made by Van der Eijk (2014a pp. 118 ff). However, I do not 
agree with Van der Eijk when he affirms that the shaping capacity is completely distinct from 
mixtures (Van der Eijk 2014a p. 119 and later p. 120), as one in fact has to distinguish i) the first 
shaping of an organism by nature and/or God, which make use of a total mixture of hot, cold, 
dry, and wet, so as to mould the parts of an individual in accordance with its soul-traits (together 
with all the features that are solely due to the shaping principle, such as eyelashes, eyebrows, 
etc.) and ii) the further physical and psychological consequences that afterwards necessarily 
follow from the mixtures themselves. In fact, only once a complete organism specifically 
different is entirely shaped (by the means of hot/cold and dry/wet), do other physical and 
psychological characteristics necessarily follow from the bodily mixtures of the whole organism 
or of its constitutive parts (i.e. the lower-level material explanation), which preserve a certain 
degree of autonomyworking in the manner of the grass, to use the Galenic metaphor (and in 
this sense I agree with Van der Eijk’s words: “an autonomy that becomes manifest in the extent 
to which states of the body can depart from this standard [the excellent shaping] and in the 
variations to this extentvariations that are the product of life-style, environmental and habitat, 
that are due to the peculiar history of the individual […] and can be influenced by food, drinks 
and drugs operating in virtue of the same elementary qualities hot, cold, dry and wet”, Van der 
Eijk 2014a p. 122). In order to back up his argument, Van der Eijk quotes a passage from De 
temperamentis (p. 80.9–11 H.; cf. van der Eijk 2014a p. 120 n. 78), where Galen says: “It is also 
possible that this kind of feature [i.e. having a snub or a hook nose] is work/product [this is the 
same term Galen used before, when he spoke of total mixture, i.e. ergon; here I disagree with 
Singer’s translation, preferring function] of the shaping capacity, rather than of mixture. If, 
however, it were in fact a distinctive sign (gnôrisma) of mixture, it would only be an indicator 
of that [mixture] in the nose, not of that in the body as a whole”. The passage in question is 
difficult, but if we read carefully we understand that Galen wants to speak against those people 
who want to infer things about the mixture of the whole body from just a part of it (De temp. 
79.19–20 H.). As Galen notes, his adversaries do not consider the role of the shaping capacity, 
which makes use of hot/cold and dry/wet as its instruments (organa) in order to shape the parts 
of the animal in conformity with the soul-traits (De temp. 79.20–28 H.). A certain characteristic 
(in this case the snubness or aduncity of the nose) can in fact be a product (ergon) of this shaping 
capacity (obtained through a total mixture of hot/cold and dry/wet), but can also follow 
necessarily from (in the abovementioned sense of hepesthai, cf. for example De temp. p. 60.6–
12 H.) that particular mixture of that particular bodily part (and I have the impression that it is 
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probably for this reason that Galen uses the coordinating conjuction καὶ/and and 
then also the disjunctive particle ἢ/or, because in this treatise he is plausibly 
concerned with the origin (divine or natural, i.e. external and from above or 
immanent and present in nature) of this shaping capacity which makes use of 
hot/cold and dry/wet as its organa. In his De usu partium, he clearly attributes 
this shaping activity to a good and sapient divine Demiurge, which is described 
by Galen as acting as efficient cause on the dry and wet (the material cause) by 
means of the active qualities, hot and cold (the instrumental cause).378 It is 
                                                          
in this last sense that, in the passage quoted by Van der Eijk, Galen speaks of krasis). But since 
it is very difficult to judge whether the former or the latter case is correct, the physician has to 
be adhering to the evaluation of the particular qualitative composition of that part independently 
from its innermost origin (De temp. p. 80, 22–24 H.). Therefore, when we talk about mixture in 
Galen we should draw a distinction between i) total mixtures brought about by nature and/or 
God so as to shape an individual being belonging to a certain species according to a teleological 
plan (higher-level of explanation); ii) a mixture of the body or mixtures of its constitutive parts 
which, after the complete formation of the organism, work independently within the organism 
and produce effects on the organism’s psycho-physiological working (lower-level of 
explanation), which is the specific field of enquiry of Galen’s physio-psychology; and iii) 
mixtures brought about by humans in order to prepare everything the human being needs to 
conduct her life (food, drinks, drugs, etc.).  
378 As Donini has shown, Galen adopts the Aristotelizing Platonist scheme of five causes (final, 
efficient, material, instrumental, formal); cf. Donini 1980 pp. 358 ff. Cf. De usu part. pp. I.343.1–
344.3 H.: “ἡμεῖς μὲν γὰρ ἁπάντων οὐχ ἓν αἰτίας γένος, ἀλλὰ σύμπαντα λέγομεν, ἓν μὲν τὸ 
πρῶτόν τε καὶ κυριώτατον, ὅτι βέλτιον οὕτως, ἐφεξῆς δ' αὐτῷ τὰ ἀπὸ τῶν ὀργάνων καὶ τῆς ὕλης, 
οἷς χρώμενος ὁ δημιουργὸς εἰς τὸ βέλτιον εἶδος ἕκαστον τῶν γιγνομένων ἄγει [I follow Donini’s 
understanding of the passage “used by the creator to lead to the better each form of everything 
he brings into being”, which is different from May, who construes εἶδος as βέλτιον and translates 
the passage as “used by the creator to confer the better form on everything he brings into being”] 
τὰς μὲν ἀρτηρίας τοῦ πνεύμονος μανάς, τὰς δὲ φλέβας ἐργασάμενος στεγανὰς δι' ἣν εἴπαμεν 
αἰτίαν· ἐπεὶ δ' οὕτως ἦν ἐργάσασθαι βέλτιον, ἐκ μὲν τῶν ἀρτηριωδῶν μορίων τῆς καρδίας 
ἐκφύσας τὰς φλέβας, ἐκ δὲ τῶν φλεβωδῶν τὰς ἀρτηρίας· ἐπεὶ δ' ὕλην ἑκατέραις χορηγεῖν ἔδει 
τὴν πρέπουσαν, εἰς μὲν τὴν τοῦ πνεύματος κοιλίαν τὰς ἀρτηρίας, εἰς δὲ τὴν ἑτέραν τὰς φλέβας 
ἀναστομώσας· ἐπεὶ δ' ἦν ἄμεινον τὸ δυσπαθέστερον αὐταῖς σχῆμα [i.e. the structure] περιθεῖναι, 
στρογγύλας ἐργασάμενος· ἐπεὶ δ' ἐξ ὕλης τε καὶ δι' ὀργάνων ἐχρῆν αὐτὰς δημιουργῆσαι, τὸ μὲν 
ὑγρὸν ἀναμίξας τῷ ξηρῷ καί τινα χυμὸν ἐξ ἀμφοῖν οἷον κηρὸν εὐτύπωτον ἐργασάμενος ὕλην 
ταύτην τοῖς ἐσομένοις ὑπεβάλετο· τὸ δὲ θερμὸν τῷ ψυχρῷ κεράσας, ὄργανα ταῦτα δραστικὰ 
περὶ τὴν ὕλην παρεσκευάσατο, κἀκ τούτων ἤδη, τὸ μέν τι ξηραίνων τῆς ὕλης τῷ θερμῷ, τὸ δέ τι 
πηγνὺς τῷ ψυχρῷ, τὸ δέ τι γεννήσας εὔκρατον πνεῦμα τῇ τούτων μίξει κἄπειθ' οὕτω διαφυσήσας 
τε καὶ διαστήσας τὴν ὕλην, ἀγγεῖον κοῖλον πρόμηκες ἐδημιουργήσατο, πλέον μὲν τῆς ὕλης 
ἐπάρδων, ᾧ βέλτιον ἦν γενέσθαι παχυτέρῳ, μεῖον δ', ᾧ λεπτοτέρῳ. ἔχεις ἁπάσας ἤδη τῷ λόγῳ 
τὰς αἰτίας, τὴν ἐκ τοῦ τέλους, τὴν ἐκ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ, τὴν ἐκ τῶν ὀργάνων, τὴν ἐκ τῆς ὕλης, 
τὴν κατὰ τὸ εἶδος. Donini closely analyses this textual locus, where Galen explains the 
generation of the homoeomerous parts of the human being through the doctrine of five causes, 
which in this passage he declares to be i) τὴν ἐκ τοῦ τέλους, ii) τὴν ἐκ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ, iii) τὴν 
ἐκ τῶν ὀργάνων, iv) τὴν ἐκ τῆς ὕλης, and v) τὴν κατὰ τὸ εἶδος. The final cause is seen as “the 
better” in view of which the Demiurge operates, the efficient cause is the Demiurge himself, the 
material cause is identified by the dry and the wet, which mixed together by the Demiurge give 
rise to τινα χυμὸν ἐξ ἀμφοῖν οἷον κηρὸν εὐτύπωτον (cf. 343.15–19), while the instrumental cause 
corresponds to the active qualities of hot and cold which act on the matter. As regards the last 
cause, Donini observes that it would make better sense to interpret Galen’s mention of εἶδος 
(343.5: “οἷς χρώμενος ὁ δημιουργὸς εἰς τὸ βέλτιον εἶδος ἕκαστον τῶν γιγνομένων ἄγει”) not as 
referring to a species of things but, ontologically, as referring to form as opposed to matter 
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plausible, therefore, that Galen brought De usu partium to completion after 
writing De temperamentis (as Ilberg also seems to notice). As Moraux has 
underscored, however, Galen himself does not know for sure what this entity is, 
whether it is corporeal or incorporeal or where it is located.379 As Moraux 
remarks, this demiurgic activity is not incompatible with the idea of an immanent 
natural principle which shapes the organism from the very beginning (that is, 
during the phase of embryogenesis) and structures it from within according to a 
teleological “evolutionary programme” of the species (the expression is taken 
from Moraux).380 As we have seen, during this first stage of development, the 
menstrual blood of the mother (containing within it phlegm and black and yellow 
bile, which in turn derive from the assimilation of the primary elements 
contained in food and drink) progressively form all the solid homoeomerous 
parts (as we have seen: through the manifold secondary and derivative dynameis 
depending upon the four basic ones, such as bone-producing, nerve-producing, 
flesh-producing, and so on). This shaping takes place through a progressive 
chain of mixtures and leads to the formation of all the parts of a completely new 
organism, which is then altogether made up of a mixture of hot/cold and dry/wet.  
 On the other hand, Nature and/or God are also responsible for the 
generation of all the other products generated when the basic homoeomerous 
parts mix in turn (such as in the case of drinks, food, and drugs): the difference 
is that the second type of mixture is achievable by means of humans acting as a 
part of the wider natural realm: for this reason, Galen says that these kinds of 
mixtures are achievable by humans too (in order to distinguish them from natural 
mixtures, we can call them artificial mixtures). As we see from the text, human 
beings are not able to use hot/cold and dry/wet to give rise to natural 
homoeomerous parts (such as stones, metals, or the biological constitutive parts 
of living beings: this is impossible for human beings. They cannot “create” from 
the primary elements and substitute themselves for Nature or God, but they can 
bring about mixtures that can only be defined as paratheseis, i.e. juxtapositions. 
                                                          
(contra, Garofalo, who translates this as “realizza il meglio di tutte le specie di cose che vengono 
fatte”): if so, it would correspond to the fifth of the causes that Galen lists at the end of the 
passage (otherwise Galen’s allusion to a cause κατὰ τὸ εἶδος would be less intelligible).  
379 Moraux 1984 pp. 326–327 with references.  
380 For the compatibility between an external demiurgical entity and the immanent natural 
principle of development, see Moraux 1984 pp. 332–333. 
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For they will never give rise to a natural homoeomerous part constituted by 
hot/cold and dry/wet: in natural homoeomerous parts it is not possible to recover 
the pure primary elements either mechanically or chemically insofar as pure 
primary elements do not exist for Galen within the cosmosin fact they can be 
known only through an intellectual act; cf. De elem. I 5).381 However, as in the 
total mixture, the simple bodies cannot be seen distinctly either, such as in the 
abovementioned case of clay or as in the case of the preparation of food, drinks, 
or pharmaceuticals.382  
Now, after having made clear the main differences between these two 
types of mixtures, let us take a closer look at the conclusion of a passage whose 
preceding section we analysed above (cf. T8), where the moment of the recovery 
of the constituents from the mixture is described in detail. 
 
T28 Galen De elem. sec. Hipp. K. I p. 490.13-491.4 De Lacy p. 138.7-14: 
 
χρόνου γὰρ δεῖται τὰ σμικρὰ μόρια τῶν κεραννυμένων, ἵν' εἰς ἄλληλα 
δράσῃ καὶ πάθῃ τελέως καὶ οὕτως ἓν ἀπεργάσηται τὸ ὅλον καὶ ὅμοιον ἑαυτῷ 
πάντη. διὰ ταῦτά τοι κἀν τῷ παραχρῆμα μὲν οἷόν τε διαχωρίσαι πάλιν ἀπ' 
ἀλλήλων ἔνια τῶν ἀναμιχθέντων· εἰ δ' ἐπὶ πλέον χρονίσειεν | ὡς ἑνωθῆναι τὸ 
πᾶν, ἀμήχανον ἔτι διακρῖναί τε καὶ διελεῖν ἀπὸ θατέρου θάτερον· ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν 
τοῦ τρόπου τῆς δι' ὅλων κράσεως εἰρήσεται κἀν τοῖς Περὶ φαρμάκων. 
 
The small parts of the things being mixed need time to complete their 
interaction and thus make the whole one and the same throughout. That is why 
it is possible immediately [after mixing] to separate again some of the 
ingredients from each other; but if a longer time has passed so that the whole has 
become one, there is no longer any way to divide and separate the one from the 
other. But we shall speak also in our work On drugs about the method of mixing 
through and through. (Trans. De Lacy)  
                                                          
381 As we have already seen, see footnote 232, Kupreeva (2014 pp. 195 ff.), who connects 
Galen’s view and a fragment by Numenius; cf. also Moraux 1984 pp. 302–303. The idea can be 
already found in Aristotle De gen. et corr. 330b21ff., which Galen knew very well.  
382 Boudon-Millot (2011 pp. 269 ff.) explains the connection between the parathesis mentioned 





In this important passage, Galen explains the phase of recovery of the 
ingredients. As we see, on the one hand, Galen describes this account (whereas 
we noted abovehe describes the mixture of water and wine) as analogous to 
the preparation of pharmaceuticals, as we understand from the mention of the 
work On drugs which, as we pointed out, has to be identified with the work On 
simple drugs. On the other hand, we should not underestimate the fact that this 
key passage explaining the concrete process of mixture of the primary elements 
is strategically placed between the two logoi,383 the first centred on the 
exposition of the doctrine of the primary elements (the first building blocks of 
human nature) and the second focusing on the four humours (the secondary 
building blocks of human nature)as we have seen, the mixture of the former 
give rise to the latter.384 Therefore, it also represents his general model of 
mixture. 
In the passage in question there are some noteworthy elements: i) the 
reversibility of the process of mixture takes place through a process of re-
division and re-separation of the constituents occurring after the unification (cf. 
the verbs used: διαχωρίσαι πάλιν, διακρῖναι, διελεῖν); ii) the relevance of the 
time-variable: right after mixing it is possible to separate the ingredients from 
one another (although here Galen does not say how, chemically or mechanically, 
this re-separation process could be possible to put into practise385); in this sense 
human beings’ mixtures are paratheseis, becausealthough a unification takes 
place at the end of the process of mixtureit is possible to recover the previous 
ingredients. If instead a longer time has passed it is not possible to re-gain the 
                                                          
383 As De Lacy points out, although Galen refers to his De elementis as a unique book, he divides 
it into two logoi; cf. De Lacy 1996 pp. 43–45.  
384 As we see, this model of mixture is valid both for so-called “basic” homoeomerous parts 
(those deriving from the mixtures of the primary elements) and “complex” homoeomerous parts 
(those deriving from a mixture ofpreviousmixtures). According to Fine (1995 pp. 301–302), 
Aristotle did not draw a distinction between the two. But if we inspect his account of mixture in 
De gen. et corr. (I 10, II 7–8), we see that Aristotle puts both kinds on an equal footing: bones, 
flesh (De gen. et corr. 334b30), the mixture of wine and water (De gen. et corr. I 10 328a27), or 
the alloy of tin and copper (De gen. et corr. 328b8). In his De mixtione Alexander follows the 
same path.  
385 In his De mixtione, as we saw in footnote n. 170, Alexander is much more precise and gives 
us some examples of (chemical and mechanical) separation of the mixture.  
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ingredients and the mixture will be indissoluble: this kind of mixture (like that 
one that only Nature and/or God can perform) is called total mixture (δι' ὅλων 
κράσεως), a definition that is clearly applied to the preparation of drugs (as if the 
physician’s work could be assimilated to that of Nature or of God, creating new 
beings out of the primary elements). In this mixture the constituents have been 
welded together over time such that it is not possible to go back. 
At any rate, one question remains: in the case of reversible mixtures, once 
recovered, will the constituents be the very same as those which gave rise to the 
mixtures? As we have learned, the difference between the Stoic and the 
Peripatetic accounts is that the Stoics claim to recover the very same ingredients 
of the mixture, whereas Alexander stated that the recovered constituents can only 
be specifically identical. What is then Galen’s position in this regard? 
 
T29 Galen De elementis sec. Hipp. K. I pp. 495.16-497.3 De Lacy 142.17-144.7:   
 
(1)ἓν μὲν γάρ τι φαίνεται τὸ αἷμα καθάπερ καὶ τὸ γάλα. διδάσκει δ' ὁ λόγος οὐχ 
ἓν ὑπάρχειν αὐτὸ καθότι μηδὲ τὸ γάλα. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἄκρως ἐστὶν ὀρρῶδες καὶ 
λεπτὸν ἐν τῷ γάλακτι, τὸ δ' ἄκρως τυρῶδες καὶ παχύ. ταῦτα δ' ἕως μὲν ἐκέκρατο 
πρὸς ἄλληλα, μέσον ἀπειργάζετο τὸ γάλα τυροῦ καὶ ὀρροῦ, διακριθέντα δὲ τήν 
τ' οἰκείαν ἰδέαν ἐνεδείξατο καὶ τὴν τοῦ γάλακτος ἔδειξε φύσιν, ὡς οὐκ ἄρ' ἓν ἦν 
ἀκριβῶς, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἐναντίων τε καὶ διαφερόντων συγκείμενον. (2) ὡς οὖν ἐν τῷ 
γάλακτι τὸ μέν ἐστιν ὀρρός, τὸ δὲ τυρός, οὕτως ἐν αἵματι τὸ μὲν οἷον ἰχὼρ 
αἵματος ἀνάλογον ὀρρῷ γάλακτος, τὸ δ' οἷον ἰλύς τις καὶ τρὺξ ἀνάλογον τῷ 
τυρῷ. […] τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐρυθρὸν ἀκριβῶς φαίνεται, τὸ δὲ ξανθότερον τούτου, τὸ 
δὲ μελάντερον. ἔστιν ὅτε δὲ καὶ σαφῶς ἐπανθεῖ τι λευκὸν αὐτῷ καί ποτε 
πελιδνὸν ἅπαν | ἐφάνη καὶ νὴ Δία γε πολλάκις ἐγγὺς τῷ μέλανι καθάπερ τις 
πορφύρα κατακορής, ὥστ' οὐχ ἓν ἀκριβῶς τὸ αἷμα. 
 
 
(1)For blood, like milk, appears to be some one thing; but reason teaches 
us that it is not one thing, just as milk is not. One part of milk is extremely serous 
and thin, another is extremely cheese-like and thick. As long as they were mixed 
together they produced milk midway between cheese and whey; but when 
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separated they exhibited their own proper form and revealed the nature of milk, 
that it was in fact not just one thing but a composite of opposite and differing 
things. (2) As then in milk there is whey and there is cheese, so in blood there is 
a kind of serum analogous to the whey in milk, and there are dregs, as it were, 
and lees analogous to the cheese. […] one (blood) is pure red in appearance, 
another is yellower than that, another darker. At times there is a clearly white 
efflorence in it, and sometimes the whole of it appears livid, and often, by Jove, 
nearly black, like some deep purple dye; therefore, blood is not just one thing.  
 
As we see from the text, Galen establishes an analogy between blood 
(more precisely, the menstrual blood of the mother, which is a mixture of blood, 
phlegm, and yellow and black bile; cf. T29.2) and milk (which is created when 
cheese and whey meet half-way; cf. T29.1 “μέσον ἀπειργάζετο τὸ γάλα τυροῦ 
καὶ ὀρροῦ”, the same example Alexander gives at De mixtione 231,30, where, in 
addition, he also speaks of a catalyst, a heated stone cast into the milk, forcing 
the separation). Both are in fact regarded as a seemingly homogeneous mixtures 
made up of different constituents; when Galen describes the separation process 
of milk into whey and cheese, he declares that the components “when separated 
they exhibited their own proper form and revealed the nature of milk” (cf. T29.1 
“διακριθέντα δὲ τήν τ' οἰκείαν ἰδέαν ἐνεδείξατο καὶ τὴν τοῦ γάλακτος ἔδειξε 
φύσιν”). As we see, the term ἰδέα (which here does not refer to the Platonic 
meaning, given that it does not refer to eternal and superspatiotemporal 
essences386) probably indicates the external and visible appearance of both the 
constituents, whey and cheese.387  
In this case, we can say that is very hard to pinpoint Galen’s own position 
in this regard, that is, whether by making usage of the example of the separation 
of milk into whey and cheese he means that is possible to recover the very same 
                                                          
386 On the Platonic theory of ideas see Baltes and Lakmann 2005 pp. 1–23. As De Lacy remarks, 
Galen sometimes uses this term with reference to Plato’s conception; cf. De Lacy 1991 p. 294.  
387 A possible objection would be that milk is a natural homoeomerous part (therefore, a product 
of a total mixture) that can instead be separated into cheese and whey. Indeed, in the case of milk 
it is not possible to recover its basic constituents (i.e. fire, air, water, and earth). But we can 
hypothesize that Galen wants to explain the causal mechanism of separation and the generation 
of two resultant components (which we claim would be only similar, and not identical) without 
properly dealing with the recovery of the previous constituents; the same happens in 
Alexandercf. De mixt. 231.30–232.3 Bruns; cf. Kupreeva 2004a pp. 311–312.  
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constituents that gave rise to milk or whether he intends to say that these 
constituents are only specifically the same. We can observe that Galen once more 
takes an anti-dogmatical position against this last critical point concerning the 
reversibility of the constituents: he does not explicitly say that the recovered 
constituents can be specifically identical, but, on the other hand, he says that the 
constituents will have to be the same, at least according to their ἰδέα or external 
form/appearance, a claim whichalthough anti-dogmaticseems again to be in 
line and consistent with the Peripatetic account,  as in Aristotelian thinking the 
external form ἰδέα/μορφή is in any case linked to the internal structure of a 
composite belonging to a certain species.388  
However, we register a development in comparison to the 
Aristotelian/Peripatetic model. If (as we have seen), Aristotle declares that is 
possible to recover the constituents and does not explain how, and if Alexander 
offers some examples of chemical and mechanical separation in order to show 
that in contrast to the Stoic account, the recovered constituents can be only 
specifically different (although Alexander does not discuss the case of the 
reversibility of a natural homoeomerous part), Galen also contemplates the 
possibility of non-reversible mixtures: so-called total mixtures.  
On the one hand, Galen singles out a total mixture performed by Nature 
and/or God whose products are the homoeomerous parts of compound natural 
bodies (inanimate and animate). Ultimately, in living beings this gives rise to a 
chain of mixtures bringing about the complete formation (diaplasis) from within 
of a new organism belonging to a certain species. We underlined that Galen 
assigns to Nature and/or God (as we saw, at the time of De temperamentis he is 
still in an enquiring phase) the power of making use of hot/cold and dry/wet, 
totally mix them and giving rise to every existent being from within through a 
series of progressive mixtures whose particular combinations/proportions 
always bring about increasingly new supervening higher-level qualitative 
determinations (as we have seen: from food and drink to the four humours 
present in the menstrual blood, from these to homoeomerous parts, up to the 
formation of the entire living being belonging to a certain species according 
                                                          
388 Cf. Metaph. 1029a3f.  
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to an overall teleological plan). And in this sense his speculation is perfectly in 
line with the Peripatetic thought of his time. These mixtures are irreversible 
simply because one cannot recover the primary elements they are made up of: as 
we have shown, primary elements cannot even exist in their pure state within 
Galen’s cosmos.  
On the other hand, he also assigns a prominent role to the mixtures that 
human beings can produce, yielding the generation of food, drinks, drugs, and 
every other product obtained by means of human action. In contrast to the 
philosophical tradition he patently draws on (which does not stress this point), 
he establishes a neat separation between these two kinds of mixtures, as he wants 
to call attention to the fact that human beings too can bring about mixtures. In 
fact, Galen was a physician, and for a physician, who needs to deal with the 
preparation of drugs or with dietary prescriptions, it was crucial and all-
important to mix the ingredients well in order to produce drugs, foods, and drinks 
and to know their nutritive and curative properties. Among all the possible 
mixtures that human beings can produce, a special status is held by medicaments. 
Like the total mixtures performed by Nature and/or God, they are not reversible 
into their initial constituents, as if they were also a “creative” act comparable to 
those of a demiurgic entity; but this is not strange at all in Galen’s world-view 
which as we will see in the next chapter it is not only anthropocentric but even 
“doctor-centric”its centre and perfect midpoint between hot/cold and dry/wet 
and in comparison with all the bodies subject to generation and corruption is the 





































2.1 Galen’s De temperamentis Book I and his system of nine mixtures  
 
 
Galen’s De temperamentis Book I provides a smooth transition from his 
elementary Physics and theory of elemental mixture, seen from a physical 
standpoint (which is mainly given throughout his De elementis and his 
Commentary on Hippocrates’ Nature of Man), to his account of mixture as 
applied to physiology (De temperamentis Book II), and to the basis of his 
pharmacological doctrines (Book III). More precisely, in this first book Galen 
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aims to find out “all the distinct types of mixtures: how many there are, and of 
what kind, as one separates them by genus and species”;389 in this case, not the 
mixtures that human beings can bring about but the bodily mixtures of animals 
(ζῷα) understood both as those which generate out a complete new organism 
specifically different (at a higher level of explanation) and as physiological 
structures autonomously working within a specific organism (and whose 
functioning does not affect the very essence of that organism, at a lower level of 
explanation). 
 Although we have demonstrated the strict dependence of Galen’s own 
account of mixture on the Peripatetic model of mixture of his times (which was 
harmonically integrated with a revised theory of the four humours of Hippocratic 
origin), in their accounts of mixture, neither Aristotle nor Alexander (or any 
other preceding Peripatetic) develop a precise classification of the typologies of 
mixtures. That is probably due to the fact that a classification of mixtures is 
needed above all for medical purposes (recognizing the type of imbalance within 
a certain mixture meant finding an adequate therapeutic treatment), whereas the 
theoretical rationale of Aristotle’s account of mixture was that of explaining the 
extreme variety of chemical combinations and of biological tissues, while 
Alexander’s main justification in his De mixtione was instead that of developing 
a systematic critique against the oncoming Stoic alternative. Hence, Galen had 
to look elsewhere to work out a proper and original classification that could be 
adjusted to his own medical and philosophical theories.  
In fact, as we will see in this chapter, on the one hand Galen deals with the 
earlier medical and philosophical traditions and recaps the opinions of his 
predecessors and, on the other, he engages in a fervent polemic against the 
Pneumatists and the founder of the school, Athenaeus of Attalia, on the most 
well-mixed mixture. In this second chapter, we will bring to the foreground 
Galen’s earlier and later medical and philosophical milieus in order to 
reconstruct the historical and theoretical sources of his scheme of nine mixtures 
(eight bad mixtures and one good mixture) and weigh up his original 
contributions to the earlier philosophical and medical tradition. Moreover, we 
will show that the scheme of mixtures is not fixed but, on the contrary, can 
                                                          
389 De temp. p. 1.7–8 H.  
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change from species to species and from genus to genus and that this has direct 
implications on Galen’s teleological outlook concerning not only the generation 
and development of a single living organism as specifically different (as we have 
seen) but, more broadly, his entire world-view.  
 
 
2.2 Galen against his predecessors and contemporaries and his criticism of 
Athenaeus of Attalia and his followers in De temperamentis Book I  
 
 
Galen begins the exposition of Book I of De temperamentis by pointing 
out that the best among the ancient physicians and philosophers had already 
demonstrated that the bodies of living beings are made up of a mixture of hot, 
cold, dry, and wet, in unequal parts.390 Although Galen does not give the names 
of the authorities to which he is referring, he seems to be referring to past 
authorities, as he calls them “παλαιοὶ”.391 More precisely, in De temperamentis 
I 1 Galen identifies two groups of thinkers: i) a first group according to which 
there are four mixtures: a wet and hot one as opposed to a wet and cold one, 
and a dry and cold one as opposed to a dry and hot one, and ii) a second group 
according to which it is impossible to have a hot and wet and a cold and dry 
mixture, whereas there are instead only two types of mixtures: a hot and dry 
mixture and a cold and wet mixture.392  
 On the one hand Galen dedicates two of incisive lines to a description of 
the second system, made up of two types of mixtures: as he maintains, these 
thinkers would have said that “when the hot is dominant the wetness will be 
consumed by it and thus the body will become hot and dry (δαπανᾶσθαι μὲν γὰρ 
ὑπὸ τοῦ θερμοῦ κρατοῦντος τὴν ὑγρότητα καὶ οὕτω θερμὸν ἅμα καὶ ξηρὸν 
γίγνεσθαι τὸ σῶμα); but in bodies where the hot is weak, the wetness remains 
undigested and unable to be processed (μένειν δ' ἄπεπτόν τε καὶ ἀκατέργαστον); 
so that it is necessary that dryness will follow in cases of dominant hotness, and 
                                                          
390 De temp. p. 1.1–4 H..  
391 De temp. p. 1.3–4 H.“παλαιοῖς ἀνδράσιν ἱκανῶς ἀποδέδεικται φιλοσόφων τε καὶ ἰατρῶν τοῖς 
ἀρίστοις”; cf. also De temp. 7.3–4 H. 
392 De temp. p. 2.4–12 H. 
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wetness will be the consequence in cases of predominant coldness (ὥστ' 
ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι θερμότητος μὲν ἐπικρατούσης ἕπεσθαι ξηρότητα, ψυχρότητος 
δὲ πλεονεκτούσης ἀκολουθεῖν ὑγρότητα). In this way, then, these people have 
persuaded themselves that there are in total two distinct types of mixture”:393 a 
hot/dry one and a cold/wet one.394  
                                                          
393 De temp. p. 2.14–21 H. 
394 Although, as I have hinted, Galen does not name these ancient authorities who theorized this 
bipartite scheme of mixtures, this description echoes some passages of De Victu, a treatise which 
Galen knew (although he rejects it as not genuinely Hippocratic, probably because of a binary 
elemental systemcf. Smith 1992 p. 263 ff.). As is well known, in De victu, a well-balanced 
mixture of fire and water makes up the physical constitution of the healthiest man (Vict. I CMG 
I 2.4 Joly I 32 p. 148, 3–4) as well as his soul (CMG I 2.4 p. 142, 6–8 Joly). Each of these two 
elements, fire and water, is associated with two primary qualities: fire is hot/dry and water is 
cold/wet: neither fire and water exist in separation but are always mixed with each other since 
they preserve something of the other element; water has the dry from fire and fire has the wet 
from water (CMG I 2.4 p. 128.20–22 Joly “τούτων δὲ προσκείται ἑκατέρῳ τάδε· τῷ μὲν πυρὶ τὸ 
θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ξηρὸν, τῷ δὲ ὕδατι τὸ ψυχρὸν καὶ τὸ ὑγρόν· ἔχει δὲ ἀπ' ἀλλήλων τὸ μὲν πῦρ ἀπὸ 
τοῦ ὕδατος τὸ ὑγρόν· ἔνι γὰρ ἐν πυρὶ ὑγρότης· τὸ δὲ ὕδωρ ἀπὸ τοῦ πυρὸς τὸ ξηρόν”). For these 
two elements, fire (which is said to move everything) and water (which is said to nourish 
everything), seem to be compresent within the same mixture and show a dynamic relation so that 
each dominates and is dominated in turn, by alternately reaching the greatest minimum and the 
greatest maximum (CMG I 2.4 126.10–11 Joly “ἐν μέρει δὲ ἑκάτερον κρατεῖ καὶ κρατεῖται ἐς τὸ 
μήκιστον καὶ τὸ ἐλάχιστον ὡς ἀνυστόν”). The fire reaches its maximum by going over the last 
part of water, but it lacks of nourishment (which it has as it consumes the water) and turns back 
to where it will again find nourishment; the water reaches its maximum by going over the last 
part of fire, and when this happens, the water stays still. But when it stays still, it is no longer 
dominant, but is consumed and becomes nourishment for fire, which assails it (CMG I 2.4 
126.11–15 Joly “τὸ μὲν πῦρ ἐπεξιὸν ἐπὶ τὸ ἔσχατον τοῦ ὕδατος, ἐπιλείπει ἡ τροφὴ, ἀποτρέπεται 
οὖν ὅθεν μέλλει τρέφεσθαι· τὸ δὲ ὕδωρ ἐπεξιὸν ἐπὶ τὸ ἔσχατον τοῦ πυρὸς, ἐπιλείπει ἡ κίνησις, 
ἵσταται οὖν ἐν τούτῳ, ὅταν δὲ στῇ, οὐκέτι | ἐγκρατές ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ἤδη τῷ ἐμπίπτοντι πυρὶ ἐς τὴν 
τροφὴν καταναλίσκεται”). On the fire/water relation in De victu cf. Bartoš 2014 pp. 293–295. 
So even if these two elements can assume various forms (CMG I 2.4 p. 126.23 Joly “πολλὰς καὶ 
παντοδαπὰς ἰδέας”), and they are different to one another in respect to appearance and power 
(CMG I 2.4 p. 126, 24–25 Joly “οὐδὲν ὁμοίων ἀλλήλοισιν οὔτε τὴν ὄψιν οὔτε τὴν δύναμιν”), 
they can in turn reach a maximum and a minimum and give rise to two distinct elements:  fire 
(hot/dry) when fire is at its maximum and water (cold/wet) at its minimum, and when the 
opposite takes place, water. Their relation is comparable to Aristotle’s potentiality/actuality 
relation between contrarieties, only here we have an elemental binary system where the hot/dry 
element preserves a wet component and the cold/wet element preserves a dry component. And 
it is thanks to this dry/wet contrariety that both the elements prevail in turn over one another. It 
is important to point out that we will never have two pure primary elements; they will be always 
mixed with each other: we can see that the boundaries between elements and elemental mixture 
are extremely blurry. As we have seen, the very same relation is assumed in the case of 
Aristotle’s simple bodies, which are always thought of as miktá (with the others); cf. De gen. et 
corr. 330b22 ff. And whereas fire and earth are conceived as extremes, air and water are thought 
of as “intermediate and more mixed (μέσα δὲ καὶ μεμιγμένα μᾶλλον 330b24). It seems to me 
that there are elements of similarity between De victu's theory of mixture and Galen's account of 
the predecessor(s) who theorized two types of mixture: a) there are two couples of qualities 
(hot/dry and cold/wet), which are indissolubly linked with one another: the hot co-exists only 
with the dry and the cold only with the wet; b) the two couples of qualities are both present in 
the mixture but only one is dominant, while the other one is dominated (cf. the use in De victu 
of the verb κρατέω in reference to hot dry fire and wet cold water and in De temperamentis of 
ἐπικρατέω and πλεονεκτέω in reference to heat, which also has the power of drying moisture, 
and to coldness, which has also the power of moistening dryness); c) the cold/wet is consumed 
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On the other hand, Galen describes the arguments of those who do not 
accept what he calls the πρῶτον ἀξίωμα, i.e. that moisture would be dried out by 
the prevailing heat.395 For they think that “the function of the hot is to heat, as 
that of the cold is to cool, of the dry to dry, and of the wet to moisten (πρῶτοι 
τοῦ θερμοῦ μὲν ἔργον εἶναί φασι τὸ θερμαίνειν ὥσπερ τοῦ ψυχροῦ τὸ ψύχειν, 
τοῦ ξηροῦ δ' αὖ τὸ ξηραίνειν ὥσπερ τοῦ ὑγροῦ τὸ ὑγραίνειν)”. According to 
Galen, these thinkers would affirm that each quality has its own inalienable 
function (ἓν ἑκατέρας κἀνταῦθα ποιότητος ἔργον ἐχούσης ἀχώριστον), and it 
does not necessarily follow that that which is hot also dries at the same time. 
Galen marshals several examples to back up this line of reasoning aimed at 
separating the power of heat from a drying action and the power of cold from a 
moistening action: a) he lists various examples taken from common sense-
perception, e.g. bodies which are naturally dry and hot, which heat in virtue of 
their hotness and dry in virtue of their dryness (“καὶ διὰ τοῦθ' ὅσα μὲν σώματα 
θερμὰ τὴν φύσιν ἐστὶν ἅμα καὶ ξηρὰ […] ᾗ μὲν θερμά, θερμαίνειν, ᾗ δὲ ξηρά, 
ξηραίνειν”), like a fire, or the double power of the summer sun as it not only 
                                                          
by the hot/drywhen the hot/dry is weak, the cold/wet remains stagnant (De victu: fire consumes 
water; De temperamentis: the dominant heat consumes the moisture by a drying action; De victu: 
when water is predominant, reducing the power of fire, the water keeps stillἵσταται/στῇ; De 
temperamentis: when the heat is weak, the moisture remains uncooked and undigestedμένειν 
δ' ἄπεπτόν τε καὶ ἀκατέργαστον); d) further, in De victu LXXIX CMG I 2.4 p. 210, 24–27 Joly, 
right at the beginning of the chapter it is said: “διαχωρέει τὸ σιτίον αὐτέοισιν ὑγρὸν ἄπεπτον […] 
πάσχουσι δὲ τοῦτο μάλιστα αἱ κοιλίαι ὅσαι ὑγραὶ  καὶ ψυχραί εἰσιν· διὰ μὲν τὴν ψυχρότητα οὐ 
ξυνεψεῖ, διὰ δὲ τὴν ὑγρότητα διαχωρέει· (their food passes watery and undigested; […] It is 
especially bowels that are cold and moist that show these symptoms. The coldness prevents 
digestion, and the moistness makes the bowels loose [therefore, the lack of hotness produces 
humidity and reduces the capacity of digestion])”; e) the fact that in De Victu the author is 
speaking of mixture seems to be clear from the fact that when he accounts for the relationship 
between fire and water, he also claims that these two elements are always changing into this or 
to that (De victu CMG I 2.4 p. 126.25–26 Joly “ἀλλ' αἰεὶ ἀλλοιούμενα ἐπὶ τὰ καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ”) and 
that they change by mixing or being separated (CMG I 2.4 p. 126, 27–28 “συμμισγόμενα δὲ καὶ 
διακρινόμενα ἀλλοιοῦται”), in addition saying later on that in his opinion these two terms are 
really what he means (CMG I 2.4 p. 128.6–11 Joly “Ὅ τι δ' ἂν διαλέγωμαι γενέσθαι ἢ ἀπολέσθαι, 
τῶν πολλῶν εἵνεκεν ἑρμηνεύω· ταῦτα δὲ ξυμμίσγεσθαι καὶ διακρίνεσθαι δηλῶ· ἔχει δὲ ὧδε· 
γενέσθαι καὶ ἀπολέσθαι τωὐτὸ, ξυμμιγῆναι καὶ διακριθῆναι τωὐτὸ, αὐξηθῆναι καὶ μειωθῆναι 
τωὐτὸ, γενέσθαι, ξυμμιγῆναι τωὐτὸ, ἀπολέσθαι, μειωθῆναι, διακριθῆναι τωὐτὸ, ἕκαστον πρὸς 
πάντα καὶ πάντα πρὸς ἕκαστον τωὐτὸ, καὶ οὐδὲν πάντων τωὐτό· ὁ νόμος γὰρ τῇ φύσει περὶ 
τούτων ἐναντίος”). I am grateful to Hynek Bartoš for drawing my attention to the fact that, in 
the abovementioned passage from De temperamentis, Galen speaks of hot and dry and a cold 
and moist mixtures, while in De victu fire and water are elements; but, as we have seen, fire and 
water do not seem to be conceived as separatedthey are always together as indissoluble parts 
of a whole, the mixture, which reaches the greatest maximum (extreme hotness and dryness or 
extreme coldness and moisture) and a greatest minimum.   
395The section I am referring to is De temp. p. 2.22–5.20 H.  
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heats but also dries out the body of people who spend too much time outside 
during the summer; moreover, he quotes the case of hot and wet bodies that at 
the same time heat and moisten, such as hot water, which Galen calls “sweet” 
waters (ὥσπερ τὰ λουτρὰ τῶν γλυκέων ὑδάτων); b) examples from the literature: 
for Galen in fact makes recourse to a Homeric quotation (Il. XXI 346-7) that 
testifies the presence of a wind that is cold and dry at the same time, Borea; c) a 
pharmacological example: the power of cooling and drying at the same time in 
poppy juice; d) an argument taken from Aristotle’s account of change, according 
to which “what is changing must, in the respect in which it is changing, be 
moving towards the opposite (τὸ γὰρ μεταβάλλον, ᾗ μεταβάλλει, ταύτῃ 
μεταχωρεῖν δεῖ πρὸς τοὐναντίον)”.396 According to these thinkers, as Galen 
declares at the conclusion of this section, reasoning and examples demonstrate 
that there could be a mixture of hot and wet and cold and dry (ἅμα δ' ὑγρόν τι 
καὶ θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρὸν ἅμα καὶ ξηρὸν εἶναι δυνατόν, ὡς ὅ τε λόγος ἀπέδειξε καὶ 
τὰ μικρῷ πρόσθεν εἰρημένα παραδείγματα), in contrast to those who held this to 
be impossible.397  
                                                          
396 Cf. the following footnote. 
397 It is very difficult to point to a precise reference but this group of ancient physicians and 
philosophers to which Galen refers seems to place itself within what Galen regarded as a 
genuinely Hippocratic theoretical framework which, according to Galen, matches Aristotle’s 
physical doctrines. In fact, the separation of the four actions of cooling, heating, drying, and 
moistening seems to be attested to in Chapter 2 of De natura hominis, where the author raises a 
criticism not only towards those who think that there is only one element from which everything 
comes to be, but also against those who think that there is a unique substance modified by the 
contrariety of hot and cold from which all the other couples of opposites are generated: 
sweet/bitter, black/white, and so on. The Hippocratic author assimilates this theoretical position 
to that of the monists, as it is declared that these thinkers believe in the existence of a unique 
substance that is progressively modified by a first couple of contrariety (hot/cold), although it 
does not seem to be possible to recognize with certitude the polemical target of the Hippocratic 
author (CMG I 1.3 p. 166.15–168.2 Jouanna: “Τῶν δὲ ἰητρῶν οἱ μέν τινες λέγουσιν, ὡς 
ὥνθρωπος αἷμα μοῦνόν ἐστιν, οἱ δ' αὐτέων χολήν φασιν εἶναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἔνιοι δέ τινες 
φλέγμα· ἐπίλογον δὲ ποιεῦνται καὶ οὗτοι πάντες τὸν αὐτόν· ἓν γάρ τι εἶναί φασιν, ὅ τι ἕκαστος 
αὐτέων βούλεται ὀνομάσας, καὶ τοῦτο ἓν ἐὸν μεταλλάσσειν τὴν ἰδέην καὶ τὴν δύναμιν, 
ἀναγκαζόμενον ὑπό τε τοῦ θερμοῦ καὶ τοῦ ψυχροῦ, καὶ γίνεσθαι καὶ γλυκὺ καὶ πικρὸν καὶ 
λευκὸν καὶ μέλαν καὶ παντοῖον”; cf. also Jouanna comm. ad loc.). By contrast, the author says 
that there are four main powers (heating, cooling, drying, and moistening), reciprocally 
interacting, because of which the body gets sick (CMG I 1.3 p. 168.2–8 Jouanna: “Ἐμοὶ δὲ οὐδὲ 
ταῦτα δοκέει ὧδε ἔχειν· οἱ μὲν οὖν πλεῖστοι τοιαῦτά τινα καὶ ἔτι ἐγγύτατα τουτέων 
ἀποφαίνονται. Ἐγὼ δέ φημι, εἰ ἓν ἦν ὁ ἄνθρωπος, οὐδέποτ' ἂν ἤλγεεν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν ἦν ὑφ' ὅτου 
ἀλγήσειεν ἓν ἐών· εἰ δ' οὖν καὶ   ἀλγήσειεν, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ ἰώμενον ἓν εἶναι· νυνὶ δὲ πολλά· 
πολλὰ γάρ ἐστιν ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐνεόντα, ἃ, ὁκόταν ὑπ' ἀλλήλων παρὰ φύσιν θερμαίνηταί τε 
καὶ ψύχηται, καὶ ξηραίνηταί τε καὶ ὑγραίνηται, νούσους τίκτει· ὥστε πολλαὶ μὲν ἰδέαι τῶν 
νουσημάτων, πολλὴ δὲ καὶ ἡ ἴησις αὐτέων ἐστίν”). In order to support the previous statement 
that each of the qualities has its own inseparable action and, therefore, the hot cannot also have 
a drying function, as the cold cannot also have a moistening function, Galen gives the example, 
194 
 
Galen mentions a third group of thinkers according to which there are four 
mixtures, but accounted for in a different manner. In their view, heat not only 
                                                          
clearly appealing to Aristotle’s physical doctrines (which in Galen’s views are totally in 
agreement with Hippocrates, cf. the beginning of I 5 in De elem. sec. Hipp.), of a qualitative 
change from the opposite poles of a contrariety so as to show that if something changes, it 
changes into its opposite, i.e. white turns into black in the same way that hot turns into its 
opposite, cold (De temp. p. 4.7–13 H.“we say that a person became, or is becoming, skilled in 
music. Evidently [he does so] from [a state of] not being skilled in music; and similarly, someone 
becomes skilled in reading and writing from [a state of] not being skilled in this way, and 
someone becomes skilled in public speaking from [a state of] not being skilled in this way”; see 
De temp. p. 4.22–26 H. and for a parallel De gen. et corr. 323b19 ff.). This qualitative change or 
alloiôsis is put on equal footing with the half-way qualitative change occurring in the mixture 
when the hot and the cold assimilate to each other and find a midpoint; in fact, as we have already 
noted, in Galen’s oversimplified Aristotelian Physics no distinction is drawn between what, 
according to Aristotle, is alloiôsis and what is mixture (nor, as we have seen, between these 
changes and the substantial generation). Moreover, this group of thinkers Galen speaks of, 
although having recognized that each quality has its own distinctive power, is reported to have 
identified four different mixtures: i) hot/wet, ii) hot/dry, iii) cold/dry, and iv) cold/wet. In this 
case too, we find a correspondence between the Hippocratic and Aristotelian traditions. Indeed, 
in the Nature of Man, the human being is regarded as a mixture of the four humours where each 
of the humours (which alternatively prevails over all the others due to external or internal factors) 
is associed with a couple of primary qualities, so that we altogether have four bodily mixtures: 
i) phlegmatic (cold/wet), ii) sanguineous (hot/wet), iii) bilious (hot/dry), and iv) melancholic 
(cold/dry). On the other hand, in his elemental theory, mainly expressed in his physical writing 
De gen. et corr., although Aristotle does not work out a scheme of mixtures, as we have noted, 
the simple bodies themselves are conceived as “mixed” insofar as they never exist in a pure state. 
Therefore we have a quadripartite system of “mixtures” (if we think of the simple bodies as 
“mixed”): i) a fiery body (where hot and dry prevail over the others), ii) an airy body (where hot 
and wet predominate over the others), iii) a watery body (where cold and wet prevail over the 
others), and iv) an earthy body (where cold and dry prevail over the others). A further point can 
be made in favour of our reading: in Galen’s view there is another treatise of the Hippocratic 
Collection that is regarded as perfectly in agreement with the Nature of Man: On air, waters, 
places. This is because it is based on the theory of mixture of hot/cold and dry/wet as primary 
building blocks of the cosmos (cf. Quod animi mor. K. IV p. 799). This treatise provides us with 
two passages that parallel the section of Galen’s De temperamentis which lists, among other 
examples, that of hot sweet waters (De temp. p. 3.6–9 H.) and that of the wind Boreas (De temp. 
p. 3.20–26 H.). On the one hand, the Hippocratic author of On air, waters, places, when he 
describes the sun’s double power of drying and heating as applied to the process of formation of 
the rain water, analogously to Galen’s passage, compares the process of the formation of rain to 
the evaporation of sweat due to the drying action of the sun (cf. Aer. CMG I 1.2 p. 40.17 ff. 
Diller); moreover, analogously to Galen’s passage, in the same textual locus, the Hippocratic 
author speaks of hot “sweet” waters which are the result of sun’s heating power, as the sun’s 
heat would exert a “sweetening” function on the remaining part of the water which does not 
evaporate (cf. Aer. CMG I 1.2 p. 42.1 ff. Diller). On the other hand, however, in the same text 
the northerly wind, Boreas, is described as having a drying and cooling action (cf. Aer. CMG I 
1.2 p. 50.5 Diller); in Galen’s text too there is a reference to Boreas’ power of cooling and drying 
which is supported by the Homeric quotation, as we have noted. To sum up, although in Galen’s 
section no mention is made of the genuine Hippocratic (in Galen’s view) doctrinal core nor of 
Aristotle’s physical doctrines, the correspondences we have found are striking and noteworthy. 
For if our reading of the text is plausible, then we can infer some important points from it: i) 
Galen does not quote directly his predecessors because he does not want to appear in open 
contrast with them and indeed he is not: as we showed, he inherits both these archaic traditions 
(although updating and aligning them with his own times) and, ii) Galen uses the sources quite 
peculiarly: behind the reference to a group of thinkers there is no a single medical or 
philosophical tradition or authority, but a smooth abridgement of Hippocratic and Aristotelian 
physical doctrines which seems to be consistently re-worked so as to bring out an alleged 
quadripartite system of mixtures (which is indeed absent in the writings Galen would refer to). 
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has the power of warming, but also the power of drying, because it is the most 
active of the four qualities (ὑποκειμένου τοῦ θερμοῦ δραστικωτάτου τῶν 
τεττάρων); but this double power of heat does not prevent a new-born animal 
from having a hot and wet mixture at the moment of its first generation. Over 
time, however, bodily moisture is consumed by heat: consequently, the body 
dries out and gets hot and dry rather than hot and wet (ἀεὶ γὰρ ἐξικμαζόμενον 
ὑπὸ τοῦ θερμοῦ τὸ ὑγρὸν ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ ξηρὸν ἀποδείξει τὸ σῶμα καὶ οὕτως οὐκ 
ἂν ἔτι θερμὸν καὶ ὑγρόν, ἀλλὰ θερμὸν εἴη καὶ ξηρόν). But over a much longer 
period of time, the adult animal’s hot and dry mixture becomes cold and dry 
because, as soon as the heat has entirely consumed the moisture of the body, it 
will begin to fade out, no longer abounding from the nourishment from which it 
was kindled (ἐπειδὰν γὰρ ἐκβοσκήσηται τὴν ἰκμάδα πᾶσαν αὐτοῦ τὸ θερμόν, 
ἄρχεσθαι τοὐντεῦθεν ἤδη φασὶ καὶ αὐτὸ μαραίνεσθαι μηκέτ' εὐποροῦν τροφῆς, 
ὅθεν ἐξήπτετο). As we see, therefore, the latter two groups of thinkers (both 
attacking the former theory of two mixtures) hold different opinions on the 
powers of the qualities: according to the first group, a quality could have only 
one corresponding power, the hot the power of heating, the cold the power of 
cooling, the dry the power of drying, the wet the power of moistening. That is, 1 
quality = 1 power. The second group of thinkers instead stresses the pivotal role 
played by heat, which is deemed to be the most active quality, having not one 
but two powers (1 quality = more powers), and describes a sort of “biological 
cycle of mixtures” according to which the first stage would correspond to the hot 
and wet mixture of the new-born animal, which is regarded as the best mixture 
(cf. De temp. p. 8 Helmirech). After this, the hot will progressively exert its 
drying function, the mixture of the adult animal will become hot and dry, but 
over time the heat will suffer from a lack of nourishment (moisture) and will fail, 
finally bringing about the old animal’s dry and cold mixture (δυνατὸν δὲ κἀν τῷ 
χρόνῳ προϊόντι γενέσθαι τὴν τέως ὑγρὰν καὶ θερμὴν κρᾶσιν αὖθις ξηρὰν καὶ 
θερμήν, ὥσπερ αὖ πάλιν τὴν ξηρὰν καὶ θερμὴν ἀποσβεννυμένου τοῦ θερμοῦ 
ψυχρὰν καὶ ξηρὰν ἀποτελεσθῆναι).398  
                                                          
398 De temp. p. 5.13–6.13 H. The biological cycle of mixtures which Galen describes bears some 
resemblances with Aristotle’s account of the ageing process, which is due to the progressive 
exstinction of the innate or vital heat (for the various names Aristotle makes use of to refer to the 
same concept, cf. Bartoš 2014 p. 290 with n. 3) which is principally and directly responsible for 
196 
 
After having summarized the opinions of the most illustrious physicians 
and philosophers before him regarding mixture, in De temperamentis I 3 Galen 
begins a polemic against the group of thinkers who think there are four types of 
mixture: for in their account they have left out the best mixture, which in Galen’s 
opinion is an essential reference point from which to judge all others.399 Some 
                                                          
the functions of the vegetative soul (digestion, growth, reproduction). In De gen an. Aristotle 
defines old age as a cold and dry age and describes the ageing of hair as a process deriving from 
the deficiency of heat (De gen an. 784a23ff. “But as to their colour, it is the nature of the skin 
that is the cause of this in other animals (and also of their being unicoloured or varicoloured); 
but in man it is not the cause, except of the hair going grey through disease (not through old age), 
for in what is called leprosy the hairs become white; on the contrary, if the hair is white because 
of old age, the whiteness does not derive from the skin. The reason is that the hair grows out of 
skin; if, then, the skin is diseased and white the hair becomes diseased with it, and the disease of 
hair is greyness. But the greyness of hair which is due to age results from weakness and 
deficiency of heat. For as the body declines in vigour we tend to be cold at every time of life, 
and especially in old age, this age being cold and dry”). Even closer is a passage taken from 
Aristotle's De long., a treatise belonging to the so-called Parva naturalia (which Galen knew; 
cf. Moraux 1984 p. 293–295): "We must remember that an animal is by nature humid and warm, 
and to live is to be of such a constitution, while old age is dry and cold, and so is a corpse. This 
is plain to observation. But the material constituting the bodies of all things consists of the 
following: the hot and the cold, the dry and the moist. Hence when they age they must become 
dry, and therefore the fluid in them requires to be not easily dried up (δεῖ γὰρ λαβεῖν ὅτι τὸ ζῷόν 
ἐστι φύσει ὑγρὸν καὶ θερμόν, καὶ τὸ ζῆν τοιοῦτον, τὸ δὲ γῆρας ξηρὸν καὶ ψυχρόν, καὶ τὸ 
τεθνηκός· φαίνεται γὰρ οὕτως. ὕλη δὲ τῶν σωμάτων τοῖς ζῴοις ταῦτα, τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρόν, 
καὶ τὸ ξηρὸν καὶ τὸ ὑγρόν. ἀνάγκη τοίνυν γηράσκοντα ξηραίνεσθαι· διὸ δεῖ μὴ εὐξήραντον εἶναι 
τὸ ὑγρόν): a warm humidity is in fact cause of growthof the bodyand of life (τῆς τε γὰρ 
αὐξήσεως ἡ θερμὴ ὑγρότης αἰτία καὶ τῆς ζωῆς)” (De long. 466a18 ff.). In Galen’s picture two 
main elements lead us to establish a link between Galen’s picture and Aristotle’s account of the 
ageing process: i) the fact that the animal passes from a hot wet constitution to a dry and cold 
constitution; ii) the paramount role played by the innate heat throughout this process which, on 
the one hand, dries up the humidity in the body and, on the other hand, tends to quench over 
time, leading to a cold and dry constitution. As we saw from the abovementioned Galenic text, 
the hot is regarded by these thinkers as the most active of the four qualities (τοῦ θερμοῦ 
δραστικωτάτου τῶν τεττάρων) and its relation to the biological development of the organism 
through time points to the hot as the most active of the qualities within the innate heat; in De 
naturalibus facultatibus Galen explicitly attributes this view both to Hippocrates and Aristotle, 
and describes how activities such as digestion, nutrition and, more importantly, growth are due 
to the action of the innate heat (De nat. fac. p. 165.7ff. H.). Indeed, with the due differences, 
some connections between Aristotle’s notion of “innate heat” and an emergent analogous 
concept within the Hippocratic corpus have been already noted (for an overview of the previous 
literature and a deeper analysis of this issue cf. Bartoš 2014). When Galen then speaks of this 
further “group” of thinkers, we can conjecture that he is referring to the biological cycle of the 
organism and the progressive transition from a hot wet constitution to a cold and dry one, as 
theorized more systematically by Aristotle. Galen himself in II 2 De temperamentis deals with 
the state of the mixture throughout the different ages of a human being and seems to take up this 
account entirely. For, as well as the abovementionedi supposed “group of predecessors”, he 
describes a biological cycle of mixture that from the childhood to old age sees the the mixture of 
the body pass from a hot and wet mixture to a dry and cold mixture as the bodily parts get drier 
and drier, insofar as they are no longer nourished due to a deficiency of heat (cf. De temp. p. 45, 
26 H.). Old age is compared, as in Aristotle, with a dried plant (De temp. p. 46, 10–11 H. “καλῶς 
Ἀριστοτέλης εἰκάζει τὸ γῆρας αὐαινομένῳ φυτῷ”; the image of the dried plant is present in 
Aristotle’s De resp. 478b27–28) and death with the extinction of the innate heat (De temp. p. 47 
1–2 H. “ὁ θάνατος σβέσις ἐστὶ τῆς ἐμφύτου θερμασίας”).  
399 De temp. p. 7.3–22 H. 
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of them, instead, maintain that the best mixture has not been put aside at all, as 
it coincides with the hot and wet one.400 But Galen declares that the hot/wet 
constitution, if hotness and moisture are brought to excess, is extremely harmful 
and, in this regard, he mentions the violent reaction of a contemporary group of 
physicians, the followers of Athenaeus of Attalia, the Pneumatists (whose 
position Galen assimilates the group under discussion), who maintained that the 
best mixture is hot and wet.  
 
T1 Galen De temperamentis K. I pp. 522.2-523.17 Helmreich p. 8.28-10.3 = fr. 
49 Coughlin:  
 
(1) Πρὸς δὴ τοὺς τοιούτους λόγους ἀπομαχόμενοί τινες τῶν ἀπ' Ἀθηναίου 
τοῦ Ἀτταλέως ὁμόσε χωροῦσιν οὔτε κατάστασιν ὑγρὰν καὶ θερμὴν μέμφεσθαι 
λέγοντες οὔθ' εὑρεθῆναί τι νόσημα φάσκοντες ὑγρὸν καὶ θερμόν, ἀλλὰ πάντως 
ἢ θερμὸν καὶ ξηρὸν ὑπάρχειν ὡς τὸν πυρετόν, ἢ ψυχρὸν καὶ ὑγρὸν ὡς τὸν 
ὕδερον, ἢ ψυχρὸν καὶ ξηρὸν ὡς τὴν μελαγχολίαν. (2) ἐπιμέμνηνται δ' ἐνταῦθα 
καὶ τῶν ὡρῶν τοῦ ἔτους, ὑγρὸν μὲν καὶ ψυχρὸν εἶναι τὸν χειμῶνα φάσκοντες, 
ξηρὸν δὲ καὶ θερμὸν τὸ θέρος καὶ ψυχρὸν καὶ ξηρὸν τὸ φθινόπωρον, εὔκρατον 
δ' ἅμα καὶ θερμὴν καὶ ὑγρὰν ὥραν εἶναί φασι τὸ ἔαρ. (3) οὕτω δὲ καὶ τῶν ἡλικιῶν 
τὴν παιδικὴν εὔκρατον θ' ἅμα καὶ θερμὴν καὶ ὑγρὰν εἶναί φασιν. δηλοῦσθαι δὲ 
τὴν εὐκρασίαν αὐτῆς νομίζουσι κἀκ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν τῆς φύσεως ἐρρωμένων 
τηνικαῦτα μάλιστα. καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ τὸν θάνατόν φασιν εἰς ξηρότητα καὶ ψῦξιν 
ἄγειν τὰ τῶν ζῴων σώματα. καλεῖσθαι γοῦν ἀλίβαντας τοὺς νεκροὺς ὡς ἂν 
οὐκέτι λιβάδα καὶ ὑγρότητα κεκτημένους οὐδεμίαν, ἐξατμισθέντας θ' ἅμα διὰ 
τὴν ἀποχώρησιν τοῦ θερμοῦ καὶ παγέντας ὑπὸ τῆς ψύξεως. ἀλλ' εἴπερ ὁ θάνατος, 
φασί, τοιοῦτος, ἀναγκαῖον ἤδη τὴν ζωήν, ὡς ἂν ἐναντίαν οὖσαν αὐτῷ, θερμήν τ' 
εἶναι καὶ ὑγράν· καὶ μὴν εἴπερ ἡ ζωή, φασί, θερμόν τι χρῆμα καὶ ὑγρόν, ἀνάγκη 
πᾶσα καὶ τὴν ὁμοιοτάτην αὐτῇ κρᾶσιν ἀρίστην ὑπάρχειν· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, παντί που 
δῆλον, ὡς εὐκρατοτάτην, ὥστ' εἰς ταὐτὸ συμβαίνειν ὑγρὰν καὶ θερμὴν φύσιν 
εὐκράτῳ καὶ μηδὲν ἄλλ' εἶναι τὴν εὐκρασίαν ἢ τῆς ὑγρότητός τε καὶ θερμότητος 
ἐπικρατούσης. οἱ μὲν δὴ τῶν ἀμφὶ τὸν Ἀθήναιον λόγοι τοιοίδε. (4) δοκεῖ δέ πως 
ἡ αὐτὴ δόξα καὶ Ἀριστοτέλους εἶναι τοῦ φιλοσόφου καὶ Θεοφράστου γε μετ' 
                                                          
400 De temp. p. 7.22–24 H.  
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αὐτὸν καὶ τῶν Στωϊκῶν, ὥστε καὶ τῷ πλήθει τῶν μαρτύρων ἡμᾶς δυσωποῦσιν. 
ἐγὼ δὲ περὶ μὲν Ἀριστοτέλους, ὅπως ἐγίγνωσκεν ὑπὲρ θερμῆς καὶ ὑγρᾶς 
κράσεως, ἴσως ἄν, εἰ δεηθείην, ἐπὶ προήκοντι τῷ λόγῳ δείξαιμι· δοκοῦσι γάρ μοι 
παρακούειν αὐτοῦ.  
 
(1) In defence against such arguments, certain of the followers of 
Athenaeus of Attaleia counter by saying that they do not find fault with any wet 
and hot state, and stating that no disease has been found which is wet and hot, 
disease being without exception either hot and dry, like fever, or cold and wet, 
like dropsy, or cold and dry, like melancholy. (2) And in this context they also 
make mention of the seasons of the year, stating that winter is wet and cold, 
summer dry and hot, and autumn cold and dry; but they state that spring is at 
once both a well-mixed, and a hot and wet, season.  (3) In the context of ages, 
too, they state childhood to be both well-mixed and at the same time hot and wet; 
and they think that its good-mixture is indicated also by the fact that the natural 
activities have their greatest vigour at this time. Furthermore, they state that 
death leads to dryness and coldness in animal bodies; and indeed, [they argue], 
dead bodies are referred to as corpses (alibas), on the grounds that they no longer 
possess any moisture (libas) and wetness, having at once lost their vapours 
because of the departure of the hot, and having been solidified by the cooling. 
If, then, their argument goes, these are the characteristics of death, then life, since 
it is opposite to death, will necessarily be hot and wet. Now, if life, they say, is 
something hot and wet, then it is absolutely necessary that the mixture that 
approximates most to this will be the best; and if it is the best, then it is evident 
to anyone that it is also the best-mixed. Thus, the wet and the hot nature and the 
well-mixed coincide; and good-mixture is nothing other than that in which 
wetness and hotness are dominant. Such, then, are the arguments of the followers 
of Athenaeus. (4) The same belief somehow seems to be shared by the 
philosopher Aristotle, and, indeed by Theophrastus after him, and also by the 
Stoics; so that they shame us with the multitude of their witnesses. Well, 
regarding Aristotle, I may perhaps show what his understanding was regarding 
the hot wet mixture, if required, as the argument progresses; for they seem to me 





As we see from the text, the Pneumatists present a series of arguments 
aimed at demonstrating that the well-mixed mixture is the hot and wet one: i) the 
Pneumatists affirm that there are no hot and wet diseases (T1.1 “οὔθ' εὑρεθῆναί 
τι νόσημα φάσκοντες ὑγρὸν καὶ θερμόν, ἀλλὰ πάντως ἢ θερμὸν καὶ ξηρὸν 
ὑπάρχειν ὡς τὸν πυρετόν, ἢ ψυχρὸν καὶ ὑγρὸν ὡς τὸν ὕδερον, ἢ ψυχρὸν καὶ 
ξηρὸν ὡς τὴν μελαγχολίαν”); ii) they make reference to the correspondence, 
clearly drawing on the Hippocratic De natura hominis, between seasons and 
qualities, so that the winter is defined as cold and wet, the summer hot and dry, 
autumn cold and dry, and spring, they say, is well-mixed (T1.2 “εὔκρατον δ' ἅμα 
καὶ θερμὴν καὶ ὑγρὰν ὥραν εἶναί φασι τὸ ἔαρ”)401; iii) they also refer to the 
biological cycle of mixtures as they hold childhood to be hot and wet, whereas 
the old age would be cold and dry; moreover, the Pneumatists establish a 
connection between mixture and activities, since they affirm that the εὐκρασία 
is also indicated by the fact that natural activities have their greatest vigour 
during childhood (T1.3 “οὕτω δὲ καὶ τῶν ἡλικιῶν τὴν παιδικὴν εὔκρατον θ' ἅμα 
καὶ θερμὴν καὶ ὑγρὰν εἶναί φασιν. δηλοῦσθαι δὲ τὴν εὐκρασίαν αὐτῆς νομίζουσι 
κἀκ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν τῆς φύσεως ἐρρωμένων τηνικαῦτα μάλιστα”): therefore, 
logically, if old ageand hence deathis cold and wet, childhoodand hence 
life, its contraryis hot and wet and, for this reason, it is absolutely necessary 
that the mixture “that approximates most to this [life] will be the best; and if it 
is the best, then it is evident to anyone that it is also the best-mixed”; iv) in order 
to support their reasoning, they appeal to several authorities, including Aristotle, 
Theophrastus, and the Stoics. 
 We have already pointed out that the Pneumatic school of medicine was 
founded by Athenaeus of Attalia and that the Pneumatists’ medical doctrines 
explicitly rely on Stoic physical tenets and, above all, on their account of pneuma 
as the unifying principle of physical bodies (in its threefold degrees of 
tensionhexis, physis, psyche). Indeed, analogously to Stoic pneuma, the 
                                                          
401 Cf. De nat. hom. CMG I 1.3 p. 182.4–186.12 Jouanna, where every season is associated with 
a humour and a couple of qualities (winter/phlegm is cold and wet; spring/blood is hot and wet; 
summer/yellow bile is hot and dry; autumn/black bile is cold and dry).  
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Pneumatists’ pneuma is conceived of as an in-born enlivening force which 
entirely pervades the living organism, flows both in the veins and in the arteries 
(though the latter would contain more pneuma) and is involved in physiological 
(such as growth, sense-perception, thinking) as well as pathological (such as the 
variety of diseases caused by an alteration of the innate pneuma) processes.402 
However, from the passage above, it is evident that Galen establishes a 
correlation between the groups of earlier illustrious physicians and philosophers 
supporting the quadripartite scheme of mixtures (which we set within a 
Hippocratic/Aristotelian framework) and the contemporary medical sect of the 
Pneumatists who, in contrast to other contemporary medical sects, such as the 
Empiricists and the Methodists, clearly adopt a classification of mixtures in order 
to explain physio-pathological processes. Moreover, in their system of mixtures, 
the Pneumatists assign a special status to the hot and wet mixture, which is 
deemed to be the best mixture, their argument strengthened by being anchored 
to some authorities of the past, whichas we seedo not coincide with the 
Stoics alone. In fact, one should also weigh up and assess contributions of 
different provenance, medical and philosophical, such as the Hippocratic (which 
is implied by the reference to the qualitative composition of the four seasons) 
and the Aristotelian (who is mentioned together with his pupil Theophrastus and 
the Stoics).  
 In fact, De temperamentis I 4 and I 5 should be regarded as 
complementary to the aforementioned passage, where Athenaeus is mentioned 
(and, therefore, essential for a fuller understanding of the fragment in De 
temperamentis I 3). For in De temperamentis I 4 Galen lambasts the Pneumatists 
(although he does not explicitly mention them) for the correlation they draw 
between the four seasons and the primary qualities and, above all, for the 
statement according to which the spring is hot and wet and therefore well-mixed, 
by recourse to other Hippocratic texts (Aphorisms and Epidemics). Moreover, in 
De temperamentis I 5, Galen explains how to interpret Aristotle’s opinion on the 
hot and wet mixture (the Pneumatists in fact mention the biological cycle of 
mixture, which, as we saw, seems to imply a reference to Aristotle’s biological 
                                                          
402 Wellmann 1865 pp. 137 ff. 
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theories). It is important to underline the main points of Galen’s criticism of 
Pneumatic medicine in De temperamentis I 4 and I 5 for different reasons: i) it 
testifies to the importance that the debate on εὐκρασία or good mixture had 
gained in Galen’s time among two contemporary medical mainstreams, the 
Pneumatic and the Galenic; ii) it gives us useful insight into the logical-
dialectical strategies which Galen displays and into the way in which Galen 
interprets his sources with the aim of reprehending his adversaries; and iii) it 
helps us to shed light on under-investigated topics concerning the theoretical 
foundations of Pneumatic medicine.   
 In De temperamentis I 4, Galen begins his argument against the 
Pneumatists by saying that when they define the spring as hot and wet and, 
therefore, as well-mixed, “their mistake is in fact twofold, consisting first in the 
desire to find the fourth pairing of mixtures in the seasons at all costs, and 
secondly in their taking spring to be hotter than winter and wetter than 
summer”.403 For indeed, on the one hand, the Pneumatists tend to strictly 
superimpose the binary coupling of primary qualities to the four seasons without 
caring too much about the real correspondence between a certain season and its 
qualitative composition. On the other hand, they take the spring to be hot and 
wet as compared to winter and to summer, such that spring appears hotter than 
winter and wetter than summer. By contrast, the kernel of Galen’s argument 
aimed at underlining the two errors made by the Pneumatists is condensed and 
makes recourse to the original Platonic distinction between two classes of 
entities (onta), καθ' αὑτά and πρὸς τι entities.404 As he notes, in fact the 
                                                          
403 De temp. p. 10.12–15 H. (trans. Singer) 
404 The distinction is drawn by the Eleatic Stranger in the Sophist (255c), Plato’s ontological 
masterpiece, when he seeks to refute Parmenides’ doctrine according to which non-being does 
not exist by showing that instead non-being does have an existence, although is not an existence 
per se but a relative existence describing the condition of being other than that in connection 
with which it is said to exist. As is well known, such a distinction, which is created within the 
framework of, and is instrumental for, the identification of five “kinds”being, motion, rest, 
sameness, differencerepresents a turning point in and a development of Plato’s theory of ideas 
(in comparison, for example, with Phaedo’s account). As Berti underscores, it is from this 
original Platonic distinction that Aristotle develops his doctrine of the categories; cf. Berti 2004 
pp. 264–272 with references at n. 53. As De Lacy observes (1972 pp. 27-39), Galen was also 
well acquainted with this dialogue ,as he was fully conversant with Plato’s corpus and he also 
wrote extensively on Plato; as De Lacy points out, in his De libris propriis he writes a list of his 
works on Plato. Together with his Quod animi mores and his De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis, 
he mentions a work (now lost) on Plato's school: Περὶ τῆς Πλάτωνος αἱρέσεως. Second, he also 
lists a commentary on the medical passages in the Timaeus, περὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ Πλάτωνος Τιμαίῳ 
ἰατρικῶς εἰρημένων. Third, he mentions a work (now lost) which apparently is a defense of the 
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Pneumatists define spring as hot in relation to winter and as wet in relation to 
summer, yet this comparison is to be considered incomplete: for if one takes the 
other opposition, spring can be also defined as dry and cold, dry in relation to 
winter and cold in relation to summer; therefore, spring will be at the same time 
hot, cold, dry, and wet. As he affirms: “If they are to be permitted to take just 
one half of each [opposition], and thus to declare it [the spring] wet and hot, then 
we may equally be permitted to take the other half, and state to the contrary that 
it is dry and cold: dry in relation to winter (πρὸς τὸν χειμῶνα) and cold in 
relation to summer (πρὸς τὸ θέρος). And so spring will be all these things, wet 
and dry and cold and hot. But even they will admit the impossibility of the four 
qualities’ dominating in one and the same object. It is not, then, right to compare 
spring with summer or winter, but to investigate it in its own right (οὔκουν οὔτε 
θέρει παραβάλλειν οὔτε χειμῶνι τὸ ἔαρ, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ καθ' ἑαυτὸ σκοπεῖσθαι 
δίκαιον).405  
And in fact, the first strategy that Galen adopts to refute the Pneumatists is 
that of considering spring, and therefore, the concept of eukrasia, of which 
spring is the atmospheric reification per se. As Galen remarks, if one considers 
spring per se, andas we will see briefly further belowfrom Galen’s 
standpoint that signifies considering something by means of both sense-
perception and reasoning, Such that spring is neither hot nor wet, but in a 
                                                          
theory of Ideas. The fourth writing is on Plato’s logical theories, περὶ τῆς κατὰ Πλάτωνα λογικῆς 
θεωρίας, whereas the fifth is a collection of summaries of Plato’s dialogues in eight books, 
Πλατωνικῶν διαλόγων συνόψεως ὀκτώ. Finally, he includes two works (now lost): On the 
transitions in the Philebus (περὶ τῶν ἐν Φιλήβῳ μεταβάσεων) and On the parts and faculties of 
the soul (περὶ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς μερῶν καὶ δυνάμεων τρία); On this occasion one should note that 
Galen’s ontology differs from the Platonic one, according to which only the true beings are the 
eternal and transcendent and super-spatiotemporal ideas. For Galen implements the Platonic 
logical–dialectical distinction between per se and in relation to something else in a very different 
ontological framework: when Galen in fact declares that one needs to investigate spring per se, 
he intends to make an enquiry not about a Platonic abstract universal, “springness”, but about 
what he often calls its “oikeia physis”, endowed with an essence-specifying krasis, that is, its 
proper/particular nature/substance (cf. De temp. p. 11.22 H.)an enquiry which, as we will see 
(and we have already pointed this out), from an epistemological point of view can be conducted 
through a joint-methodology involving both sense-perception and reasoning. More studies on 
Galen’s ontology still seem to be a desideratum.  
405 De temp. p. 11, 4–13 H. “εἰ δ' ἔξεστιν ἐκείνοις ἐξ ἑκατέρας αὐτῶν ἥμισυ λαβοῦσιν ὑγρὸν 
ἀποφαίνειν αὐτὸ καὶ θερμόν, ἐξέσται δήπου καὶ ἡμῖν ἐπὶ θάτερον ἥμισυ μετελθοῦσι ξηρὸν καὶ 
ψυχρὸν ἀποφῆναι, ξηρὸν μὲν ὡς πρὸς τὸν χειμῶνα, ψυχρὸν δ' ὡς πρὸς τὸ θέρος. ἅπαντ' οὖν 
οὕτως ἔσται τὸ ἔαρ, ὑγρὸν καὶ ξηρὸν καὶ ψυχρὸν καὶ θερμόν. Ἀλλ' οὐδὲ | κατ' αὐτοὺς ἐκείνους 
οἷόν τ' ἐστὶν ἐν ἑνὶ καὶ ταὐτῷ πράγματι τὰς τέτταρας ἐπικρατῆσαι ποιότητας. οὔκουν οὔτε θέρει 
παραβάλλειν οὔτε χειμῶνι τὸ ἔαρ, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ καθ' ἑαυτὸ σκοπεῖσθαι δίκαιον. 
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precisely middle position with respect to all the excesses. Now, as we have 
previously hinted, the “seasons” example seems to be taken from the Hippocratic 
De natura hominis, a text which, despite to what has been said above, seems 
therefore to have played a role in the construction of the Pneumatists’ scheme of 
mixtures.406 There are two reasons which lead us to think that, in the text we 
quoted above, the implied reference is the Hippocratic De natura hominis: i) the 
first is that in Galen’s Commentary on De natura hominis, he comments on the 
Hippocratic passage relating to the hot/wet qualitative composition of the spring 
(= CMG I 1.3 pp. 182,15-184,2 Jouanna) and declares thatas was stated in the 
first book De temperamentisit is better to describe spring as well-tempered, 
and for this reason some doctors and philosophers are reluctant to call it hot and 
wet407 (we can, therefore, infer that even in this passage Galen is taking a 
sideswipe at the Pneumatists); ii) on the other hand, in De temperamentis I 4, 
Galen makes use of several Hippocratic statements (taken from other 
Hippocratic writings and not from De natura hominis) in order to demonstrate 
that according “Hippocrates” himself, spring is not hot and wet but, on the 
contrary, a hot and wet (disproportionate) mixture of the ambient air brings about 
various sorts of diseases:408 for Galen is fully aware of the fact that in De natura 
                                                          
406 Smith (1979 pp. 232–233) seems to underestimate the importance that the Hippocratic 
medicine had for the Pneumatists, especially for the theorization of their system of mixtures: “I 
point out and emphasize the Pneumatic theorists' lack of attention to Hippocrates in order to 
correct past habits of reading medical history through Galen's eyes. It is not true that, as Galen 
saw it, everyone was a ‘follower’ or ‘enemy’ of Hippocrates and so oriented his medicine. The 
Pneumatics must have been aware of books of the Corpus, but they do not appear to have claimed 
that those books contained their science of elemental eucrasia and dyscrasia”. On the contrary, 
although there are no accurate studies yet, the importance of Hippocratic medicine for the 
Pneumatists is clear. On the one hand, it has already been noted that in the Corpus Hippocraticum 
there are some later texts, such as De alimento or De medico, which seem to be wholly permeated 
by Pneumatic influences: the De alimento, for example, exhibits a physiological system 
analogous to the Pneumatists’ one (Kudlien 1962 pp. 424 ff.; Manuli and Vegetti 1977 pp. 165-
166; Nutton 2004 pp. 202–203; Nutton 2006b). On the other hand, the Pneumatists linked their 
account of pneuma to the “archaic” Hippocratic theory of mixture of four humours, each of 
which is associated with a couple of primary qualities; Wellmann 1865 pp. 138–139, pp. 160–
161.  
407 In Hipp. Nat. Hom. comment. CMG V 9.1 pp. 43, 24 ff. Mewaldt.  
408 In De temp. I 4 Galen introduces several quotations from other Hippocratic writings so as to 
demonstrate that i) the Pneumatists blunder, because of the fact that they rigidly associate the 
four primary qualities with the four seasons: a) spring is well-mixed not because it is hot and wet 
(as the Pneumatists think), but because none of the primary qualities predominates, as 
“Hippocrates” already recognizes (in his Aphorisms he states: ‘Spring is most healthy and least 
fatal’; trans. Singer, De temp. p. 11.12–14 H. = Aph. III 9 L. IV 488); b) a fixed pairing between 
a couple of primary qualities and the seasons does not hold in the case of autumn, which, 
according to Hippocrates himself, is not cold and dry but has an uneven mixture: “But autumn, 
too, is less hot than summer, while it is less cold than winter. From this point of view, then, it is 
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hominis the spring is defined as hot and wet, but he does not dare to contradict 
the Hippocratic text (whichas we have seenfor him represents a crucial 
reference). Hence, by exhibiting one of his characteristic exegetical moves, i.e. 
to explain “Hippocratem ex Hippocrate”, Galen re-interprets (distorts and 
garbles) the Hippocratic De natura hominis and confutes the Pneumatists by 
appealing to what seemswith good probabilityto be the Hippocratic 
authority.409  
Galen’s criticism of the Pneumatists is not only useful for disclosing and 
bringing to light the influences exerted by an “archaic” Hippocratic text on the 
Pneumatic system of mixtures, it is also very enlightening and instructive for 
unravelling the dispute, in the medical field, relating to the most well-mixed or 
                                                          
neither hot nor wet in absolute terms: it is both things, and neither in the extreme sense. But there 
is another, additional ill associated with autumn, which Hippocrates, too, indicated in his 
Aphorisms, when he said: ‘When there is an alternation between warmth and cold on the same 
day, one must expect the diseases of autumn’ (Aph. III 4 = L. IV 486.). And it is this that makes 
autumn so particularly conducive to illness: the unevenness of the mixture” (trans. Singer, De 
temp. p. 12.8–16 H.). ii) On the other hand, Galen wants to disqualify the Pneumatists’ claim 
according to which there are no hot and wet diseases by bringing as witnesses other Hippocratic 
pieces of evidence taken from the Epidemics: a) De temp. p. 14, 12–17 H. = Epid. II 1.1 L. V 
72.: Pustules in Kranon in summer. “There was constant, violent rain in burning-hot weather. 
This happened more with the south wind, after which there was accumulation of fluids under the 
skin. These being trapped within were then heated, which caused irritation. Subsequently blisters 
came up like burns; and they had the sensation of burning beneath the skin” (transl. Singer). The 
passage describes an atmosphere where a hot and wet mixture of the ambient air predominates 
(“There was constant, violent rain in burning-hot weather”), whence there is an incidence of 
pustules that were evidently the result of a putrefaction of the secretions of the body, which then 
gave rise to certain excessively hot, wet fluids; b) Galen reports four quotations from the third 
book of the Epidemics (Epid. III 3.2 L. III 66 Kühlewein p. 224.7; III 3.2 L. III 68 Kühlewein p. 
224,18-19; III 2.4 L. III 72-74 Kühlewein p. 225,18-20; III 2.7 L. III 84 Kühlewein p. 228,5-7) 
where the case of a great plague due to a protracted, year-long, hot and wet mixture of the 
ambient air is described.  
409 For this Galenic practise in his commentary on the Hippocratic works cf. von Staden 2002 
pp. 115–117. It is worth underlining that here Galen is using a commentary technique in a text 
that is not a commentary. The most reasonable explanation is that he indeed is commenting on 
an implied “Hippocratic” passage (that from De natura hominis concerning the qualitative 
composition of the seasons). This claim is corroborated by the abovementioned cross-reference 
to the section from Galen’s commentary on De natura hominis where he comments on the 
Hippocratic passage of De nat. hom., in which it is said that spring is hot and wet and refers to 
the discussion apropos of the seasons in the first book of De temperamentis (i.e. exactly our I 4 
De temperamentis). Hence, Galen also uses this technique in other kinds of writings (De 
temperamentis is not a detailed line-by-line commentary of a Hippocratic work: in De ord. libr. 
suor. K. XIX p. 56 (p. 85.20ff. Müller) the three books De temp. are defined as hypomnêmata, 
but as is well known, the term hypomnêma covers different meanings and may refer to both 
detailed commentaries composed for a wider public and personal notes written for further later 
elaboration; cf. Flemming 2008 pp. 325 f.) and in this case, with good probability, he is referring 
to a Hippocratic passage of a text which here, in his De temperamentis, he does not want to 




good mixture and the way Galen himself, differently from his predecessors and 
contemporaries, constructs his own system of mixtures. He clearly builds on a 
quadripartite scheme of what he will call composite mixtures (hot/wet; hot/dry; 
cold/wet; cold/dry),410 which he ascribes to a supposedly concordant and 
abridged Hippocratic/Aristotelian physical-biological framework; but in 
developing his polemics against the Pneumatists’ school, he surpasses and 
outdistances them by singling out a kind of mixture which they have left aside, 
and which, like the spring, does not admit of any excess, the well-mixed state of 
which can be discovered both  empirically and rationally: “For we are able to 
learn manifestly from our senses that spring is a perfectly well-mixed season; 
and from rational argument to find out that it is healthy for this reason, namely 
that none of the four dominates”.411  
The second logical strategy that Galen adopts in De temperamentis I 5 is 
exactly opposed to the first one displayed in De temperamentis I 4, and consists 
in relativizing the interpretation of the Pneumatists, who, by calling Aristotle as 
a witness affirm that living beings (and therefore, life itself) are hot and wet such 
that, hence, the well-mixed mixture can be defined as hot and wet. In fact, 
although the Pneumatists regard themselves as exponents of the Dogmatic 
“school(s)” of medicine, they not only do not rely on experience, but, more 
importantly for a Dogmatic school, they do not undertake a theoretical study of 
nature by basing it on logical reasoning: consequently, they fall back into 
sophismata412 and, ultimately, end up misunderstanding Aristotle’s doctrines.413 
More precisely, the point at issue is Aristotle’s definition of living bodies as hot 
and wet (as opposed to old age and death, which are cold and dry). For Galen 
and the Pneumatists, who, as we have seen, refer both to what I have defined the 
“biological cycle of mixtures” (from the hot and wet mixture of the new-born 
animal to the cold and dry mixture of a corpse), both seem to draw on Aristotle’s 
                                                          
410 De temp. p. 32.2 H.  
411 De temp. p. 16.9–12 H. The combination of empirical observation and theoretical reasoning 
in the determination of the bodily mixture (while hotness can be assessed simply on the basis of 
the sense of touch, wetness is recognized by the sense of touch in conjunction with the sense of 
sight and logical reasoning or logismós; cf. De temp. 59.24–60.5 H.) is also stressed by Van der 
Eijk 2015a p. 689.  
412 Singer translates the term as “fallacious reasoning”; I’d be much more inclined to interpret 
the word as “errors in logic”; Montanari 2000 s.v. has “ragionamento fallace o capzioso”.  
413 De temp. 16.28–17, 5 H.  
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biological doctrines (the Pneumatists explicitly quote Aristotle in this regard 
and, in Galen’s case, we have already pinpointed some references in Aristotle’s 
work, in particular in the Parva Naturalia, which seem sto provide a parallel to 
Galen’s account) which could have been a source of tension and a collision field 
between the two medical strands.  
In his argument against the Pneumatists, Galen emphasizes the logical 
fallacies espoused by the Pneumatists. In the first place, they do not recognise 
that, according to Aristotle, hot, cold and dry, wet are said in many senses 
(pollachôs), whereas they intend them always in the same way. Second, as Galen 
highlights, the Pneumatists misinterpret Aristotle’s teachings because, on the 
one hand, Aristotle saw a difference between connate and proper hot and an 
acquired, external hot, and on the other hand, heas well as his pupil 
Theophrastusprecisely indicated the reference point that used to define 
something as well- or badly mixed414.  
As Tassinari points out in their commentary on De temperamentis,415 
Galen probably has in mind Aristotle’s discourse on heat (analogously applied 
by Aristotle to cold, dry, and wet, too), Pollachôs legomenon, which is 
specifically analysed at I 2 De partibus animalium (648b35-649b7).416 This 
                                                          
414 De temp. 17, 7–13 H. “For Aristotle is well aware that [the terms] hot, cold, dry and wet are 
used in a plurality of senses; yet these people do not interpret him as [using the terms] in a 
plurality of senses, but always in the same way. Indeed, Aristotle even discussed the way in 
which it is not the same thing for hot to be present in virtue of a hot that is connate and proper 
or in virtue of an acquired, external hot. Even this, though, they misinterpret him as [using the 
terms] in a plurality of senses, but always in the same way. Indeed, Aristotle even discussed the 
way in which it is not the same thing for hot to be present in virtue of a hot that is connate and 
proper or in virtue of an acquired, external hot. Furthermore Aristotle, and similarly 
Theophrastus, have said precisely by reference to what one should take [something] to be well- 
or badly-mixed in its nature” (trans. Singer). 
415 Tassinari 1997 p. 80 n. 7.  
416 Cf. De part. an. 648b11–16 “Is the hot, then, spoken of without qualification or in a number 
of ways? Surely one needs to grasp what the function of the hotter is or, if there are many, how 
many. i) In one way that which makes what touches it hotter is said to be hotter; ii) in another 
way that which arouses greater sensation during touching, especially if accompanied by pain. 
But it seems that at times this can be deceptive; for sometimes it is the state of the perceivers that 
is the cause of their feeling pain. Again, iii) of the meltable and combustible, the more meltable 
and more combustible are said to be hotter” (transl. Lennox). As we have seen, Aristotle backs 
up his reasoning with a plethora of examples, where “is hotter” is not treated as a core-related 
homonymous predication, because we understand different things by the predication “is hotter” 
if we paraphrase Aristotle’ sentences: i) x which touches y is said to be hotter than y in the sense 
that it releases the effect of a qualitative alteration; ii) x it is said to be hotter than y, which 
touches it in the sense that it burns and at the same time harms; iii) x is said to be hotter than y 
in the sense that is more meltable/combustible. As we see, these examples are very different from 
an example of core-dependent homonymy (such as Aristotle’s favourite example of health; cf. 
Metaph. 1003a34–b4a: if we consider the sentence i) “Socrates is healthy”, there will be a series 
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section indeed strikingly corresponds to Galen’s few lines on the issue, since, on 
the one hand, Aristotle analyses the predication “is hotter” in more depth by 
calling into question the fleeting category of relation or πρὸς τι (in order to make 
clear that if something is defined as hotteror colder, it is important to 
indicate the respect in which something is defined so417) and, on the other, he 
brings out, by contrast, a clear-cut difference between an external/ἀλλότριος or 
κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς, such as boiling water, and a proper/οἰκεῖος or καθ' αὑτὸ heat 
(a hot that pertains to the very essence of something), such as a burning flame,418 
with the main aim of preparing the ground for the statement, made in I 3, that 
blood is hot only accidentally and not essentially.419  
Having briefly winnowed out Aristotle’s argument in De partibus 
animalium I 2, we will now seek to answer a more urgent question, which 
concerns the reason why Galen feels the need to recall the Aristotelian 
distinction between an acquired/accidental and an internal/essential hot (or cold, 
dry, or wet) and, second, to identify a continuously shifting reference point on 
the basis of which to define something hot (or cold, dry, or wet) and, certainly, 
what this has to do with his polemics against the Pneumatists. His criticism is 
summarized in the following passage (T2). 
                                                          
of core-dependent predications stemming from the first core-instance of predication, like: ii) 
“Socrates’ complexion is healthy; iii) Socrates’ diet is healthy”; iv) “Socrates’ weight is healthy”; 
etc. Therefore, “is healthy” is a core-dependent homonymous predication because all its 
secondary predicative instantiations rely on the first, without which they would not make any 
sense at all; we see that this type of predication expresses an order in multiplicity and lies exactly 
in the middle between simple univocity and rank non-univocity). 
417 De part. an. 648b24–34 “One thing is said to be hotter than another, then, in at least this many 
ways, if not more; but it is impossible that being hotter is predicated of the same thing in all these 
ways [I dissent from Lennox’s translation of “τούτους δὲ τοὺς τρόπους ἀδύνατον ὑπάρχειν τῷ 
αὐτῷ πάντας” as “but it is impossible that being hotter belong in all these ways to the same 
thing”; for ὑπάρχειν + dative I prefer the more technical sense “to be predicated of”cf. 
Montanari 2000 s.v.; for a parallel cf. Post. Anal. 25a13. For boiling water heats more than flame 
does, and flame burns and melts the combustible and meltable, while water does not. Again, 
boiling water is hotter than a small fire, but hot water cools and more than a small fire; for fire 
does not become cold, but all water does. Again, boiling water is hotter to the touch, but cools 
and solidifies more quickly than oil. And again, blood is hotter to the touch than water and oil, 
but solidifies more quickly. Again, stones, iron, and such things heat up more slowly than water, 
but once hot burn more intensely” (trans. Lennox; slightly modified). As Lennox notes at 
648b26–34, in every example x is hotter than y in one respect, but y hotter than x in another; cf. 
Lennox 2001 pp. 193–194.  
418 De part. an. 648b35ff. As Tassinari (1997 p. 80 n. 78) observes, the difference between a 
proper and an acquired heat is treated also in Meteor. IV 379a17–19, where decay is defined as 
the “destruction of a moist body’s natural heat (oikeias […] thermotêtos) by heat external 
(allotrias) to it, that is, the heat of its environment” (trans. Lee).  





T2 Galen De temperamentis K. I p. 535.12-537.3 Helmreich p. 17, 14-18,9; 
 
 
(2.1) ὅταν ἀκούσωσί που λεγόντων αὐτῶν ὑγρὸν εἶναι καὶ θερμὸν τὸ ζῷον 
ἢ τὴν τοῦ παιδὸς κρᾶσιν ὑγρὰν καὶ θερμήν, οὔθ' ὅπως εἴρηται ταῦτα συνιᾶσιν 
ἐμπλήκτως τε μεταφέρουσι τὸν λόγον ἐπὶ τὰς ὥρας ὥσπερ ταὐτὸν ὂν ἀλλ' οὐ 
μακρῷ διαφέρον ἢ τὴν οἰκείαν κρᾶσιν ὑγρὰν εἶναι καὶ θερμὴν ἢ τὴν τοῦ 
περιέχον|τος ἡμᾶς ἀέρος. οὔτε γὰρ ταὐτόν ἐστιν οὔθ' ὁμοίως ὑγρὰ καὶ θερμὴ 
ζῴου κρᾶσις ἀέρος ὑγρᾷ καὶ θερμῇ κράσει λέγεται. (2.2) […] ἕπεται τοιγαροῦν 
ἤδη καὶ τάδε τὰ σοφίσματα τῷ μὴ διελέσθαι περὶ τῶν σημαινομένων ὀρθῶς, ἀλλ' 
οἰηθῆναι τὸ θερμὸν λέγεσθαι διχῶς, τὸ μὲν ὡς ἄκρατον καὶ ἄμικτον καὶ ἁπλοῦν, 
τὸ δ' ὡς ἐν τῇ πρὸς τοὐναντίον ἐπιμιξίᾳ πλεονεκτοῦν. ὅτι δὲ καὶ παραβάλλοντες 
ἑτέρᾳ κράσει πολλάκις ἑτέραν ἀποφαινόμεθα τὴν ἑτέραν αὐτῶν εἶναι θερμὴν ἐν 
ἴσῳ τῷ θερμοτέραν, ἐπιλανθάνονται τοῦδε. καὶ μὴν οὕτω τὰ ζῷα θερμὰ καὶ ὑγρὰ 
λέγεται πρὸς τῶν παλαιῶν, οὐ κατὰ τὴν ἰδίαν κρᾶσιν ἁπλῶς, ἀλλὰ τοῖς τε φυτοῖς 
καὶ τοῖς τεθνεῶσι παραβαλλόμενα. καὶ γὰρ τῶν τεθνεώτων τὰ ζῷα καὶ τῶν 




 (2.1) When they read some statement in those authors [Aristotle and 
Theophrastus] that the animal is wet and hot, or that the mixture of children is 
wet and hot, they do not understand how these [terms] have been used, and 
transfer the argument idiotically to the seasons, as if it were the same thingand 
not, in fact, something very different indeedto say that our own, proper 
mixture is wet and hot and that the air that surrounds us is wet and hot. For it is 
not the same thing, nor are [the terms] wet and hot applied in the same way to 
the mixture of an animal and to the mixture of the air. (2.2) […] And these 
fallacious reasonings in turn follow from a failure to make the correct 
distinctions between meanings, and from thinking that ‘hot’ is used in [only] two 
senses, that of ‘unmixed’, ‘uncombined’ and ‘simple’, and that of a 
209 
 
predominance over the opposite in a combination. What they forget is that when 
comparing one mixture with another, we frequently assert one of them to be 
‘hot’, in an equivalent sense to ‘hotter’. But in fact this is the sense in which 
animals are referred to as hot and wet by the ancients, not in absolute terms by 
reference to their own peculiar mixture, but by comparison with plants and dead 
bodies. For indeed animals are wetter and hotter than both dead bodies and 
plants. (trans. Singer).  
 
 As we see, Galen attacks the Pneumatists on two different but interrelated 
fronts. In the first place, Galen seems to find fault with the fact that, in contrast 
to Aristotle (and Theophrastus), the Pneumatists do not distinguish between a 
proper/oikeia hot and wet mixture and the external/allotría mixture of the 
ambient air (T2.1 “ὥσπερ ταὐτὸν ὂν ἀλλ' οὐ μακρῷ διαφέρον ἢ τὴν οἰκείαν 
κρᾶσιν ὑγρὰν εἶναι καὶ θερμὴν ἢ τὴν τοῦ περιέχοντος ἡμᾶς ἀέρος”). For, as 
Galen points out, if in fact they are focusing on the proper/essential mixture of 
the living being (in this case human beings, and especially children), they cannot 
make any further inferences by idiotically referring this reasoning to the seasons 
(T2.1 “ἐμπλήκτως τε μεταφέρουσι τὸν λόγον ἐπὶ τὰς ὥρας”), because if they 
consider their principal object of enquiry to be the mixture of the living being, 
the mixture of the ambient air surrounding us will automatically have to be 
treated as external. Second, it is logically erroneous to define the living being as 
hot and wet in an absolute sense as if they were so essentially and according to 
their own mixture (cf. T2.2 “οὐ κατὰ τὴν ἰδίαν κρᾶσιν ἁπλῶς”). The 
Pneumatists, in fact, forget that something can be defined as hot (as well as cold, 
dry, and wet) in relation to something else, as Aristotle in the abovementioned 
passage from De partibus animalium defined, for example, boiling water as 
hotter than, that is in relation to, pròs ti, a small fire. As Galen remarks, “in fact 
this is the sense in which animals are referred to as hot and wet by the ancients, 
not in absolute terms by reference to their own peculiar mixture, but by 
comparison with plants and dead bodies. For indeed animals are wetter and 
hotter than both dead bodies and plants” (T2.3 “καὶ γὰρ τῶν τεθνεώτων τὰ ζῷα 
καὶ τῶν φυτῶν ἐστιν ὑγρότερα καὶ θερμότερα”). The conclusion is that the 
Pneumatists are then mistaken in thinking of the living being, especially human 
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beings and above all children, as essentially hot and wet without any 
qualification and in an absolute sense. The question, for Galen, as we will see, 
is much more complex.  
 Galen’s critique of the Pneumatists reveals itself to be crucial for 
different reasons. First, in taking account of De temperamentis I 4 and I 5, we 
saw concretely that Pneumatic medicine benefitted from different contributions, 
Hippocratic and Aristotelian, which fall outside of Stoic physics. Second, we 
brought to light the hot debate concerning eukrasia between two medical strands, 
the Pneumatic and the Galenic, relying on a system of mixtures to explain the 
behaviour of an organism as well as related physio-pathological facts; and we 
also dealt with Galen’s way of overtly manipulating (in the case of several 
Hippocratic writings) or making use of (in the case of Aristotle’s multiple senses 
of hot in De part. an.) his sources to knock his adversaries down. Finally, we 
saw that while criticizing the Pneumatic concept of eukrasia, Galen makes use 
of the Aristotelian category of pròs ti and this, as we will show in the last section 
of this chapter, will be his keystone argument for defining a binary (an absolute 
and a relative) system of mixtures which is indeed required to underpin his 
teleological, anthropocentric, and even doctor-centric world-view (i.e. going 
beyond the birth and development of the single individual as specifically 
different).  
 However, before giving a full account of Galen’s general world-view, we 
will tackle Galen’s nine typologies of mixtures, its origins, the innovations 
brought by Galen in comparison with the speculations of his predecessors and, 
again, Galen’s relation to the Pneumatists, whobefore Galenic 
medicineworked out a well-defined system of nine mixtures. This will lead us 
to a deeper comparison between the elemental foundations of Galenic and 
Pneumatic medicine.  
 
 
2.3 Galen's additions to the theories of the predecessors. The good mixture and 





As we have hinted, in his De temperamentis Galen makes us believe that, like 
his other predecessors, the Pneumatists distinguished four typologies of 
mixtures; he places them among the second subgroup of the second group of 
physicians and philosophers (those opting for a four-mixtures scheme along with 
the biological cycle of the mixtures). This is confirmed by another statement that 
Galen makes at De temperamentis I 9: “Now, the majority of doctors and 
philosophers, as we also mentioned above, recognize these latter four [types of] 
bad-mixture. But, for some reason which I cannot understand, they omit (οὐκ 
οἶδ' ὅπως παραλείπουσιν) the other four, which come about from one half of 
each of these, just as they also omit the first mixture of all the best”.420 As Galen 
emphasizes, the majority of doctors and philosophers (he rather ambiguously 
does not specify whether they are predecessors or contemporaries) to his 
astonishment ignore the four simple mixtures (mixtures in which only one 
quality predominates: hot, cold, dry, or wet) and the best mixture:421 “And if, 
indeed, this is the case, as we have shown that it is, we may now confidently say 
that there are nine different kinds of mixture in all: one well-mixed, the [other] 
eight not well-mixed; and of these eight, four which are simple bad-mixtures 
(wet, dry, cold and hot), and another four composite bad-mixtures (wet and hot, 
dry and hot, cold and wet, cold and dry)”.422  
However, we have yet to reveal that in presenting things in this way here, 
Galen is aiming to manipulate the reader. For although in his key work 
concerning mixtures he ascribes the formulation of this system of nine mixtures 
to himself, Galen betrays himself in a passage in De locis affectis, where he 
inform us that in dealing with a case of memory loss (De loc. aff. K. VIII p. 147 
“Εἰς ἀνάγκην οὖν ποτε καταστὰς ἀνακτήσασθαί τινος ἀπολωλυῖαν μνήμην”), he 
came to know that Archigenes (of Apamea, the Pneumatist who lived between 
the 1st and 2nd century CE and studied under Agathinos, a student of 
Athenaeus)423 had written a book on this very issue (De loc. aff. K. VIII p. 148). 
For Galen wanted to know which type of mixture was the cause of the disease: 
                                                          
420 De temp. p. 30.6–10 H.  
421 Cf. the end of De temp. I 8, where the entire scheme of mixtures is enunciated for the first 
time.  
422 De temp. pp. 31.27–32.4 H.  
423 Nutton 2006c. 
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in fact, since Galen knew the medical school to which the Archigenes belonged, 
he also knew that this school recognized eight types of dyskrasiai, four simple 
and four composite (De loc. aff. K. VIII p. 149 “ἐζήτουν δ' ἐγνωκέναι, τίνα 
δυσκρασίαν αὐτῆς αἰτίαν ἡγεῖται εἶναι τοῦ πάθους. οὐδὲ γὰρ ὅτι δυσκρασίαν 
τινὰ εἶναι νενόμικεν, ἠμφίβαλλον, εἰδὼς τὴν αἵρεσιν τοῦ ἀνδρός· ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ 
δυσκρασίας ᾔδειν ὀκτὼ καθ' ἕκαστον μόριον συνισταμένας, τέτταρας μὲν 
ἁπλᾶς, τέτταρας δὲ συνθέτους”). More precisely, Galen wanted to know 
whether, according to Archigenes, the disease was brought about by a (simple) 
cold or a wet mixture of the pneuma residing in the heart, or a composite cold 
and wet, or dry and cold one (cf. De loc. aff. K. VIII p. 149 “ἐπεθύμουν γνῶναι, 
τίνα τούτων ὁ Ἀρχιγένης ἀπεφήνατο τῆς βεβλαμμένης ἐνεργείας αἰτίαν εἶναι, 
πότερα ψύξιν ἢ ὑγρότητα τοῦ κατὰ τὴν καρδίαν πνεύματος, ἢ σύνθετον ἐκ 
ψύξεώς τε καὶ ὑγρότητος, ἢ ξηρότητα μετὰ ψύξεως ὑπολαμβάνει δύνασθαι 
τὸ πάθος ἐργάσασθαι τοῦτο”).424  
It was exactly this passage that led Max Wellmann to affirm that Galen’s 
scheme of nine mixtures was “entirely dependent on the Pneumatic School 
(Galen ist in dieser Theorie völlig von der Pneumatischen Schule abhängig)”.425 
I intend to demonstrate that Wellmann was right in one respect and wrong in 
another. Indeed, it is true that Galen distinguishes eight types of bad mixtures, 
like the Pneumatists, and one good mixture, which in Galen’s case corresponds 
to a mixture where all the excesses are neutralized. However, if we say that a 
theory is entirely dependent on an earlier model, we must also assume that the 
theoretical foundations of the two theories match, meaning that even the 
elemental doctrines have to be the same. And this is not the case.  
As I repeatedly emphasized throughout the first main chapter, Kupreeva 
has systematically (in comparison to previous contributions on this issue) dealt 
with Galen’s elemental theory and has brought to light the way in which Galen’s 
elemental theory aligns with the Peripatetic. Whereas Aristotle was disinclined 
to speak of stoicheia as substances and rather stressed their qualitative aspects, 
Galen goes further and shows that the stoicheia are ontologically conceived of 
as qualified bodies (more precisely, Kupreeva defines them as the “most basic 
                                                          
424 I am grateful to Matyas Havrda, who drew my attention to this passage from De locis affectis.  
425 Wellmann 1895 p. 145 n. 5.   
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qualified alterable bodily structures”426), and this conception, which also agrees 
with a hylomorphic analysis, resembles that provided by his (younger) 
Peripatetic contemporary Alexander of Aphrodisias.427 Coherently with these 
theoretical premises, we showed that, in every respect Galen’s theory of mixture 
conforms to the contemporary Peripatetic model of mixture and finds its 
innermost justification within an Aristotelian/Peripatetic bio-teleological 
framework, although in his account, Galen endevours to incorporate the 
Hippocratic four-humour theory.  
By contrast, as very recent scholarship has made ever more clear, the 
Pneumatists’ Elementenlehre relies on very different theoretical foundations. 
The founder of the Pneumatic school wrote a long treatise on medicine, now lost, 
Peri boêthêmatôn or On remedies, which Galen seems to know and refers to in 
his De elementis.428 It has been underlined by David Leith that Athenaeus’ 
definition of the elements of the medical art (preserved in Ps.-Galen, 
Definitiones Medicae 31 xix 356 K.) establishes an analogy between the Stoic 
infinite cycles of cosmic generations and ekpyrôseis and the biological cycle of 
the human being. Just as the cosmos comes out of the primary elements at the 
beginning of the cosmic cycle, and then dissolves into them again at the end of 
every cycle, in the same way the human being is made up of hot, cold, dry, and 
wet, and, after its passing away, faces dissolution into these elements once 
again.429 However, there is a great difference between the cosmic elements and 
the elements constituting human beings: both are the last, the simplest, and the 
most basic constituents but, in contrast to the former, the latter are defined as 
“φαινόμενα” (i.e. apparent or perceptible to the senses).430 Therefore, according 
                                                          
426 Kupreeva 2014 p. 192. 
427 Kupreeva 2014 pp. 192–193. 
428 Cf. Kupreeva 2014 pp. 171–172; cf. De elem. sec. Hipp. CMG I 1.2 p. 102.7–9 De Lacy. 
429 In his account, Leith, however, does not distinguish – as Cooper does, cf. p. 44 n. 117 – 
between the proto-elements of the cosmogony and the real primary elements. 
430 Cf. Leith (2015c), who has recently delivered a paper on Athenaeus’ elemental theory. Ps.-
Galen, Definitiones Medicae K. XIX p. 356 “τί ἐστι στοιχεῖον; στοιχεῖόν ἐστιν ἐξ οὗ πρώτου καὶ 
ἁπλουστάτου τὰ πάντα γέγονε καὶ εἰς ὃ ἁπλούστατον τὰ πάντα ἀναλυθήσεται ὂν ἔσχατον. 
Ἀθηναῖος δὲ ὁ Ἀτταλεὺς ἐν τῷ τρίτῳ βιβλίῳ φησὶν οὕτως. τίνα ἐστὶ τῆς ἰατρικῆς στοιχεῖα; 
στοιχεῖά ἐστι τῆς ἰατρικῆς, καθάπερ τινὲς τῶν ἀρχαίων ὑπέλαβον, τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν καὶ 
τὸ ὑγρὸν καὶ τὸ ξηρόν, ἐξ ὧν πρώτων φαινομένων καὶ ἁπλουστάτων καὶ ἐλαχίστων ὁ ἄνθρωπος 
συνέστηκε καὶ εἰς ἃ ἔσχατα φαινόμενα καὶ ἁπλούστατα καὶ ἐλάχιστα τὴν ἀνάλυσιν λαμβάνει 
(What is an element? An element is the first and simplest thing from which everything has come 
to be, and the simplest and last thing into which everything will be resolved. Athenaeus of 
Attaleia speaks thus in the third book. What are the elements of medicine? The elements of 
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to the Pneumatists, the two fields  of Physics/Cosmology and Medicine are 
rigorously separate and rely on different theoretical grounds.  
But what exactly does it mean to say that the elements of medicine are 
“perceptible to the senses”? In his De elementis, Galen extensively criticizes 
Athenaeus’ view on the primary elements of the medical art. Kupreeva and, more 
recently, Leith have delved deeper into this very intricate criticism and unfolded 
some remarkable findings concerning Athenaeus’ elemental theory. On the one 
hand, Leith makes the very important point that Galen’s criticism starts out from 
a defence of a particular reading of the Hippocratic treatise De natura hominis, 
according to which, when “Hippocrates” speak of the hot, the cold, the dry, and 
the wet, he is indeed referring to the corresponding primary elements (fire, air, 
water, and air). However, Galen attacks Athenaeus for propounding a rival 
interpretation of the text according to which the Hippocratic author instead wants 
to point out that the cosmic elements, although they exist, fall outside the field 
of medical investigation and, therefore, that the doctor should fall back on the 
mere “organic” qualities of the hot, the cold, the dry, and the wet, i.e., insofar as 
they constitute the bodies of the living beings. These elements are defined by 
Galen as proximate (προσεχῆ), evident, and not requiring proof (ἐναργῆ 
φάσκων εἶναι τὰ στοιχεῖα καὶ ἀποδείξεως μὴ δεῖσθαι).431 In his reading of the 
                                                          
medicine are, as some of the ancients believed, hot, cold, wet and dry. The human being has been 
put together out of these first, apparent, simplest and least things, and has its resolution into these 
last, apparent, simplest and least things)” (trans. Leith); cf. SVF II 580; cf. Wellmann 1895 pp. 
131–133. For the problem of the attribution to Athenaeus of this definition-pair and its 
philological implications cf. Coughlin 2016 
http://www.ancientmedicine.org/home/2016/1/5/the-medical-definitions. In a second definition, 
Athenaeus introduces what is thought of as fifth element: the pneuma (although in Stoic thinking, 
more precisely in the Chrysippean formulation, pneuma is a mixture of the active elements, fire 
and air; SVF II 841, 310, 442, 786 and Galen Quod animi mor. K. IV p. 784.7–12); Ps.-Galen, 
Introd. s. medic. K. XIV p. 698 Petit p. 21: “κατὰ δὲ τὸν Ἀθήναιον στοιχεῖα ἀνθρώπου οὐ τὰ 
τέσσαρα πρῶτα σώματα, πῦρ καὶ ἀὴρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γῆ, ἀλλ’ αἱ ποιότητες αὐτῶν, τὸ θερμὸν καὶ 
τὸ ψυχρὸν καὶ τὸ ξηρὸν καὶ τὸ ὑγρόν, ὧν δύο μὲν τὰ ποιητικὰ αἴτια ὑποτίθεται, τὸ θερμὸν καὶ 
τὸ ψυχρόν, δύο δὲ τὰ ὑλικά, τὸ ξηρὸν καὶ τὸ ὑγρόν, καὶ πέμπτον δὲ παρεισάγει κατὰ τοὺς 
Στωικοὺς τὸ διῆκον διὰ πάντων πνεῦμα, ὑφ’ οὗ τὰ πάντα καὶ συνέχεσθαι καὶ διοικεῖσθαι 
(According to Athenaeus the elements of man are not the four primary bodies (fire, air, water 
and earth), but their qualities (hot, cold, dry and wet), of which he posits that two are productive 
causes (hot and cold), and two are material (dry and wet). He introduces a fifth (element), in 
accord with the Stoics, namely the pneuma which permeates everything, by which everything is 
held together and regulated)” (transl. Leith).  
431 The Galenic passages Leith quotes are: i) De Elem. sec. Hipp. CMG V 1.2 p. 102 De Lacy 
“οὐ παρακολουθοῦντες δὲ οἱ πολλοὶ τῇ κατὰ τὸν λόγον ὁμωνυμίᾳ συγχέονται καὶ ταράττονται, 
καθάπερ καὶ Ἀθήναιος ὁ Ἀτταλεύς, ἅμα μὲν στοιχεῖα τιθέμενος τἀνθρώπου τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ 
ψυχρὸν καὶ τὸ ξηρὸν καὶ τὸ ὑγρόν, ἅμα δ’ ἐναργῆ φάσκων εἶναι τὰ στοιχεῖα καὶ ἀποδείξεως μὴ 
δεῖσθαι, καὶ ποτὲ μὲν ὀνομάζων αὐτὰ ποιότητας καὶ δυνάμεις, ἐνίοτε δὲ σώματα συγχωρῶν 
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ὑπάρχειν, εἶτα δεδιὼς ἀέρα καὶ πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν ὁμολογῆσαι. (But most men, not 
understanding this, are confused and upset by the verbal ambiguity [N.B. Galen is referring to 
a passage from De natura hominis]; thus Athenaeus of Attaleia made hot, cold, dry and wet the 
elements of man, and at the same time he claimed that the elements are clearly visible and do 
not require proof, sometimes calling them qualities and powers, on occasion granting that they 
are bodies, then afraid to agree that they are fire, air, water and earth)” (trans. De Lacy); ii) De 
Elem. sec. Hipp. CMG V 1.2 p. 104 De Lacy “ἀλλ’ ἴσως φήσουσιν οἱ ἀπ’ Ἀθηναίου μηδ’ αὐτοὶ 
περί γε τούτων ἀποφαίνεσθαι μηδέν, ἐπέκεινα γὰρ εἶναι τῆς ἰατρικῆς τέχνης, ἀρκεῖν δ’ αὐτοῖς 
τὸ θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρὸν καὶ ξηρὸν καὶ ὑγρόν, ἃ κἀν τοῖς ζῴοις ἐναργῶς δεῖξαι δύνανται, στοιχεῖα 
καὶ τῶν σωμάτων ὑποθέσθαι καὶ τῆς ὅλης ἰατρικῆς. τὸ μὲν οὖν ὥσπερ ζῴου τῆς ἰατρικῆς τέχνης 
ὑποθέσθαι στοιχεῖα τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν καὶ τὸ ξηρὸν καὶ τὸ ὑγρὸν ὅσης ἀλογίας ἔχεται, τί 
ἂν ἐγὼ νῦν ἐπεξίοιμι; κεκωμῴδηται γὰρ ὑπὸ πολλῶν ἤδη τὸ δόγμα καὶ ψόγον καὶ καταγέλωτα 
οὐ σμικρὸν ἔτι τε πρὸς τούτοις ἀπιστίαν οὐκ ὀλίγην τῷ παλαιῷ προσετρίψατο λόγῳ (Perhaps the 
followers of Athenaeus will say that they themselves make no statement about these things 
because they are outside the medical art; they are content to make hot, cold, dry and wet, which 
they can clearly point to also in animals, the elements both of bodies and of the whole of 
medicine. Why should I now dwell on the utter absurdity of making hot, cold, dry and wet the 
elements of the medical art, as if it were an animal? It is a view that has been ridiculed by many 
before now and has subjected the ancient account to no small amount of blame and derision, and 
no little distrust besides)” (trans. De Lacy); iii) De Elem. sec. Hipp. CMG V 1.2 p. 110 De Lacy 
“ἐθαύμαζον δὲ καὶ πῶς οὐκ αἰσθάνεται συγχέων ἑαυτὸν ὁ Ἀθήναιος, ὃς θερμὸν μὲν καὶ ψυχρὸν 
καὶ ξηρὸν καὶ ὑγρὸν ὀνομάζων ἀπαξιοῖ πῦρ εἰπεῖν καὶ ἀέρα καὶ γῆν καὶ ὕδωρ. ναί φησι. τὰ γὰρ 
προσεχῆ λαμβάνω τῶν ζῴων, οὐχὶ τὰ κοινὰ πάντων σωμάτων στοιχεῖα. καλοῦσι δὲ προσεχῆ 
τὰ οἷον ἴδια καὶ μηδενὸς ἄλλου τῶν ἁπάντων. ἐμοὶ δὲ καὶ κατ’ ἀρχὰς εὐθὺς εἴρηται πάμπολυ 
διαφέρειν τὰ φαινόμενα στοιχεῖα τῶν ὄντως στοιχείων. ἔοικα δὲ καὶ νῦν ἐρεῖν ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν διὸ 
μακροτέρων. εἴπερ ἐλάχιστόν τι καὶ ἁπλούστατόν ἐστι μόριον τὸ στοιχεῖον, εἴη ἂν ὡς πρὸς τὴν 
αἴσθησιν ὀστοῦν καὶ χόνδρος καὶ σύνδεσμος καὶ ὄνυξ καὶ θρὶξ καὶ πιμελὴ καὶ σὰρξ καὶ νεῦρον 
καὶ μυελὸς ἶνες τε καὶ ὑμένες καὶ ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν ἅπαντα τὰ ὁμοιομερῆ στοιχεῖα τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων 
σωμάτων. ἆρ’ οὖν ὁ Ἀθήναιος ἔθετό που ταῦτα στοιχεῖα; καὶ μὴν αὐτός ἐστιν ὁ γράφων ἕκαστον 
μὲν τῶν ὁμοιομερῶν ἐκ τῶν πρώτων γεγονέναι στοιχείων, ἐκ δὲ τῶν ὁμοιομερῶν ἤδη τἆλλα 
συγκεῖσθαι τοῦ ζῴου μόρια (I was amazed that Athenaeus does not see that he is confusing 
himself when he names hot and cold and dry and wet but avoids naming fire and earth and water 
and air. ‘Yes,’ he says, ‘because I am taking the proximate elements of animals, not the elements 
common to all bodies’ – and by proximate they mean ‘peculiar to’ and ‘of nothing else at all’. 
But I said right at the start that apparent elements are far different from true elements; it seems 
to me that this is the time to discuss this difference at greater length. If the element is some least 
and simplest part, it would be on the visible level bone, cartilage, ligament, nail, hair, fat, flesh, 
nerve, marrow, fibres too, and membranes, and in a word all the homoeomerous parts would be 
elements of human bodies. But did Athenaeus make these the elements? He is the very one who 
writes that each of the homoeomerous parts has come into being from the first elements, and that 
the other parts of the animal are then formed from the homoeomerous parts)” (trans. De Lacy); 
iv) Gal. Hipp. Elem. CMG V 1.2 p. 116 De Lacy “τὸ δὲ διὰ τοῦτο δεδιέναι ταῦθ’ ὁμολογεῖν εἶναι 
στοιχεῖα, διότι μήτ’ ἐξαιροῦμεν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος αὐτῶν τι μήτ’ ἐντίθεμεν, ἐσχάτως ἠλίθιόν ἐστι· 
τὰ γὰρ ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων γεγονότα προσφερόμενοι πάντως δήπου καὶ τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῖς σώμασιν 
ἡμῶν ἐντίθεμεν. ἀλλ’ οὐκ εἰλικρινῆ, φασίν, οὐδὲ μόνα. κακῶς οὖν ἐλέγετο <τὸ> μήτ’ ἐξαιρεῖν 
μήτ’ ἐντιθέναι στοιχεῖον· ἐχρῆν γὰρ οὐχ ἁπλῶς οὕτως εἰπεῖν, ἀλλ’ ὅτι μὴ μόνον μηδ’ ἄμικτον 
μηδ’ αὐτὸ καθ’ αὑτό. καίτοι καὶ τοῦτ’ αὐτὸ τί ποτε βούλεται περαίνειν αὐτοῖς; οὔτε γὰρ 
ἄχρηστος ἡ περὶ τῶν στοιχείων θεωρία διὰ τοῦτ’ ἂν εἰκότως νομισθείη, διότι μηδὲν αὐτῶν 
ἄμικτον ἑτέρου τοῖς σώμασιν ἡμῶν προσφέρομεν, οὔτε διὰ τοῦτο πῦρ καὶ ἀὴρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γῆ 
κακῶς εἴρηται στοιχεῖα, διότι τοῖς μὲν ἐξ αὐτῶν χρώμεθα γεγονόσι, μόνον δ’ αὐτῶν ἕκαστον 
ἰδίᾳ καὶ καθ’ ἑαυτὸ παντάπασιν ἄχρηστον ὑπάρχει (To be afraid to grant that they are elements 
for the reason that we neither take any of them out of the body nor put any of them into it is 
utterly stupid; for when we eat and drink the things that have been generated from the elements 
we most certainly put the elements too into our bodies. But not in a pure form, they say, and not 
alone. Then it was incorrect to say that we neither take out nor put in an element; this statement 
should not have been made without qualification in that way, but with the qualification ‘not alone 
or unmixed or itself by itself’. And yet even with this qualification what does it aim to achieve 
for them? It is not reasonable that speculation about the elements be considered useless because 
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Galenic passages, Leith points out that according to the Pneumatists, although 
the cosmic elements indeed exist and are the elements common to all, when it 
comes to the medical art and to the close inspection of the nature of human 
beings, they are not useful at all for dietetic or therapeutic purposes. In adopting 
this approach, Athenaeus follows a strictly medical tradition whose roots have 
to be recognized in the tendency, amply displayed by “archaic”, i.e. Hippocratic, 
and Hellenistic medicine, to separate natural philosophy as the highest form of 
theoretical hypotheseis from medical techne that starts its enquiry at the sense-
perceptible level (a tendency rejected by Galen himself). Like the earlier medical 
tradition, although conscious of the existence of the ultimate constituents of the 
cosmos, the physician should instead appeal to the proximate elements 
(according to Leith, the adjective προσεχής reflects Athenaeus’ awareness of the 
existence of true primary elements), i.e., the concrete and perceptible 
(ἐναργῆ/φαινόμενα) instantiations of the cosmic elements: the temperature of 
bodies or their degree of humidity.432  
By analysing Galen’s criticism of Athenaeus’ theory of elements in his De 
elementis,433 Kupreeva unearths not only the main features of Galen’s theory of 
primary elements, but also some new and noteworthy reflections on both i) the 
                                                          
we do not take into our bodies any one of them unmixed with another; and it was wrong to deny 
that fire and air and water and earth are elements for the reason that we use things that have 
been generated from them, but each of them alone, separate and by itself, is completely useless)” 
(trans. De Lacy). 
432 As I have hinted, Leith enquires into the theoretical framework within which Athenaeus’ 
speculation relating to the primary elements is situated. On the one hand, he convincingly argues 
that Athenaeus’ position may have developed from his reading of the treatise De natura hominis 
(as can be inferred from Galen’s De elementis): for right at the beginning, the Hippocratic author 
declares – as Leith underlines – that he will not deal with the nature of the human being in a way 
that will trespass on what strictly pertains to the art of medicine;  in fact, as the Hippocratic 
author affirms, he will not consider the nature of the human being as made up of air, water, and 
earth, “or any other thing which is not evident (φανερόν) in human beings” (De nat. hom. I 1.3 
p. 164, 1 ff. Jouanna). On the other hand, Leith underscores the influence the Alexandrian 
anatomists may have exerted on Athenaeus. Analogously to Athenaeus, Herophilus and 
Erasistratus, who are sometimes defined by Galen as semi-Dogmatists, did not enquire into the 
nature of the ultimate cosmic building blocks of the nature of the human being. On the one hand, 
according to Erasistratus the first theoretical structure constituting the nature of man is the well-
known triplet of nerve, artery, and vein (which in any case was the theoretical reproduction of 
perceptible uniform parts). On the other hand, Herophilus limits his medical investigation to the 
first visible structures in the anatomical evidence (in a passage from the Anonymus Londinensis 
these primary constituents are defined phainomena; cf. Anon. Lond. XXI 18–23, 32–35 = pp. 
45–46 Manetti = T50a von Staden; cf. also Gal. De meth. med. K. X p.107 = T50b von Staden). 
On this cf. also Leith 2015a.  
433 I have summarized the main lines of Galen’s criticism of Athenaeus’ elemental theory 
throughout 1.3.4 pp. 85ff. 
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ontological status of Athenaeus’ primary elements and ii) their place within the 
Pneumatists’ medical system.  
On the one hand, according to Galen these sense-perceptible elements of 
human nature would have to be identified only with the homoeomerous parts 
(that is, the body in which a certain quality inheres by prevalence), whereas 
Athenaeus is reported to have said that, by contrast, the homoeomerous parts 
come out of the hot, the cold, the dry, and the wet (so according to the 
Pneumatists, they would not coincide with the homoeomerous parts).434 
Kupreeva, not irreconcilably with Leith, sheds more light on the connections 
between the Pneumatists’ so-called sense-perceptible, evident and proximate 
elements, which are always to be understood as corporeal, and the Stoic cosmic 
elements.435 Kupreeva notes that, according to the Stoics, the soul’s ontogenesis 
takes place through a process they refer to as a “hardening” or στόμωσις: it 
consists in the sudden refrigeration of the internal hot pneuma.436 Now, as 
Kupreeva shows, in an account provided by Antyllus, a Pneumatist who was 
Galen’s contemporary, the connatural pneuma is thought of as continuously in 
motion and as producing a friction which re-kindles the vital heat:437 a kind of 
adventitious, secondary, and proximate heat which, as Kupreeva points out, 
would coincide neither with the pyr technikón (the active principle which by 
acting on the passive generates the whole cosmos) nor with the elemental fire 
(which is produced only secondarily during the cosmogonic process). Therefore, 
as Kupreeva states, “the Pneumatists thus have philosophical reasons, taken from 
Stoic physics, to argue that vital heat present in the human body is not identical 
                                                          
434 Galen De elem. sec. Hipp. CMG V 1.2 p. 110–112.2 De Lacy.  
435 However, in contrast to Leith, Kupreeva identifies the προσεχῆ elements as the humours (cf. 
Kupreeva 2014 p. 174), although in her account of the Pneumatists’ elemental theory this does 
not emerge in a clear-cut way.  
436 Plut. Stoic. Rep. 1053c4–d1 “ἄτοπος οὖν φαίνεται τῇ περιψύξει νῦν μὲν ἐξ ἀναισθήτων ποιῶν 
ἔμψυχα, νῦν δ' εἰς ἀναίσθητα καὶ ἄψυχα μεταβάλλων τὸ πλεῖστον μέρος τῆς τοῦ κόσμου ψυχῆς. 
ἄνευ δὲ τούτων ὁ περὶ ψυχῆς γενέσεως αὐτῷ λόγος μαχομένην ἔχει πρὸς τὸ δόγμα τὴν ἀπόδειξιν. 
γίνεσθαι μὲν γάρ φησι τὴν ψυχήν, ὅταν τὸ βρέφος ἀποτεχθῇ, καθάπερ στομώσει τῇ περιψύξει 
τοῦ πνεύματος μεταβαλόντος, ἀποδείξει δὲ χρῆται τοῦ γεγονέναι τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ μεταγενεστέραν 
εἶναι μάλιστα τῷ καὶ τὸν τρόπον καὶ τὸ ἦθος ἐξομοιοῦσθαι τὰ τέκνα τοῖς γονεῦσι; Plut. Comm. 
Not. 1084d7–e4 Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν παρὰ τὰς κοινὰς βιάζονται προλήψεις· ἐκεῖνα δ' ἤδη καὶ παρὰ 
τὰς ἰδίας, τὸ θερμότατον περιψύξει καὶ πυκνώσει τὸ λεπτομερέστατον γεννῶντες. ἡ γὰρ ψυχὴ 
θερμότατόν ἐστι δήπου καὶ λεπτομερέστατον· ποιοῦσι δ' αὐτὴν τῇ περιψύξει καὶ πυκνώσει τοῦ 
σπέρματος οἷον στομώσει τὸ πνεῦμα μεταβάλλοντος, ἐκ φυτικοῦ ψυχικὸν γενόμενον. γεγονέναι 
δὲ καὶ τὸν ἥλιον ἔμψυχον λέγουσι, τοῦ ὑγροῦ μεταβάλλοντος εἰς πῦρ νοερόν. ὥρα καὶ τὸν ἥλιον 
διανοεῖσθαι περιψύξει γεννώμενον”.  
437 Cf. Oribasius Coll. Med. CMG VI 1.1 p. 163.11–15 Raeder.  
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with the cosmic heat. This makes all the proximate qualities dependent on the 
pneumatic motion, and accounts for the difference between these qualities and 
their cosmic counterparts (earth, air, fire, water), although presumably there is 
some sort of relation between these cosmic qualities (which are identical with 
cosmic elements in the Stoic system) and the proximate qualities”.438 Moreover, 
with regard to the role these perceptible elements play within Pneumatism, 
Kupreeva recognizes that in their refusal to speak of the cosmic elements as 
constitutive of the medical techne, the Pneumatists situate themselves alongside 
the Rationalists and the Empiricists. For they share with the Rationalists the 
conviction that there is a limited number of basic principles to which we can 
have recourse in medical enquiry (although in Galen’s view these ultimate 
constituents of all the natural bodies have to be found through conceptual 
investigation and not through sense-perception), and with the Empiricists the 
inclination to limit themselves to the external experience given by the senses.439  
As we can see, both the scholars proceed in the same direction as they tend, 
on the one hand, to enhance the link between the Pneumatists’ primary elements 
and Stoic physics (although with due differences between the Stoics’ corporeal 
cosmic elements and the Pneumatists’ sense-perceptible elements) and, on the 
other hand, the distance between Galen’s Rationalist approach (which makes of 
the cosmic elements of natural philosophy as the building blocks of medicine) 
and the semi-Dogmatic Pneumatists’ approach, which rigidly marks the 
difference between these two disciplines and assigns them different basic 
constituents. We can easily note that the two elemental systems are very different 
from one another and for two main reasons: i) on the one hand, the corporeal 
sense-perceptible qualities of the Pneumatists of Stoic origin do not coincide 
with Galen’s primary elements, which are based on an antidogmatic qualitativist 
physics of Aristotelian origin (although not declared); and ii) the severe 
exclusion of natural philosophy, broadly understood, from medicine leaves the 
Pneumatists unable to work out a comprehensive philosophical world-view 
within which to place their scheme of mixtures, which was exclusively used for 
medical – pathophysiological – purposes (differently from Galen, as we will 
                                                          
438 Kupreeva 2014 p. 175–176.  
439 Kupreeva 2014 p. 178. 
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see). We can therefore reach the following conclusion. From the point of view 
of natural philosophy (which is our narrowed field of enquiry), on the one hand 
Galen inherits from the Pneumatists the pure and empty scheme of nine mixtures, 
which he applies to a notion of elemental mixture – which, as we saw in detail, 
has nothing to do with the Stoic model of mixture (apart from some superficial 
redundancies), and which he fundamentally derives from the contemporaneous 
Peripatetic physics. And, on the other hand, this scheme is profoundly anchored 
to his unified (although with antidogmatic limits) medical-cum-philosophical 
system, where medicine is thought of, as Kupreeva stresses, as the “handmaiden” 
of natural philosophy,440 and where a strongly teleological order entirely informs 
his understanding of the physical world – on a small but also on a large scale.  
 
 
2.4 A twofold εὐκρασία (good mixture). The midpoint according to substance, 
genus, and species, its consequences and teleological implications 
 
 
In his 1981 essay Modelli di medicina in Galeno, Mario Vegetti argues 
that in Galen’s De temperamentis it is impossible to recover traces of a 
teleological language. According to Vegetti, the Nature pervading this Galenic 
treatise takes on the appearance of a natura peccans insofar as Galen opposes to 
one good mixture eight types of bad mixtures, which are to be considered 
literally as “natural failures” leading to degenerative phenomena and 
pathological predispositions: a badly mixed krasis would depend on a 
compositional error, i.e. a convoluted assemblage executed by what can be also 
seen as a fallible artist, i.e. nature.441  
In this discussion, I intend to subvert Vegetti’s claim by showing not only 
manifest evidence of a teleological framework in De temperamentis (an aspect 
which Philip Van der Eijk has brought to light442), but also that Galen’s scheme 
of nine mixtures is the skeleton for such a framework. We will start by returning 
                                                          
440 Kupreeva 2014 p. 179, comments on Galen De elem. sec. Hipp. CMG V 1.2 pp. 92.26–94, 2 
De Lacy.  
441 Vegetti 1981 pp. 56–57.  
442 Van der Eijk 2010 and 2014a. 
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to Galen’s definition of hot, cold, dry, and wet, then we will recall the research 
findings gained in the previous chapter concerning Galen’s notion(s) of eukrasia 
and, finally we will apply these to his general world-view (on which we 
developed a somewhat different account in comparison to the classical essay by 
Hankinson443).  
Moraux has already underlined that in Galen’s view hot, cold, dry, and wet 
can be said trichōs, i.e. in three ways: a) as a quality; b) as unmixed body, i.e. 
the pure element, that is fire, air, water, and earth, where the primary qualities 
(hot, cold, dry, and wet) are present to the extreme degree; and c) as a mixed 
body (i.e. the homoeomerous part in which the quality is prevalent).444 Kupreeva 
goes further still, showing that behind this threefold distinction lurks Galen’s 
logical background, insofar as Galen differentiates between these three senses of 
the hot, the cold, the dry, and the wet by appealing to the distinction, drawn by 
Aristotle in his Categories (a text that he knew very well and on which he even 
wrote a commentary in four books), between “being said of a subject” 
(synonymous predication) and “being said in a subject” (inherence).445 We 
intend to go even further since, to this logical distinction, Galen adds the 
category of relation and makes it more complex, as we see in T3:  
 
 
T3 Galen De temperamentis K. I p. 542.13-544.14 Helmreich pp. 21.20–22.26: 
 
 
(1) εἰς δὲ τὰ παρόντα, τῶν ποιῶν σωμάτων τριχῶς λεγομένων, 
ἐπισκοπεῖσθαι προσήκει, πῶς ἐν ἑκάστῃ ῥήσει κέχρηταί τις τῇ προσηγορίᾳ, 
πότερον ὡς ἁπλοῦν τι καὶ ἄμικτον δηλῶν ἢ ὡς πρὸς τὸ σύμμετρον ὁμογενὲς ἢ 
ὁμοειδὲς παραβάλλων | ἢ ὡς πρὸς τὸ τυχὸν ὁτιοῦν· (2) οἷον ὅταν ὀστοῦν εἴπῃ 
τις ξηρὸν ἢ ψυχρὸν ἁπλῶς οὑτωσὶ μόνον ὀνομάσας ἄνευ τοῦ προσθεῖναι λέοντος 
ἢ κυνὸς ἢ ἀνθρώπου, δῆλον, ὡς πρὸς τὴν ὅλην φύσιν ἀποβλέπων ἁπάντων τῶν 
ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ σωμάτων ἐπινοεῖ τι μέσον, ᾧ παραβάλλων αὐτὸ ξηρὸν εἶναί φησιν. 
                                                          
443 Hankinson 1989.  
444 Moraux 1984 p. 303 cf. De elem. sec. Hipp. CMG V 1.2 pp. 114.24–116.5 De Lacy.  
445 Kupreeva 2014 pp. 181 ff. with references.  
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ἂν δέ γ' εἴπῃ τὸ τοῦ λέοντος ὀστοῦν [ἢ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἢ τοῦ κυνὸς] ξηρὸν εἶναι, 
δῆλον, ὡς ἐν αὐτοῖς πάλιν τοῖς τῶν ζῴων ὀστοῖς τῷ μέσῳ παραβάλλει. καὶ χρὴ 
κἀνταῦθά τι νοῆσαι, πάντων τῶν ζῴων τῶν μὲν μᾶλλον τῶν δ' ἧττον ἐχόντων 
ὀστᾶ ξηρά, μέσον εἶναι τὴν κρᾶσιν ὀστοῦν ἔν τινι γένει ζῴων, οἷον ἀνθρώπων, 
εἰ τύχοι, καὶ τούτῳ τἆλλα παραβαλλόμενα τὰ μὲν ξηρά, τὰ δ' οὐ ξηρὰ 
προσαγορεύεσθαι. καὶ μὲν δὴ κἀν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις αὐτοῖς πάλιν ὁ μέν τις ξηρόν, 
ὁ δ' ὑγρὸν ὀστοῦν ἔχειν λεχθήσεται, τῷ μέσῳ παραβαλλόμενος ὡς ἐν ἀνθρώποις. 
Ὅτι δ' ἐν ἅπασι τοῖς οὖσι τὸ μέσον τῶν ἄκρων ἐστὶ τὸ σύμμετρόν τε καὶ κατ' 
ἐκεῖνο τὸ γένος ἢ εἶδος | εὔκρατον, ἀεὶ χρὴ προσυπακούειν ἐν ἅπαντι τῷ λόγῳ, 
κἂν παρελθόντες ποτὲ τῇ λέξει τύχωμεν αὐτό, καὶ δὴ καὶ τούτων οὕτως ἐχόντων, 
ὅταν ὑγρὰν εἶναί τις εἴπῃ τήνδε τὴν κρᾶσιν ἢ θερμήν, ἐρωτᾶν, ὅπως εἴρηκεν, 
ἆρά γε τῷδέ τινι παραβάλλων ἀφωρισμένως ἑνί, καθάπερ, εἰ τύχοι, τῷ Πλάτωνι 
τὸν Θεόφραστον, ἢ κατὰ γένος ὁτιοῦν ἢ εἶδος· [ἢ γὰρ ὡς ἄνθρωπον ἢ ὡς ζῷον 
ἢ ὡς οὐσίαν ἁπλῶς]. (3) τὸ γὰρ δὴ τρίτον σημαινόμενον ἑκάστου τῶν τοιούτων 
ὀνομάτων, ὅπερ ἁπλοῦν ἐλέγομεν εἶναι καὶ ἄμικτον, οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς 
κεκραμένοις, ἀλλ' ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς πρώτοις, ἃ δὴ καὶ στοιχεῖα προσαγορεύομεν, 
ὥστε τριχῶς ἑκάστου τῶν ποιῶν σωμάτων λεγομένου τῶν δύο μόνων ἡμᾶς 
χρῄζειν εἰς τὴν περὶ κράσεων πραγματείαν ἢ πρὸς τὸ τυχὸν ὁτιοῦν 
παραβάλλοντας ἢ πρὸς τὸ σύμμετρον ὁμογενές.  
 
(1)For the present, since the term ‘qualified bodies’ may be used in one of three 
senses, we ought to consider, in each statement, how the appellation has been 
used, whether to indicate something absolute and uncombined, or in comparison 
with that which is at the point of good balance within the genus or species as a 
whole, or in comparison with anything [else] (πότερον ὡς ἁπλοῦν τι καὶ ἄμικτον 
δηλῶν ἢ ὡς πρὸς τὸ σύμμετρον ὁμογενὲς ἢ ὁμοειδὲς παραβάλλων | ἢ ὡς πρὸς 
τὸ τυχὸν ὁτιοῦν). (2) When, for example, someone says that bone is dry, or cold, 
in the absolute sense, without adding that it is the bone of a lion, or of a dog or 
of a human being, then it is evident that he has in mind some midpoint when 
considering the whole of nature [consisting] of all the bodies in the cosmos; and 
it is by comparison with this that he states it to be dry (ὡς πρὸς τὴν ὅλην φύσιν 
ἀποβλέπων ἁπάντων τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ σωμάτων ἐπινοεῖ τι μέσον, ᾧ 
παραβάλλων αὐτὸ ξηρὸν εἶναί φησιν). If, however, he says that the bone of a 
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lion is dry, then it is evident that he is, in this case, comparing it with the middle 
[item] within the bones of animals themselves. And here too there is something 
[else] that one should realize: that, as all animals have dry bones to a greater or 
lesser degree, the middle [type of] bone in terms of mixture occurs in some 
particular species of animal, such as humans, for example, and that the others 
are referred to as dry or not dry in comparison with that. And indeed within the 
human species, similarly, some will be said to have dry bones, and some wet 
bones, the comparison here being with the middle [type] within human beings. 
Throughout the whole argument it must be borne in mind that the mid-point 
between the extremes for all beings is the state of good balance, and of good-
mixture within that particular genus or species, even though we may sometimes 
ignore this in our actual verbal expression. And this being so, whenever someone 
calls a mixture wet or hot, one should ask in what sense that term has been used. 
Is it in comparison with one specific [item], in particular, as if, say, one were 
comparing Theophrastus with Plato? Or is it by reference to a particular genus 
or species? (3) For indeed the third meaning of each of these terms, the one 
which we called absolute and uncombined, does not exist in [objects that] consist 
of a mixture, but only in the primary [objects], those, indeed, to which we also 
refer as ‘elements’. Thus, though there are, in the case of each qualified body, 
three senses in which the terms may be used, we only require two in the study of 
mixtures, where we are either making a comparison with any chance [body], or 




After having summarized the theories of his predecessors in De 
temperamentis I 1–3 and given polemics against the Pneumatists in I 4–5, in I 6 
Galen lays the path for the study of mixtures of living beings (and, of course, 
especially of human beings). As we see in T3.1, he focuses on the poia sômata, 
or qualified bodies (that is, on the non-synonymous predication or predication 
by way of inherence, putting aside synonymous predication) and states that, 
when a body is defined as hot, cold, dry, or wet, this can indicate a) either 
something absolute and uncombined where the quality is present to the extreme 
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degree (cf. T3.1 ἁπλοῦν τι καὶ ἄμικτον, i.e. the element); or b) a qualified body 
which is said to be hot, cold, dry, and wet by way of prevalence: b.1) in 
comparison with that which is at the point of good balance within the same genus 
or species (cf. T3.1 πρὸς τὸ σύμμετρον ὁμογενὲς ἢ ὁμοειδὲς παραβάλλων), or 
b.2) in comparison with any random object (cf. T3.1 πρὸς τὸ τυχὸν ὁτιοῦν).  
Afterwards, in T3.2, Galen elucidates more clearly what he has in mind 
when he speaks of poia sômata by way of prevalence. In the first place, Galen 
says that when someone declares that bone is dry without qualification or term 
of reference (ἁπλῶς) (i.e. without adding that it is the bone of a lion, or of a dog 
or of a human being), it is clear that he is comparing this bone to the unique 
absolute midpoint among all the physical bodies subjected to generation and 
destruction, and it is by comparison with this that he affirms this bone to be dry 
(i.e. it is dry in an absolute sense) (cf. T3.2 “then it is evident that he has in mind 
some midpoint when considering the whole of nature [consisting] of all the 
bodies in the cosmos; and it is by comparison with this that he states it to be dry 
(πρὸς τὴν ὅλην φύσιν ἀποβλέπων ἁπάντων τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ σωμάτων ἐπινοεῖ 
τι μέσον, ᾧ παραβάλλων αὐτὸ ξηρὸν εἶναί φησιν)”). In the preceding chapter, 
we singled out this absolute symmetric midpoint where hot and cold, dry and 
wet meet at their very centre (i.e. the case in which hot/cold and dry/wet are 
exactly equidistant from one another and the volumes of their elemental matter 
are equal): it is the skin of the palm of the hand which is defined as the yardstick 
or gnômôn (i.e. reference point, also called κανών and κριτήριον De temp. p. 33, 
19) of all the perceptible objects446 and which indicates a state of absolute 
eukrasia.  
Second, if one specifies that the dry bone in question is the bone of a lion, 
it is evident that one is comparing the lion’s bone to the bone that is the midpoint 
of the same genus (i.e. animals): thus, the lion’s bone will be defined as dry when 
compared, for example, to the bone of the human being (cf. T3.2 “If, however, 
he says that the bone of a lion is dry, then it is evident that he is, in this case, 
comparing it with the middle [item] within the bones of animals themselves. 
                                                          
446 De temp. p. 34.20 ff. H. “τοιοῦτον δ' ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων δέρμα, μέσον ἀκριβῶς 
ἁπάντων τῶν ἐσχάτων, θερμοῦ καὶ ψυχροῦ καὶ σκληροῦ καὶ μαλακοῦ, καὶ τούτου μάλιστα τὸ 
κατὰ τὴν χεῖρα. γνώμων γὰρ αὕτη πάντων ἔμελλεν ἔσεσθαι τῶν αἰσθητῶν”. 
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And here too there is something [else] that one should realize: that, as all animals 
have dry bones to a greater or lesser degree, the middle [type of] bone in terms 
of mixture occurs in some particular species of animal, such as humans, for 
example, and that the others are referred to as dry or not dry in comparison with 
that (ἂν δέ γ' εἴπῃ τὸ τοῦ λέοντος ὀστοῦν ξηρὸν εἶναι, δῆλον, ὡς ἐν αὐτοῖς 
πάλιν τοῖς τῶν ζῴων ὀστοῖς τῷ μέσῳ παραβάλλει. καὶ χρὴ κἀνταῦθά τι 
νοῆσαι, πάντων τῶν ζῴων τῶν μὲν μᾶλλον τῶν δ' ἧττον ἐχόντων ὀστᾶ ξηρά, 
μέσον εἶναι τὴν κρᾶσιν ὀστοῦν ἔν τινι γένει ζῴων, οἷον ἀνθρώπων, εἰ τύχοι, 
καὶ τούτῳ τἆλλα παραβαλλόμενα τὰ μὲν ξηρά, τὰ δ' οὐ ξηρὰ 
προσαγορεύεσθαι)”; or else, although it is not specified in T3, the bone of a lion 
can be defined as dry compared to the midpoint of its own species (lion), whence 
the meaning of the non-synonymous predication will be different – the 
difference is given by the reference term. In the first case, the bone will be called 
dry if compared – within the genus of animals – to the human being’s bone (i.e. 
it will then be defined as dry with respect to the genus of animals); in the second 
case, the bone will be called dry compared to the bone of the lion that is in the 
middle of the species of lions (i.e. the bone will be then defined as dry with 
respect to the species of lions).447 Finally, a mixed body can be defined as hot, 
cold, dry, or wet compared to whichever other random mixed body (i.e. without 
reference to genus or species), when for example we compare Theophrastus to 
Plato (cf. T3.2 “And this being so, whenever someone calls a mixture wet or hot, 
one should ask in what sense that term has been used. Is it in comparison with 
one specific [item], in particular, as if, say, one were comparing Theophrastus 
with Plato? Or is it by reference to a particular genus or species? (τῷ Πλάτωνι 
τὸν Θεόφραστον, ἢ κατὰ γένος ὁτιοῦν ἢ εἶδος)”. In fact, as Galen clarifies at the 
end of the passage, for the study of mixtures one needs to analyse them either in 
comparison to a) whichever random body one encounters or b) to the midpoint 
according to the same genus (cf. T3.3 “εἰς τὴν περὶ κράσεων πραγματείαν ἢ 
πρὸς τὸ τυχὸν ὁτιοῦν παραβάλλοντας ἢ πρὸς τὸ σύμμετρον ὁμογενές”). 
                                                          
447 De temp. p. 20, 16–22 H. “A hot animal, for example, is one that is hotter than the middle 
animal, in terms of its mixture; a hot horse is one that is hotter than the middle horse. And 
the middle [items] in each genus or species are also the well-balanced ones: they are equidistant 
from each of the extremes within that particular genus or species. Animal, for example, is a 
genus; horse, ox and dog, species. Furthermore, the human being is middle, in its mixture, 
within the genus of animals as a whole” (transl. Singer). 
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As we saw in the last two cases, which – as we will see later on – especially 
relate to living bodies (plants and animals), the category of relation comes into 
play here.  
On the one hand, when a body x is compared with some random body y, 
“it is possible for the same thing to be referred to by opposite [terms], for 
example for Dion to be referred to as drier than Theon and Memnon but as wetter 
than Ariston and Glaucon”.448 Of course, Aristotle would deny that Dion can be 
classed among the relatives if he is considered qua individual substance, but he 
is a relative qua drier than Theon and Memnon or qua wetter than Ariston and 
Glaucon.449 Dion is a relative on both an ontological (something is said to be dri-
er or wet-ter in relation to another being) and a logical level (one has to specify 
the reference term: Dion is drier than Theon and Memnon, or he is wetter than 
Ariston and Glaucon); and ontologically grounded relatives (which are also 
logically grounded) are contemporaneous by nature: they cannot exist without 
each other (Dion cannot be dri-er if we do not think of comparing him to 
someone else).450 At the same time, he can be both drier and wetter given that 
we change the reference terms.  
On the other hand, and more importantly, the physician has to enquire into 
the oikeia physis of the body under investigation and we have already seen that, 
analogously to Aristotle’s biological approach (on Lennox’s reading), the 
differences between single individuals that are specifically different are marked 
off by the rule of “the more and the less” (I refer to what I have defined as 
Galen’s functionalistic physical/physiological articulation mixture-dynamis/eis-
energeia/ai: in sum, the differences among the single individuals and their 
activities are due to the proportions of hot/cold and dry/wet within a certain 
essence-specifying range).451 What we left open there will now be clarified: for 
the oikeia physis of every living body should be evaluated, and, therefore, 
defined as hot/dry, hot/wet, cold/dry, cold/wet (composite mixtures), or hot, 
                                                          
448 De temp. p. 23.4–7 H. (transl. Singer).  
449 Cat. 7 8a16–18. 
450 Cat. 7b15–b22 “Relatives seem to be simultaneous by nature; and in most cases this is true. 
For there is at the same time a double and a half, and when there is a half there is a double, and 
when there is a slave there is a master; and similarly with the others. Also, each carries the other 
to destruction; for if there is not a double there is not a half, and if there is not a half there is not 
a double. So too with other such cases” (transl. Barnes).  
451 Cf. supra pp. 137 ff. 
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cold, dry, wet (simple mixtures), or well-mixed (eukratos) on the basis of a 
comparison between the individual body in question and the symmetric midpoint 
of the same species and genus (i.e. the best physis within that species or genus).  
But what does Galen mean by species and genus? In De temperamentis I 
6 he describes the cosmos as being made up of three concentric realms. For there 
is the highest genus (anôtátô ti génos), that of the substance or ousía, within 
which falls everything animate or inanimate, and this is the common genus of 
human being, dog, plane tree, fig tree, stone, bronze, iron, and all the rest.452 The 
genus of substance in turn includes the genus of the plants and within this latter 
that of the animals, the genus of the plants being higher than that of the animals 
(as we saw, analogously to Alexander, from the simplest to increasingly more 
complex bodies).453 Below the highest genus of the substance there are many 
other genera: “that of ‘animal’, including bird and fish; that of ‘plant’, including 
tree and herb; ‘bird’ includes eagle and raven; and ‘fish’ bass and wrasse. And 
in exactly the same way the genus ‘tree’ contains olive and fig, while that of 
‘herb’ contains pimpernel and peony. These are the ultimate genera (ἔσχατα 
γένη), which are also referred to as species (εἴδη), such as raven, wrasse, fig and 
pimpernel; and of this sort too are human, ox and dog”.454 Now, in relation to 
this subdivision into three concentric realms (substances, plants, animals), an 
unspecified substance (which, as we have seen, can be either inanimate or 
animate) can be said to be hot, cold, dry, and wet, or well-mixed in an absolute 
sense, whereas, by contrast, if it is a plant or an animal, this definition is no 
longer sufficient as the physician must consider its oikeia physis in comparison 
                                                          
452 De temp. p. 26.18 ff. H.  
453 De temp. p. 23.16 ff. H. “Of these, the comparison with another man is a comparison within 
the same species, while the comparison with bees or ants is one within the same genus, as, 
equally, is the comparison with any plant. The genus in question in the latter case is a higher 
(anôtérô) one than that of animals; so, in the same way, that which includes stone, iron and 
bronze is even higher than that” (transl. Singer). 
454 De temp. p. 26, 23 ff. H. (transl. Singer). As we see, Galen speaks only of the ultimate genê 
more precisely as eidê rather than with recourse to a systematic γένος/εἶδος analysis that can be 
used at various levels of generality; although he seems to be well aware of the Aristotelian usage: 
De temp. 27.1–6 H.“As one proceeds from the higher categories downwards, these are the 
ultimate genera, which are therefore also referred to as species;454 as one proceeds upwards from 
the individual existent objects, on the other hand, they are the first. And it has been shown in 
another work how the ancients reasonably referred to all these items between the 
individual and the first genus as both species and genera” (the reference to this writing may 
be to Differ. puls. VIII.601 and 630 K.). On Aristotelian diairetical process in biological works 
and on γένος/εἶδος analysis cf. Balme 1987c and Lennox 1987 pp. 348 ff. 
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with the midpoint of the same genus or species.455 Therefore, the physician is 
endowed, so to speak, with two pairs of eyes when he deals with physical bodies: 
an absolute pair and a relative pair. In the first case, every physical body is 
judged on the basis of an absolute reference point (i.e. within the highest genus 
of substance and by referring its own mixture to the quantitatively determinable 
onkoi of the elements; therefore, to put it simply, by comparing the mixture of 
whichever physical body, be it animate or inanimate, to the absolute well-mixed 
mixture, i.e. the yardstick or the palm of the hand). In the second case, living 
bodies’ mixtures are judged on the basis of the relative midpoint according to 
their own species and genus and the state of good-mixture is evaluated in 
functionalistic terms, that is on the basis of activities: as we saw, even if a plant 
or an animal does not have an absolute well-mixed mixture (i.e. the amounts of 
the elements are not equal), it has a relative well-mixed mixture because it 
performs its activities best.456 We see that, only in the first case, on an absolute 
scale, do we have just one well-mixed mixture or absolute eukrasia (and this 
                                                          
455 De temp. p. 23, 24 ff. H. “But let us just make this distinction amongst them: that when some 
existent object is called well-mixed in absolute terms, and some other is called drier, hotter, 
colder or wetter than it, the one that we are calling well-mixed, in this context, is that [which is 
composed] from a precise equality of opposites coming together, while whatever has some 
deficiency or predominance in relation to this we refer to by the term for whatever predominates. 
When, however, we speak of a well-mixed plant or animal, we are not with this kind of verbal 
expression comparing opposites with each other in the absolute sense, but rather using as our 
point of reference the nature of the plant or animal [in question]” (trans. Singer). 
456 De temp. p. 24.3–25.14 H.: “We would say, for example, that a fig-tree was well-mixed, if it 
were one possessed of that nature which is most appropriate to a fig-tree; and the same of a dog, 
pig, horse or human being when each of these, similarly, was in the best state with regard to its 
own nature. And this matter of ‘being in the best state with regard to its own nature’ is 
evaluated in terms of the activities […] We will, then, speak of all these – I mean, animals 
and plants – as having the best, middle [type of] mixture within their own genus, not in the 
absolute sense, when there is a precise equality of opposites, but when they have that good 
balance which accords with their capacity. […] And so, in the case of all well-mixed animals 
and plants, their equality of mixture is not that [defined] by the amount of the elements in the 
mixture, but that appropriate to the nature of that animal or plant. Sometimes it is appropriate for 
there to be more wet than dry, or more cold than hot. For it is not right for a human being, a 
lion, a bee and a dog to have the same sort of mixture. Indeed, when someone asks, what is 
the mixture of a human being, or of a horse, an ox, dog or any other creature at all, the question 
cannot be answered in absolute terms. For, if one answers in a single way on things that are 
spoken of and evaluated in many ways, one cannot avoid criticism. One must, rather, do one of 
two things: either go through all the different senses, or ascertain which one the person was 
asking about, and speak of that one alone. If, for example, one were to ascertain that [he was 
asking] what mixture it had within [the genus of] animals, then one should make one’s 
response by reference to that animal which is in the middle position with regard to all 
animals; if he was posing the question in absolute terms, with reference to every existent 
object, in that case one would have to compare the opposites amongst those things in the 
animal with each other and make one’s investigation by referring its mixture, not to the 
activities, but to the amounts of the elements” (transl. Singer).  
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account would correspond to Vegetti’s view: one eukrasia and infinite natural 
failures in a world completely devoid of any intrinsic teleology); but in the 
second case, when we see the world from a relative and functionalistic 
standpoint, the relative eukrasiai grow out of all proportion because an animal 
or a plant does not need to have the absolute best mixture to perform its functions 
properly. 
Now, contrary to what has been said by Vegetti, a cosmos so conceived is 
imbued with an inner teleological order. In his classical essay on the nature of 
Galen’s teleological explanation, Hankinson has underlined the differences 
between Aristotelian and Galenic teleology. In the first place, in contrast to the 
Galenic view, which has recourse to a creative Demiurgic entity inspired by 
Plato’s Timaeus, Aristotelian teleology does not involve direction.457 Second, 
whereas Aristotle’s teleology is limited (because although he often repeats the 
motto that “Nature does nothing in vain”, it is true that there are some parts of 
animals, such as the gall-bladder, which cannot be explained teleologically – cf. 
De part. an. 677a12–19), Galen stresses much more cogently the all-pervading 
perfection of nature’s design (for example, as Hankinson remarks, in contrast to 
Aristotle, he explains the function and nature of the gall-bladder teleologically – 
cf. De usu part. p. I.272–6 Helmreich).458 Notwithstanding such differences, on 
the strength of the account provided by Moraux and Kovačić, we have shown 
that the presence of a Demiurge is not at all irreconcilable with the idea of an 
Aristotelian immanent natural principle that shapes an organism specifically 
different since, from its very beginning, i.e. during the phase of embryogenesis, 
it structures it from within in accordance with a teleological plan. Now, another 
aspect, which remains controversial, of Aristotle’s teleology concerns its 
anthropocentric character, at least according to the much-debated interpretation 
provided by David Sedley.459 This interpretation, if indeed it is in doubt and is 
nevertheless arguable for Aristotle himself, certainly identifies a more prominent 
feature of the nature of Galen’s teleological explanation as exhibited in his De 
temperamentis. Let us consider two texts from De temperamentis, T4 and T5:  
                                                          
457 Hankinson 1989 p. 213.  
458 Hankinson 1989 p. 214.   




T4 Galen De temperamentis K. I. 565.3-566.3 Helmreich p. 35.17–36.6:  
 
Ἐπιστήσαντες οὖν πάλιν ἐνταῦθα τὸν λόγον ἐπισκεψώμεθα, τίς ἄριστα 
κέκραται πάντων ἄνθρωπος, ὃν καὶ τῆς ὅλης μὲν οὐσίας, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον 
ἀνθρώπων τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων ἐν τῷ μέσῳ χρὴ τάξαντας, καθάπερ τινὰ 
κανόνα καὶ γνώμονα, τοὺς ἄλλους ἅπαντας τούτῳ παραβάλλοντας θερμοὺς καὶ 
ψυχροὺς καὶ ξηροὺς καὶ ὑγροὺς ὀνομάζειν. δεῖ δὲ συνδραμεῖν ἐς ταὐτὸν ἐπὶ 
τοῦδε πολλὰ γνωρίσματα. καὶ γὰρ ὡς πρὸς τὴν ὅλην οὐσίαν ἐξετάζοντι μέσον 
χρὴ φαίνεσθαι τὸν τοιοῦτον, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον ὡς πρὸς ἀνθρώπους τε καὶ ζῷα. τὰ 
μὲν οὖν ἁπάσης τῆς οὐσίας κοινὰ γνωρίσματα προείρηται· τὰ δ' ὡς ἐν ζῴων 
εἴδεσιν ἐνεργείας τελειότητι κρίνεται τῆς ἑκάστῳ πρεπούσης. πρέπει δ' ἀνθρώπῳ 
μὲν εἶναι σοφωτάτῳ, κυνὶ δὲ πρᾳοτάτῳ θ' ἅμα καὶ ἀλκιμωτάτῳ, λέοντι δ' 
ἀλκιμωτάτῳ μόνον, ὥσπερ γε καὶ προβάτῳ πρᾳοτάτῳ. καὶ μέν γε καὶ ὡς τὰς τοῦ 
σώματος ἐνεργείας οἰκείας εἶναι προσήκει τῷ τῆς ψυχῆς | ἤθει, δέδεικται μὲν 
καὶ πρὸς Ἀριστοτέλους ἐν τοῖς περὶ ζῴων μορίων, δέδεικται δὲ καὶ πρὸς ἡμῶν 
ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν οὐδὲν ἧττον. 
 
So let us again focus our argument at this point and consider: which human being 
has the best mixture of all? We should place this human being in the middle with 
respect to all existent objects, and even more so in relation to human beings and 
other animals; and using him as a kind of standard and yardstick, should call all 
others hot, cold, dry or wet by comparison with him. Many indicators must point 
in the same direction here. For indeed, when one conducts the examination in 
relation to all existent objects, it must be apparent that such a person is in the 
middle, and this must be the case even more so in relation to human beings and 
animals. Now, the common indicators that apply to all existent objects have been 
stated already; those applicable to animal species, on the other hand, are 
evaluated on the basis of the perfection of the activity appropriate to each. It is 
appropriate for a human being to be very intelligent; for a dog to be both very 
docile and very brave […] Moreover, that the activities of the body should be 
appropriate to the character of the soul has been shown by Aristotle in the Parts 




T5 Galen De temperamentis K. I p. 546.15-547.9 Helmrecih p. 24.4–15: 
 
εἰ τύχοι, λέγοντες, ὅταν, οἵᾳ μάλιστα πρέπει τὴν φύσιν ὑπάρχειν συκῇ, τοιαύτη 
τις ᾖ, κύνα δ' αὖ καὶ σῦν καὶ ἵππον καὶ ἄνθρωπον, ἐπειδὰν καὶ τούτων ἕκαστον 
ἄριστα τῆς οἰκείας ἔχῃ φύσεως. αὐτὸ δὲ δὴ τοῦτο τὸ τῆς οἰκείας φύσεως ἔχειν 
ἄριστα ταῖς ἐνεργείαις κρίνεται. καὶ γὰρ καὶ φυτὸν καὶ ζῷον ὁτιοῦν ἄριστα 
διακεῖσθαι τηνικαῦτά φαμεν, ὅταν ἐνεργῄσῃ κάλλιστα. συκῆς μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴ 
βέλτιστά τε καὶ πλεῖστα τελεσφορεῖν σῦκα· κατὰ ταὐτὰ δὲ καὶ τῆς ἀμπέλου τὸ 
πλείστας τε καὶ καλλίστας ἐκφέρειν σταφυλάς, ἵππου δὲ τὸ θεῖν ὠκύτατα καὶ 
κυνὸς εἰς μὲν θήρας τε καὶ φυλακὰς ἄκρως εἶναι θυμοειδῆ, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς οἰκείους 
πρᾳότατον.  
 
We would say, for example, that a fig-tree was well-mixed, if it were one 
possessed of that nature which is most appropriate to a fig-tree; and the same of 
a dog, pig, horse or human being when each of these, similarly, was in the best 
state with regard to its own nature. And this matter of ‘being in the best state 
with regard to its own nature’ is evaluated in terms of the activities. The 
excellence of a fig-tree, for example, consists in its bringing to fruition the most 
and the best figs; in exactly the same way, that of a vine [consists in its] 
producing the most and the best grapes; that of a horse in running very fast, and 
that of a dog in extreme spiritedness in hunting and guarding, combined with 
very great docility towards the members of its own household. (Trans. Singer) 
 
 
As we have seen, the bodily mixture is responsible for the living being’s 
specific behaviour and its distinctive bodily activities and these in turn – as Galen 
states – should be appropriate to the character of the soul, as shown also by 
Aristotle in his De partibus animalium (cf. T4 “καὶ μέν γε καὶ ὡς τὰς τοῦ 
σώματος ἐνεργείας οἰκείας εἶναι προσήκει τῷ τῆς ψυχῆς | ἤθει, δέδεικται μὲν 
καὶ πρὸς Ἀριστοτέλους ἐν τοῖς περὶ ζῴων μορίων, δέδεικται δὲ καὶ πρὸς ἡμῶν 
ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν οὐδὲν ἧττον”). As Schiefsky has aptly highlighted in an article on 
the Galenic teleological explanation, both in Aristotle and in Galen the body and 
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its parts (and hence the bodily mixture) are teleologically thought of as existing 
for the sake of the soul in the sense that the whole organism has an explanatory 
priority over its constitutive parts.460 However, if we look ahead and beyond the 
teleological explanation regarding the single individual specifically different, we 
see from all the texts we have considered so far that, within anti-dogmatic 
boundaries,461 Galen envisages his cosmos (of which, unfortunately, in his De 
temperamentis, we catch only passing glimpses), in the first place as permeated 
by a unified teleological order, in which the characteristic activities of animals 
and plants are thought of as at the service of human beings. The anthropocentric 
nature of Galen’s teleological explanation undoubtedly stands out in our T5, 
where it is clearly said that the excellence (the word aretê – taken from 
Aristotle’s moral philosophy – can be paraphrased as “the nature of the being in 
the best condition with regard to its own nature”) of plants and animals can be 
measured by how far they serve human beings. On the one hand, the best fig tree 
(the fig tree par excellence, i.e. the midpoint within the species of fig trees), for 
example, is such because it produces the most and the best figs, its natural end 
being the fact that human beings can eat its fruits; and the best vine (the vine par 
excellence, i.e. the midpoint within the species of vines) is such because it 
produces the most and the best grapes. On the other hand, the same reasoning is 
valid for the species of animals: the best horse is that which runs very fast in 
order to be used by human beings as a means of transportation, whereas the best 
dog is endowed with extreme spiritedness in order to serve for the purpose of 
helping human beings in hunting and guarding their homes. Hence, as we see, 
the human being is at the centre of Galen’s sublunary cosmos. In fact, as can be 
easily gleaned from T4, the human being, i.e. the best human being or the most 
well-mixed human being, is in the middle with respect to all existent beings 
belonging to the highest genus of the whole substance, and a fortiori in relation 
                                                          
460 Cf. Schiefsky 2007 pp. 369-400. Schiefsky’s essay is devoted to exploring the relation 
between Galen’s teleology and the functional explanation. One of his nodal points is in fact the 
distinction between energeia and chreia. As Schiefsky underscores, while energeia is defined 
by Galen as an “active motion”, the chreia is “what is commonly called the utility (euchrestía)” 
(De usu part. p. II. 437.8–15 H.), that is, the beneficial contribution of an activity to the 
organism’s life that is threefold (as in Aristotle): i) for life itself, ii) for better life, iii) for the 
preservation of the race (cf. De usu part. p. I.318.8–11 H.). 
461 As Moraux observes, Galen does not take a position on the thorny doctrinal question dividing 
philosophical schools concerning whether the cosmos is generated or not or whether there exists 
an extra-cosmic void (cf. Moraux 1984 p. 327 with n. 324 with references).  
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to all human beings and other animals (cf. T4 “τίς ἄριστα κέκραται πάντων 
ἄνθρωπος, ὃν καὶ τῆς ὅλης μὲν οὐσίας, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον ἀνθρώπων τε καὶ τῶν 
ἄλλων ζῴων ἐν τῷ μέσῳ χρὴ τάξαντας”) and should be regarded as a kind of 
canon or yardstick on the basis of which to call all other bodies hot, cold, dry, or 
wet (again, cf. T4 “καθάπερ τινὰ κανόνα καὶ γνώμονα, τοὺς ἄλλους ἅπαντας 
τούτῳ παραβάλλοντας θερμοὺς καὶ ψυχροὺς καὶ ξηροὺς καὶ ὑγροὺς 
ὀνομάζειν”).462  
Now, because of its being a standard and a yardstick, it is not by chance 
that Galen establishes a well-known comparison between the most well-mixed 
human being, which is clearly a man (women are not considered, since by nature 
they have a cold mixture463) and the Canon, the celebre statue of Polyclitus, as 
we see from T6:  
 
 
T6 Galen De temperamentis K. I 566.8-567.9 Helmreich pp. 36.12–37.1: 
 
(1) οὕτω γοῦν καὶ πλάσται καὶ γραφεῖς ἀνδριαντοποιοί τε καὶ ὅλως 
ἀγαλματοποιοὶ τὰ κάλλιστα γράφουσι καὶ πλάττουσι καθ' ἕκαστον εἶδος, οἷον 
ἄνθρωπον εὐμορφότατον ἢ ἵππον ἢ βοῦν ἢ λέοντα, τὸ μέσον ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ γένει 
σκοποῦντες. καί πού τις ἀνδριὰς ἐπαινεῖται Πολυκλείτου κανὼν ὀνομαζόμενος, 
ἐκ τοῦ πάντων τῶν μορίων ἀκριβῆ τὴν πρὸς ἄλληλα συμμετρίαν ἔχειν ὀνόματος 
τοιούτου τυχών. ἐστὶ μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ πλέον, ὃν νῦν ἡμεῖς ζητοῦμεν, ἢ ὁ κανὼν οὗτος. 
(2) οὐ μόνον γὰρ ὑγρότητός τε καὶ ξηρότητος ἐν τῷ μέσῳ καθέστηκεν ὁ οὕτως 
                                                          
462 At any rate, attention must be drawn to the fact that although the human being remains at the 
centre of Galen’s sublunary cosmos, its importance should be brought into perspective and scaled 
down when – as has been pointed out – considers the marvellous grandeur of the supralunary 
regions and, therefore, the powerful intelligence penetrating the celestial bodies, such as the sun, 
the moon, and all the stars (cf. De usu part. pp. II.441–447 H. in Van der Eijk 2014a pp. 98–101; 
cf. also Van der Eijk 2017. For a precise and schematic overview of Galen’s scala naturae from 
the primary elements to divine Demiurge cf. Kovačić 2001 pp. 207–209. The passage from De 
usu partium is rightly famous: various scholars (Donini 1980 pp. 334–335; Moraux 1981b p. 
101 ff. and 1984 pp. 327–328; Kovačić 2001 pp. 202–204 with nn. 35 and 44) have seen that in 
his theorizing of such an intelligence permeating, in the first instance, the celestial bodies and 
then gradually reaching, although less intensely, the earthy bodies, Galen approximates the views 
expressed by the pseudo-Aristotelian author of the treatise De mundo.  
463 For, as Galen states, women are fatter than men and this is taken to be an indication of their 
cold mixture due to their natural constitution or a lazy lifestyle; cf. the only passage in De 
temperamentis where Galen deals with women’s constitution, De temp. p. 62.8–11 H. “σπάνιον 
μὲν οὖν ἐπ' ἀνδρῶν τὸ τοιοῦτον, ἐπὶ δὲ γυναικῶν καὶ πάνυ πολλάκις εὑρισκόμενον. ἐστὶ γὰρ καὶ 
φύσεως ψυχροτέρας καὶ ἀργοτέρου βίου τὸ τοιοῦτον γνώρισμα”.  
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εὔσαρκος ἄνθρωπος, ἀλλὰ καὶ διαπλάσεως ἀρίστης τετύχηκεν, ἴσως μὲν 
ἑπομένης τῇ τῶν τεττάρων στοιχείων εὐκρασίᾳ, τάχα δέ τινα θειοτέραν ἀρχὴν 
ἑτέραν ἐχούσης ἄνωθεν. (3) ἀλλὰ τό γε πάντως εὔκρατον εἶναι τὸν τοιοῦτον ἐξ 
ἀνάγκης ὑπάρχει· τὸ γὰρ ἐν εὐσαρκίᾳ σύμμετρον εὐκρασίας ἐστὶν ἔκγονον. 
εὐθὺς δ' ὑπάρχει τῷ τοιούτῳ σώματι καὶ ταῖς ἐνεργείαις ἄριστα διακεῖσθαι καὶ 




(1) And indeed it is in this way, too, that sculptors, painters, makers of 
human statues, and makers of images in general, achieve the greatest beauty in 
their painting or sculpting of each species, for example, the most well-formed 
human being, or horse, or ox, or lion, by aiming for the middle within that 
particular genus. And indeed, there is a certain statue that is much admired and 
which is named the Canon of Polyclitus; it has acquired this name from the fact 
that all its parts are in a precise state of good balance with each other. The 
[canon] that we are now seeking is, broadly speaking, this Canon464 (2) For the 
man who is well-fleshed in this way is not just in the middle state with regard to 
wetness and dryness, but has also got an excellent shaping, something which is 
possibly dependent on the good-mixture of the four elements, but may perhaps 
                                                          
464 In contrast to Helmreich’s text (ἐστὶ μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ πλέον, ὃν νῦν ἡμεῖς ζητοῦμεν, ἢ ὁ κανὼν 
οὗτος), Singer’s translation omits ἢ (which in Helmreich’s critical apparatus is omitted by the 
ms. Marcianus (M), whereas, as the philologist Vito Lo Russo notes, in the Laurentianus (L), the 
most authoritative ms., ἢ seems to be added by a different hand and might be a later scribal 
insertion) and translates the reconstructed sentence “ἐστὶ μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ πλέον, ὃν νῦν ἡμεῖς 
ζητοῦμεν, ὁ κανὼν οὗτος". This translation leads to a new interpretation according to which the 
Canon of Polyclitus is equivalent to Galen’s well-fleshed man. This is not, however, the only 
interpretation of the passage. In fact, according to a second interpretation, in line with 
Helmreich’s text, Galen’s well-fleshed man would even be superior to Polyclitus’ Canon, the 
translation of Helmreich’s sentence being the following: “Now (the canon) that we are looking 
for at present is something more than this Canon (of Polyclitus)”. There is also a third 
interpretation of the passage. M in fact omits ἢ and writes the genitive relative pronoun οὗ instead 
of ὃν, to be taken as ‘than the one whom’. In this case, the translation would be: ‘Now this Canon 
(of Polyclitus) is something that goes beyond the (canon) that we are looking for at present. For 
the man who is well-fleshed in this way (i.e. as demonstrated by Polyclitus) does not just occupy 
a middle position as regards wetness and dryness, but he has also received an outstanding 
shaping, which is perhaps a consequence of the good balance between the four elements, but 
which perhaps has a certain different, divine origin from above’. According to this third 
translation, the Standard of Polyclitus would seem to be superior to the body Galen is looking 
for. For a thorough discussion on this textual locus and its different interpretations cf. Van der 
Eijk 2014a pp. 113 ff. with n. 68. 
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have some other, more divine, source, from above (οὐ μόνον γὰρ ὑγρότητός τε 
καὶ ξηρότητος ἐν τῷ μέσῳ καθέστηκεν ὁ οὕτως εὔσαρκος ἄνθρωπος, ἀλλὰ καὶ 
διαπλάσεως ἀρίστης τετύχηκεν, ἴσως μὲν ἑπομένης τῇ τῶν τεττάρων στοιχείων 
εὐκρασίᾳ, τάχα δέ τινα θειοτέραν ἀρχὴν ἑτέραν ἐχούσης ἄνωθεν). (3) But at any 
rate, it will necessarily be the property of such a person that he is completely 
well-mixed; for good balance with regard to well-fleshedness is a product of 
good mixture (ἀλλὰ τό γε πάντως εὔκρατον εἶναι τὸν τοιοῦτον ἐξ ἀνάγκης 
ὑπάρχει· τὸ γὰρ ἐν εὐσαρκίᾳ σύμμετρον εὐκρασίας ἐστὶν ἔκγονον.). It will also 
automatically be the property of his body that it is in the best state as regards its 
activities, as well as being in a well-moderated position with respect to hardness 
and softness, hotness and coldness (εὐθὺς δ' ὑπάρχει τῷ τοιούτῳ σώματι καὶ ταῖς 
ἐνεργείαις ἄριστα διακεῖσθαι καὶ σκληρότητός τε καὶ μαλακότητος ἔχειν 
μετρίως  θερμότητός τε καὶ ψυχρότητος). (Trans. Singer; slightly modified) 
 
 
The sculpture Galen is referring to, the Canon, i.e. the Standard, is also 
known as the Doryphoros (‘spearthrower’), by the fifth century sculptor 
Polyclitus, who also wrote a treatise with the same title (as can be inferred from 
De plac. Hipp. et Plat. p. 308 De Lacy).465 In his study on ancient aesthetics, 
Jackie Pigeaud observes that this statue represented a great innovation in Greek 
art because it posed the problem of the articulation and harmony of the human 
body, of measure and commensurability (symmetría), bestowing for this reason 
proper dignity on both the part and the whole of the statue.466 As the scholar 
perceptively remarks, in his De temperamentis (but also in many other passages 
of his works),467 Galen makes use of the Canon of Polyclitus to translate his idea 
                                                          
465 Cf. Pigeaud 1995 p.  29; cf. Van der Eijk 2010 pp. 3–4. 
466 Cf. Pigeaud 1995 p. 29 cf. also Van der Eijk 2010 pp. 3–4.  
467 Cf. De opt. corp. constit. p. 13.2 H.; De meth. med. K. X p. 463-8 ff.; De san. tuend. CMG V 
4.2 p. 56.24 ff. Koch where Galen even finds a geographical collocation for perfect bodies 
comparable to the Canon (the central well-tempered region including Rome and Greece): “ξηροὶ 
μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἰσχνοὶ καὶ οἷον ἐσκελετευμένοι γίνονται κατὰ τὰς θερμὰς χώρας οἱ ἄνθρωποι, 
ἀνώμαλοι δὲ ταῖς κράσεσιν, ὡς τὰ μὲν ἔξω ψυχρά, τὰ δὲ ἔνδον τε καὶ κατὰ τὰ σπλάγχνα θερμὰ 
περαιτέρω τοῦ προσήκοντος ἔχειν, οἱ τῶν ψυχρῶν χωρίων οἰκήτορες. τὸ δ' ἄριστον σῶμα, περὶ 
οὗ νῦν ὁ λόγος, ὥσπερ ὁ <Πολυκλείτου> κανών ἐστιν, ᾧ κατὰ μὲν τὴν ἡμετέραν χώραν, ὡς ἂν 
εὔκρατον ὑπάρχουσαν, ὦπται πολλὰ παραπλήσια σώματα, παρὰ δὲ Κελτοῖς ἢ Σκύθαις ἢ 
Αἰγυπτίοις ἢ Ἄραψιν οὐδ' ὄναρ ἔστιν ἰδεῖν τοιοῦτον σῶμα. καὶ αὐτῆς δὲ τῆς ἡμετέρας χώρας 
ἱκανὸν ἐχούσης πλάτος, εὐκρατότατόν ἐστι τὸ μεσαίτατον, οἷόνπερ ὑπάρχει τὸ κατὰ τὴν 
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of the midpoint into images, which would serve as a standard on the basis of 
which to compare and to assess all the other existent bodies.468 Such a body is 
defined as εὔσαρκος – “well-fleshed” – and, as Galen explains, that means both 
that he is the midpoint between hot/cold and dry/wet and that he has got an 
excellent shape (diaplasis), which can be dependent either on the eukrasia of the 
four primary elements (in the sense that it would be an outcome of this) or on a 
more divine source (T6.2).469 At any rate, as Galen states, it is the good-mixture 
that produces, on the one hand, well-fleshedness (or eusarkia) and, on the other 
hand, is εὐθὺς, immediately responsible also for the best activities of the 
organism, as we have underscored (T6.3).  
However, one point remains unclear: is the standard, on the basis of which 
we are to compare all the other bodies, the best human being, or is it the palm of 
the hand? In fact, as we have seen, Galen defines both as canon (kanôn) and 
yardstick (gnomon). The issue is not trivial at all, because if, on the one hand, 
we have previously examined the anthropocentric character of Galen’s 
teleology, we now want to press the question a little further to find the very core 
of Galen’s sublunary cosmos.  
It is Galen himself who, when recapping the contents of the first book in 
De temperamentis II 1, explains the relation between the human being as the 
                                                          
<Ἱπποκράτους> πατρίδα· καὶ γὰρ χειμῶνος αὕτη καὶ θέρους ἐστὶν εὔκρατος, ἔτι δὲ δὴ μᾶλλον 
ἦρός τε καὶ φθινοπώρου”.  
468 Pigeaud 1995 pp. 29–38 and esp. p. 37: “Mais le Canon que cherche Galien est plus difficile, 
car il droit rendre compte à la fois de la crase et de la forme (diaplasis). Cette reductio du Canon 
de Polyclète à la moyenne implique bien davantage qu'une référence convenue au topos 
polyclétéén quand il s'agit de symmétria. Le Doryphore comme homme moyen est une chose 
apparemment nouvelle. Elle correspond à une tentative poir homogénéiser les questions de la 
matière et celles de la forme. Le mèson est un cas d' égalité entre les extremes, cas particuler de 
la symmétria”. Cf. also the chapter on Galen’s Aesthetics, pp. 127–153, and on Galen’s usage of 
the Canon, pp. 139–143.  
469 As we see in this passage (T6) concerning the Canon of Polyclitus, Galen ascribes the 
excellent shaping  (διαπλάσεως ἀρίστης) either to the good-mixture of the four elements (on 
which such a shaping would be dependent in the sense of a necessary physical/physiological 
consequence; cf. ἑπομένης τῇ τῶν τεττάρων στοιχείων εὐκρασίᾳ) or to a more divine source, 
coming from above (which in any case – as we have shown – had to make use of the four 
elements to shape an organism specifically different from within, according to a teleological 
programme or kata prôton logon). In fact, we have pointed out that one has to draw a clear-cut 
distinction between i) the first shaping of an organism (i.e. the shaping capacity Galen refers to 
in this section) which we identified as the total mixture of hot, cold, dry, and wet, performed by 
a demiurgic Nature or God, and which moulds the parts of an individual in accordance with its 
own soul, and ii) the further physical and psychological consequences which afterwards 
necessarily follow (in the sense of hepesthai) on the mixtures themselves (and it is to this that 




midpoint of the highest genus of substance and the part of the human body which 




T7 Galen De temperamentis K. I 575.4-15 Helmreich pp. 41.24–42.7: 
 
(1) Δέδεικται γὰρ δὴ πρόσθεν, ὡς ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν οὐ τῶν ζῴων μόνον ἢ φυτῶν, 
ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων εὐκρατότατον. ἐπεὶ δ' ἐκ πολλῶν καὶ διαφερόντων 
σύγκειται μορίων, εὔδηλον, ὡς τὸ μέσον ἁπάντων τῇ κράσει τοῦτο καὶ ἁπλῶς 
ἐστιν εὔκρατον. τὸ γὰρ τοῦ μέσου τῇ κράσει ζῴου μέσον μόριον ἁπάντων ἁπλῶς 
εὐκρατότατον ἔσται. (2) ἐδείχθη δὲ τοῦτ' ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ καλούμενον δέρμα καὶ 
μάλιστα τοῦ δέρματος τὸ τῶν χειρῶν ἐντός, ὅταν, οἷον ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως 
ἀπειργάσθη, τοιοῦτον φυλάττηται. καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ ὡς οὐ παντὸς ἀνθρώπου τὸ 
δέρμα μέσον ἁπλῶς ἐστιν ἁπάσης οὐσίας, ἐδείχθη πρόσθεν, ἀλλ' ὅστις ἂν 
εὐκρατότατος ᾖ·  
 
(1) For indeed it has been shown above that the human being is the most well-
mixed [being], not just among animals or plants, but also among all others. Since, 
however, it is composed of many different parts (ἐπεὶ δ' ἐκ πολλῶν καὶ 
διαφερόντων σύγκειται μορίων), it is quite evident that that part which is in the 
middle of all of them with regard to mixture will also be well-mixed in the 
absolute sense (τὸ μέσον ἁπάντων τῇ κράσει τοῦτο καὶ ἁπλῶς ἐστιν εὔκρατον). 
For, of the animal which is in the middle with regard to mixture, the middle part 
will be the most well-mixed of all, in the absolute sense (τὸ γὰρ τοῦ μέσου τῇ 
κράσει ζῴου μέσον μόριον ἁπάντων ἁπλῶς εὐκρατότατον ἔσται). (2) And it was 
shown hat within human beings this part was that known as ‘skin’, and more 
especially the skin the palm of the hand – provided that this has remained as it 
was crafted by Nature. It was, however, also shown above that not every human 
being’s skin is in the middle of all existent object[s], but only that of the one who 




As Galen has it, there is a part of the human being, that which is in the 
middle with regard to mixture, which is in the middle with regard to all its other 
parts and, therefore, in the middle in the absolute sense: this part is, as Galen 
puts it, τὸ μέσον μόριον τοῦ μέσου ζῴου and, therefore, the most well-mixed in 
the absolute sense, i.e. ἁπλῶς εὐκρατότατον (T7.1). In fact, by comparing this 
part, the skin of the palm of the hand, to the other parts of the most well-mixed 
body it is possible to understand the standard qualitative composition of each 
part: an operation which Galen himself undertakes at the end of I 9 when he 
analyses the main bodily parts individually (from the humours to the flesh of the 
various organs) and describes their qualitative composition by comparing them 
to the skin.470 As Galen goes on to clarify in T7.2, he is not speaking of every 
human being’s skin but of that belonging to the most well-mixed human being, 
that has remained as it was, shaped by the work of Nature. At I 9 of De 
temperamentis, however, Galen is much more precise in outlining the defining 
traits of the possessor of such a bodily part, giving us detailed pieces of 
information on i) his social status and ii) the specific function that such a bodily 
part has, as we can understand from T8:  
 
 
T8 Galen De temperamentis K. I pp. 567.11-568.16 Helmreich p. 37.1–24: 
 
καὶ ταῦθ' ὑπάρχει [ἅπαντα] τῷ δέρματι καὶ τούτου μάλιστα τῷ τῆς χειρὸς ἐντός, 
ὅταν γε μηδένα τύλον ἔχῃ τοιοῦτον, οἷος τοῖς ἐρέττουσί τε καὶ σκάπτουσι 
γίγνεται. διττῆς γὰρ ἕνεκα χρείας τῶν χειρῶν γεγενημένων, ἁφῆς καὶ 
ἀντιλήψεως, αἱ μαλακαὶ μὲν εἰς τὴν τῆς ἁφῆς ἀκρίβειαν, αἱ σκληραὶ δ' εἰς τὴν 
τῆς ἀντιλήψεως ἰσχὺν ἐπιτηδειότεραι. Καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ δέρμα τὸ μέσον οὐ μόνον 
ἁπάντων τῶν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου μορίων, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς ὅλης οὐσίας ἁπάντων τῶν ἐν 
γενέσει τε καὶ | φθορᾷ σωμάτων οὐ τὸ τετυλωμένον ἐστὶ καὶ σκληρὸν καὶ 
λιθῶδες, ἀλλὰ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἔχον, ᾧ δὴ καὶ μάλιστά φαμεν ἀκριβοῦσθαι τὴν 
ἁφήν. […] εἰ δὴ τοῦτο κανόνα τε καὶ οἷον κριτήριον ἁπάντων τῶν τοῦ ζῴου 
μορίων προστησάμενος ἐξετάζοις τε καὶ παραβάλλοις αὐτῷ τἆλλα, τὰς ὀκτὼ 
διαφορὰς εὑρήσεις τῶν δυσκρασιῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς.  
                                                          




These also will be the properties [the equidistance between hot/cold and dry/wet] 
of the skin, and especially of the skin on the inside of the hand (provided that it 
does not have any callus of the sort suffered in rowing or digging). For there are 
two functions for which hands came into being, that of touching and that of 
holding; soft hands are better equipped for accuracy in the sense of touch, hard 
hands for strength in grasping objects. The skin which is middle, not just with 
regard to all the parts of the human being, but with regard to all existent objects 
– all bodies that are subject to generation and decay – is not that which is 
callused, hard and stone-like, but rather that which has preserved its natural state; 
and it is by virtue of this, we say, that its sense of touch is made especially 
precise. […] If, then, you take skin as a standard and, as it were, criterion against 
which to examine all other parts of the animal, and compare these with it, you 
will find the eight distinct types of imbalance within those parts (Trans. Singer) 
 
 
As is clear from the text, the skin of the hand that Galen has in mind is not 
that which is callused, hard and stone-like (οὐ τὸ τετυλωμένον ἐστὶ καὶ σκληρὸν 
καὶ λιθῶδες) and which can belong to particular social actors, i.e. working-class 
people devoted to more generally banausic practises, such as rowers or diggers 
(ὅταν γε μηδένα τύλον ἔχῃ τοιοῦτον, οἷος τοῖς ἐρέττουσί τε καὶ σκάπτουσι 
γίγνεται), but the soft hand (αἱ μαλακαὶ μὲν εἰς τὴν τῆς ἁφῆς ἀκρίβειαν) that is 
preserved in its natural state (τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἔχον) and which, for this reason, is 
endowed with an extremely precise sense of touch (ᾧ δὴ καὶ μάλιστά φαμεν 
ἀκριβοῦσθαι τὴν ἁφήν). Now, touch (ἁφή) has been considered a powerful 
diagnostic tool since Hippocratic medicine and, in Galen’s text too, it is 
described as an irreplaceable instrument used by the doctor for recognizing and 
assessing the mixtures in living bodies. For it is sufficiently straightforward that 
the palm of the hand, which represents the midpoint with respect to all bodies 
subject to coming-to-be and passing-away, is that of the aspiring physician, 
whom Galen wants to train in the study of mixtures. Thus he suggests taking 
skin as a standard and criterion against which to compare all parts of animals 
and find out the eight other dyskrasiai (εἰ δὴ τοῦτο κανόνα τε καὶ οἷον κριτήριον 
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ἁπάντων τῶν τοῦ ζῴου μορίων προστησάμενος ἐξετάζοις τε καὶ παραβάλλοις 
αὐτῷ τἆλλα, τὰς ὀκτὼ διαφορὰς εὑρήσεις τῶν δυσκρασιῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς).471 The 
conclusion, then, is that the meson of the meson, the centre of Galen’s universe, 
that is, the middle part of the middle human being, coincides with the palm of 
the hand of the physician. By applying it to whichever body, and above all, to 
the body of the patients the doctor cures, he is enabled to gain an empirical 
absolute knowledge concerning the very essence of whichever physical body, 
inanimate and animate, i.e. its mixture or qualitative composition, its being hot, 
cold, dry, or wet on an absolute scale. On the other hand, by using the logikê 
theoria acquired through his long logical training and by comparing it to the 
corresponding relative midpoint, he can heal his patients, equating the patients’ 
own oikeia physis to the meson of the species or genus in order to restore the 
relative eukrasia of living bodies.  
To take stock of the results gained in this last section contributing to our 
analysis of Galen’s scheme of nine mixtures, its roots and function within his 
natural philosophy, we can say, first of all, that the physician should begin the 
study of the mixtures in living beings with considerations on qualified bodies, 
especially those of plants and animals, by comparing them either a) to whichever 
random body or b) to the midpoint according to species or genus. Second, we 
have seen that Galen’s sublunary cosmos is made up of three concentric physical 
realms (substance, plants, and animals), with humans, the most well-mixed of 
all (comparable to Polyclitus’ Canon), at its centre as the natural end of the 
activities of all other living beings. Third, we found out that there is a part of this 
most well-mixed human that is deemed the meson of the meson, namely the skin 
of the palm of the hand, whose possessor is an upper-class doctor making use of 
it as tool for recognizing mixtures in living beings. Finally, throughout the whole 
section we showed, on the one hand, that Galen’s De temperamentis resorts to 
teleological (anthropocentric) explanation and, on the other hand, that his system 
of nine mixtures fits in with this insofar as, if we look at Galen’s cosmos from a 
relative point of view, we do not have only one absolute eukrasia, but, on the 
contrary, myriads of relative, functional, and functionalistic eukrasiai.  
                                                          
471 On Galen’s account of the sense of touch as a fundamental instrument used by doctors for the 

























































3.1 A vexata quaestio. Κρᾶσις versus μίξις  
 
 
The Ancient Greeks did not express the concept of mixture univocally – Ancient 
Greek has a range of verbs (and cognates) indicating or pertinent to the mixing 
of different constituents: κεράννυμι, μείγνυμι, φύρειν and κυκᾶν472. Leaving 
                                                          
472 Schmidt 1886, p. 645. As far as the meanings of the latter two verbs are concerned, it is likely 
that φύρειν (“to mix up, to wet, to soak”) etymologically stems from a pre-Greek root, since it is 
impossible to reconstruct an IE etymology. This verb originally indicated a mixture between powder 
grains and liquids, such as the mixture of earth and water (Hesiod Erga 60–62); cf. Schmidt 1886, 
pp. 658–659. See also Beekes 2010, s.v. φύρειν. Hence it also developed the meaning of “soaking”, 
“wetting”, as it is possible to infer from the Homeric expression δάκρυσι εἵματ᾽ἔφυρον (Ω 162); cf. 
Schwabe 1980, p. 40; cf. also Schmidt 1886 p. 659. The deverbative φυρᾶν also belongs to this 
family, but in contrast to φύρειν it chiefly has the meaning of “kneading”, whereas φύρειν could also 
mean “to dirty, to confuse, to mingle”; cf. Passow 1841-1857, s.v. φύρειν. Cf. also Schmidt 1886 p. 
659. As for κυκᾶν, whose etymology could derive either from an IE or from a pre-Greek root (cf. 
Beekes 2010, s.v. κυκᾶν), it means from Homer onwards “to mix” or “to stir”, and is said with 
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aside the latter κυκᾶν and φύρειν, in this context we will zoom in mainly on the 
former and on the nomina actionis stemming from these, κρᾶσις and μίξις. For 
in Galen’s texts the concept of mixture of primary elements is principally 
expressed using the latter two words. 
  Etymologically speaking, the word-family of κεράννυμι has a Greek 
root, κερᾰ-/κρᾱ- (κρη-), stemming from the IE *ḱerh� / *ḱṛh�. From the root 
κρᾱ- derive Ancient verbal forms, such as the passive aorist ἐκρᾱθην (Ion. 
ἐκρήθην), the passive future κρα-θήσομαι, or the passive perfect κέ-κρᾱ-μαι 
(Ion. κέκρημαι). Among many nominal derivatives stemming from the root κρᾱ-, 
it is worth mentioning the most important ones here: the nomen actionis κρᾶ-σις 
“mixture”, the noun κρα-τήρ “mixing bowl” (present also in Myc. ka-ra-te-
ra473), and the adjective (ἄ)-κρᾱ-τος “unmixed” or “pure”, which corresponds 
linguistically to the Sanskrit participle ā́-śīr-ta, “mixed”.474 The -νυ- present 
κεράννυμι (<*kera-s-nu) is a secondary verbal form arising from the root κερᾰ- 
of the sigmatic aorist ἐ-κέρᾰ-σ-α, as well as κεραίω and κεράω.475 There are 
several nominal derivatives of the root κερᾰ-, such as κεραστής, “mixer”, 
κέρασμα, “result of a mixture”, and κατακέρᾰσις, which describes the restoration 
of a certain mixture and is also used (together with its derivative adjective 
κατακεραστικός) in the medical field. The archaic nasal present κίρνημι (Lesb. 
κέρνᾱμι, Hom. κιρνάω) is from *kər-nāmi, which contains a schwa secundum.476 
This form used to be related by linguists to the Sanskrit śrīṇā́ti, usually translated 
as “mixes, cooks”.477 But this has recently been called into question and the form 
has instead been connected to the IE root *ḱreiH “to shine, to excel”478 On the 
                                                          
reference to liquids and solids. Kυκᾶν differs from φύρειν insofar as it describes more precisely an 
action of “stirring” that does not necessarily entail the mixing of different constituents (as for 
example in E 903 where the verb is employed with reference to milk). The word-family, however, 
seems to show a connection with the concept of mixture as well, since the verb is also employed to 
describe the preparation of the so-called κυκεών (a word which belongs to the same word-family), 
a drink made of wine and ground cheese (Λ 638); see Schmidt 1886, p. 660. 
473 MY Ue 611.2. On this cf. Lejeune 1960, p. 21. 
474 Beekes 2010; Chantraine 2002; Frisk 1973; Boisacq 1950, s.v. κεράννυμι. 
475 Rix 2001, s.v.*ḱerh�. Chantraine 2002, s.v. κεράννυμι. 
476 Beekes 2010, s.v. κεράννυμι.  
477 Pokorny 1959, pp. 1020–1021; Chantraine 2002; Frisk 1973, s.v. κεράννυμι; Montanari 1979, 
pp. 95–98. 
478 Narten 1987, pp. 270–196, where the scholar argues that the edic verb śrī is semantically separate 
from the IE root *ḱerh�, to which the words ā-śír, “mixture”, and ā-śīr-ta, “mixed”, belong instead. 
According to Narten, this vedic verb, śrī, has neither the meaning of “mixing” nor the meaning of 
“cooking”, but etymologically belongs to the noun śrī́, meaning “beauty, splendour, radiance”. 
Therefore, it is instead connected to the IE root *ḱreiH “to shine, to excel, to stand out”, and 
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other hand, the Old Avestan sārə-ṇtē “to unite”, “to merge” med. present 3pl 
seems to belong to the IE root *ḱerh₂ / *ḱṛh₂,479 where the connection with 
Western languages is questionable.480  
The verb μείγνυμι stems from the Greek root μειγ-/μιγ-, which in turn 
derives from the IE root *m(e)iḱ, reflected in the Sanskrit miś-rá, “mixed”.481 It 
is likely that the -νυ- present in μίγνυμι, which is very frequent in manuscripts 
and can be hesitantly considered an original zero-grade form, occurred later than 
the full-grade form μείγνυμι. The present μίσγω must be understood as a form 
with the -σκ- inchoative suffix (< μίγ-σκ-ω < μίσγω),482 which is also well 
represented in Western languages: Latin: misceō (cf. the form misc in CIL 560 
“mix!” imp. 2s.); Old Irish: mescaid; “mixes, confuses, immerses”; Old High 
German: miscan; Modern High German: mischen (<*miska, if it is not a Latin 
loanword). Sanskrit has a reduplicated s-formation mí-mikṣati, “to mix”, 
probably an original desiderative, perfect mimikṣé, causative mekṣayati.483 As 
we can see, while the other IE languages have a voiceless root-final stop 
(*m(e)iḱ), in Greek it is voiced and is reflected by μίσγω andis also present in 
other forms, such as the passive aorist μιγῆναι. Although the voiced root-final 
stop is difficult to explain, it is perhaps unnecessary to assume an IE root meiǵ/ḱ. 
In this regard, Beekes remarks that with the exception of the inchoative present, 
all the Greek formations with a voiced root-final stop -γ- are probably analogical 
                                                          
corresponds to the Greek κρείων, κρέων, “ruler, lord, master”. On this cf. also Beekes 2010, s.v. 
κεράννυμι and Rix 2001, s.v.*ḱerh�.  
479 Therefore, in Old Avestan the IE root would have the meanings of “uniting” and “mixing with” 
(cf. also Cheung 2007 s.v. sarH2), although Frisk and Chantraine are convinced that the meaning 
carried by this Old Avestan form should be drawn apart from the Greek semantic field; see 
Chantraine 2002 and Frisk 1973, s.v. κεράννυμι. More recently scholars have highlighted a 
connection between the Greek and the aforementioned Old Avestan form; see Beekes 2010, s.v. 
κεράννυμι, cf. also Rix 2001, s.v.*ḱerh� (Beekes, however, claims that the vocalic outcome ā of Old 
Avestan sārə-ṇtē remains unexplained); Pokorny 1959, pp. 1020–1021; Boisacq 1950, s.v. 
κεράννυμι.  See also Wackernagel and Debrunner 1942, p. 174.  
480  Pokorny 1959, p. 1021.  Pokorny seems to claim that Western languages preserve the IE root as 
well, where the laryngeal as usual has different vocalic outcomes: Old English; hrēran; Old High 
German: (h)ruoren; German: rühren, “to stir”, or more generally “to set in motion”, Rhur (river in 
Western Germany). This connection, however, is not so straightforward. Boisacq 1950 s.v., 
establishes a comparison between the terms related to the Germanic area and the Old Avestan 
without mentioning a connection with the Greek κεράννυμι; on the other hand, Frisk 1973, 
Chantraine 2002, Rix 2001, and Beekes 2010 do not draw comparisons with the Germanic linguistic 
area. 
481 Beekes 2010, s.v. μείγνυμι. 
482 See Frisk 1973; Chantraine 2002, s.v. μείγνυμι. For a detailed discussion cf. Montanari 1979, pp. 
80–82. 
483 Beekes 2010, Rix 2001, s.v. *meiḱ. 
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to forms with a voiced consonant or made to the aorist μεῖξαι,484 where the -ξ- 
of the sigmatic aorist infinitive ending (-σ-αι) could be considered as stemming 
either from a voiceless -κ- or from a voiced root-final stop -γ-. As for the nominal 
derivatives, the term μισγ-άγκεια, “place where the valleys meet”, is made to the 
present the root μίσγ-, whereas from the root μιγ- stem, among other nominal 
derivatives, the nomen actionis μίξις (also μεῖξις), “mixture”, and the noun 
μεῖγμα, “result of a mixture”.   
 As for the nomina actionis κρᾶσις and μίξις, their first occurrences do 
not appear in the Homeric poems; we find the term κρᾶσις for the first time in a 
fragment by Sappho485 and μίξις in a fragment by Anacreon.486 In both 
occurrences the terms already carry figurative meanings. Therefore, they are 
likely to have already been in use before Sappho’s and Alcaeus’ times, and, as 
Schwabe argues, certainly the first ancient Greek philosophers to elaborate 
different element theories already had these terms at their disposal to express the 
concept of the mixture of primary elements.487 As we have observed, they are 
nomina actionis formed by the suffix -σις. This suffix stems from an IE suffix -
ti-, which occurs in the most ancient Greek texts and plays a great role in the 
construction of the vocabulary of Ancient Greek prose. Generally this IE suffix 
-ti- is employed for the formation of verbal abstracts, although this general rule 
is not always valid and there are many exceptions to it.488 This IE suffix gives 
rise in Ancient Greek to the suffix –τις, which over time passes into -σις.489 
Differently from the nouns in -τις, the nouns in -σις seem to gain an increasingly 
                                                          
484 Beekes 2010, Frisk 1973, s.v. μείγνυμι. 
485 Fr. 148 Lobel - Page, where κρᾶσις indicates the metaphorical blending of wealth and virtue.  
486 Fr. 32 Page, where the term is used with reference to sexual union.  On the first occurrences 
of the terms cf. also Holt 1940, p. 97 and p. 100; Schwabe 1980, p. 18.  
487 Schwabe 1980, p. 18.  
488 For forms with this suffix can also designate a noun which is at the same time abstract and 
concrete, such as βάσις, which means both “basement” and “stepping”. It can also distinguish a 
nomen agentis, although this usage remains quite isolated: μάντις, “diviner”, “seer”, etc. 
Furthermore, some derivatives in -ti- designate an instrument, for instance κνῆστις, “grater”, or 
ἄρυστις, “cup”. Cf. Debrunner 1917 § 370–373; Chantraine 1933, § 217; Holt 1940, § 7.  
489 Chantraine 1933, § 217. The conservation of the dental consonant t is exceptional and the 
passage from t to s is perhaps due to the ionic-attic influence. For in some phonetic contexts the 
t before i is assibilated, contrary to what happens in Western Greek dialects (cf. dor. δίδωτι 
corresponding to ion.-att. δίδωσι). Cf. Chantraine 1933 § 218; Holt 1940 § 8. According to Holt, 
the conservation of the suffix -tis, at least in some of the nouns belonging to this small group, 
also occurs for semantic reasons: these nouns in fact express a process set in motion not by an 
individual but by an impersonal dynamis. Cf. Holt 1940, § 16.  
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abstract verbal component over time.490 In Homeric Greek, the nouns in -σις 
carry the meaning of an action in progress, i.e. a process that has not yet been 
brought to completion, but in post-Homeric Greek they designate a pure and 
simple action independently from whether it has been brought to completion or 
not.491 Therefore, a nomen actionis can indicate not only the action, but also the 
result of the action. And indeed κρᾶσις and μίξις do not merely express the action 
of mixing qua process in progress, if we consider both terms from a more general 
point of view (i.e. without specifying which kind of mixture they indicate. As 
regards κρᾶσις for example, Franco Montanari’s dictionary indicates, under 
κρᾶσις, that the term can mean both the action of mixing and the result of this 
action.492  
 Since the domains of these two word-families are so semantically close 
that they seem almost synonymous, they have received a great deal of attention 
from modern lexicographers. These scholars very often sought to explain the 
meaning of these two words by contrasting them with one another, which gave 
rise to what has been defined as “un luogo comune lessicografico”, i.e. a 
lexicographical commonplace.493 According to this commonplace, which has 
been pinpointed by Elio Montanari, κρᾶσις indicates a deep and absolute mixture 
obtained by precise qualitative proportions, leading to the formation of a new 
homogenous body, whereas μίξις refers to a far more superficial and disordered 
mixture where the constituents are well recognizable.494 In modern times, the 
discussion of the meanings of κρᾶσις and μίξις seems to have been first raised 
in Stephanus' Thesaurus Linguae Graecae.495 In Montanari's view, Stephanus' 
definition of κρᾶσις and its implicit opposition to μίξις spawned subsequent 
                                                          
490 Holt 1940, § 136.  
491 Holt 1940, § 138.  
492 Montanari 2000, s.v. κρᾶσις. See also Montanari 2015 s.v.  Schwabe makes this a little more 
complex. In fact, according to him, κρᾶσις and μίξις show a rather wide Bedeutungsspielraum 
as they can equally mean: das Mischen, die Weise des Mischens (or Sich-Mischens), die 
Gemischtheit (or der Vermischungszustand, τὸ κεκρᾶσθαι), das Gemisch; see Schwabe 1980, p. 
20. As we can see more clearly by maintaining the German terms, the first and last meanings 
correspond to the action of mixing and the final result of this action, i.e. the mixture qua product 
of the mixture. The second meaning instead stresses the way one mixes with reference to the 
relation or proportion in which the different constituents stand to each other. The third meaning 
indicates the state or condition of that which is mixed, conceived in terms of its abstract and 
internal structure. This scheme goes back to den Dulk 1934, p. 11 ff.  
493 Montanari 1979, p. 23. 
494 Montanari 1979, p. 24.  
495 Stephanus 1831–1865, s.v. κρᾶσις. 
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speculation in modern lexicography on the difference in meaning between these 
two word-families, which led to the creation of a lexicographical locus 
communis.496  
Under the entry κρᾶσις, Stephanus lists several meanings. First of all, 
according to him, the term particularly refers to the mixture of wine and water 
(mixtio, mixtura: peculiariter de ea qua aqua vino miscetur). More specifically 
it could directly refer to the ratio of water to be added to the wine (de ratione 
aquae vino miscendae). Hence this semantic shift would have yielded the 
meaning “ratio of the mixing”, such as, for instance, in the expression οἴνου 
κρᾶσις.497 More generally the term also means any kind of mixture (generaliter 
vero de quavis mixtura et temperatura s. temperamento dicitur) and can be 
referred, for instance, to the preparation of drugs and colour pigments. 
Furthermore, the term designates the mixture of the primary elements and of the 
human body (dicitur etiam de temperie s. temperamento corporis humani et 
elementorum), with particular reference to the healthy state, which depends on a 
balanced mixture or constitution of the body (ex aequabilis corporis 
temperamento s. constitutione sanitas existit), such as in the expression “τῆς 
ὑγείας ἐκ συμμέτρου κράσεως οὔσης”.498 The term could also refer to the 
external surrounding air, such as in the expression κρᾶσις ἀέρος,499 and in this 
case would correspond to the Greek κατάστασις. It is remarked in Stephanus’ 
dictionary that sometimes the term should be rendered in Latin as cinnus or 
commixtio,500 and in this case it would indicate a mixture where two or more 
different constituents coalescing and hence becoming unified give rise to one 
new quality (Qualitas commixta e duobus aut pluribus, licet a se invicem 
discrepantibus, ita coalescentibus, ut unum quippiam tantummodo videatur). As 
Stephanus reports, the same process would also happen in the case of the vocalic 
crasis, where two vowels or diphthongs merge into one new vowel.  
                                                          
496 Montanari 1979, pp. 25–26. 
497 Plutarch Amat. 752 D. 
498 Ps.-Alexander Probl. I 35.5.  
499 Theophrast, Hist. Plant. IV 1 5.5.  
500 As Montanari rightly observes, this rendering of cinnus, which according to Nonius defines a 
drink made out of different ingredients (cf. Nonius De comp. doct. 43.17 and 59.29) is rather 
questionable, since the Ciceronian textual locus brought forward by Nonius and then quoted by 
Stephanus (in order to support the translation cinnus), preserves vicinus instead of ut cinnus. 
Furthermore, this term, which occurs ex conjectura only once in Arnobius’ text, could not exist and 
could even have been invented. Cf. Montanari 1979, pp. 25–26; Ernout and Meillet 1979, s.v. cinnus.   
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Under the entry μίξις, beside the Latin translation (Mistio, Permistio) in 
Stephanus, we find a passage from the Byzantine Suida lexicon, which in turn 
refers to the Commentary on Aristotle's Topica by Alexander of Aphrodisias.501 
In Suida’s lemma, as well as in Alexander’s passage, μίξις is regarded as the 
general term, the γένος, including within it κρᾶσις as its εἶδος. In order to explain 
Aristotle’s passage according to which “μίξις is not always κρᾶσις (for the μίξις 
of dry constituents is not κρᾶσις)”, Alexander remarks that μίξις is the γένος to 
which κρᾶσις belongs and not the contrary, as some say. For, he continues, if 
something is mixed in terms of κρᾶσις (κέκραται) it is also mixed in terms of 
μίξις (μέμικται). Conversely, however, not all that is μεμιγμένον is also mixed 
in terms of κρᾶσις (οὐ μὴν πᾶν τὸ μεμιγμένον καὶ κέκραται), for κρᾶσις is not a 
mixture of dry constituents. The conclusion is therefore that according to 
Alexander, κρᾶσις solely consists of a mixture of liquids, although this is not 
explicitly expressed in this Alexandrian locus, while μίξις includes mixtures of 
both dry and liquid constituents. Thus, Alexander’s passage seems to be aimed 
at explaining the difference between κρᾶσις and μίξις and at clarifying what is 
the main γένος of the mixtures and what is the εἶδος, mainly for people who 
think differently. Therefore, even though the lexicographer does not venture to 
take a personal position on the issue, he patently wants us to understand that the 
debate on the difference in meaning of κρᾶσις and μίξις had already arisen in 
antiquity.  
What seems noteworthy, therefore, which Montanari fails to report or 
simply undervalues, ultimately altering our understanding of the problem, is not 
that Stephanus' dictionary establishes a pattern for future discussions on the 
topic, but rather that this issue had already germinated in Ancient Greek 
philosophical texts and hence also spread to Byzantine lexicographical literature. 
                                                          
501 Suida s.v. μίξις = Alexander in Top. 315.27–316.3 “ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ τῆς μίξεως τὴν κρᾶσιν γένος 
λέγων τὸ γένος ὑποτίθησι τῷ εἴδει· ἐπὶ πλέον γὰρ ἡ μῖξις τῆς κράσεως. εἰ μὲν γάρ τι κέκραται, 
καὶ μέμικται τοῦτο, οὐ μὴν πᾶν τὸ μεμιγμένον καὶ κέκραται· ἡ γὰρ τῶν ξηρῶν μῖξις οὐκ ἔστι 
κρᾶσις”. The passage of Aristotle’s Topica on which Alexander comments (Top. 122b26–31) is 
the following: “οὔτε γὰρ ἡ μεῖξις ἅπασα κρᾶσις (ἡ γὰρ τῶν ξηρῶν μεῖξις οὔκ ἐστι κρᾶσις”). As 
we can infer from the Prolegomena to Adler’s edition of the Suida lexicon, Suida’s lemma is not 
a direct quotation from Alexander's text, but rather a quotation from some philosophical excerpta 
also including, besides passages from Alexander's Commentary on Topica, doxographical 
sections of Diogenes Laertius’ and John Philoponus’ commentary on Aristotle's De anima. The 
structure of these quotations is the same as that of the excerpta preserved in the manuscript 
Vatican 268; cf. Adler 1928-1938 pp. XXI–XXII. 
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Moreover, Stephanus' dictionary adds a reference to a scholion on Euripides' 
Hecuba, where the scholiast explains that κρᾶσις is generally used with reference 
to the mixture of liquids, such as the mixture of water and wine, whereas μίξις 
indicates a mixture of different kinds of grains, such as grain and barleycorn.502 
Both the passages quoted by Stephanus’ dictionary and the way they explain the 
difference between κρᾶσις and μίξις seem to have had a great bearing on future 
depictions of the semantic question, at least in three of the most important 
Ancient Greek lexicons: Passow, Pape, and Liddell and Scott.  
Passow explains the semantic difference between κρᾶσις and μίξις in 
these terms:503 “Mischung, Vermischung, Temperatur: der Unterschied zwischen 
κρᾶσις und μίξις wird so bestimmt, dass bey der κρᾶσις verschiedene Stoffe so 
innig verbinden, dass sie ihre eigne Natur verlieren, und zusammen einen neuen 
Stoff bilden, wie Wein und Wasser, bey den μίξις aber bloss eine 
Durcheinandermengung statt findet, wobey die einzelnen Stoffe ihre eigne Natur 
beybehalten, wie wenn man Hafer und Gerste mengt”. As we can see, the 
examples given by Passow to illustrate the difference between κρᾶσις and μίξις 
(which will be removed in the following edition of the lexicon504) seem to draw 
closely on the examples presented in the scholion quoted by Stephanus’ 
dictionary (for κρᾶσις is conceived as a mixture of wine and water, while μίξις 
is explained as a mixture of grain and barleycorn). Passow’s dictionary interprets 
the semantic difference as an opposition between a kind of mixture where the 
constituents are so deeply mixed that they give rise to another new substance and 
another mixture, μίξις, where the constituents are simply juxtaposed, such as 
grains for example, such that they preserve their own nature. In the same vein, 
Pape's lexicon explains the semantic difference between the two terms. For 
κρᾶσις is said “von jeder Mischung (μίξις, Mengung) durch welche die 
gemischten Stoffe sich so innig verbinden, dass sie ihre eigene Natur verlieren 
und zusammen einen neuen Stoff bilden”.505 As for the several editions of the 
Liddell and Scott Greek–English lexicon, the first edition’s formulation is the 
following: κρᾶσις is “a mixing of two things, so that they are quite blended and 
                                                          
502 Schol. in Eur. Hec. 216.  
503 Passow 1831, s.v. κρᾶσις.  
504 Passow 1841-1857 (2004) s.v. κρᾶσις.  
505 Pape 1914 s.v. κρᾶσις.  
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form a compound, as wine and water; whereas μίξις is a mere mixing so that 
they can be separated again as two sorts of grains; (or we might say, κρᾶσις is 
chemical, μίξις is mechanical mixture)”.506 This definition of κρᾶσις seems to 
have been substantially modified in the New Edition, as well as in later revised 
editions (since it has been removed the opposition κρᾶσις vs μίξις). Afterwards 
the term κρᾶσις is defined as “mixing, blending of things which form a 
compound, as wine and water, opp. mechanical mixture (defined as an εἶδος 
μίξεως in which the constituents are liquids, Arist. Top. 122b26 Stoic. 2.153 
[…])”.507 
As becomes clear from this short overview of the different accounts 
provided by modern lexicons, what has been mistaken for a modern 
lexicographical commonplace, actually proves to have older roots; more 
precisely it seems that the debate on the semantic difference between κρᾶσις and 
μίξις can be traced back to Ancient Greek texts. We could even say that the two 
passages quoted by Stephanus’ dictionary in order to make the meaning of 
κρᾶσις clear in opposition to μίξις go straight to the heart of the question by 
offering two very different explanations of the meaning of μίξις, while seeming 
to agree on κρᾶσις as a mixture of liquids. For from Aristotle’s account as 
reinterpreted by Alexander, we can infer that μίξις (insofar as it it the genos) is a 
mixture of both dry and liquid constituents, whereas κρᾶσις is supposed to be 
only a mixture of liquids (the eidos). However, to put it simply, according to 
Aristotle these two mixtures do not coincide with a mechanical mixture of 
                                                          
506 Liddell and Scott 1845, s.v. κρᾶσις. See also Montanari 1979, pp. 26–27. 
507 Liddell, Scott and Jones 1940, s.v. κρᾶσις (cf. also Liddell, Scott and Jones 1996, s.v. κρᾶσις). 
To be thorough, it would have been very useful to also take the new Greek-Spanish Dictionary 
(DGE) into consideration, which was produced under the direction of F.R. Adrados, in order to 
understand how the scholars involved in the project coped with this semantic issue. 
Unfortunately, at present we have only the entries from α to ε at our disposal. In any case, it is 
perhaps worth referring to the lemmas ἄκρατος and ἄμικτος in order to seek to conversely grasp 
the meanings attributed to κρᾶσις and μίξις. The adjective ἄκρατος refers to different kinds of 
liquids, such as wine, blood or milk (sin mezcla, puro del vino; de la sangre αἷμα, ἄ. γάλα la 
leche entera); it is also applied to the medical field and it can refer to the humours (χυμός) and 
bodily constituents. Furthermore, the adjective is employed with reference to colours, odours, 
abstract nouns (such as justice, grace, freedom, peace, and so on), and the psychological sphere, 
carrying the meaning of “uncontrolled, unrestrained” (inmoderado, destemplado, desmedido). 
As for ἄμικτος, the adjective refers to abstract nouns (courage, pleasure) or to thoroughbred 
animals (de animales de pura sangre). With the corresponding nomen actionis μίξις, it is also 
used in social contexts and in this case it refers to sexual abstinence or to unsociable or intractable 
individuals (unsociable, intratable), cf. Adrados 1980-1997 s.v. ἄκρατος and ἄμικτος.  
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constituents, which he calls σύνθεσις.508 For contrary to a mechanical mixture 
they both lead to the formation of a homogenous final product that is defined as 
a homeomerous part.509 On the other hand, the above-mentioned scholion on 
Euripides’ Hecuba provides a very different explanation by describing μίξις as a 
mechanical mixture of two different kinds of grains. This twofold interpretation 
of the meaning of μίξις has also been highlighted by den Dulk. In a section of 
his monograph committed to exploring the concept of κρᾶσις τῶν στοιχείων, den 
Dulk tackles the problem of the semantic difference between κρᾶσις and μίξις.510 
The scholar starts to unravel the question by quoting the very same passage from 
the abovementioned passage from Aristotle’s Topica and the corresponding 
passage of Alexander’s commentary. First he defines κρᾶσις as a kind of μίξις, 
i.e. a mixture of liquids or “chemical mixture”. As for the term μίξις, he argues 
that it refers instead to a mixture of both liquids and solids and has both the 
meanings of “chemical” and “mechanical” mixture, since μίξις is the more 
general term. On the one hand, den Dulk is aware of the fact that Aristotle draws 
a distinction between μίξις and σύνθεσις and that the latter corresponds to a 
mechanical mixture where each of the constituents preserves its own nature.511 
On the other hand, he brings forward some other passages in order to support his 
idea that μίξις can also express a mechanical mixture of different constituents 
which remain well recognizable.512 Therefore, it seems that according to den 
Dulk the term μίξις ultimately refers either only to a mechanical mixture or to a 
combination of mechanical and chemical mixture.513  
The etymological dictionary by Chantraine distances itself from the 
preceding lexicographical tradition by defining κρᾶσις as a mixture obtained by 
                                                          
508 De gen. et corr. 328a7–9 “δῆλον ὡς οὔτε κατὰ μικρὰ σωζόμενα δεῖ τὰ μιγνύμενα φάναι 
μεμίχθαι. Σύνθεσις γὰρ ἔσται καὶ οὐ κρᾶσις οὐδὲ μίξις, οὐδ' ἕξει τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον τῷ ὅλῳ τὸ 
μόριον”.  
509 De gen. et corr. 328a10–12 “Φαμὲν δ', εἴπερ δεῖ μεμίχθαι τι, τὸ μιχθὲν ὁμοιομερὲς εἶναι, καὶ 
ὥσπερ τοῦ ὕδατος τὸ μέρος ὕδωρ, οὕτω καὶ τοῦ κραθέντος”.  
510 Den Dulk 1934, pp. 31–39.  
511 Cf. den Dulk 1934 p. 34: “Nu doet echter merkwaardige moeilijkheid voor, dat de hierboven 
vastgestelde, op Aristoteles zelf gegronde onderscheiding van μίξις en κρᾶσις in strijd is met de 
plaats bij Aristoteles, waarvan we zijn uitgegaan. Daar immers wordt gezegd dat, wanneer bij 
een vermenging de kleine deeltjes den aard van de stof behouden, wij niet alleen niet mogen 
spreken van en κρᾶσις, maar ook niet van een μίξις”. 
512 Anon. Lond. XIV 20 ff.; Alexander De mixt. 228.25 Bruns.; Schol. in Eur. Hecuba 216 (the 
same scholion already cited by Stephanus).  
513 “Het begrip μίξις òf uitsluitend mechanische vermenging inhoudt, òf een samenvatting van 
mechanische en chemische”; cf. Den Dulk 1934, p. 35.  
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a certain proportion, while leaving the meaning of μίξις in a way 
undifferentiated: “Sens: ‘mélanger dans un certain équilibre’ notamment pour 
l’eau et le vin, se dit aussi des caractères, des climats, etc.: se distingue de 
μείγνυμι ‘mêler’ de sens plus vague, qui peut se dire de combattants, de l’union 
sexuelle, etc.”514 As we can see, contrary to the previous definitions Chantraine 
places emphasis on the proportionality distinguishing the mixture, called κρᾶσις, 
and concisely describes the semantic domains pertaining to this term (the 
convivial mixture of wine and water, the mixture of the surrounding air, i.e. the 
climate, the reference to the meaning the word acquires in the psychological 
sphere). The term κρᾶσις is once again set against the term μίξις, but this 
opposition remains convoluted, since is not assigned any precise meaning to 
μίξις (“μείγνυμι ‘mêler’ de sens plus vague”).  
The scholar Wilhelm Schwabe seems to align himself with Chantraine’s 
interpretation. According to Schwabe, it seems possible to find traces of an 
opposition between κρᾶσις and μίξις already in Homeric Greek. The first term 
would refer primarily to the mixture of wine and water obtained by precise 
proportions that brings about positive effects on men. For, by conveniently 
diluting the wine, men could mitigate its excesses and at the same time enjoy its 
benefits. More generally, the term is applied in post-Homeric contexts to any 
mixture obtained by precise proportions (“geordnete, gute Mischung, 
harmonische Vereinigung”). Furthermore, in his analysis of the development of 
the post-Homeric κρᾶσις-Vorstellung, Schwabe points out that the term can refer 
not only to liquids, such as in the case of metals in the liquid state, colours, drugs, 
and humours, but also to the condition of the air in the meteorological field or to 
the relation between dynameis, among which there is also “the dry”.515 The term 
μίξις instead defines a confused, disordered mixture (conceived stricto sensu as 
“ wirre, schlechte Mischung, Vermengung”), such as the mingling of the 
combatants in the battlefield516 or sexual intercourse considered as a passionate 
and disordered union.517  Apart from this pejorative understanding, this term, 
however, preserves a more general meaning which can be found in Aristotle, 
                                                          
514 Chantraine 2002, s.v. κεράννυμι. 
515 Schwabe 1980, p. 31.  
516 Schwabe 1980, pp. 24–25. 
517 Schwabe 1980, p. 34.  
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according to which μίξις designates any kind of mixture of different constituents 
leading to a new whole whose previous constituents, however, are not 
completely destroyed and can be recovered.518  
 To sum up, it seems that interpretations of the problem relating to the 
semantic difference between κρᾶσις and μίξις can be in nuce summarized as 
follows: on the one hand the difference is interpreted as an opposition between 
a mixture of liquids, κρᾶσις, and a mixture of dry constituents, μίξις (with the 
latter, μίξις, as a mechanical mixture – Passow, Pape, Liddell and Scott, den Dulk 
– or not – Liddell, Scott and Jones, den Dulk). On the other hand, the opposition 
κρᾶσις/μίξις is formulated in terms of proportion/disproportion, order/disorder, 
balance/imbalance, such as in Chantraine’s and Schwabe’s accounts. Moreover, 
in Schwabe’s view κρᾶσις has a positive value, while μίξις has a negative value 
– the latter of which would carry, however, the more neutral meaning of 
“mixture” without Wertakzent. Further, according to Schwabe the term κρᾶσις, 
which would originally have exclusively referred to the mixture of liquids, 
especially wine and water, over time freed itself from the reference to liquids, in 
order to also be applied to other semantic fields, for instance meteorology.  
 We can look more closely at the meaning of both terms by turning to 
Homer, i.e. to the deepest stratum of Ancient Greek in our possession, in order 
to compare the two semantic fields by analysing their original meanings. Here I 
will refer, very briefly, to Montanari’s research on the topic, which proves to be 
extremely helpful since he linguistically and philologically analyses all 
occurrences of the terms relating to these two word-families in Homer. This will 
help us grasp the original meaning of both the roots.519 Montanari claims that 
the two word-families do not seem to completely semantically overlap in the 
Homeric Greek. In Mycenaean Greek there are no occurrences of the two word-
families, apart from ka-ra-te-ra, as we have seen.  
 Montanari adopts the method of componential analysis, i.e. a structuralist 
semantic analysis that assigns a list of more basic semiotic components to the 
lexeme520 and for each word-family isolates their basic semantic traits. On the 
                                                          
518 Schwabe 1980, p. 22. 
519 Montanari 1979 pp. 39–144. 
520 “Semiotic component” is the literal translation of Montanari’s expression “componente 
semiotico”. As pointed out, this notion stems from the componential semantic analysis. From 
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one hand, with regard to the word-family of μείγνυμι, he recognizes three basic 
semantic traits, which represent the basic set of meanings of μείγνυμι, and 
therefore, of its nomen actionis μίξις: “to mix (generally)”, “to come into close 
contact”, “to confuse”.521 On the other hand, with regard to the Greek word-
family of κεράννυμι, it (and therefore κρᾶσις) shows not only the general 
meaning (carried out also by the IE root) “to moderate”, “to temper”, but also 
“to mix with water”, “to dilute”, “to water down”, and indicates the action of 
mixing (said specifically, but not exclusively, of liquids) in order to moderate the 
power they release, such as in the case of the mixture of wine and water.522  
 In conclusion, by looking at the lexicological findings together, alongside 
Montanari’s etymological work, we can safely say that μίξις seems to indicate 
any type of mixture (mechanical or “chemical”) (“to mix generally”) that can be 
brought about by contact among the constituents (“to come into close contact”, 
for this reason the term can be applied to the social sphere), and can be connoted 
negatively (to confuse). With regard to κρᾶσις, it seems instead to be a mixture 
prevalently of liquids (“to mix with water”), aiming at moderating or tempering 






                                                          
now on we will refer to this notion with the term “semantic trait”, which in being more general 
carries the lightest burden of theory; it is used in lexical semantics to indicate the most basic 
meanings of a word making up the set of meanings of a single word; see Cruse 1986, p. 16, for 
a discussion concerning different denominations (such as “semantic components” and “semantic 
features”); cf. ibid. p. 22 n. 17. For a historical overview of the origin and development of the 
componential analysis cf. also Geeraerts 2010, p. 70 ff.  
521 Montanari 1979 pp. 37–92.  
522 Montanari 1979 pp. 93–144.  
523 We say prevalently and not exclusively of liquids because as Montanari also notes, there is 
a Homeric passage where the mixture regards not solely liquids but also their qualitative 
properties in terms of mixing together and finding an equilibrium point, that is, k 360–3, where 
Circes is portrayed as mixing hot and cold water and pouring it over Odysseus’ head and 
shoulders (“αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ δὴ ζέσσεν ὕδωρ ἐνὶ ἤνοπι χαλκῷ, ἔς ῥ' ἀσάμινθον ἕσασα λό' ἐκ τρίποδος 
μεγάλοιο, θυμῆρες κεράσασα, κατὰ κρατός τε καὶ ὤμων, ὄφρα μοι ἐκ κάματον θυμοφθόρον 
εἵλετο γυίων”). Montanari in fact speaks of the application of the verb to the thermic sphere; 
Montanari 1979 pp. 141 ff.  
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3.2 Terminologies for mixtures: The Hippocratic authors, Aristotle and the 
Peripatetics, and the Stoics 
 
After having enquired into and understood the meanings of κρᾶσις and μίξις, we 
will briefly review the terminology (and summarize the research findings so far) 
of the main theoretical models of mixture which Galen had in mind when 
formulating his own conception: the Hippocratic, the Aristotelian and 
Peripatetic, and the Stoic, with the main aim of grasping the influence that this 
terminology had on the texture of Galen’s scientific lexicon of mixture.  
In Hippocratic medicine, the term κρῆσις can indicate either a process or 
the result of this process, i.e. a state; as a technical term it is used to indicate 1) 
the process of mixing different ingredients524 and 2) the qualitative composition 
that is the result of an act of mixing (the basic building blocks of the cosmos and 
of the nature of human beings), and can be applied 2.1) to the whole body as 
made up of qualities, dynamies, or humours; 2.2) to a part of the body; or 2.3) to 
the meteorological climate.525 What is important to underline is that, as Jouanna 
                                                          
524 As Festugière (1948 pp. 37–38) points out, the notion of κρῆσις acquires different shapes 
throughout the Hippocratic corpus. In De vetere medicina food and drinks are conceived as 
containing various juices (bitter, salty, acid, etc.), and if they are consumed pure and unmixed, 
cause pain and disease to the organism (cf. CMG I 1 p. 46.4–8 Heiberg). For this reason, 
according to the Hippocratic author, these pure and strong dynamies of foods’ and drinks’ juices 
have to be weakened through processes of concoction and mixture (κρῆσις) in order to be suitable 
for the living organism’s constitution (cf. CMG I 1 p. 39.22 Heiberg). The task of the physician 
is to find a diet proportional to the individual constitution of the patient; therefore he has to 
modify, on the one hand, the quantity of the foods and, on the other, their quality by mixing the 
right amount of “strong” food with the right amount of weak food, potentially through a process 
of concoction (cf. CMG I 1 p. 39.6–26 Heiberg). 1) The κρῆσις is therefore regarded as a 
procedure through which the physician mixes together different quantities of strong and weak 
substances in order to reach a moderate qualitative mean between the extremes; cf. Tracy 1969 
pp. 37–38. 
525 In De vetere medicina the term κρῆσις also signifies the bodily mixture of potentially infinite 
couples of dynamies (CMG I 1 p. 47.15 Heiberg, corresponding to those contained in food and 
drinks, cf. CMG I 1 45.25–26 Heiberg): the health of the living body is determined by an inner 
state of equilibrium of the these dynamies, whereas whenever this state of balance is disrupted 
and one of them either separates off or grows excessively to the detriment of its opposite, the 
organism is affected by diseases and illnesses (cf. CMG I 1 p. 46.1–4 Heiberg). In other 
Hippocratic writings, this basic idea of a well-proportioned mixture or κρῆσις is continuously 
reshaped and reformulated; it is connected, on the one hand, to the primary qualities, that is 
hot, cold, dry, and wet (cf. Aph. V 62 L. IV 556 Jones p. 174: “Ὁκόσαι ψυχρὰς καὶ πυκνὰς τὰς 
μήτρας ἔχουσιν, οὐ κυΐσκουσιν· καὶ ὁκόσαι καθύγρους ἔχουσι τὰς μήτρας, οὐ κυΐσκουσιν, 
ἀποσβέννυται γὰρ ὁ γόνος· καὶ ὁκόσαι ξηρὰς μᾶλλον καὶ περικαέας, ἐνδείῃ γὰρ τῆς τροφῆς 
φθείρεται τὸ σπέρμα· ὁκόσαι δὲ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων τὴν κρᾶσιν ἔχουσι ξύμμετρον, αἱ τοιαῦται 
ἐπίτεκνοι γίνονται”). In this text, qualitative disproportions of the uterus’ are described, such as 
hot/cold and dry/wet, which are able to impede pregnancy; while it is declared that a 
symmetric/well-proportionate mixture in the uterus’ of either qualitative opposition (ἐξ 
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remarks, the term κρῆσις in the Hippocratic Collection presents the term as 
meaning balanced mixture, “mélange équilibré”, that is, a mixture that is already 
an intrinsically good, balanced, and moderated mixture, to put it simply, a good 
mixture; and it is said not only of liquids but also of the primary qualities mixing 
together and finding a good, positive, and healthy balance.526  
 Aristotle’s and the Peripatetic speculation regarding mixture (whose 
inner justification, the generation of inanimate and animate elemental 
compounds, we dealt with extensively in the first main chapter) seems to be 
extremely relevant for terminological purposes too. In fact, Aristotle’s 
terminological remarks (and the interpretation provided by his greatest 
commentator, Alexander of Aphrodisias) are at the origin of the lexicographical 
commonplace which opposed κρᾶσις to μίξις. Joachim notes that Aristotle draws 
a distinction between mechanical mixture and what he calls “chemical 
combination” (that is, a kind of mixture giving rise to a uniform tertiary product). 
According to Joachim, Aristotle refers to the first type of mixture as σύνθεσις 
even though he recognizes that it is sometimes less technically referred to as 
μίξις (cf. De gen. et corr. 328a2). Throughout the De generatione et corruptione 
and especially in I 10, the general term Aristotle adopts to indicate the kind of 
mixture that gives rise to a homoeogeneous product, the homoeomerous part, is 
μίξις, although, as is clarified in Topica 122b30–31, “οὔτε γὰρ ἡ μίξις ἅπασα 
κρᾶσις (ἡ γὰρ τῶν ξηρῶν μίξις οὔκ ἐστι κρᾶσις)”: for, according to Aristotle, 
whereas μίξις can be of both solids and liquids (insofar as is the genus), κρᾶσις, 
being the species, cannot also be of solids (for it is said of liquids, which in any 
                                                          
ἀμφοτέρων τὴν κρᾶσιν … ξύμμετρον) makes women fertile. In this case therefore the term refers 
to the good and proportioned qualitative composition of a part of the body, the uterus. In 
addition to Aphorisms, De natura hominis describes the conditions in which birth can take place 
and reports that generation cannot take place if there is not due proportion between hot/cold and 
dry/wet (cf. De nat. hom. CMG I 1.3 pp. 170.11–172.2 Jouanna “Καὶ πάλιν, εἰ μὴ τὸ θερμὸν τῷ 
ψυχρῷ καὶ τὸ ξηρὸν τῷ ὑγρῷ μετρίως πρὸς ἄλληλα ἕξει καὶ ἴσως, ἀλλὰ  θάτερον θατέρου πουλὺ 
προέξει καὶ τὸ ἰσχυρότερον τοῦ ἀσθενεστέρου, ἡ γένεσις οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο. Ὥστε πῶς εἰκὸς ἀπὸ 
ἑνός τι γεννηθῆναι, ὅτε γε οὐδ' ἀπὸ τῶν πλειόνων γεννᾶται, ἢν μὴ τύχῃ καλῶς ἔχοντα τῆς κρήσιος 
τῆς πρὸς ἄλληλα”). The term can also designate the good and healthy mixture of the seasons, 
that is, the qualitative composition of the external environment (cf. Aer. CMG I 1.2 p. 54.4-13 
Diller). On the other hand, κρῆσις is linked to the theory of the four humours (De nat. hom. 
CMG I 1.3 p. 172.1 Jouanna), which in this Hippocratic treatise are regarded as the constitutive 
elements of the nature of the human being and are each associated with a couple of primary 
qualities (which are seen as constitutive of all the other physical bodies), and which over time 
will become canonical and will give rise to the theory of the four temperamental constitutions 
depending on the prevailing humour; cf. Festugière 1948 p. 38 n. 25. 
526 Jouanna 1996 pp. 294–295 with references.  
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case are the most mixable, as they divide more readily into particles; see De gen. 
et corr. 328a33 ff.).527 Therefore, Aristotle recognizes that the term μίξις is more 
popularly used to indicate a kind of mixture that is actually a juxtaposition (a 
mechanical mixture), whereas he uses the term technically with the sense of 
“chemical” combination, including the mixture of solids and of liquids, and 
employs κρᾶσις as a technical term restricted solely to liquids (and this would 
be the reason why, coeherently with his own statements, Aristotle mainly adopts 
κρᾶσις when he deals with physiological issues528).  
In the abovementioned passage from his commentary on Aristotle’s 
Topica, Alexander underlines that, in contrast to what other people think (though 
it is not clear to whom he is referring here – perhaps to the Stoics), the μίξις is 
the genus of κρᾶσις, which represents the species.529 But as Joachim points out, 
in his De mixtione, Alexander seems to have interpreted Aristotle’s genos/eidos 
distinction differently from the Stagirite. In fact, differently from Aristotle, 
Alexander under the general head of μίξις he differentiates i) σύνθεσις of unlike 
with unlike (for example, a heap of grains of wheat and grains of barley); from 
ii) κρᾶσις of liquids, which is the only type of mixture leading to the generation 
of a uniform compound (this would neutralize Aristotle’s distinction between 
genos and eidos). Moreover, Alexander singles out a second type of σύνθεσις, a 
mechanical mixture of like with like (such as, for instance, a heap of grains of 
wheat), which would not coincide with μίξις at all.530 In Alexander’s case μίξις 
designates a type of mixture that coincides with a type of juxtaposition of unlike 
with unlike (what Aristotle would have simply called σύνθεσις, referring either 
                                                          
527 Joachim 1904 p. 73. 
528 Cf. van der Eijk 2004, cf. also Tracy 1969 pp. 163-174.  
529  In Top. 315.25 ff. “ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ τῆς μίξεως τὴν κρᾶσιν γένος λέγων τὸ γένος ὑποτίθησι τῷ 
εἴδει· ἐπὶ πλέον γὰρ ἡ μῖξις τῆς κράσεως. εἰ μὲν γάρ τι κέκραται, καὶ μέμικται τοῦτο, οὐ μὴν πᾶν 
τὸ μεμιγμένον καὶ κέκραται· ἡ γὰρ τῶν ξηρῶν μῖξις οὐκ ἔστι κρᾶσις”. 
530 Cf. Joachim 1904 p. 73; cf. De mixt. 228.25 ff. Bruns “τούτου τοίνυν διωρισμένου μετὰ ταῦτα 
ἄξιον ἐπιστῆσαι, πότερον ταὐτόν ἐστι μῖξίς τε καὶ κρᾶσις, ἢ διαφορὰν ἔχει τινά. ἔοικε δὴ 
διαφέρειν, ᾗ τὸ μὲν κοινότερόν ἐστιν ἡ μῖξις, ἡ δὲ κρᾶσις ἰδικώτερον. ποιὰ γὰρ μῖξις ἡ κρᾶσις. 
τῶν γὰρ μίξεων ἡ μέν τις κατὰ παράθεσιν τῶν οὐσιῶν καὶ ἁφὴν γίνεται, ἣν λέγομεν τῆς μίξεως 
γίνεσθαι κατὰ σύνθεσιν (οὐ πᾶσα μὲν γὰρ σύνθεσις μῖξις· σύνθεσις μὲν γὰρ καὶ τῶν ὁμοίων τε 
καὶ ὁμοειδῶν γίνεται, ἡ δὲ μῖξις ἐκ διαφερόντων τε καὶ ἐν διαφέρουσι· διὸ ὁ μὲν τῶν πυρῶν 
σωρὸς κατὰ μόνην σύνθεσιν, ὁ δὲ τῶν πυρῶν τε καὶ κυάμων ἤδη τῇ συνθέσει καὶ τὴν μῖξιν 
προσείληφεν), ἡ δὲ ὡς κρᾶσις μῖξις γίνεται, οὐ σωζομένων ἔτι τῶν μιγνυμένων καὶ οὕτως 
ἀλλήλοις παρακειμένων, ἀλλ' ἑνουμένων κατὰ τὸ ὑποκείμενον. διὸ ἐν τοῖς εὐορίστοις τε καὶ 
ὑγροῖς ἡ ὡς κρᾶσις μῖξίς ἐστιν. ὥσπερ δὲ οὐχ ἡ τῶν τυχόντων σύνθεσις μῖξις ἦν, οὕτως οὐδὲ ἡ 
τῶν τυχόντων ὑγρῶν ἕνωσις κρᾶσίς τε καὶ μῖξις. οὐ γὰρ ὕδωρ ὕδατι κιρνᾶται, καίτοι ἑνούμενον 
αὐτῷ, οὐδὲ ἔλαιον ἐλαίῳ, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἔλαιον ὕδατι· ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν διὰ γλισχρότητα”.  
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to the juxtaposition of like with like or to that of unlike with unlike). The 
privileged term for indicating a “chemical” mixture is therefore κρᾶσις, although 
Alexander puts it under the general heading of μίξις. Though we do not need to 
hypothesize any Stoic influence on Alexander’s terminology (although it is very 
likely), we can safely say that for a Peripatetic of Alexander’s age the technical 
term to designate a complete mixture bringing about a new whole (the 
homoeomerous part) was κρᾶσις (and it is in fact this the term that is applied 
throughout De mixtione or περὶ κράσεως to designate what Aristotle called more 
generically μίξις).  
We have mentioned the Stoics, Alexander’s great adversaries and 
Galen’s polemical target, who – as we have seen – (in particular Chrysippus), 
worked out a classification of mixture using specific terminology, which we 
shall now examine. This task is extremely challenging because of the 
fragmentary evidence that we have at our disposal. As Groisard remarks, 
Alexander of Aphrodisias attributed a classification of mixtures to the Stoics in 
De mixtione (Ch. 3) (which we have already analysed in detail), where under the 
general heading of μίξις we find the three different Chrysippean mixtures: 
παράθεσις or juxtaposition, σύγχυσις or fusion, and κρᾶσις or total mixture.531 
As Groisard notes, this fragment seems to be a quotation from a work by 
Chrisippus,532 from which we can therefore extract some technical terms. For 
the first mixture the technical term seems to be καθ' ἁρμήν, “by juncture”, for 
the second σύγχυσις, “fusion”, and σύμφθαρσις, “simultaneous destruction”, and 
for the third, which is regarded as mixture in the strict sense of the term (ἰδίως 
cf. De mixt. 228.25 ff.), δι' ὅλων κρᾶσις and ἀντιπαρέκτασις, or coextension, 
where the expression δι' ὅλων suggests the Stoic total interpenetration of the 
                                                          
531 Groisard 2016 p. 97, cf. De mixt. 216.18 Bruns “τὰς μὲν παραθέσει μίξεις γίνεσθαι 
[Chysippus] λέγει, δύο τινῶν ἢ καὶ πλειόνων οὐσιῶν εἰς ταὐτὸν συντεθειμένων καὶ 
παρατιθεμένων ἀλλήλαις, ὥς φησιν, καθ' ἁρμήν, σωζούσης ἑκάστης αὐτῶν ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ 
παραθέσει κατὰ τὴν περιγραφὴν τὴν οἰκείαν οὐσίαν τε καὶ ποιότητα, ὡς ἐπὶ κυάμων φέρε εἰπεῖν 
καὶ πυρῶν ἐν τῇ παρ' ἀλλήλους θέσει γίνεται, τὰς δέ τινας συγχύσει δι' ὅλων τῶν τε οὐσιῶν 
αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ἐν αὐταῖς ποιοτήτων συμφθειρομένων ἀλλήλαις, ὡς γίνεσθαί φησιν ἐπὶ τῶν 
ἰατρικῶν φαρμάκων κατὰ σύμφθαρσιν τῶν μιγνυμένων, ἄλλου τινὸς ἐξ αὐτῶν γεννωμένου 
σώματος· τὰς δέ τινας γίνεσθαι μίξεις λέγει δι' ὅλων τινῶν οὐσιῶν τε καὶ τῶν τούτων ποιοτήτων 
ἀντιπαρεκτεινομένων ἀλλήλαις μετὰ τοῦ τὰς ἐξ ἀρχῆς οὐσίας τε καὶ ποιότητας σώζειν ἐν τῇ 
μίξει τῇ τοιᾷδε, ἥντινα τῶν μίξεων κρᾶσιν ἰδίως εἶναι λέγει”.  
532 Groisard 2016 p. 83 with n. 135.  
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bodies as wholes from part to part.533 In contrast to Chapter Three of De 
mixtione, according to two other testimonies of the classification –Philo’s De 
confusione linguarum and the Anonymus Londinensis – , μίξις indicates the 
mechanical mixture or παράθεσις as opposed to σύγχυσις or fusion, and δι' ὅλων 
κρᾶσις or total mixture where the opposition κρᾶσις/μίξις is understood as the 
opposition liquid/solid.534 Yet again different is the terminology used by Arius 
Didymus in a fragment that was afterwards integrated into Stobaeus’ Anthology 
in the chapter περὶ μίξεως καὶ κράσεως, belonging to Book I, dedicated to 
physics (with which we have already dealt).535 Here, the term μίξις is used to 
                                                          
533 Groisard 2016 p. 83. Apart from De mixtione, cf. also Arius Didymus (SFV II 471 = Ar. Did. 
Fr. 28); SVF II 472 (Philo De conf. ling. 264.23 ff. Wendland) and An. Lond. XIV 16–23 Manetti 
do not attribute the classification to Chryisppus.  
534 Philo De conf. ling. p. 264.23 ff. Wendland “ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν μῖξις ἐν ξηραῖς, ἡ δὲ κρᾶσις ἐν 
ὑγραῖς οὐσίαις δοκιμάζεται. μῖξις μὲν οὖν σωμάτων διαφερόντων ἐστὶν οὐκ ἐν κόσμῳ 
παράθεσις, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις σωρὸν ποιήσειε κριθὰς καὶ πυροὺς καὶ ὀρόβους καὶ ἄλλ' ἄττα 
εἴδη τῶν σπαρτῶν εἰς ταὐτὸ εἰσενεγκών,  κρᾶσις δ' οὐ παράθεσις, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἀνομοίων μερῶν 
εἰς ἄλληλα εἰσδυομένων δι' ὅλων ἀντιπαρέκτασις, ἔτι δυναμένων ἐπιτεχνήσει τινὶ διακρίνεσθαι 
τῶν ποιοτήτων, ὡς ἐπὶ οἴνου καὶ ὕδατός φασι γίνεσθαι· συνελθούσας μὲν γὰρ τὰς οὐσίας 
ἀποτελεῖν κρᾶσιν, τὸ δὲ κραθὲν οὐδὲν ἧττον ἀναπλοῦσθαι πάλιν εἰς τὰς ἐξ ὧν ἀπετελέσθη 
ποιότητας· σπόγγῳ γὰρ ἠλαιωμένῳ τὸ μὲν ὕδωρ ἀναλαμβάνεσθαι, τὸν δ' οἶνον ὑπολείπεσθαι· 
μήποτε ἐπειδήπερ ἐξ ὕδατος ἡ σπογγιᾶς γένεσίς ἐστι, τὸ μὲν οἰκεῖον, ὕδωρ, πέφυκεν 
ἀναλαμβάνεσθαι πρὸς αὐτῆς ἐκ τοῦ κράματος, τὸ δ' ἀλλότριον ὑπολείπεσθαι, ὁ οἶνος. σύγχυσις 
δέ ἐστι φθορὰ τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ποιοτήτων πᾶσι τοῖς μέρεσιν ἀντιπαρεκτεινομένων εἰς διαφερούσης 
μιᾶς γένεσιν, ὡς ἐπὶ τῆς ἐν ἰατρικῇ τετραφαρμάκου συντέτευχε· κηρὸς γὰρ καὶ στέαρ καὶ πίττα 
ῥητίνη τε, οἶμαι, συνελθόντα ταύτην ἀποτελεῖ, συντεθείσης δὲ ἀμήχανον ἔτι τὰς ἐξ ὧν συνετέθη 
διακριθῆναι δυνάμεις, ἀλλ' ἑκάστη μὲν αὐτῶν ἠφάνισται, πασῶν δ' ἡ φθορὰ μίαν ἐξαίρετον 
ἄλλην ἐγέννησε δύναμιν”. Cf. also An. Lond. XIV 16–23 Manetti. On this cf. Groisard 2016 p. 
97.  
535 Groisard 2016 pp. 95–96; cf. Ar. Dydim. Fr. 28 “Χρύσιππος δὲ τοιοῦτόν τι διεβεβαιοῦτο· 
εἶναι τὸ ὂν πνεῦμα κινοῦν ἑαυτὸ πρὸς ἑαυτὸ καὶ ἐξ αὑτοῦ, ἢ πνεῦμα ἑαυτὸ κινοῦν πρόσω καὶ 
ὀπίσω· πνεῦμα δὲ εἴληπται διὰ τὸ λέγεσθαι αὐτὸ ἀέρα εἶναι κινούμενον· ἀνάλογον δὲ γίνεσθαι 
κἀπὶ τοῦ αἰθέρος, ὥστε καὶ εἰς κοινὸν λόγον πεσεῖν αὐτά. Ἡ τοιαύτη δὲ κίνησις κατὰ μόνους 
γίνεται τοὺς νομίζοντας τὴν οὐσίαν πᾶσαν μεταβολὴν ἐπιδέχεσθαι καὶ σύγχυσιν καὶ σύστασιν 
καὶ σύμμιξιν καὶ σύμφυσιν καὶ τὰ τούτοις παραπλήσια. Διαφέρειν γὰρ ἀρέσκει τοῖς ἀπὸ τῆς 
Στωϊκῆς αἱρέσεως παράθεσιν, μῖξιν, κρᾶσιν, σύγχυσιν. Παράθεσιν μὲν γὰρ εἶναι σωμάτων 
συναφὴν κατὰ τὰς ἐπιφανείας, ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν σωρῶν ὁρῶμεν, ἐν οἷς πυροί τε καὶ κριθαὶ καὶ φακοὶ 
καὶ εἴ τινα τούτοις ἄλλα παραπλήσια περιέχεται καὶ τῶν ἐπὶ τῶν αἰγιαλῶν ψήφων καὶ ἄμμων. 
Μῖξιν δ' εἶναι δύο ἢ καὶ πλειόνων σωμάτων ἀντιπαρέκτασιν δι' ὅλων, ὑπομενουσῶν τῶν 
συμφυῶν περὶ αὐτὰ ποιοτήτων, ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ πυρὸς ἔχει καὶ τοῦ πεπυρακτωμένου σιδήρου, 
ἐπὶ τούτων γὰρ <δι'> ὅλων γίγνεσθαι τῶν σωμάτων τὴν ἀντιπαρέκτασιν. Ὁμοίως δὲ κἀπὶ 
τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν ψυχῶν ἔχειν· δι' ὅλων γὰρ τῶν σωμά των ἡμῶν ἀντιπαρεκτείνουσιν, ἀρέσκει 
γὰρ αὐτοῖς σῶμα διὰ σώματος ἀντιπαρήκειν. Κρᾶσιν δὲ εἶναι λέγουσι δύο ἢ καὶ πλειόνων 
σωμάτων ὑγρῶν δι' ὅλων ἀντιπαρέκτασιν τῶν περὶ αὐτὰ ποιοτήτων ὑπομενουσῶν· [Τὴν 
μὲν μῖξιν καὶ ἐπὶ ξηρῶν γίγνεσθαι σωμάτων, οἷον πυρὸς καὶ σιδήρου, ψυχῆς τε καὶ τοῦ 
περιέχοντος αὐτὴν σώματος· τὴν δὲ κρᾶσιν ἐπὶ μόνων φασὶ γίνεσθαι τῶν ὑγρῶν] 
συνεκφαίνεσθαι γὰρ ἐκ τῆς κράσεως τὴν ἑκάστου τῶν συγκραθέντων ὑγρῶν ποιότητα, οἷον 
οἴνου, μέλιτος, ὕδατος, ὄξους, τῶν παραπλησίων. Ὅτι δ' ἐπὶ τοιούτων κράσεων διαμένουσιν αἱ 
ποιότητες τῶν συγκραθέντων, πρόδηλον ἐκ τοῦ πολλάκις ἐξ ἐπιμηχανήσεως ἀποχωρίζεσθαι 
ταῦτα ἀπ' ἀλλήλων. Ἐὰν γοῦν σπόγγον ἠλαιωμένον καθῇ τις εἰς οἶνον ὕδατι κεκραμένον, 
ἀποχωρίσει τὸ ὕδωρ τοῦ οἴνου, ἀναδραμόντος τοῦ ὕδατος εἰς τὸν σπόγγον. Τὴν δὲ σύγχυσιν δύο 
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designate the total coextensive mixture of dry bodies, whereas κρᾶσις more 
precisely indicates a total and coextensive mixture of liquid bodies. We can note 
that, in the testimonies we have at our disposal (and which we have to examine 
rather carefully, since not all of them are literal quotations but rather 
abridgements and summaries of Chrysippus’ tripartition), μίξις may indicate a) 
a general heading (as in Alexander); b) a mechanical mixture of grains (as in 
Philo and in Anonymus Londinensis); or c) a total mixture of solids (here in 
Stobaeus); whereas κρᾶσις indicates unmistakably the total mixture, especially 
of liquids. However, the opposition solid/liquid might be an authentic element 
of the Stoic doctrine, although it is absolutely clear that the term par excellence 
(ἰδίως), which Chrisippus uses to indicate the total mixture, is δι' ὅλων κρᾶσις. 
As Groisard remarks, it is possible that in his De mixtione Alexander neglected 
to point out the opposition κρᾶσις/μίξις as liquid/solid total mixture (and 
followed his own terminology, where μίξις is just the general heading of all the 
types of mixtures), and then, in this regard, it is possible that the Stoics were 
influenced by the Aristotelian doctrine according to which μίξις is said both of 
solids and of liquids and κρᾶσις is said solely of liquids, but then certainly 
privileged the latter.536 Personally, I would consider an explanation for the Stoic 
privileged usage of the term κρᾶσις to describe the total mixture of primary 
elements in general, and this has to do with the Stoic cosmogony. As we have 
seen, in Zeno’s cosmogony, the real elements come to be from a pre-elemental 
stage of pure water (which is the discrimen between the pre-elements and the 
real elements): in Diogenes Laertius’ cosmological report (VII 135–136) it is 
said that “[i]n the beginning he [God] was by himself; he transformed the whole 
of substance through air into water, and just as in animal generation the seed has 
a moist vehicle, so in cosmic moisture God, who is the seminal reason of the 
universe, remains behind in the moisture as such an agent, adapting matter to 
himself with a view to the next stage of creation. Thereupon he created first of 
all the four elements, fire, water, air, earth (εἶτα ἀπογεννᾶν πρῶτον τὰ τέσσαρα 
στοιχεῖα πῦρ, ὕδωρ, ἀέρα, γῆν)”.537 The real elements then come to be from a 
                                                          
<ἢ> καὶ πλειόνων ποιοτήτων περὶ τὰ σώματα μεταβολὴν εἰς ἑτέρας διαφερούσης τούτων 
ποιότητος γένεσιν, ὡς ἐπὶ τῆς συνθέσεως ἔχει τῶν μύρων καὶ τῶν ἰατρικῶν φαρμάκων”. 
536 Groisard 2016 pp. 97–98.  
537 Cf. Hahm 1977 p. 57 and cf. Diogen. Laërt. VII 135–136 = SVF I 102. 
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state of water, that is, from a liquid, and they then mix together so as to create 
all the existent beings within the cosmos. Ab origine, then, the Stoic primary 
elements mix together out of a watery stage such that perhaps, for this reason, 
the Stoics naturally adopted the term κρᾶσις (which was adopted, as we have 
seen, before Chrysippus) to refer to such a mixture.  
  
3.3 Galen’s usage of κρᾶσις 
 
This section will explore Galen’s usage of the term κρᾶσις throughout our 
primary sources. First of all, we have pointed out that the term κρᾶσις can 
indicate either a process or the result of a process, i.e. a state.  
 We will first deal with places where Galen uses the term κρᾶσις to 
indicate the process of mixture either of primary elements (which would be a 
work of nature and/or God) or of ingredients in order to produce medicaments 
(which would be a work performed by a human being, and specifically, by the 
doctor). 
 In the first place, as we saw in the first chapter, nature and/or God 
perform a total mixture of the primary elements in order to generate every 
existent being; and we have seen that in living beings this total mixture coincides 
with an act of shaping the individual from within, which over time fully develops 
according to a teleological design. The act of completely mixing these 
primordial ingredients, performed by nature and/or God, is defined either 
using a Stoic vocabulary, δι' ὅλων κρᾶσις,538 or simply by the word κρᾶσις.539 
The distinctive feature of such a process is that it is not reversible, as we have 
demonstrated.  
                                                          
538 De temp. p. 34.5–12 H “Τὸ μὲν οὖν ὅλα δι' ὅλων αὐτὰ κεράσαι, τὸ θερμὸν λέγω καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν 
καὶ τὸ ξηρὸν καὶ τὸ ὑγρόν, ἀδύνατον ἀνθρώπῳ. γῆ γὰρ ὑγρῷ | φυραθεῖσα μέμικται μέν, ὡς ἄν 
τῳ δόξειε, καὶ οὕτω κέκραται πᾶσα παντί, παράθεσις μήν ἐστι τὸ τοιοῦτον κατὰ σμικρὰ καὶ οὐ 
δι' ὅλων κρᾶσις, ἀλλὰ τὸ δι' ὅλων ἄμφω κεράσαι θεοῦ καὶ φύσεως ἔργον, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον, εἰ καὶ 
τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν ὅλα δι' ὅλων ἀλλήλοις κεραννύοιτο”. Cf. also In Hipp. Nat. Hom. 
comment. CMG V 1.9 p. 33.14–21 Mewaldt.  
539 In Hipp. Nat. Hom. comment. CMG V 1.9 p. 21.15–18 Mewaldt “γενήσεται γὰρ ἡ ἐκ τούτων 
δόξα τὴν γένεσιν ἡμῶν ἐν ποιᾷ συνθέσει τῶν ἀιδίων ἐκείνων σωμάτων τιθεμένη, καθάπερ ἡ 
Ἱπποκράτους ἐν τῇ κράσει τῶν τεσσάρων στοιχείων, ἣν Ἀριστοτέλης τε καὶ οἱ Στωϊκοὶ 
προσήκαντο”; cf. ibid. p. 27.20–27, p. 33,4–13.  
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 Second, we have also seen that the physician can perform a δι' ὅλων 
κρᾶσις, that is, an act of completely mixing the ingredients to obtain a drug 
(cf. De elem. sec. Hipp. CMG V 1.2 p. 138.11–14 De Lacy “εἰ δ' ἐπὶ πλέον 
χρονίσειεν | ὡς ἑνωθῆναι τὸ πᾶν, ἀμήχανον ἔτι διακρῖναί τε καὶ διελεῖν ἀπὸ 
θατέρου θάτερον· ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τοῦ τρόπου τῆς δι' ὅλων κράσεως εἰρήσεται 
κἀν τοῖς περὶ φαρμάκων”).540 In this case the term κρᾶσις included within the 
Stoic-flavoured expression δι' ὅλων κρᾶσις indicates a process of production of 
medicaments whose distinctive feature is their non-reversibility.  
 The word κρᾶσις can indicate a state, that is, the result of the process 
of elemental mixture: all other occurrences of the word in our primary sources 
point to this meaning. In contrast to the first use of κρᾶσις as process of mixture, 
this second use of κρᾶσις as a state resulting from the mixture presents a 
connection with the notion of φύσις (a connection which Boudon-Millot fails to 
notice). For Galen affirms that when he says φύσις he means κρᾶσις and the 
whole substance: “φύσιν δ' ὅταν εἴπω, τὴν ὅλην οὐσίαν τε καὶ κρᾶσιν λέγω τὴν 
ἐκ τῶν πρώτων στοιχείων, θερμοῦ καὶ ψυχροῦ καὶ ξηροῦ καὶ ὑγροῦ” (De temp. 
p. 104.1–3 Helmreich). This equivalence of φύσις with οὐσία and κρᾶσις can be 
interpreted in two different ways: as essence (that which makes something what 
it is) or as natural condition (understood as the physical constitution of 
something).541  
As to the first case, as the lexicographer den Dulk also notes (although he 
does not establish a relation with the abovementioned sense of κρᾶσις as a state 
resulting from the mixture), κρᾶσις indicates more Aristotelico form qua 
essence.542 It is therefore clear why, philosophically, φύσις is the οὐσία and 
κρᾶσις: mixture is form and essence (that is, οὐσία in the primary sense, in the 
sense of Metaph. VII 11) and, therefore, nature qua essence (in the sense of 
Metaph. V 4 1015a) is the κρᾶσις. Thus, we can understand why all existent 
beings, animate and inanimate, and even their parts, are endowed with a κρᾶσις, 
                                                          
540 This represents progress with respect to Boudon-Millot’s account, according to which solely 
μίξις would have been used in pharmacology.  
541 For this distinction cf. van der Eijk 2014a pp. 89–90. 
542 Den Dulk 1934 pp. 90 ff. Cf. Quod animi mor. K. IV p. 773.  
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that is, an essence (what makes something what it is), resulting from a proportion 
of hot/cold and dry/wet.543  
As for second case, when φύσις is intended as the “natural condition” of 
whichever unspecified substance or οὐσία interpreted as the highest genus 
(including inanimate or animate beings), κρᾶσις indicates the “condition or 
state resulting from the process of mixture” of whichever natural substance 
(therefore its “natural state”), made up of primary elements (Galen’s hot, 
cold, dry, and wet, and not the humours) reaching a relative equilibrium 
point. In contrast to the Hippocratic κρῆσις which – archaically – inditicates an 
intrisinc “good mixture”, Galen’s κρᾶσις indicates any relative equilibrium 
reached by the constituents. For he distinguishes eight varieties of mixtures, 
pointedly calling them δυσκρασίαι or hot, cold, dry, or wet or hot/dry, hot/wet, 
cold/dry, or cold/wet κρᾶσις and one good mixture; if for Hippocrates κρῆσις 
already meant good and healthy mixture, now Galen uses a composite to 
emphasize this idea, i.e εὐκρασία.  
Under this general heading of κρᾶσις as a natural “condition or state 
resulting from the mixture”, we find many terminological articulations, which 
we will treat separately  
1)A physical/physiological meaning. Galen speaks of a φυσικὴ κρᾶσις, 
meaning the natural bodily state, said exclusively of living bodies, and 
resulting from the process of mixture of hot/cold and dry/wet.544 This natural 
                                                          
543 Cf. for example the passage where Galen seeks the midpoint in inanimate and animate, 
therefore, unspecified, substances; cf. De temp. p. 26.5–10 H. or De temp. p. 32.5–14 H.. For 
κρᾶσις as the essence of parts of a body cf. De usu part. pp. I.18.25ff. H.: “αὗται (sc. the 
mixtures) γὰρ τὴν ἰδίαν οὐσίαν τῶν μορίων συμπληροῦσιν. ὅτι γὰρ ὧδέ πως ἔχει θερμότητός 
τε καὶ ψυχρότητος καὶ ξηρότητος καὶ ὑγρότητος τὸ σῶμα, διὰ τοῦτο τοιόνδε τὴν φύσιν ἐστί. τὸ 
γὰρ εἶναι σαρκὶ τῇ σαρκὶ καὶ νεύρῳ τῷ νεύρῳ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἑκάστῳ τοῦθ', ὅπερ ἐστί, διὰ 
τὴν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων τεττάρων ποιὰν κρᾶσιν ἐγένετο. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν αὐτοῖς κατὰ τὸν τῆς 
οὐσίας ὑπάρχει λόγον […] ὅταν οὖν τις ἀκριβῶς ἐθέλῃ βασανίσαι τὴν χρείαν ἁπάντων τῶν 
ὑπαρχόντων τοῖς ὀργάνοις, πρῶτον μὲν ἐξετασάτω, καθ' ὃ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἐκτήσατο. τὰ πολλὰ 
μὲν γὰρ εὑρήσει κατὰ τὴν ἰδίαν οὐσίαν”.  
544 Cf. De temp. p. 52.5–21 H. “ἔσται δ' ἡ κρίσις [ἡμῖν] ἀρίστη καθ' ἓν καὶ ταὐτὸν σῶμα βρέφους 
ἑνός. οὐ γὰρ ἀδύνατον ὁποία τέ τις ἡ θερμασία διετεῖ τὴν ἡλικίαν ὑπάρχοντι προϋπῆρχεν αὐτῷ 
μεμνῆσθαι καὶ ὁποία νῦν ἐστι δυοῖν ἢ τριῶν ἐτῶν, εἰ τύχοι, μεταξὺ γενομένων. εἰ γὰρ ὅλως 
φαίνοιτο μεταβολή τις ἐπὶ τὸ θερμὸν ἢ ψυχρὸν γεγονέναι τῷ βρέφει, χαλεπὸν οὐδὲν ἔτι 
συλλογίζεσθαι τὴν ἕως τῆς ἀκμῆς ἐσομένην ὑπεροχήν. εἰ δὲ καὶ πλείω παιδία πολλοῖς 
ἀκμάζουσιν ἐθέλοις παραβάλλειν, ἰσχνὰ μὲν ἰσχνοῖς, εὔσαρκα δ' εὐσάρκοις καὶ παχέα παχέσι 
παράβαλλε· οὕτω δὲ καὶ χρόας ὡσαύτως ἔχοντα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων ὡς οἷόν τε. τὴν γὰρ ἐν 
ταῖς ἡλικίαις διαφορὰν ἐξευρεῖν ζητῶν ἐπὶ τῶν ὁμοίων ὡς ἔνι μάλιστα φύσεων ἀσφαλέστερον 
ἂν ἐπισκέπτοιο. τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τῶν ἐναντίων ἐξετάζειν οὐ σμικρὸν ἔχει τὸν παραλο|γισμόν, οὐ διὰ 
τὴν ἡλικίαν ἐνίοτε τῆς τῶν δοκιμαζομένων σωμάτων διαφορᾶς ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν φυσικὴν 
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state can change on the basis of age, customs, dietetic or pharmacological 
prescriptions, and external factors. This produces an opposition between a 
connnate (σύμφυτος) and an acquired (ἐπίκτητος) κρᾶσις. Physiological facts 
can be based on both (the verb used is hepesthai), such as thickness and 
thinness545 or the hairiness546 of the body, to confine ourselves to those treated 
in Book II of De temperamentis (that dedicated to the physiology of mixture). 
Now, this state, resulting from the relatively balanced mixture of hot/cold 
dry/wet, similarly to Hippocratic medicine, relates either to the whole body or to 
a part of it. In several passages of De temperamentis Galen indeed speaks often 
of a κρᾶσις τοῦ σώματος (as opposed to a mixture of the single part), indicating 
the natural state of the entire body resulting from the process of mixture of 
                                                          
ὑπαρχούσης κρᾶσιν (And the evaluation will be best [carried out] on one single body, that of 
an infant. For it is perfectly possible to remember what its heat was like at two years old, in 
relation to what it is now, after an interval of, say, two or three years.  If a general change is 
detected, whereby the infant has become either hotter or colder, it is then no difficult matter to 
deduce the further increase that will take place up to the prime of life. If, on the other hand, you 
wish to compare many children with many people in their prime, then compare thin examples of 
both, or well-fleshed, or fat; and, similarly, make sure that they have the same colour, and all 
other characteristics, as far as is possible. In seeking to discover the difference due to different 
ages your investigation will be conducted more reliably on the basis, in brief, of natures which 
are as similar to each other as possible. To perform an examination on the basis of opposite 
types of nature involves a considerable distortion, as the difference is sometimes not due to 
age, but to the naturally obtaining mixture, of the bodies being tested)” (trans. Singer); De 
temp.  p. 75.20–21 H. “ἡ φυσικὴ δ' οὐκ εὐθὺς ὑπαλλαχθήσεται κρᾶσις οὔθ' ἥπατος οὔτε καρδίας 
οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων σπλάγχνων”. Den Dulk translates the word κρᾶσις as “natuurlijke gesteldheid” 
(den Dulk 1934 p. 81). 
545 De temp. p. 60.9 ff. H.: “ἀλλὰ καὶ παχύτητες ἕξεως καὶ λεπτότητες ἕπονται κράσεσιν, οὐ ταῖς 
συμφύτοις μόνον, ἀλλὰ κἂν ἐξ ἔθους μακροῦ τις ἐπίκτητος γένηται. πολλοὺς γὰρ καὶ τῶν φύσει 
λεπτῶν ἐθεασάμην παχυνθέντας καὶ τῶν παχέων λεπτυνθέντας τοὺς μὲν ἀργίᾳ τε καὶ τῷ 
ἁβροδιαίτῳ τὴν ὅλην κρᾶσιν ὑπαλλάξαντας ἐπὶ τὸ ὑγρότερον, τοὺς δ' ἐν ταλαιπωρίαις πλείοσι 
καὶ φροντίσι καὶ διαίτῃ λεπτῇ καταξηρανθέντας. εἰρήσεται δὲ καὶ τούτων τὰ γνωρίσματα. 
κάλλιον γὰρ ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ἔκ τινων σημείων ὁρμωμένους, πρὶν παρ' ἑτέρου πυθέσθαι, δύνασθαι 
γνωρίζειν, εἰ φύσει τοιοῦτος ἦν ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἢ ἐξ ἔθους ἐγένετο”.  
546 Cf. De temp. p. 64.14–18 H: “Δασεῖα μὲν ἡ θερμὴ καὶ ξηρὰ κρᾶσίς ἐστιν, ἀλλ' αὕτη μὲν 
ἐσχάτως· μετρίως δ' ἡ θερμὴ μέν, σύμμετρος δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἑτέραν ἀντίθεσιν, ὥσπερ γε καὶ ἡ ξηρὰ 
μέν, εὔκρατος δὲ κατὰ τὸ θερμόν τε καὶ ψυχρόν· ἔστι γὰρ καὶ ἥδε μετρίως δασεῖα. ψιλαὶ δὲ 
τριχῶν αἱ ψυχραὶ πᾶσαι κράσεις, εἴτ' οὖν ἀμέτρως ἔχοιεν ὑγρότητος εἴτε μετρίως”. Cf. also De 
temp. p. 64.19–23 H.; De temp. p. 67.22 H.; De temp. p. 68.16–18 H. 
264 
 
hot/cold and dry/wet,547 which den Dulk defines as “constitution”.548 But does 
this constitution also involve a mixture of humours? In De temperamentis Galen 
mentions people with “melancholic mixtures” (μελαγχολικαὶ κράσεις), meaning 
natural constitutions where there is an abundance of black bile.549 In fact, 
                                                          
547 The alternation between the expression κρᾶσις τοῦ σώματος and κρᾶσις τῶν μορίων emerges 
in De temperamentis II 6 when Galen attacks a group of adversaries because they purport to infer 
the κρᾶσις of the whole body from the κρᾶσις of one single part; De temp. p. 71.1 ff. 
H.: “Ἀκριβῶς δὲ χρὴ προσέχειν τῷ λεγομένῳ τὸν νοῦν, ὅπως μὴ λάθωμεν ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς 
παρακούσαντές τι καὶ σφαλέντες, οἷα δὴ πολλοὶ τῶν πάνυ δοκούντων ἀρίστων ἰατρῶν εἶναι 
σφάλλονται, εἴ τίς ἐστι φαλακρός, εὐθὺς τοῦτον οἰόμενοι ξηρὰν ἔχειν ἅπαντος τοῦ σώματος 
τὴν κρᾶσιν. οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἁπλῶς οὕτως εἰκάζειν ἐχρῆν, ἀλλὰ διορίζεσθαι πρότερον ἄμεινον ἦν, 
ὡς τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὸ σῶμα τῶν μὲν ὁμαλῶς κέκραται σύμπαν, ἐνίων δὲ καὶ οὐκ ὀλίγων 
τούτων ἀνωμάλως διάκειται. τὰ μὲν γάρ τινα τῶν μορίων αὐτοῖς ὑγρότερα τοῦ συμμέτρου τε 
καὶ προσήκοντός ἐστι, τὰ δὲ ψυχρότερα, τὰ δὲ ξηρότερα, τὰ δὲ θερμότερα, τὰ δὲ καὶ παντελῶς 
εὔκρατά τε καὶ σύμμετρα. δεῖ δὲ προσέχειν μάλιστα τούτῳ τὸν νοῦν, ἐπειδὰν ἐπισκέπτῃ 
σώματος κρᾶσιν. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ὁμαλῶς εὔρυθμον ὅλον ἐστὶν ἁπάσας τε τῶν μορίων ἀποσῶζον 
τὰς πρὸς ἄλληλα συμμετρίας ἐν μήκει καὶ πλάτει καὶ βάθει, δύναιτ' ἂν ὅλον ὁμοίως 
κεκρᾶσθαι τὸ τοιοῦτον. εἰ δέ τι σῶμα θώρακα μὲν ἔχει καὶ τράχηλον καὶ ὤμους μεγίστους, 
ἰσχνὰ δὲ καὶ σμικρὰ τὰ κατ' ὀσφὺν καὶ σκέλη λεπτά, πῶς ἂν ὁμοίως εἴη τοῦτο διακείμενον 
ἅπασι τοῖς μορίοις; “The point under discussion requires precise attention. There is a danger 
here that we may without noticing it fall into a certain misinterpretation and mistake – a mistake 
made by many of those who have a great reputation for excellence as doctors – namely to think 
that someone who is bald must automatically have a dry mixture of the body as a whole. 
One should not draw the inference thus, in absolute terms; one ought first to have made a 
distinction between those whose body consists of an even mixture throughout and those – 
a large number, in fact – whose body is in an uneven state. For in these some of the parts are 
wetter than the appropriate state of good balance, some colder, some drier, some hotter – and 
indeed, some completely well-mixed and well-balanced. You must pay particular attention to 
this matter whenever you consider the mixture of a [particular] body. If the whole body is 
evenly well-proportioned, preserving good balance in all respects between the different 
parts, in terms of length, width and depth, then it is possible that such a body consists of 
the same kind of mixture throughout. But if a body has a very large chest, neck and 
shoulders, but is thin and small in the region of the loins, and has thin legs, how can this 
body have the same kind of state in all its parts?” (Trans. Singer) Moreover, from this passage 
emerges an opposition between a evenly mixed body (when the body maintains the same state 
throughout) and an unevenly mixed body (when the parts of the body do not have the same 
qualitative composition)”; cf. De temp. II 6. For the occurrences of κρᾶσις τοῦ σώματος in De 
temperamentis cf. De temp. p. 73.5; p. 73.13; p. 73.16; p. 74.16; p. 77.14–15; p. 80.24; p. 80.27–
28; p. 81.5 H. For the occurrences of κρᾶσις referred to the parts cf. p. 72.22; p. 73.25; p. 73.28; 
p. 74.5; p. 74.9; p. 74.15; p. 75.20– 21; p. 75.23; p. 77.24; p. 78.25; p. 78.27; p. 79.6–7; p. 81.3–
4; p. 83.17; p. 105.29 H.  
548 Den Dulk notes that κρᾶσις can be used alternatively with διάθεσις, ἕξις, κατάστασις τοῦ 
σώματος (pp. 82–85) and translates the word κρᾶσις as “lichaamsgesteldheid” “constitutie” 
without making the logical passage from mixture to constitution clear. This passage is difficult 
to understand insofar as κρᾶσις is referred to the whole body to indicate its state resulting from 
the mixture of hot/cold and dry/wet, where the state concerns the entire body of the organism. 
Once this is clarified, it is evident that Galen is referring to the physical constitution of the body. 
As den Dulk rightly points out, this meaning survives in New Greek, p. 85 and p. 89.  
549 De temp. 83.1–24 H.: “μὴ τοίνυν, εἰ δασύς τις ἱκανῶς ἐστιν, εὐθὺς τοῦτον οἰώμεθα 
μελαγχολικὸν ὑπάρχειν, ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ἀκμάζων, οὔπω τοιοῦτον· εἰ δὲ παρακμάζων, ἤδη 
μελαγχολικόν· εἰ δὲ γέρων, οὐκέτι. γίγνονται μὲν γὰρ αἱ μελαγχολικαὶ κράσεις ἐκ συγκαύσεως 
αἵματος. οὐ μήν, ἐπειδὰν ἄρξηται τοῦτο πάσχειν, εὐθὺς καὶ κατώπτηται τελέως. ἀλλ' ἐν τάχει 
μὲν ἱκανῶς ἔσται δασὺς ὁ θερμὸς καὶ ξηρός, εἴ τι μεμνήμεθα τῶν ἔμπροσθεν λόγων, οὐκ εὐθέως 
δὲ μελαγχολικός. ἡ γὰρ τοῦ δέρματος πύκνωσις εἴργουσα τῶν παχυτέρων περιττωμάτων τὴν 
διέξοδον ἀναγκάζει συγκαίεσθαι κατὰ τὰς ἄκρως θερμὰς κράσεις, ὥστε τοιοῦτον αὐτοῖς 
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Galen does not exclude the presence of humours in the human body (during 
embryogenesis the homoeomerous parts are formed out of them), although in De 
temperamentis he privileges a qualitative understanding of the bodily mixture 
and of the human being’s bodily parts, since the bodily fluids are thought to be 
integrated with the solid parts of the body.550  
2)A physical/pharmacological-dietetic meaning. As we have seen, each 
substance, inanimate and animate, has its own κρᾶσις, but in the case of the 
pharmacological or alimentary ingredients Galen draws a further distinction of 
strongly Aristotelian flavor: as he himself declares that something has a hot, cold, 
dry, or wet mixture “when it is not yet of that kind, but may very readily become 
of that kind by virtue of a natural tendency that that object has for this to happen” 
(De temp. p. 32.17–19 H.; trans. Singer).551 In this case, κρᾶσις indicate not a 
process but a “potential natural state” (which is differentiated from an actual 
natural state) of any substance which, when its inner potentialities are freed, 
                                                          
ὑπάρχειν ἤδη τὸ περίττωμα τὸ φύον τὰς τρίχας, οἷον ἐν τοῖς ἀγγείοις ἔσεσθαι μέλλει 
προελθόντος τοῦ χρόνου. Καὶ ταῦτ' οὖν ἠμέληται τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ἔτι τε πρὸς τούτοις, ἐπειδὰν 
ἐκ τῆς φύσεως τῶν περιττωμάτων ἀδιορίστως ὑπὲρ τῶν κράσεων ἀποφαίνωνται. νομίζουσι γὰρ 
ἀνάλογον ἔχειν τὰς κράσεις τῶν μορίων τῇ φύσει τῶν περιττωμάτων. τὸ δ' οὐχ ὅλως ἀληθές 
ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ἐγχωρεῖ ποτε περίττωμα μὲν ἀθροίζεσθαι φλεγματῶδες, ὑγρὸν δ' οὐκ εἶναι τὸ μόριον, 
ἀλλὰ ψυχρὸν μὲν ἐξ ἀνάγκης, οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἄλλη γέ τις ἡ τοῦ φλέγματος γένεσις, ὑγρὸν δ' οὐκ ἐξ 
ἀνάγκης· ἐγχωρεῖ γὰρ καὶ ξηρὸν εἶναι. τὸ δ' ἀπατῆσαν αὐτοὺς εὐφώρατον. οὐ γὰρ ἐνενόησαν, 
ὡς ἐκ τῶν σιτίων, οὐκ ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ σώματος ἡμῶν γίγνεται τὸ φλέγμα “We should not, then, 
think, just because someone is quite hairy, that he is automatically melancholic. This does not 
hold if he is still in the prime; it does hold if he is at the stage after the prime; and again does not 
hold in old age. For melancholic mixtures come about as a result of the burning of the blood; 
but when this process has just begun, the ‘baking’ effect is not a complete one. One who is hot 
and dry will very quickly become hairy (if we recall the earlier arguments); he will not, however, 
immediately become melancholic. For in extremely hot mixtures, the closeness of the skin 
impedes the expulsion of the thicker secretions, necessarily causing burning; and this means that 
the secretion responsible for the production of hair is already of that quality which will obtain in 
the vessels some time later. These facts, too, have been neglected by our predecessors; 
another area of neglect is in their making assertions on mixtures on the basis of the nature 
of the secretions, without making any distinction between the two. For they think that the 
mixtures of the parts are in proportion to the nature of the secretions. This is very far from 
being the case: it is quite possible in some cases for a phlegmatic secretion to accumulate, but 
for the part not to be wet. This part will necessarily be cold – there is no other way in which 
phlegm can be generated – but it will not necessarily be wet. It is quite possible also for it to be 
dry. The point that has deceived them is very easily discovered: they have failed to realize that 
phlegm is produced from foods, not from our actual bodies”, (Trans. Singer) 
550 I do not agree with den Dulk (1934 pp. 79–80) who, by privileging a modern train of thought 
promulgated by historians of medicine, translates the expression (of which he reports old 
occurrences such as Aristotle 30 Probl. 954b and Galen in Hipp. Prorrheticum K. XIV p. 793) 
as “melancholish temperament” (esp. p. 92). Here Galen is not speaking of psychological 
characteristics, which is made all the more evident by his reference to melancholic residues 
produced by a melancholic bodily mixture (!).  
551 Galen analyses the way drugs and foods release their potentials (passing therefore from a 
mixture in capacity to that one in actuality) throughout De temperamentis III.  
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can become hot, cold, dry, or wet, or hot/dry, hot/wet, cold/dry, cold/wet, or well-
mixed. 
3)A physical/meteorological meaning. Galen uses the term κρᾶσις, 
meaning the natural state resulting from the mixture, applying it to the qualitative 
composition either of the four seasons552 or of the ambient air.553 In these cases, 
the term κρᾶσις refers to the temperature, either understood as “thermic degree” 
(balance between hot and cold) or  as “humidity degree” (balance between wet 
and dry), or, meteorologically, as the atmospheric state with reference to heat, 
coldness, dryness, and moisture.554 As we have seen, Montanari points to the 
meaning “temperature” in the Homeric Greek, with reference to the pleasant 
effects obtained by mixing hot and cold water. In this case the verb κεράννυμι 
conveys the meaning of “tempering/mitigating” applied to the thermic sphere: 
the two opposites reach in fact a common midpoint, i.e. temperate water.555 As 
                                                          
552 As we have seen, in De temperamentis I 3 and in more in detail I 4 – and also in the sections 
of Galen’s Commentary on Hippocrates’ the Nature of Man where the author comments on 
Hippocrates’ theory of the prevalence of one of the four humours in accordance with each of the 
seasons (CMG V 1.9 pp. 43-49 Mewaldt) – , the two different treatises display strinking thematic 
similarities, as well as cross-references; they can also, as we have seen, be interpreted in light of 
Galen’s polemic against the Pneumatists. Cf. in Hipp. Nat. Hom. comment. CMG V 1.9 p. 46.31–
32 Mewaldt (the well-balanced κρᾶσις of the spring); De temp. p. 12.16 H. (the uneven κρᾶσις 
of autumn); ibid. 13.5–9 (hot and wet κρᾶσις of spring and cold and dry κρᾶσις of autumn, 
according to his adversaries); p. 16.15–16 (well-balanced κρᾶσις of spring).  
553 Cf. De temp. p. 13.23; p. 14.26; p. 17.19; p. 17.20–21 H.  
554 den Dulk 1934 pp. 51–52.  
555 As den Dulk confirms, when the term κρᾶσις is applied to the 
thermic/hygrometric/meteorological field it refers to the state of the mixture, i.e. what den Dulk 
calls the “vermengingstoestand”; cf. Den Dulk 1934 p. 53–65. In his enquiry into the field of 
meaning of the word κρᾶσις, den Dulk tries to reconstruct the process through which the term 
and its family would have undergone a semantic shift, i.e. a passage from the meaning “mixture 
of opposites in a proper balance” to the meaning “temperature” as thermic temperature or 
understood in a climatological sense, i.e. as climate or atmospheric state. Den Dulk puts forward 
two alternatives. On the one hand, this semantic shift might be attributable to a metaphorical 
process. For this metaphorical usage would have led the meaning of the word from indicating a 
concrete process of mixture between liquids, i.e. the mixture of hot and cold water bringing about 
more temperate water, to referring to a metaphorical mixture of primary elements/qualities and 
then to meaning both temperature and climate; den Dulk 1934, p. 66. On the other hand, the term 
may refer to state brought about by a real mixture, i.e. a mixture of the primary qualities, which, 
he argues, were originally conceived as mixing liquids; den Dulk pp. 66–67. This semantic 
process, which led the word-family of κεράννυμι to be applied to the thermic/meteorological 
field and which may be attributable to a metaphoric or to a real mixture of the primary 
elements/qualities, finds a remarkable parallel in the Latin semantic field related to the verb 
temperare. In his article on the Latin notion of tempus, Benveniste underlines that temperare is 
a denominative of tempus, just like generare is denominative of genus. As Benveniste observes, 
temperare corresponds to the gr. κεράννυμι and means in the first place to mix a liquid (it is 
especially said of the mixture between water and wine) in order to mitigate and to temper it. Like 
κεράννυμι, the verb is applied to the meteorological field. For temperatura (preclass. and 
postclass. for temperatio) also belongs to this word-family; cf. the expression caeli temperatura, 
or temperies (the way in which the weather is) and its contrary intemperies and tempestas from 
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Jouanna remarks, the oldest occurrence of κρᾶσις as indicating the good and 
healthy meteorological conditions of the seasons is that in De aere aquis locis 
where the Hippocratic author speaks of κρῆσις τῶν ὡρέων.556 However, in 
contrast to this first occurrence, Galen’s usage also covers cases where such a 
state resulting from the mixture is not well-balanced at all, but indicates any 
atmospheric state of the seasons.557  
 
 
3.4 Galen’s usage of μίξις 
 
The occurrences of μίξις in our primary sources represent only 3%, against 
uses of κρᾶσις, at 97% – just 5 compared to 171 of the latter (this confirms the 
                                                          
*tempesti-tas and tempus. The first meaning of tempus that Benveniste recostrues is “right 
proportion of a mixture, required dosis for a combination” (Benveniste 1940, p. 12). However, 
in the first place tempus and especially its derivates qualify the atmospheric state as derived from 
a mixture, i.e. the proportion of the elements that brings about the state of the atmosphere 
(Benveniste 1940, p. 13 and p. 15). In this sense tempus initially means “atmospheric mixture”. 
Hence it has also undergone a semantic shift from meaning “good atmospheric state” to meaning 
“favourable moment” and then also “occasion to use”; cf. Benveniste 1940 p. 15. In its 
meteorological sense it was applied to the seasons – cf. primus tempus, i.e. spring, or hibernum 
tempus, i.e. winter. According to Benveniste, it is possible to draw a comparison between 
temperare and κεράννυμι and between tempus and καιρός. For Benveniste attributes a 
reconstrued meaning to the latter, *“atmospheric mélange”, and then “exact or critical time”, 
“season”. As Montanari observes, the connection between κεράννυμι and καιρός is far from 
being certain; cf. Montanari 1979, p. 136–137. Cf. also Chantraine 2002 s.v. καιρός. Scholars 
have recently called the meaning of tempus as stemming from the same root of temperare into 
question; cf. Rix 2001 s.v. *temp, which means “to stretch” < tempus = stretch of time, i.e. 
occasion. However, Benveniste’s analysis concerning temperare and its correspondence with 
κεράννυμι may be useful in shedding light on κεράννυμι as applied to ancient meteorological 
concepts. In the first place, both the verbs mean “to mix ingredients proportionately”. Further, 
they both are applied to the meteorological field and they both refer to the mixture of the elements 
in the atmosphere bringing about particular meteorological conditions. Instead of comparing 
tempus with καιρός, we can note some similarities between the members of the word-family of 
temperare, such as temperatura or temperies and κρᾶσις, indicating the atmospheric state in 
relatoin to the seasons. To sum up, in Greek–Roman culture the notion of weather seems to be 
connected to a mixture of the elements.  
556 Cf. Jouanna 1996 p. 295. In this Hippocratic writing this expression (CMG I.2 p. 54.13 Diller 
= CMG I 1 p. 67.22 Heiberg) indicates the good, healthy, and more temperate climate of a region 
in Asia, on account of which the charater of the inhabitants is milder and gentle. In this region, 
in fact, “nothing is forcibly predominant, but equality in every respect prevails (ἀλλὰ παντὸς 
ἰσομοιρίη δυναστεύῃ). Asia, however, is not everywhere uniform; the region, however, situated 
midway between the heat and the cold is very fruitful, very wooded and very mild; it has splendid 
water, whether from rain or from springs. While it is not burnt up with the heat nor dried up by 
drought and want of water, it is not oppressed with cold, nor yet damp and wet with excessive 
rains and snow”; cf. Aer. CMG I 1.2 ed. Diller 54.12 ff., trans. Jones.  
557 As we have seen, in De temp. p. 12.16 H. Galen uses the term κρᾶσις to indicate the uneven 
atmospheric condition of autumn, in which is it much hotter at midday than at dawn or dusk, but 
is not precisely at the midpoint between wetness and dryness either, since it tends to be drier. 
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general picture of a clear-cut predominance of κρᾶσις over μίξις given by 
Boudon-Millot). In this section, I shall be commenting on these occurences and, 
given their scarcity, will back up my claims by recourse to other remarkable 
examples concerning the word-family of μείγνυμι taken from Galen’s entire 
corpus.   
 Analogously to κρᾶσις, the term μίξις can indicate either a process or a 
state resulting from such a process. Furthermore, as we have seen in the 
lexicographical overview, combined with Montanari’s etymological work on the 
Ancient Greek root, μίξις can more generically indicate either a mechanical 
mixture or a “chemical” mixture and, therefore, can be used either when the 
constituents remain solid and just enter into contact with each other or when, 
because of a minimum of moisture, they merge together.  
 In the case of μίξις as a process, a couple of occurrences of μίξις seems 
to point to a kind of mixture that starts with a juxtaposition and ends up in a 
homoeogeneous state. Let us consider the following occurrences:  
 
T1 Galen De temperamentis K. I pp. 560.13-561.13 Helmreich pp. 32.24–33.13: 
 
Ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν τὸ μέσον ἐν ἅπαντι γένει καὶ μάλιστα κατὰ τὰς συμπάσας 
οὐσίας ἐκ τῆς τῶν ἄκρων μίξεως γίγνεται, χρὴ καὶ τὴν νόησιν αὐτοῦ καὶ τὴν 
διάγνωσιν ἐξ ἐκείνων συνίστασθαι. τὸ μὲν δὴ τῆς νοήσεως ῥᾷστον. ἀπὸ γὰρ τοῦ 
θερμοτάτου πάντων τῶν εἰς αἴσθησιν ἡκόντων, οἷον ἤτοι πυρὸς ἤ τινος ὕδατος 
ἄκρως ζέοντος, ἐπὶ τὸ ψυχρότατον καταντῶντες ἁπάντων ὧν ἴσμεν, οἷον ἤτοι 
κρύσταλλον ἢ χιόνα, νοήσαντές τι διάστημα, μέσον ἀκριβῶς τοῦτο τέμνομεν. 
οὕτω γὰρ ἐξευρήσομεν τῇ νοήσει τὸ σύμμετρον, ὅπερ ἑκατέρου τῶν ἄκρων ἴσον 
ἀπέχει. ἀλλὰ καὶ κατασκευάσαι πως αὐτὸ δυνάμεθα τὸν ἴσον ὄγκον κρυστάλλου 
μίξαντες ὕδατι ζέοντι. τὸ γὰρ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν κραθὲν ἴσον ἑκατέρου τῶν ἄκρων ἀφέξει 
τοῦ τε καίοντος καὶ τοῦ νεκροῦντος διὰ ψῦξιν. οὔκουν οὐδὲ χαλεπὸν ἔτι τοῦ 
κραθέντος οὕτως ἁψαμένους ἔχειν τὸ μέσον ἁπάσης οὐσίας ἐν τῇ κατὰ τὸ 
θερμόν τε καὶ ψυχρὸν ἀντιθέσει καὶ μεμνῆσθαι τούτου καὶ κρίνειν ἅπαντα τἆλλα 




Now, since the middle in any genus, and most obviously in the whole of 
existent objects, arises from a mixing together of the extremes, our conception 
and distinguishing of it must also be composed on the basis of those. Well, as far 
as the conception of it is concerned, the matter is very simple. We start from the 
hottest of all things that reach our senses, such as fire, or water at its extreme 
boiling point, and go down to the coldest of all those we know, such as ice or 
snow; we conceptualize a line between them; and we divide this line at its precise 
midpoint. In this way we will find out conceptually the point of good balance, 
which is equidistant from each of the extremes. But we can also in a way create 
it physically, by combining an equal volume of ice and boiling water. For that 
which is made from a mixture of both these will be equidistant from the two 
extremes, that which burns and that which causes death by cold. And so it is no 
difficult matter, either, to touch the product of this mixture and so to hold that 
which is at the midpoint amongst all existent objects as regards the opposition 
of hot and cold, and to remember this, and to evaluate all other objects by using 
this as a standard with which to compare them. (Trans. Singer)  
 
T2 Galen De temperamentis K. I pp. 562.15-563.13 Helmreich p. 34.5-19: 
 
Τὸ μὲν οὖν ὅλα δι' ὅλων αὐτὰ κεράσαι, τὸ θερμὸν λέγω καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν καὶ 
τὸ ξηρὸν καὶ τὸ ὑγρόν, ἀδύνατον ἀνθρώπῳ. γῆ γὰρ ὑγρῷ | φυραθεῖσα μέμικται 
μέν, ὡς ἄν τῳ δόξειε, καὶ οὕτω κέκραται πᾶσα παντί, παράθεσις μήν ἐστι τὸ 
τοιοῦτον κατὰ σμικρὰ καὶ οὐ δι' ὅλων κρᾶσις, ἀλλὰ τὸ δι' ὅλων ἄμφω 
κεράσαι θεοῦ καὶ φύσεως ἔργον, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον, εἰ καὶ τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ 
ψυχρὸν ὅλα δι' ὅλων ἀλλήλοις κεραννύοιτο. τὸ μέντοι παράθεσιν ἐργάσασθαι 
τοιαύτην, ὡς ἐκφεύγειν τὴν αἴσθησιν ἕκαστον τῶν ἁπλῶν σωμάτων, οὐ φύσεως 
τοῦτό γε μόνης ἢ θεοῦ τοὖργον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡμέτερόν ἐστιν. οὐδὲν γὰρ χαλεπὸν 
ὑγροῦ καὶ ξηροῦ μέσον ἐργάσασθαι πηλὸν ἐκ τῆς τοιαύτης μίξεως, ὡσαύτως 
δὲ καὶ θερμοῦ καὶ ψυχροῦ, καί σοι φανεῖται τὸ τοιοῦτον σῶμα καὶ τῇ θερμότητι 
μὲν εὔκρατον, ἀλλὰ καὶ σκληρότητος καὶ μαλακότητος ἐν τῷ μέσῳ. 
 
The total mixing of one with the other, I mean of hot, cold, dry and wet, is 
not possible for a human being. When earth is kneaded together with 
270 
 
[something] wet, it seems to one that it has been combined, certainly, and in 
this sense a whole has been mixed with a whole; but in fact such a process 
is a placing alongside each other of very small parts, not a total mixture; the 
total mixing of the two is the work of God, and of Nature, especially in the case 
where the hot and the cold undergo total mixture with each other. However, to 
bring about a setting-alongside such that each of the simple bodies escapes 
perception, is not the work of Nature alone, nor of God, but is achievable by us 
too. For it is not at all difficult by this kind of combination to produce clay 
which is at the midpoint between wet and dry and also between hot and cold; 
and such a body will appear to you well-mixed in terms of hotness, as well as at 
a midpoint between hardness and softness. (Trans. Singer) 
 
As we see, the term μίξις is used in (T1) to indicate the mixture of boiling 
water and ice and in (T2) to refer to the mixture of earth with something liquid. 
Now, in (T2) the process of mixture is defined as μίξις and as παράθεσις; 
therefore we can assume that this process coincides with a mechanical mixture 
of particles of earth and liquid, which – in contrast to total mixtures – are 
recoverable. De facto, in Galen’s terminology of mixture the word-family of 
μείγνυμι can convey the meaning of a mechanical mixture of solids, such as in 
the case of a heap of grains (which in Aristotle’s technical terminology would 
more precisely correspond to synthesis).558 But in this case the juxtaposition is 
                                                          
558 More precisely, this sense of μείγνυμι as indicating a juxtaposition of constituents emerges 
when Galen accounts for the transformation of the primary elements leading to the generation of 
a perceptive body. In this regard, in his De elementis Galen remarks that thinkers “who hold that 
when fire and water and air and earth are changed and mixed and altered through and through 
(μεταβαλλόντων τε καὶ κεραννυμένων καὶ ἀλλοιουμένων δι' ὅλων), some one of the bodies 
formed from them becomes sentient, are stating possibilities; but those (who hold that this 
happens when the components) remain such as they are and are merely mixed up together as 
though in a heap of wheat and barley and chickpeas and beans are attempting the impossible 
(ὅσοι δὲ μενόντων, οἷά πέρ ἐστι καὶ μόνον ἀναμιγνυμένων ἀλλήλοις οὕτως ὥσπερ ἐν σωρῷ 
πυρῶν καὶ κριθῶν ἐρεβίνθων τε καὶ κυάμων, ἀδυνάτοις ἐπιχειροῦσιν)”; cf. De elem. sec. Hipp. 
CMG V 1.2 I 3 pp. 72.23–74.3 De Lacy (trans. De Lacy). In this passage the verb ἀναμείγνυμι 
(“to mix up”) indicates a mechanical mixture where the components remain such as they are 
(μενόντων, οἷά πέρ ἐστι), as there is no qualitative interaction between them. In other words, it 
indicates a juxtaposition, and this seems to be confirmed by the image of the heap of wheat 
grains, barley, chickpeas, and beans. For in this mechanical mixture of dry bodies, only the 
external surfaces of the grains are in contact; they do not merge and give rise to a homogeneous 
compound. In his Commentary on Hippocrates’ De natura hominis, Galen also employs 
ἀναμείγνυμι and μείγνυμι to describe the mechanical mixture of the Empedoclean primary 
elements, as is clear from the following passage: “And prior to them, Empedocles believed that 
the nature of compound bodies was generated from the four elements in an unchanged state, the 
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just the beginning of the process (which coincides with its reversibility phase): 
as we demonstrated in the first chapter, in Galen’s account of mixture (De 
elementis I 9) a process of progressive division takes place according to which 
at the very beginning the substances enter into contact and are merely 
juxtaposed; then their particles begin to progressively divide until they merge 
together, giving rise to a homogeneous product whose constituents may (as in 
the case of the every-day mixtures for the preparation of foods and drinks) or 
may not (as in the case of total mixtures) be recoverable.559 In (T1) the two 
phases of the process are even spelled out with a terminological alternation: the 
preliminary stage of a mixture of boiling water and ice is called μίξις, whereas, 
by contrast, the second stage leading to the formation of a homogeneous 
compound is described by resorting to the participle from the other word-family, 
τοῦ κραθέντος.560  
                                                          
primary things mixing up with one another (οὕτως ἀναμεμιγμένων ἀλλήλοις τῶν πρώτων) 
in the same way as if someone were to mix rust, bronze, cadmium and copper (ὡσεί τις λειώσας 
ἀκριβῶς καὶ χνοώδη ποιήσας ἰὸν καὶ χαλκίτην καὶ καδμείαν καὶ μίσυ μίξειεν) after grinding 
them down to a powder so that none of them was capable of being grasped without another”; cf. 
In Hipp. Nat. Hom. comment. CMG V 9.1 p. 19.7–12 Mewaldt (trans. Hankinson; slightly 
modified). A further proof of the fact that in this context ἀναμείγνυμι and μείγνυμι are meant to 
indicate a juxtaposition can be found in a parallel locus taken from the same treatise. In this 
passage we find a juxtaposition of Hippocrates’ and Empedocles’ elemental theories. As Galen 
observes, although Empedocles was convinced that every earthy body comes to be from the same 
elements that Hippocrates postulated, in his opinion such elements are not mixed through and 
through, but rather juxtaposed in very small particles that touch one another (οὐ μὴν 
κεκραμένων γε δι' ἀλλήλων, ἀλλὰ κατὰ σμικρὰ μόρια παρακειμένων τε καὶ ψαυόντων). We 
see that in the very same context Galen replaces ἀναμείγνυμι with παράκειμαι, which 
unambiguously indicates a juxtaposition of constituents sitting side by side. Another important 
element is the reference to contact (ψαύω), which confirms the link between juxtaposition and 
contact and ultimately also the already-known semantic link between the terms related to the 
word-family of μείγνυμι and the idea of contact. For this wording, based on the verbs παράκειμαι 
and ψαύω, explains the very same concept that was previously illustrated by the usage of 
ἀναμείγνυμι and μείγνυμι. Moreover, it seems that juxtaposition by contact and total mixture of 
the primary elements do not exclude each other. For the primary elements are not only said to be 
mechanically mixed with one another (μόνον ἀναμιγνυμένων), but also to undergo a change 
(μεταβολή), a κρᾶσις, and a complete qualitative alteration (ἀλλοίωσις); cf. In Hipp. Nat. Hom. 
comment. CMG V 9.1 p. 27.20 Mewaldt. The same rhetoric structure, “οὐ μόνον … ἀλλὰ καὶ”, 
which stresses this point, can also be found in a passage of De temperamentis, where Galen 
accounts for the generation of the skin of the hand. As Galen explains, the skin of the hand comes 
to be out of an equal proportion of the primary qualities, which are not only mechanically 
mixed, but also totally mixed (καὶ δὴ καὶ γέγονεν ἐκ τῆς τούτων ἁπάντων ἰσομοιρίας οὐ 
μιχθέντων μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ δι' ὅλων ἀλλήλοις κερασθέντων); cf. De temp. pp. 34.26–35.2 H. 
559 Cf. supra pp. 174 ff.  
560 The alternation between the two word-families is even present on a greater scale at (and seems 
to be confirmed by) De elementis I 9, where Galen describes more in detail the fragmentation of 
the particles leading to the final unification; cf. De elementis sec. Hipp. CMG V 1.2 pp. 136.22–
138.14 De Lacy “εἰρήσεται δὲ κἀν τοῖς τῆς θεραπευτικῆς μεθόδου περὶ τῆς χρείας αὐτῶν ἐπὶ 
πλέον, ἐν δὲ τῷ παρόντι τοσοῦτον εἰπεῖν ἀποχρήσει πρὸς τὸν ἐνεστῶτα λόγον, ὅτι τῶν ὑπ' 
Ἀσκληπιάδου λεγομένων ἐν τῷ Περὶ στοιχείων βιβλίῳ πρὸς τοὺς ὅλας | δι' ὅλων κεραννύντας 
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The term μίξις (or its derivatives) seems to indicate a generic mixture 
broadly understood: in fact, under this general heading we find mixtures of 
solids (such as in the case a heap of grains; in this, Galen distances himself from 
Aristotle’s technical terminology), of solids and liquids (earth and liquid, cf. 
T2), or of liquids (such as hot and cold water that we obtain when the ice melts, 
cf. T1, or in the case of a μίξις of humours561). Thus, the term μίξις can indicate 
not only a mechanical mixture of solids (such as in the case of a heap of grains), 
but as we see in (T1) it can also represent the starting point of a process that 
culminates in a complete and thorough κρᾶσις. Now, if in the κρᾶσις the 
previous constiutents are so homogeneously mixed that are no longer 
distinguishable (even though they may or may not be recoverable), we can infer 
that in the very extensive domain of μίξις it is still possible to conceive the 
constituents as distinguishable. 
This seems to be confirmed by a text from Galen’s De elementis (T3). In 
De elementis I 5 Galen tackles the issue of the fact that we never find pure 
primary elements in our cosmos – they are all always mixed:  
 
                                                          
ἀλλήλαις τὰς οὐσίας οὐδὲν ἅψεται τῶν κατὰ τὰς ποιότητας μόνας κεράννυσθαι λεγόντων, ὥστ' 
εἰ καὶ μὴ δι' ἄλλο τι, διὰ γοῦν τό ἀσφαλὲς αἱρετέον τὸ δόγμα καὶ λεκτέον, ὡς ἐν τῷ μίγνυσθαι 
τῷ ὕδατι τὸν οἶνον, εἰ τύχοι, καὶ καταθραύεσθαι μέχρι σμικροτάτων ἑκατέρου τὰ μόρια δρᾶν καὶ 
πάσχειν αὐτοῖς εἰς ἄλληλα συμβαίνει καὶ μεταδιδόναι τῶν ποιοτήτων ἀλλήλοις ἑτοιμότερον, 
ὅσῳ περ ἂν εἰς ἐλάττω καταθραυσθῇ, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο κινοῦσιν ἐπὶ πλεῖστον οἱ μιγνύντες ἀλλήλοις 
τὰ τοιαῦτα τὴν εἰς ἐλάχιστον διαίρεσιν αὐτῶν μηχανώμενοι. καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον ἑνοῦσθαι 
τὰς ποιότητας ἀλλήλαις τῶν ἐπὶ πλέον ἀναμιχθέντων τε καὶ χρονισάντων ὁμολογεῖ τῷ λόγῳ. 
χρόνου γὰρ δεῖται τὰ σμικρὰ μόρια τῶν κεραννυμένων, ἵν' εἰς ἄλληλα δράσῃ καὶ πάθῃ τελέως 
καὶ οὕτως ἓν ἀπεργάσηται τὸ ὅλον καὶ ὅμοιον ἑαυτῷ πάντη”. As we see from the text, the final 
stage of the process is described by recourse to κεράννυμι (τῶν κεραννυμένων, ἵν' εἰς 
ἄλληλα δράσῃ καὶ πάθῃ τελέως καὶ οὕτως ἓν ἀπεργάσηται τὸ ὅλον καὶ ὅμοιον ἑαυτῷ 
πάντη), whereas the initial stage of the process is treated using words belonging to the 
family of μείγνυμι (ἐν τῷ / μίγνυσθαι τῷ ὕδατι τὸν οἶνον; οἱ μιγνύντες ἀλλήλοις; τῶν ἐπὶ 
πλέον ἀναμιχθέντων). But at the end of the description Galen uses the verb κεράννυμι (τῶν 
κεραννυμένων) in order to designate a stage of the process where the parts have been 
minutely crushed and their interaction is complete (δράσῃ καὶ πάθῃ τελέως): in this way 
they make the whole one and the same throughout, i.e. they give rise to something 
homogeneous, a unity (οὕτως ἓν ἀπεργάσηται τὸ ὅλον καὶ ὅμοιον ἑαυτῷ πάντη). As Galen 
makes clear, however, the final κρᾶσις between water and wine is only a provisional unification, 
as it is possible to separate mixed substances from one another again (διὰ ταῦτα κἀν τῷ 
παραχρῆμα μὲν οἷόν τε διαχωρίσαι πάλιν ἀπ' ἀλλήλων ἔνια τῶν ἀναμιχθέντων). Therefore, 
differently from the mixtures of primary elements/qualities performed by God or Nature, th unity 
to which these substances give rise in the physical process of mixture, which is expressed by 
recourse to κεράννυμι, seems to be only provisional and temporary. For beyond the appearences 
this mixture of substances, the only one that humans can perform, turns out to be just a 
juxtaposition (a parathesis, as Galen says in De temperamentis), as it is possible to recover the 
previous constituents.  





T3 Galen De elementis sec. Hipp. K. I pp. 453.10-454.11 De Lacy p. 98.2–15 : 
 
ἀλλ' οἷον ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ τὸν λίθον ἐπιδεικνύεις μοι σὺ γεῶδες σῶμα, τοιοῦτον ἐν 
τοῖς ζῴοις ἐπιδείξω σοι τό τε τῶν ὀστῶν γένος καὶ τὸ τῶν χόνδρων καὶ τὸ τῶν 
τριχῶν. ἐκ τούτου δὲ τοῦ γένους ἐστὶ κἀν τοῖς ὀστρακοδέρμοις ζῴοις τὸ 
καλούμενον ὄστρακον, ἀκριβῶς εἰς γῆς ἰδέαν ἀπεξηραμμένον καὶ πεπιλημένον, 
ὥστ', εἰ ζητεῖς ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις γῆν, ἔχεις θεάσασθαι τοιαύτην, οἵαν κἀν τῷ | κόσμῳ, 
τὴν δ' ἄμικτόν τε καὶ παντελῆ καὶ μόνην οὐκ ἂν οὐδ' ἐν ἐκείνῳ ῥᾳδίως ἐξεύροις, 
ὥσπερ οὐδ' ὕδωρ καθαρὸν καὶ ἀμιγὲς ἁπάντων τῶν ἄλλων οὐδὲ πῦρ οὐδ' ἀέρα· 
νενόθευται γὰρ ἅπαντα τοῖς ἑτερογενέσι καὶ ἀναμέμικται καὶ μετείληφεν ἢ 
μᾶλλον ἀλλήλων ἢ ἧττον. ἀλλά τοι κἀν τῇ μίξει τοῖς γε νοῦν ἔχουσιν ἡ τοῦ 
κρατοῦντος ἰδέα φαίνεται. μὴ τοίνυν μηδ' ἐν τοῖς τῶν ζῴων σώμασιν ἄμικτόν τι 
ζήτει, ἀλλ' ἀρκείτω σοι τουτὶ μὲν ψυχρὸν καὶ ξηρὸν καὶ πυκνὸν ἰδόντι τὸ μόριον 
ἀναμνησθῆναι γῆς, τουτὶ δ' ἀραιὸν καὶ ὑγρὸν καὶ ῥυτὸν εἰς ἔννοιαν ὕδατος 
ἀφικέσθαι. 
 
But the stone that you point out to me as an earthy body in the cosmos is of the 
same description as the classes of the bones and of the cartilages and of the hairs 
that I shall point out to you in animals. To this same class belongs also the so-
called shell of hard-shelled animals, which is dried and compacted precisely to 
the form of earth that you see also in the cosmos; but earth that is unmixed 
(ἄμικτόν), complete, and by itself (παντελῆ καὶ μόνην) you would not easily find 
even in the cosmos; similarly you would not see water that is pure (καθαρὸν) 
and not mixed (ἀμιγὲς) with all the rest, and the same is true of fire and air; all 
have been adulterated by other kinds of things (νενόθευται γὰρ ἅπαντα τοῖς 
ἑτερογενέσι) and mixed (ἀναμέμικται) with them, and they have all received a 
larger or smaller share of each other. But even in the mixture (κἀν τῇ μίξει) a 
sensible person recognizes that what is visible is the form of the prevailing 
(element). Do not then look for anything unmixed (ἄμικτόν) in the bodies of 
animals either, but be content, when you see that part rarefied and wet and fluid, 




As we see from (T3), Galen’s terminology polarizes into: i) that relating 
to the purity of the element taken singularly (ἄμικτόν, παντελῆ καὶ μόνην, 
καθαρὸν, ἀμιγὲς); and ii) that (νενόθευται γὰρ ἅπαντα τοῖς ἑτερογενέσι, 
ἀναμέμικται, κἀν τῇ μίξει) describing the state of the element resulting from the 
mixture; Galen’s usage of expression κἀν τῇ μίξει shows that he is referring to 
the state resulting from mixture and not to the process. Although it has a 
slightly negative connotation (which is in line with the original meaning of the 
word-family),562 this state is envisioned as a heterogeneous mix of components 
where, however, a sensible person is still able to recognize the visible appearance 
(ἰδέα) of the prevailing element (τοῖς γε νοῦν ἔχουσιν ἡ τοῦ κρατοῦντος ἰδέα 
φαίνεται): everything comes out of the primary elements but if we strive to 
imagine a physical body as the result of this heterogeneous mix of constituents 
(i.e. μίξις) rather than as the indistinguishable homoeogeneous outcome that we 
indeed see (i.e. κρᾶσις), we are still able to single out the predominant 
constituent whose visible appearance presents itself to our senses (cf. T3 ‘μὴ 
τοίνυν μηδ' ἐν τοῖς τῶν ζῴων σώμασιν ἄμικτόν τι ζήτει, ἀλλ' ἀρκείτω σοι 
τουτὶ μὲν ψυχρὸν καὶ ξηρὸν καὶ πυκνὸν ἰδόντι τὸ μόριον ἀναμνησθῆναι γῆς, 
τουτὶ δ' ἀραιὸν καὶ ὑγρὸν καὶ ῥυτὸν εἰς ἔννοιαν ὕδατος ἀφικέσθαι (Do not then 
look for anything unmixed (ἄμικτόν) in the bodies of animals either, but be 
content, when you see that part rarefied and wet and fluid, to think of water”). 
We have seen before that, in the physical process, μίξις alternates with and 
gives way to κρᾶσις, but if we instead zoom in on the state resulting from an 
act of mixing, in this case this condition can be seen either as a μίξις, i.e. when 
                                                          
562 As we see, the terminology used for this mixture is formulated in terms of impurity, alteration, 
and contamination with heterogeneous things. According to LSJ the verb νοθεύω means “to 
corrupt”, “to adulterate”, “to be spurious”, whereas the adjective νόθος means “bastard”, i.e. 
born of a slave or concubine; it can also convey the more general meaning of “spurious”, 
“counterfeit”, “supposititious” in reference to persons and things. In this context, the term 
belonging to the word-family of μείγνυμι seems to convey the image of a bad and deteriorating 
mixture that contaminates and adulterates the state of purity of the primary element. The third 
component of the original basic set of meanings of the word-family of μίξις, as pinpointed by 
Montanari, is “to come into close contact”, which give rise to all the meanings connected to the 
social sphere, such as “sexual intercourse”; this is also present in Galen’s corpus (Comm. in 
Hipp. Nat. Hom. comment. CMG V 9.1 p. 170.8 ff. Mewaldt, where the term ἐπιμιξία indicates 
the mating of animals), but we do not treat them here for two main reasons: i) on the one hand, 
in our primary sources, there are no occurrences of μίξις with such a meaning; and ii) these 
occurrences of the other cognates are not relevant for Galen’s theory and terminology of mixture 
intended as physical process of mixing substances; on this cf. Boudon-Millot 2011 pp. 272–274.  
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we perceive the heterogeneous constituents of the body as distinct, or as a 
κρᾶσις if we regard the body as a final result where the constituents are, as a 
matter of fact, completely indistinguishable.563  
Having reviewed Galen’s usage of the terms κρᾶσις and μίξις as applied 
to his theory of the mixture of primary elements, we shall turn to the relation 
between Galen’s lexicon and the terminology used in the Hippocratic, 
Aristotelian, and Stoic traditions and the difference between κρᾶσις and μίξις in 
Galen’s terminology.  
In the first place, as we have seen, in the Hippocratic tradition, κρᾶσις, or 
better its Ionic form κρῆσις, preserves the archaic meaning of “good and well-
balanced mixture” of opposite forces (be they qualities, humours, dynamies), 
whereas Galen classifies each κρᾶσις (intended as “natural state”) on the basis 
of the predominant element. Therefore with κρᾶσις he indicates a relative 
equilibrium point reached by hot/cold and dry/wet. Second, we have seen 
that Aristotle carefully distinguishes μίξις from σύνθεσις, which he claims is a 
mechanical mixture of items (the case of the heap of grain remains 
paradigmatic). Clearly, Galen does not make use of Aristotle’s technical 
terminology: he employs the word-family of μίξις and μίξις itself to indicate 
either a juxtaposition of solid items or a juxtaposition of micro-particles of 
substances before (and after) the final unification. Rather, analogously to the 
                                                          
563 The connection between μίξις and its word-family and the distinguishability of the ingredients 
is confirmed by a further occurrence at De simp. med. (temp. ac) fac. K. XI p. 586.13 ff. “εἰ γὰρ 
ἀναμίξας ἀκριβῶς ἶσον ἀψινθίου καὶ μέλιτος ὄγκον ἐπιθείης τῇ γλώττῃ, γλυκύπικρον, 
ὥσπερ οἱ ποιηταὶ τὸν ἔρωτα προσαγορεύουσι, φανεῖταί σοι τὸ μικτὸν ἐξ ἀμφοῖν, οὐκ ἐν ἄλλῳ 
μέν τινι χρόνῳ μέλιτος αἰσθανομένης τῆς γλώττης, ἐν ἄλλῳ δὲ ἀψινθίου, οὔτε θατέρου μόνον, 
ἀλλὰ διὰ παντὸς ἀμφοῖν ἀήθη τινὰ μίξιν μεμιγμένην”. As we see from the text, in the case of 
the mixture of absinth and honey, which is defined as γλυκύπικρον (of course, with reference to 
Sappho’s definition of love as a “bittersweet invincible creature”), the tongue perceives its 
double flavour (the sweet and the bitter) continuously and not in two different moments; the term 
used is μίξις and the point of the passage is the fact that we perceive the ingredients (the absinth 
and the honey and their capacities) as distinct – cf. Boudon-Millot 2011 pp. 270–271. Of course, 
it is also possible that μίξις indicates the state (and not the process) resulting from the act of 
mechanically mixing the constituents (to put it simply, the state of a heap of grains), and 
indeed in Galen’s work we find such a case. In his work On Simple Drugs (De simp. med. 
(temp. ac) K. XII p. 183.17 ff.), Galen describes the properties of the Samian earth, and on this 
occasion he claims (analogously to De elementis I 5) that pure earth does not really exist in the 
cosmos and, for this reason, one should carefully inspect the mixture of the things that are 
accidentally contained within it (ἐπεὶ δ' ἀδύνατόν ἐστιν ἄμικτον εὑρεῖν ἀκριβῶς τι σῶμα, 
προσεπισκέπτεσθαι προσήκει τὴν μίξιν τῶν συμβεβηκότων αὐτῇ κατά τε τὰς ἐν κουφότητι καὶ 
βαρύτητι διαφορὰς καὶ τὰς ἐν τῇ γεύσει). In this case, the term μίξις indicates the state of being 
mixed, the particles of the material that accidentally stick to the earth and which have to be 
cautiously analysed. It does not seem to be a process, but rather a state.  
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contemporary Peripatetic terminology (which we see mirrored in Alexander’s 
De mixtione), μίξις works as general term for mixture although, contrarily to 
Alexander, Galen does not draw the specific distinction between mechanical 
mixtures of like with like and of unlike with unlike. Three differences, however, 
between Galen’s usage of μίξις and that of κρᾶσις remain: i) μίξις can indicate a 
mechanical mixture of items; κρᾶσις cannot (they are in opposition in this 
regard). ii) μίξις is used to refer to the first part of the process of fragmentation 
of the particles, whereas κρᾶσις is used to indicate the final phase of the process 
(terms belonging to both word-families are alternated in describing the two 
different stages of the mixture – where μίξις gives way to κρᾶσις). iii) Whereas 
κρᾶσις indicates a homogeneous and complete mixture in which it is not possible 
to distinguish the previous ingredients (usage of the image of the 
tetrapharmakon is central), we have seen that μίξις is used by Galen to express 
a mix of heterogeneus components making up every physical body (they refer 
to the very same mixture but from different perspectives: μίξις underlines 
the heterogeneity of the mix, κρᾶσις the unity produced by the tempering 
of constituents – a tempering which constitutes the essence and the nature 
of whichever physical body, a concept which is never expressed by μίξις). 
Finally, even though the Stoic terminology is difficult to reconstruct (especially 
when it comes to usage of the term μίξις), we can safely say with Groisard that 
the expression δι' ὅλων κρᾶσις for total mixture and the term σύγχυσις for fusion 
were originally Stoic. Now, we have already demonstrated that Galen’s theory 
of mixture differs considerably from the Stoic account of δι' ὅλων κρᾶσις, 
although Galen uses this Stoic expression fairly often. However, Boudon-Millot 
approximates Galen’s μίξις to the Stoic σύγχυσις,564 but this is inaccurate, for 
two main reasons: i) μίξις can indicate a recoverable mixture, whereas in the 
Stoic fusion the ingredients are no longer recoverable; and ii) even within the 
limits of his antidogmatism, Galen’s physics is based on Aristotelian/Peripatetic 
elementary physics, where the qualities are not corporeal (as they are in Stoic 
physics and, therefore, also in the Stoic fusion).  
Certainly we can say that κρᾶσις is more prevalent in Galen, to the 
detriment of μίξις (the difference in the number of occurrences is clear evidence 
                                                          
564 Cf. Boudon-Millot 2011 pp. 276–277.  
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of this), for a number of potential reasons. First, in Hippocratic medicine, the 
Ionic variant of κρᾶσις was used to convey the idea of balance among the 
constituents and was applied, in Galen’s favourite Hippocratic reference model 
of mixture, De natura hominis, to the mixture of physiological liquids. This 
made the term suitable for physiological purposes. Second, it is undeniable that 
the Stoic terminology greatly influenced Galen, given his usage of the Stoic 
expression δι' ὅλων κρᾶσις. Third, as witnessed by De mixtione, in Galen’s time 
κρᾶσις was a common term, also adopted by the Peripatetics to refer to a mixture 
leading to the generation of homoeomerous parts. It is reasonable to think that, 
given that Galen knew these three theoretical models of mixture very well and 
made extensive use of them in the definitions of his own account, the 
corresponding terminologies played a role in the creation of Galen’s vocabulary 
of mixture.  
 
3.5 Problems of translation  
 
As is evident, the semantic closeness of these two word-families makes hard 
work for a translator, as it proves to be extremely difficult to render the meanings 
of two quasi-synonyms, such as κρᾶσις and μίξις, in a modern language. Here I 
will offer some reflections on problems of translation.   
Certainly, when κρᾶσις and μίξις indicate a mixture of ingredients 
(although, as we have seen, in a different manner), a translator should both render 
the meaning of mixture and try to make their difference intelligible. With regard 
to κρᾶσις, Singer is very consistent, and tends to translate the word as “mixture”; 
whereas in the case of μίξις he is rather flexible: for example, he translates the 
expression “ἐκ τῆς τῶν ἄκρων μίξεως” in (T1) as “from a mixing together of the 
extremes”, and the expression “ἐκ τῆς τοιαύτης μίξεως” in (T2) as “by this kind 
of combination”. The translation of μίξις as combination (which corresponds to 
Joachim’s standard translation of Aristotle’s μίξις) might baffle the reader. For 
“combination” does not seem particularly suitable for indicating a mixture: two 
or more colours can be combined, two or more items can be combined, i.e. put 
together, and even two or more abstract concepts can be mentally combined. It 
would be helpful to use a word indicating a mixture but which is distinct from 
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mixture and which gives the sense of the type of mixture Galen intended. When 
κρᾶσις and μίξις indicate mixture, I propose to render the first as “mixture” 
(although the root of this word belongs to that of μίξις; the more exact 
“temperament” – if we consider the Latin etymology – must be discarded for 
other reasons) and the second, μίξις, as “mix”. This could be a fitting solution 
because mixture can convey the sense of the homogeneousness of the mixture 
(in Italian this would be “miscela”; in English also “blending”; whereas by 
contrast mix (which in Italian would correspond to “miscuglio”) indicates a 
mixture (which can be also a mechanical mixture) where the elements are 
heterogeneous and may be recognizable. 
Second, however, because of its special link with the essence and the 
nature of things, Galen’s κρᾶσις goes beyond what is simply a mixture. It has 
philosophical, physiological, pharmacological, and meteorological implications. 
A solution could be to translate them all as “crasis”, resemantising a word which 
in English mainly refers to a type of vocalic contraction, and leaving the task of 
distinguishing difference senses of the word to the reader. Another solution may 
instead be to make the terminology more explicit by translating it with the term 
to which Galen seems to be referring; in our account of Galen’s usage of the 
word we highlighted the complexity of his terminology. That seems to be 
particularly helpful in the cases of the meteorological and physiological 
acceptations of the term.  
On the one hand, when Galen speaks of κρᾶσις of the seasons or of the 
surrounding air, one could render it as “climate” or better as “temperature” (the 
Latin verb temperare in fact represents the closest equivalent to the Greek 
κεράννυμι565). On the other hand, when κρᾶσις indicates the state resulting from 
                                                          
565 Differently from Benveniste 1940 (who in his account interprets temperare as denominative 
of tempus, which would have originally meant “right proportion of a mixture” as applied to the 
meteorological weather cf. footnote n. 548) Pariente 1957 gives another interpretation and holds 
that temperare would have been made to the locative temperĕ, which means “at the right 
position/moment”. The original meaning of the verb, therefore, seems to be “to put something 
in the right position” (“poner algo en el punto adecuado”). When applied to the context of 
mixture, this meaning would have naturally led to a later semantic shift “to give the right 
proportion to the constituents of a mixture” (“dosificar los elementos de una mexcla en la 
proproción debida”) and then “to mix in the right proportion”. In any case both the scholars 
establish a correspondence between temperare and the Greek κεράννυμι because of their 
semantic similarities, as both the verb mean “to mix proportionately” as also Montanari stresses, 
cf. Montanari 1979, p. 135. 
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the mixture of the entire body, it clearly indicates its “constitution”. Translations 
such as “temperament” and “complexion” (which correspond to temperamentum 
and complexio, which in turn correspond to the translations into Latin language 
of Galen’s treatise περὶ κράσεων, “De temperamentis” and “De 
complexionibus”566) seem to be inappropriate for rendering what is instead a 
physiological state, i.e. the physical or bodily constitution. In fact, the term 
complexion, although in the Middle ages it was used to indicate the entire 
physical constitution, is restricted today to the appearance of the face,567 whereas 
the word “temperament” (whose Italian equivalent, “temperamento”, Tassinari 
uses systematically in his 1997 translation of De temperamentis) covers a field 
of character study and psychology.568 For the term “temperament” seems to 
strongly allude to psychological aspects of the personality. Even though Galen 
theorizes a body-soul interaction – which clearly stands out in his later treatise 
Quod animi mores corporis temperamenta sequantur – the term κρᾶσις does not 
show this meaning in Galen. For although it develops synonymical relations with 
terms indicating the physical constitution as a whole, κρᾶσις does not refer to 
personality and psychological features, as it always points to the material basis 
of the physical constitution, that is, the mixture of the primary elements, hot, 








                                                          
566 Cf. Fichtner 2015 s.v. De temperamentis.  
567 Thorndike 1958 p. 398.  









1 Conclusion – Part I  
 
As was made clear in the Introduction, this dissertation is split into two 
main parts: the first comprises the first two main chapters and is devoted to an 
investigation of Galen’s theoretical model of mixture and his system of nine 
mixtures as connected to his general world-view; the second is dedicated to the 
exploration of Galen’s terminology of mixtures. In this first concluding section, 
we will review and summarize the research findings of the first part of the thesis.  
As was pointed out in the Introduction and Forschungsstand, the scholarship 
expresses very conflicting views on the issue of the historical and theoretical 
sources of Galen’s theory of mixture. Vegetti (1995) is convinced that in his 
formulation of the theory of mixture, Galen draws on an “archaic”, i.e. 
Hippocratic, and even “pre-Aristotelian” background. Other scholars, for 
example Gill (2010) and Boudon-Millot (2011), have hypothesized that Galen’s 
theory of mixture may have been influenced by the Stoic notion of δι' ὅλων 
κρᾶσις or total mixture, whereas, including Moraux (1984) and Cordonier 
(2007), and, ultimately, also the recent contribution by Groisard (2016), 
understand Galen’s model of mixture merely as a syncretistic conflation of the 
Stoic and Peripatetic models of mixture without taking his Hippocratic milieu 
into consideration. In this investigation, I aimed to surpass previous 
contradictory accounts and to describe a model of mixture that shows a clear 
internal logic – and to find its historical and theoretical sources. Differently from 
previous scholarship, which proves to have achieved partial and still 
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unsatisfactory research results, I brought to light the neat coherence of Galen’s 
model of mixture. For if we go beyond its syncretistic surface or its flimsy Stoic 
echoes, Galen’s model of mixture in every respect reveals itself to be perfectly 
consistent with the contemporary Peripatetic account of mixture without 
renouncing some due integrations coming from the archaic, Hippocratic, 
backdrop, i.e. the four-humour theory. In what follows, we will recount in more 
detail the findings attained in this research.   
First of all, from section 1 to section 1.2 of the first main chapter, I 
summed up the Stoic and Peripatetic accounts of mixtures analysed from an 
historical standpoint, i.e. from Zeno to Chrysippus, whose account, at Galen’s 
time, was credited with representing the general Stoic model of mixture, and 
from Aristotle to Alexander of Aphrodisias, Galen’s contemporary, who – as we 
underscored – in his De mixtione engages in a violent polemic against the Stoic 
doctrine of total mixture. At the same time, we brought to light the inner 
justifications of both these theories. Whereas the Stoic model of total mixture 
finds its inner justification in the explanation of the interpenetration of the two 
corporeal principles, matter and pneuma, Aristotle’s account explains the 
formation of the homoeomerous parts, i.e. organic and inorganic basic materials. 
Moreover, we delved deeper into the evolution of the mixture-theory within the 
Peripatetic philosophical system of Alexander – which, in contrast to Aristotle’s 
account, explains the soul itself as a power arising from the mixture of the 
primary elements.  
After having summarized Galen’s contemporary philosophical models of 
mixture, we went into detail regarding Galen’s theory, which, as we clarified, is 
analysed as a physical process and as the essential basis of Galen’s elementary 
physics. In 1.3.1, “Syncretistic approach”, I pointed to the twofold reason why 
Galen presents his own account of mixture in a syncretistic way. In fact, as we 
saw, he declares that “Hippocrates”, Aristotle, and the Stoics were in substantial 
agreement in holding that the hot, the cold, the dry, and the wet mix in their 
entirety (which in Stoic terminology he calls a δι' ὅλων mixture); although, as 
we pointed out, these three theories, if considered singularly, differ significantly 
from one another. On the one hand, I explained Galen’s syncretistic approach to 
mixture by underlining that it is typical of Galen’s general approach to group 
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several authorities together when he needs to back up an argument. On the other 
hand, apart from the rhetorical use of these authorities, there is a deeper reason 
why Galen builds an ad hoc strategic alliance between the Stoics and the 
Peripatetics: both these philosophical schools were continuist, like Galen, and 
one of the objectives of his medical-cum-philosophical system was the rebuttal 
of older and more recent versions of atomism/corpuscularism. However, in order 
to bring out the inner coherence of Galen’s model of mixture and its deeper 
historical and theoretical sources, we had to go beyond this syncretistic 
formulation; first of all, we tackled the issue of the activators of the mechanism 
of mixture, a point regarding which the Stoics and the Peripatetics expressed 
different views. 
In 1.3.2 “Galen and the Stoic/Peripatetic controversy. Qualities or 
bodies?” we dealt with an aspect connected to the theory of mixture that proves 
to have relevant implications regarding Galen’s epistemology. For, as Galen 
knows perfectly well, the Stoic and the Peripatetic schools provide two very 
different explanations when it comes to the causal factor involved in the 
mechanism of mixture: according to the Aristotelians the qualities alone set in 
motion and carry out the process of mixture, whereas the Stoics, in conformity 
with their own corporealist physics, attribute this role to the substances-cum-
qualities (this controversy, which powerfully comes to the fore in Alexander’s 
De mixtione, is actually part of a far-reaching debate that set different schools 
from the post-Hellenistic period onwards – the Platonic, the Peripatetic, and even 
the Epicurean – against the Stoics and their corporealism. In this section, we 
highlighted that despite his own reiterated declarations of philosophical 
independence, Galen actively (although anti-dogmatically) enters this historical 
debate in accordance with his own epistemological principles. On the one hand, 
although he does not want to be officially grouped with the Aristotelians, he 
affirms (in his De propriis placitis) it to be πιθανώτερον that the qualities mix, 
and insists (in his De elementis), that it is ἀσφαλὲς, saying that the arguments 
that are used against those who mix substances (i.e. the Stoics) cannot be used 
against those who mix qualities alone.569 This of course does not mean that 
                                                          
569 Cf. supra pp. 86 ff.  
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Galen is certain that the qualities are responsible for the activation of the process 
of mixture: such a statement would have meant a commitment to a specific 
philosophical school; moreover, in order to be βέβαιον, this claim would have 
needed to be corroborated by scientific demonstration or empirical evidence, 
which has not noticeably been given. Rather, it means that Galen develops a 
vision of this issue that is consistent with the view of the Aristotelians. And it is 
so consistent and coherent that, like the Aristotelians of his age, we have seen 
that Galen casts serious doubt on and even ridicules the notion of antiparektasis 
or bodily interpenetration, as well as Stoic corporealism, in a way very similar 
to Alexander’s criticism of the Stoics in his De mixtione.  
But this was just the beginning and, so to speak, the tip of the iceberg. 
For in 1.3.3, “Galen and the Peripatetics. Galen’s κρᾶσις as a progressive 
διαίρεσις”, we saw, in agreement with Groisard, that analogously to the 
Peripatetic model mirrored in Alexander’s De mixtione, Galen’s account of the 
process of mixture is envisaged as progressive division (διαίρεσις) of the 
constituents followed by a final unification brought about by a qualitative 
interaction; moreover, both the models, the Peripatetic and the Galenic, show a 
strict link between the easy divisibility of the constituents and the speed of 
qualitative interaction.570 However, in contrast to Groisard (and Moraux), we 
demonstrated that every aspect of Galen’s model of mixture fits into a Peripatetic 
framework, to which we must also attach some additional elements from Galen’s 
Hippocratic background (which, as stated, both the aforementioned scholars 
completely neglect).  
In 1.3.4, “Mixture, change and the ontological status of the primary 
elements in the mixture (actuality or potentiality?). The example of the 
τετραφάρμακος and the generation of a tertium quid”, we reached three main 
research results: i) first, we exposed how, as in the Aristotelian and Peripatetic 
accounts, Galen thought of mixture as a two-way qualitative change (which he 
calls alloiôsis without precisely distinguishing it from substantial 
generation/corruption and mixture in the proper sense):571 the hot, the cold, the 
                                                          
570 Cf. supra pp. 96 ff.  
571 As an aside, we should mention that throughout the whole of section 1.3.4 we saw that Galen’s 
elementary physics bases itself on a revised version of Aristotle’s elementary physics: if in fact 
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dry, and the wet meet in a broader central region and give rise to “metaxu” 
bodies; ii) in contrast to Groisard, who is inclined to think that, analogously to 
the Stoic fusion, corporeal hot, cold, dry, and wet get destroyed in the mixture, 
we demonstrated, by putting forward more Galenic textual evidence, that in the 
Aristotelian and the Peripatetic accounts the basic constituents of the mixture are 
preserved in potentiality; iii) we saw how, by resorting to the Stoic example of 
the tetrapharmakos, Galen actually seeks to exemplify the supervenience, during 
the process of mixture, of new qualitative determinations on the previous 
structure, which brings about the generation of a new body distinct in kind (this 
transition, ἐξ εἴδους εἰς εἶδος, finds a precise correspondence in the scala naturae 
– from the simplest to more complex bodies – as exhibited in Alexander’s De 
anima): as we have seen, when the primary elements mix, they make up (apart 
from other inorganic substances) foods and drinks; these in turn acquire new 
qualitative determinations through a qualitative alteration taking place during 
digestion, and give rise to the four Hippocratic humours, which, in the same way, 
in turn give rise to the homoeomerous parts: bone, fat, nerve, and flesh.  
In 1.3.5, “Mixture and generation. Humors or homoeomerous parts?”, we 
came to a conclusion regarding a dilemma posed by the preceding section: if 
Galen’s theory of mixture draws on the Peripatetic account, why does a mixture 
of the primary elements give rise to the four Hippocratic humours (which are 
viewed by Galen as the building blocks of all the blooded animals) and these in 
turn to the homoeomerous parts? For in Aristotle’s speculation, who is well 
aware of the four humours of the Hippocratic tradition, these are located on the 
same level as the homoeomerous parts and not, as in Galen’s case, on an 
intermediate level between the real primary elements and the homoeomerous 
parts. In this section, we showed that Galen’s four humours differ from the 
                                                          
in his treatise De generatione et corruptione Aristotle carefully distinguishes between 
generation/corruption, qualitative alteration or alloiôsis, and mixture, Galen does not: for him 
the most important thing to underline is that, according to him, these three changes are ruled by 
a μεταβολὴ ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων εἰς τὰ ἐναντία. This does not seem to be dependent on any Stoic 
influence (as Cordonier supposes by recalling that Zeno describes the elemental change or tropè 
as a mixture that takes place through a metabolê of the interpenetrating elements; cf. SVF I 102; 
cf. intr. p. 35) since as we have seen Galen speaks against the Stoic process of bodily 
interpenetration. The conflation is probably better explained through an oversimplification of the 
Aristotelian physics due to Galen’s attempt to grasp the common principle underlying them, that 
is, the change from opposites to opposites.  
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Hippocratic ones, since Galen’s are conceived of as integrated into, and a 
functional part of a solidist conception of the body which, in contrast to that 
developed by the Alexandrian anatomists, is based on the homoeomerous part 
as its first and fundamental unity. To prove this point, we mainly relied on two 
previous contributions, Moreno Rodríguez 1991 and Vegetti 1994, although 
neither presupposes the strict dependence of Galen’s model of mixture on the 
Peripatetic one.  
In 1.3.6, “Mixture and symmetry. Galen and the Hippocratic legacy”, we 
explored the issue of balance among the constituents within the mixture. For 
according to the Aristotelian and the Peripatetic accounts of mixture, there 
should be an equal balance of the ingredients that mix, with regard to both 
quantity and powers of action.572 However, this idea of balance between the 
quanta and qualia of elemental components can be traced back to early Greek 
medicine, especially Hippocratic, and is instrumental in explaining states of 
health and disease of the human organism. In this section we showed that by 
drawing on “archaic”, i.e. Hippocratic but also Aristotelian doctrines and re-
working them, Galen develops a conception of twofold symmetry of the 
elemental constituents: i) a symmetry according to τὸ ποσὸν τῆς οὐσίας, i.e. the 
absolute and, at least theoretically, numerically determinable midpoint between 
hot/cold dry/wet; and ii) a symmetry κατὰ δύναμιν, which has to be evaluated 
with respect to the oikeia physis of the individual and which is directly connected 
to Galen’s own speculation on health and disease. As we have demonstrated, 
within the mixture there is no one absolute midpoint between hot/cold and 
dry/wet, but many relative midpoints within a wider central region where 
hot/cold and dry/wet meet. For since hot/cold and dry/wet are Aristotelically 
thought of as admitting of degrees and hence of “the more and the less”, there 
can be myriads of different qualitative combinations that explain the great 
variety of dynameis (and related energeiai) of different species of living beings: 
as long as the living being works and it works well (physically and psychically), 
we should infer that this living being is healthy and its krasis has found a relative 
                                                          
572 De gen. et corr. 238a23–28; De mixt. 230.29–30. 
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equilibrium state between the opposites, matching its proper κατὰ δύναμιν 
συμμετρία. 
After dealing with the activators, the process of progressive division, the 
ontological status of the elements in the mixture, the alteration and generation of 
a tertium quid, and the absolute and relative equilibrium point of the constituents 
of the mixture, in 1.3.7, “The reversibility of the process of mixture”, we tackled 
the recoverability of the constituents of the mixture. In this section, we pursued 
a deeper investigation into the inner justification of Galen’s theory of mixture. 
For the general model of mixture as progressive division we have so far brought 
to light explains different kinds of mixture: i) mixtures performed by God and/or 
nature (De temperamentis’ formulation shows a slight hesitation on this point); 
and ii) mixtures that human beings too can perform. The first type is defined as 
a “total mixture” and, as we saw, coincides with a progressive chain of mixtures 
producing increasingly new supervening higher-level qualitative 
determinations: from foods and drinks to the four humours present in the 
menstrual blood, from these to homoeomerous parts, up to the formation of the 
entire living being belonging to a certain species. In contrast to what has been 
said so far, we recognized a correspondence between this “total mixture” and the 
shaping capacity of God and/or nature. For these total mixtures are brought about 
by God and/or nature, which use hot/cold and dry/wet as their instruments or 
organa, so as to shape an individual being belonging to a certain species 
according to a teleological plan (once the organism is shaped, these mixtures 
work independently within the organism and produce effects on the organism’s 
psycho-physiological workings). The second type is divided into two sub-types: 
i) mixtures that human beings can create (to produce, for example, foods and 
drinks): these are called paratheseis and are recoverable; ii) mixtures created by 
the doctor (to produce medicaments) which – analogously to the mixtures 
performed by God and/or nature – are called “total mixtures”: the ingredients of 
these mixtures are not recoverable. As regards mixtures whose ingredients are 
recoverable, we have seen that Galen’s position is consistent with the Peripatetic 
account, although he does not clearly declare, as an Aristotelian would have 
done, that the recovered ingredients are specifically different: for although it is 
not said that, once recovered, the ingredients are specifically the same (as in the 
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Peripatetic model), Galen declares that they are the same, at least according to 
their ἰδέα or external form/appearance (this is coherent with the Peripatetic 
model too, as according to Aristotle the external form ἰδέα/μορφή is linked to 
the internal structure of a composite belonging to a certain species).  
In the second main chapter, by analysing Galen’s first book De 
temperamentis more deeply, I sought to reconstruct the historical and theoretical 
sources of Galen’s scheme of nine mixtures (eight bad mixtures and one good 
mixture) so as to assess his original contributions in comparison with the earlier 
philosophical and medical tradition and with more contemporary medical 
strands, such as Pneumatic medicine.  
In the first part of 2.2, “Galen against his predecessors and 
contemporaries and his criticism of Athenaeus of Attalia and his followers in De 
temperamentis Book I”, we identified the doctrines to which Galen is referring 
when he speaks of past authorities, the “παλαιοὶ”, working out bipartite or 
quadripartite schemes of mixtures. We identified the first “group” of two-
mixture theorists with the theories exposed by the Hippocratic author in first 
book of De victu. Moreover, we saw that behind the other two supposed “groups” 
of four-mixture theorists there are, respectively, i) an abridgement of Hippocratic 
and Aristotelian physical doctrines that seem to be consistently re-worked so as 
to bring out an alleged quadripartite system of mixtures; and ii) a summary of 
Aristotle’s doctrine concerning the biological cycle of the organism, i.e. the 
progressive transition from a hot wet constitution to a cold and dry one; in this 
transition, the concept of innate heat, the most active quality, whose first 
formulation Galen ascribes to both “Hippocrates” and Aristotle, plays a pivotal 
role.  
In the second part of section 2.2, we dealt with Galen’s criticism of the 
Pneumatists, whose position Galen assimilates to that of the four-mixture 
theorists, and according to whom the best mixture or εὐκρασία would coincide 
with the hot and wet one (as we saw from a fragment from De temperamentis I 
3). As we demonstrated, this analysis of De temperamentis I 4 and I 5 sheds new 
and novel light on the fragment taken from De temperamentis I 3 for three main 
reasons. First of all, in analysing De temperamentis I 4 and I 5, we brought to 
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light the vigorous dispute on εὐκρασία or good mixture that flourished in Galen’s 
time among two contemporary medical mainstreams: the Pneumatic and the 
Galenic. Second, we saw that Galen adopts two opposite logical-dialectical 
strategies against the Pneumatists by appealing to the original Platonic 
distinction between καθ' αὑτά and πρὸς τι entities. Finally, section 2.2 cast light 
on another under-researched topic concerning the theoretical foundations of 
Pneumatic medicine, which does not only rely on Stoic physical doctrines, but – 
at least for the definition of the concept of εὐκρασία – draws on Hippocratic and 
Aristotelian teachings.   
In 2.3, “Galen's additions to the theories of the predecessors. The good 
mixture and the simple mixtures”, we saw that although Galen assimilates the 
Pneumatists’s position to that of a “group” of four-mixture theorists, they instead 
developed a scheme of nine mixture (four simple mixtures, four composite, and 
a good mixture – a hot and wet one – , as Max Wellmann also notes). As we saw, 
Galen inherits this scheme but, against Wellmann’s declaration, does not 
completely depend upon it as he makes three major changes: i) differently from 
the Pneumatists, according to Galen the εὐκρασία is not a hot and wet mixture 
but a mixture where none of the qualities predominates; ii) furthermore, whereas 
the Pneumatists’ Elementenlehre is based on Stoic corporealist physical tenets 
(although the Pneumatists’ elements of medicine are defined as sense-
perceptible), Galen’s elementary physics grounds itself on Peripatetic bases and 
his primary elements indeed coincide with the cosmic and ultimate elements; iii) 
whereas the Pneumatists rigorously separate physics and cosmology from 
medicine and, therefore, do not apply this scheme of mixture to a more general 
world-view, Galen does.  
It is to this latter topic that the final paragraph of this second main 
chapter, “A twofold εὐκρασία (good mixture). The midpoint according to 
substance, genus and species, its consequences and teleological implications”, is 
dedicated. In the first place, I showed that Galen’s cosmos is made up of three 
concentric realms, which include all existent beings from the simplest to the 
more complex. The highest genus (anôtátô ti génos) is that of the substance or 
ousía, within which everything that is animate or inanimate falls; below this is 
the genus of plants; within this latter is the genus of the animals – the genus of 
289 
 
the plants being higher than that of the animals, and each of these genera 
containing the ἔσχατα γένη, which are also referred to as species or εἴδη, such 
that the genus of animals contains within it dog, horse, and human being. Second, 
we showed that within a cosmos so constituted the physician is endowed, so to 
speak, with two pairs of eyes when he deals with physical bodies: an absolute 
pair and a relative pair. In the first case, any physical body belonging to the 
highest genus of substance is defined as hot/wet, hot/dry, cold/wet, cold/dry 
(composite mixtures), hot, cold, wet, or dry (simple mixtures) when it is 
compared to the unique absolute well-mixed mixture, i.e. the yardstick or canon, 
which is identified with the palm of the doctor’s hand. According to Mario 
Vegetti, a cosmos so envisioned seems to be completely devoid of any 
teleological order as it presents only one eukrasia and infinite natural failures. 
By contrast, we have seen that in the case of living bodies (plants and, more 
importantly, animals), the mixtures are assessed through a comparison with the 
relative midpoint of the genus and/or species to which the individual belongs: in 
this case, the state of good-mixture or eukrasia is judged on functionalistic bases, 
that is, on the basis of the activities. Hence, even if a plant or an animal does not 
possess an absolute well-mixed mixture, it has a relative well-mixed mixture, 
because it performs its activities as well as possible. In a universe so envisaged, 
the number of relative eukrasiai spirals and it is possible to get a glimpse of signs 
of a teleological design even in a work, such as De temperamentis, which deals 
mainly with the lower-level elementary structures of living beings. We have seen 
that Galen’s directed teleology does not clash but harmonizes itself with the idea 
of an Aristotelian immanent natural principle that shapes an organism 
specifically different, from within in conformity with a teleological plan. As we 
have demonstrated, another feature of Galen’s teleological explanation, which 
emerges from our reading of De temperamentis Book I, is its anthropocentric 
nature insofar as the natural end of the characteristic functions of living beings, 
animals, and plants, coincides with the advantages that human beings may take 
from them. In fact, human beings, and especially the meson or midpoint within 
the genus of animals, the most well-mixed human being, which Galen compares 
to Polyclitus’ famous Canon, are at the centre of Galen’s sublunary cosmos. 
However, we did not confine ourselves to this point but pushed the question of 
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the centre of Galen’s sublunary cosmos further and found that there is a part, the 
middle part of the middle animal (τὸ μέσον μόριον τοῦ μέσου ζῴου), which lies 
in the middle of all the bodies subjected to generation and decay. This part is the 
soft skin of the palm of the hand and, as we have seen, it belongs to an upper-
class aspiring doctor who therefore represents the very centre of Galen’s 
sublunary universe. Such a hand should be regarded as an instrument of 
knowledge and a diagnostic tool: for, as Galen teaches in his De temperamentis, 
the physician must take it as kanôn and gnômôn and use it to compare all parts 
of animals and find the eight other dyskrasiai. 
 
2. Conclusion – Part II 
 
In the third main chapter, we examined Galen’s scientific terminology of 
mixture and, more precisely, Galen’s usage of κρᾶσις and μίξις, the two main 
words that he uses to indicate the mixture of primary elements. As we pointed 
out in the second part of our Introduction, the only study specifically devoted to 
Galen’s terminology of mixture, Boudon-Millot 2011, has evident shortcomings. 
In the first place, Boudon-Millot does not in fact examine accurately Galen’s 
terminology in relation to the original meaning of κρᾶσις and μίξις. Second, she 
far simplistically envisages the difference between κρᾶσις and μίξις as a 
difference between a mixture of qualities which are preserved (performed by 
God and/or Nature) and a mixture of substances (performed by humans) which 
give rise to a new (mainly pharmacological) product. Third, she establishes a 
terminological and conceptual correspondence between Galen’s use of κρᾶσις 
and μίξις and the Stoic, specifically Chrysippean, classification of mixtures, but 
she does not broaden the research focus to the Peripatetic and the Hippocratic 
terminologies and corresponding models of mixtures. For before dealing with 
Galen’s usage, we found it useful, first of all, to determine as accurately as 
possible the meaning of κρᾶσις and μίξις and, second, to analyse all the 
terminological aspects of the theoretical models of mixture that Galen 
presupposes and by which he may have been influenced.  
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In 3.1, “A vexata quaestio. Κρᾶσις versus μίξις”, we reviewed the 
meanings that etymological and Ancient Greek lexicons attribute to κρᾶσις and 
μίξις. Furthermore, in order to pinpoint with precision the original meanings of 
the roots of κρᾶσις and μίξις, we examined the research of Elio Montanari, who 
investigated the two word families to which the words belong in Homeric Greek. 
By comparing the lexicological findings with Montanari’s etymological work, 
we identified μίξις with any general type of mixture, either mechanical or 
“chemical”, involving solids or liquids, which can be produced through contact 
among the constituents and connoted negatively as bad mixture. By contrast, 
κρᾶσις would identify a mixture prevalently of liquids that balance each other 
out and reach a common midpoint by tempering one another’s excesses; this 
mixture is connoted positively as good mixture. Since both the words as nomina 
actionis are endowed with the suffix -σις, they can indicate either an action in 
progress or a state resulting from the action.  
After a brief section – 3.2, “Terminologies for mixtures: the Hippocratic 
authors, Aristotle and Peripatetics, the Stoics” – in which we investigated the 
terminology of mixture used by the Hippocratic, Aristotelian and Peripatetic, 
and Stoic traditions (whose findings we will sum up later on), in 3.3 we dealt 
with Galen’s use of the term κρᾶσις, and in 3.4 with Galen’s use of the term μίξις 
(although the two terms occur in our primary sources in very different 
proportions: in a total of 176 occurrences of κρᾶσις and μίξις, κρᾶσις occurs 97% 
of the time and μίξις only 3%), whereas in 3.5 we specifically tackled some 
problems of translation of the terms. In 3.3 we showed, on the one hand, that 
Galen uses the term κρᾶσις to refer to the process of mixture, either of primary 
elements (which would be a work of nature and/or God) or (differently from 
Boudon-Millot’s account) of ingredients to produce medicaments (which would 
be a work performed by the humans, especially by the doctor). In this process of 
mixture, the constituents find a relative common midpoint by tempering each 
other’s excesses; the result is a mixture that is complete, homogeneous and 
thorough: this mixture may be irreversible and, in this case, as we have seen, 
Galen uses the Stoic expression δι' ὅλων κρᾶσις. When, by contrast, κρᾶσις 
indicates the state resulting from the mixture, then, as we have pointed out, the 
term presents a connection with the notion of φύσις and with that of οὐσία 
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(which Boudon-Millot does not bring to light), which can be construed in a 
twofold manner. On the one hand, κρᾶσις indicates the form and essence of 
something (that is, the οὐσία in the primary sense) and, therefore, refers to the 
nature qua essence (i.e. that which makes something what it is and not something 
else). On the other hand, by using the term κρᾶσις Galen means the “condition 
or state resulting from the process of mixture” of any natural substance or οὐσία 
(thus, its “natural state”) made up of hot, cold, dry, and wet, which temper each 
other’s excesses and find a relative equilibrium point. We have seen that this 
differs slightly from the meaning the term has in the archaic phase of the Greek 
language: the Hippocratic term κρῆσις indicates already a good, healthy, and 
well-balanced mixture. We have also seen that under the general meaning of 
κρᾶσις as “natural state” we find several terminological articulations, as κρᾶσις 
indicates: a) the “natural state” of the entire body, i.e. the κρᾶσις τοῦ σώματος 
(as opposed to the natural state of one of its parts), and therefore its physical 
constitution; b) the “natural state” in potentiality (as opposed to a natural state in 
actuality), i.e. the κρᾶσις δυνάμει, of whichever substance which can be used for 
dietetic or pharmacological purposes; c) the “natural state” of the seasons or of 
the ambient air: in this case the term κρᾶσις would indicate the temperature or 
the atmospheric conditions of the weather.  
In 3.4, “Galen’s usage of μίξις”, we saw that the term μίξις seems to 
indicate a generic mixture broadly understood. For, on the one hand, we 
highlighted that Galen uses the term μίξις to mean a generic process of mixture 
understood either as a mechanical mixture of solids (such as in the paradigmatic 
case of a heap of grains) or as a “chemical” mixture of liquids –in this case, as 
we have seen, it can also represent the starting point of a process of 
fragmentation and progressive division of particles that culminates in a complete 
and thorough unification or κρᾶσις (this statement is supported by the fact that 
while describing this process Galen alternates the two terms or terms belonging 
to the two word-families). On the other hand, we have pointed out that, when 
μίξις indicates the result (as opposed to the action of mixing), it means a state of 
mixture where either the constituents are actually distinguishable (as in a 
juxtaposition of items) or, when they have already undergone a unification or 
κρᾶσις, are simply thought of as well-recognizable. As we have underlined, in 
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Galen’s terminology κρᾶσις and μίξις indicate two very different kinds of 
mixture depending not on the constituents, qualities vs substances (as Boudon-
Millot would maintain), but on the stage of the process and on the degree of 
recognisability of the constituents. In the first place, Galen’s μίξις can indicate a 
mechanical mixture of items, whereas κρᾶσις is never used to indicate this. 
Second, Galen uses μίξις and κρᾶσις to indicate two very different phases of the 
process of mixture, the progressive division and the final unification bringing 
about a new outcome: in this case, the two terms are used alternatively and one 
type of mixture, μίξις, gives way to the other, i.e. κρᾶσις. Finally, κρᾶσις and 
μίξις can refer to the very same mixture but from two different points of view: 
whereas the usage of the term μίξις underscores the heterogeneity of the mix 
constituting every physical body, the usage of κρᾶσις points more to the unity 
produced by the tempering of constituents; a tempering which constitutes the 
very essence and nature of whichever physical body, a meaning which, as we 
noted, is never expressed by the term μίξις.  
The difference between Galen’s usage of κρᾶσις and μίξις and the 
preponderance of the former over the latter led us to the following two 
reflections.  
On the one hand, we can observe that theory and terminology go hand in 
hand and are ultimately nothing other than two faces of the same coin insofar as 
the two terms (when used alternatively and with reference to the very same 
process of mixture) correspond to two different phases of Galen’s general model 
of mixture which, as we saw, is patently of Peripatetic derivation (and it is not 
drawn from the Stoic corporealist physics): μίξις (apart from indicating 
whichever type of mixture, even the mechanical) can in fact refer to the very first 
stage of the progressive division of components into micro-particles, whereas 
the term κρᾶσις more specifically designates the final phase of unification of 
constituents within the mixture bringing about a new superior unity. It is 
important to point out that in this two-phase (μίξις-κρᾶσις) process it is always 
the qualities that carry out the mechanism of mixture.  
On the other hand, we have shown that Galen’s terminology of mixture 
betrays the influences of three major theoretical models, the Hippocratic, the 
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Peripatetic, and the Stoic. For, apart from the fact that κρᾶσις and μίξις have 
different meanings, Galen’s prevalent choice of κρᾶσις over μίξις, as we saw, 
may have depended on different factors: i) the influence exerted by Hippocratic 
medicine, and especially by the Hippocratic treatise De natura hominis, where 
the Ionic variant of κρᾶσις was employed to mean the good and healthy mixture 
of bodily humours and was particularly appropriate for application to 
physiological uses; ii) the impact that Stoic terminology had on Galen’s 
terminology, given his abundant use of the Stoic expression δι' ὅλων κρᾶσις (and 
derivatives); iii) finally, the fact that in Galen’s time κρᾶσις was the common 
term, which even the Peripatetics adopted to indicate a mixture leading to the 
generation of the homoeomerous parts. Furthermore, Galen’s use of the term 
μίξις as a general heading indicating both a mechanical and a chemical mixture 
(or its initial stages) seems to distance itself from the Aristotelian usage (as we 
saw, Aristotle adopts exclusively the term σύνθεσις to indicate a juxtaposition 
of items) and to approximate, although with the due differences, the Peripatetic 
usage testified in Alexander’s De mixtione.573 As we have underlined, these three 
terminologies of mixture, the Hippocratic, the Stoic, and the Peripatetic, 
plausibly contributed to and played a part in shaping the texture of Galen’s 
scientific terminology of mixtures.  
The last paragraph of the third main chapter (3.5, “Problems of 
translation”) was devoted to issues concerning the translation of both κρᾶσις and 
μίξις. As we saw, a problem occurs when both the terms refer to a mixture, 
although of a different type (therefore not in cases in which κρᾶσις indicates the 
essence and the nature of something). Thus, in order to enhance their difference, 
we proposed to render κρᾶσις as “mixture” (although the root of this word 
belongs to that of μίξις; the more exact “temperament” – if we consider the Latin 
etymology – must be discarded because as we saw it has unhappy psychological 
connotations) and the second term, μίξις, as “mix”. This could be convenient 
because the first term, mixture, can convey the sense of the homogeneity of a 
mixture where by tempering one another the constituents reach a (relative) 
equilibrium point; whereas the second term, mix, indicates a mixture (which can 
                                                          
573 Cf. supra pp. 254 ff.  
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be also a mechanical mixture) in which the constituents are heterogeneous and 
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